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ABSTRACT
Despite being a relatively young field, cryptography taught us how to perform
seemingly-impossible tasks, which now became part of our everyday life. One of
them is secure multiparty computation (MPC), which allows mutually distrustful
parties to jointly perform a computation on their private inputs, so that each party
only learns its prescribed output, but nothing else. In this work we deal with two
longstanding challenges of MPC: adaptive security and deniability (or, incoercibility).
A protocol is said to be adaptively secure, if it still guarantees security for the remaining
honest parties, even if some parties turn dishonest during the execution of the protocol,
or even after the execution. (In contrast, statically secure protocols give security
guarantees only when the set of dishonest parties is fixed before the execution starts.)
While adaptive security threat model is often more realistic than the static one, there is
a huge gap between efficiency of statically and adaptively secure protocols: adaptively
secure protocols often require more complicated constructions, stronger assumptions,
and more rounds of interaction. We improve in efficiency over the state of the art in
adaptive security for a number of settings, including the first adaptively secure MPC
protocol in constant number of rounds, under assumptions comparable to those of
vi
static protocols (previously known protocols required as many rounds of interaction
as the depth of the circuit being computed).
The second challenge we deal with is providing resilience in the situation where an
external coercer demands that participants disclose their private inputs and all their
secret keys - e.g. via threats, bribe, or court order. Deniable (or, incoercible) protocols
allow coerced participants to convincingly lie about their inputs and secret keys,
thereby still maintaining their privacy. While the concept was proposed more than
twenty years ago, to date secure protocols withstanding coercion of all participants were
not known, even for the simple case of encryption. We present the first construction of
such an encryption scheme, and then show how to combine it with adaptively secure
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Secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols allow a set of mutually distrustful
parties to engage in a joint computation for evaluating an agreed-upon function of
their local inputs, while preserving the privacy of their inputs up to what is revealed
by the function. First envisioned by Yao (Yao82), and realized in a sequence of
breakthrough protocols starting with (Yao86, GMW87, BGW88, CCD88, GL90), the
concept evolved into a vibrant discipline that is one of the standard bearers of cryp-
tography. Indeed, today we have a mature theory of secure distributed computation,
with highly optimized and innovative protocols in a variety of models and settings.
We also have a number of real-world systems, both academic and commercial, that
use this rich theory to better society.
Still, even today, we are unable to provide satisfactory answers to some very basic
challenges in secure computation. One of these challenges is providing adequate
security and efficiency guarantees in the setting where the adversary may get to see
the secret keys of the participants after the protocol finishes. This threat is being
taken into account by the following two related, but very different security models:
• Adaptive security models the scenario where the adversary learns the internal
state (i.e. its inputs and outputs, secret keys and randomness) of victims;
moreover, it can choose its victims in the middle or even after the protocol
execution, relying on information it learned so far. In practice, this can be due
2
to any form of leakage, or due to machines being corrupted by a virus. While
security of victims can no longer be guaranteed - all their inputs and randomness
are now known to the adversary - adaptively secure protocols still guarantee
protection for other participants1.
• Deniability (or, incoercibility) models the scenario where the adversary may
coerce parties into revealing their internal state - say, via bribes or threats. Unlike
the previous scenario, here the victim may elect to lie about its internal state,
in an attempt to still protect its true inputs and outputs from being revealed.
Incoercible protocols provide participants with means to convincingly lie about
its inputs, outputs, and random coins used in the protocol, thus guaranteeing
protection even for victims of coercion2.
Prior to this work, a number of very fundamental questions about adaptive security
remained unanswered: for instance, are adaptively secure primitives inherently less
efficient than static ones? Do they require more rounds of interaction, stronger
assumptions, more communication? For incoercibility, we had only partial results even
for basic feasibility questions: for instance, prior to this work we still didn’t know if
bideniable encryption was possible at all, let alone incoercible MPC.
This work aims to answer those questions.
1While it might sound strange that compromising security of some parties may greatly affect other
parties, this is often the case with many existing protocols. Even when it’s not the case, proving this
fact may present a significant challenge.
2We note that this notion of incoercibility is different from incoercibility (sometimes spelled as
uncoercibility) which is usually considered in the voting literature. There the coercer may approach a
party before the execution starts and force it to deviate from the protocol, as long as it is undetectable
by outside observers. The goal of the coercer is to issue instructions to the victim such that, on one
hand, the victim is able to produce a binding receipt of its vote, but on the other hand, coercion is
not detectable from the outside (see, e.g., (BT94)).
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1.1 Our Results in a Nutshell
Here we briefly and very informally list our results. For precise theorem statements,
we refer the reader to the body of this work.
Theorem 1 (section 2.1). Assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way
functions, there exists adaptively secure two-round two-party computation protocol.
Theorem 2 (section 2.2). Assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way
functions, there exists adaptively secure two-round MPC protocol, which is also leakage-
tolerant.
Theorem 3 (section 2.3). Under the assumptions comparable to those of static security,
there exists an adaptively secure constant-round MPC protocol.
Theorem 4 (section 2.4). Assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way
functions, there exists an adaptively secure encryption scheme with rate arbitrarily
close to 1.
Theorem 5 (chapter 3). Assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way
functions, there exists bideniable encryption.
Theorem 6 (chapter 4). There exists a transformation from deniable encryption and
adaptively secure MPC with certain properties to incoercible MPC.
In the next section of this introduction we give a broader picture of adaptive security
and deniability by giving an overview of main challenges and different techniques to
deal with them, both established and new. We refer the reader to the sections in
the main body of this work for an in-depth discussion of motivation, prior work and
technical details of each result.
1.2 Adaptive Security and Deniability: an Overview
In this section we provide a more detailed context for our results: we discuss and
compare the definitions (still at a very high-level); we give some flavor of what is
the core difficulty in satisfying these definitions; we discuss prior results and their
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techniques and explain how our work fits within a landscape.
Statically and adaptively secure MPC. Security of cryptographic protocols
guarantees that no participant learns more information than it is supposed to learn.
This is captured by proving that whatever the adversary learns from the execution of
a protocol (i.e. from seeing the messages sent by parties, and from seeing randomness
and input of dishonest parties), it could have also learned just from seeing dishonest
parties’ inputs, without running the protocol at all. Since in the latter case the
adversary doesn’t receive any information about other parties’ inputs, this implies
that running the protocol cannot disclose such information to the adversary either.
This informal requirement is formalized by considering a mental experiment called
simulation. In order to prove security of a protocol, we have to come up with a
special algorithm called simulator which, given only the inputs of dishonest parties,
but nothing else, has to “reconstruct” the whole execution of the protocol. The
existence of such a simulator means that the adversary could have “reconstructed” the
execution itself, without interacting with honest parties at all, and therefore seeing
the real execution of the protocol doesn’t give it any more information. A little more
formally, an execution reconstructed by a simulator - usually simply called a simulated
execution - is required to be computationally indistinguishable from the real execution;
computational indistinguishability means that no polynomial-size circuit should be
able to tell which execution it sees - the real one or the simulated one - with any
significant gap in certainty.
Thus, proofs of security of MPC protocols usually describe the simulator and prove
indistinguishability between the real and simulated execution. This is enough to
show that the protocol is secure: indeed, assume there is a polynomial-size adversary
which can look at the protocol execution and learn, say, the first bit x1 of input x
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of one of the honest parties. By indistinguishability between a real and a simulated
execution, the same adversary should be able to learn the same information x1 from a
simulated execution. However, the latter is impossible since the simulated execution
was generated without any knowledge of x, which gives us a contradiction.
The precise syntax of a simulator depends on what is called a corruption model. In the
static corruption model, which is considered most often, the set of dishonest parties is
fixed in advance: parties may not turn dishonest during the execution. Thus, the job
of a simulator in the static corruption model is the following: given inputs and outputs
of dishonest parties, but not those of honest parties, simulate the communication
between all parties in the protocol.
In contrast, adaptive corruption model captures the fact that participants may become
dishonest after the execution started. This means that adaptive simulation has to
be interactive: for instance, it could be that initially no one is dishonest, and the
simulator has to simulate some initial part of the execution without knowing any of
the inputs. Over time, however, parties may become dishonest; in the real life the
adversary would learn their whole internal state: inputs, randomness, keys. This
means that the simulator now receives the input and has to simulate randomness and
keys. The difficulty here is that those keys have to match what was generated before,
even though the right input was not known back then.
The difference between static and adaptive model is best illustrated with the example
of encryption. Assume the protocol instructs party 1 to send its encrypted input
c = Enc(pk, x; r) to party 2. In the static case, as long as both parties are honest,
dishonest parties never get to know what the plaintext was; therefore the simulator
can set simulated c′ to be, e.g., an encryption of 0, or even a random string, if an
encryption scheme has pseudorandom ciphertexts. However, in adaptive case it may
happen that, say, party 1 eventually becomes dishonest. This means that the simulator
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now has to come up with some fake randomness r′ such that c′ = Enc(pk, x; r′), even
though c′ initially was encrypting 0, or wasn’t even a valid ciphertext.
This example very well captures the core difficulty of obtaining adaptive security:
while in the static case it is enough to use primitives which are hiding, in the adaptive
case they should be in addition equivocable: that is, they should allow the simulator
to generate, e.g., a ciphertext without knowing the plaintext, and later allow the
simulator to open it to any possible plaintext (by creating fake randomness which looks
consistent with this plaintext). An encryption scheme which satisfies this property
is called adaptively secure, or non-committing encryption (CFGN96). Finally, let us
mention that this issue of equivocating is not limited to encryption only: if one wants
to build adaptively secure MPC, it has to make sure that even the “computation”
itself is be equivocable.
Comparison between adaptively secure and deniable encryption. The
equivocation requirement from above sounds very similar to the requirement of deniable
encryption: indeed, deniable encryption allows a party to send, say, an encryption
of 0 and later claim that it was 1, by showing fake random coins of encryption. The
two requirements are indeed very close and sometimes require similar techniques to
achieve them.
However, there are important differences which stem from the fact that in deniable
encryption faking happens in the real life, whereas in adaptive security faking is
merely part of a mental experiment, and may be not guaranteed in the real life. More
concretely:
1. In adaptively secure encryption, only simulated ciphertexts (which are not valid
ciphertexts) can be opened to any plaintext, but real ciphertexts cannot be (or,
at least, not necessarily). In contrast, in deniable encryption real ciphertexts
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can be opened to any plaintext.
2. In adaptively secure encryption, the simulator may generate the simulated
ciphertext together with some trapdoors to assist it in later equivocation; these
trapdoors are part of a mental experiment and therefore they do not exist in
the real world and are not seen by the adversary. In deniable encryption, all
trapdoors and keys which are required for faking are seen by the adversary,
since the adversary knows that parties are using deniable encryption scheme
and expects to see all their coins, including any possible trapdoors.
3. In adaptively secure encryption, equivocating both parties is done by a single
entity, a simulator. In contrast, in deniable encryption, parties have to fake on
their own, and still be consistent with each other.
From this discussion it may seem that deniability is a stronger property than adaptive
security, and indeed, this is the case. On one hand, any bideniable encryption
is immediately adaptively secure, as already noted by (CDNO97). On the other
hand, bideniable encryption provably doesn’t exist in 2 rounds (BNNO11), whereas
2-round adaptively secure encryption is known (e.g. (CDMW09)), which implies
that deniability is a strictly stronger property. Furthermore, currently there exists
a significant gap between assumptions required for adaptive security and deniability.
Indeed, adaptively secure encryption can be built from very mild assumptions, such
as factoring (CDMW09). In contrast, existing constructions of deniable encryption
require obfuscation (CPP18), even for one-sided deniability (SW14). Moreover, the
work of (Dac12) shows that a certain primitive cannot be used to construct deniable
encryption (even for sender-deniability only), but the same primitive suffices to
construct adaptively secure encryption. This may serve as a further evidence that
deniability is significantly stronger than adaptive security.
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Adaptively secure encryption. Recall that at heart of adaptive security lies the
ability to equivocate. Most known public-key encryption schemes are not equivocable:
for instance, a ciphertext of El Gamal encryption uniquely defines its randomness.
Over time several techniques to allow equivocation were developed.
Previous line of work on adaptively secure encryption (Bea97), (CFGN96), (DN00),
(CDMW09), (HOR15), (HORR16) employs a common technique to allow equivocation:
to encrypt a bit b, the sender generates several ciphertexts encrypting both 0 and 1
(with some rule of how b is defined by these ciphertexts: e.g. b could be a majority of
the plaintexts). Moreover, some of these ciphertexts the sender generates obliviously,
i.e. without the knowledge of underlying plaintexts3. The simulator then can generate
all ciphertexts with the knowledge of underlying plaintext; later, when it is time to
equivocate, it can claim that some ciphertexts were generated obliviously. By claiming
different sets of ciphertexts to be obliviously generated, the simulator can make it
look like an encryption of 0 or 1.
This technique however has the following shortcoming: to transmit a single bit of
plaintext in adaptively secure way, the sender has to send several ciphertexts of
underlying encryption scheme. This means that the rate of the resulting adaptively
secure encryption is far from optimal, since it inherently requires sending many bits of
ciphertext per bit of plaintext. This issue was partially dealt with in the later works of
(HOR15), (HORR16), which, by reusing parts of the ciphertexts, make the overhead
to be only polylogarithmic in security parameter. Still, this doesn’t match the rate of
statically secure encryption schemes, which can be made very close to 1. Whether it
is possible to build non-committing encryption with rate similar to the rate of static
ones, or whether adaptively secure communication is inherently less efficient, remained
3For instance if the scheme has pseudorandom ciphertexts, one can generate ciphertexts obliviously
simply by choosing a random string and calling it a ciphertext.
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an open problem.
The state of affairs changed with the work of (SW14), who built the first sender-
deniable encryption from obfuscation. In fact, they came up with a mechanism to
make any algorithm deniable. In their approach, the true randomness used to compute
the output - e.g. the ciphertext - is sampled deep inside the program, such that
even a person who executes the program doesn’t learn it, and therefore it does not
become available to the adversary upon corruption. Further, their technique allows to
construct an additional program “Explain” which allows to open this ciphertext in
any way, by generating fake random coins for any desired plaintext.
While their result doesn’t directly imply adaptively secure encryption4, their tech-
nique was incredibly promising for adaptive security. Indeed, this technique brings
obliviousness, which was at heart of all adaptively secure constructions so far, to a new
level, by allowing to compute, obliviously, not just ciphertexts of certain encryption
schemes, but rather the output of any computation.
This new technique allows us to overcome the overhead which seems to be inhenerent
with the previous approach: indeed, in section 2.4 we build the first adaptively secure
encryption where rate can be made arbitrarily close to 1. Our approach is to first build
an adaptively secure encryption with erasures - i.e. where the sender can erase its whole
encryption randomness upon corruption, and the receiver can erase its generation
randomness (but not the secret key). Equipped with this primitive, we can let parties
use (SW14) mechanism to generate it obliviously (and equivocably). Intuitively, since
randomness of encryption and key generation is sampled inside the program and not
known by anyone, it is essentially as good as being erased; thus security should hold
even without erasures (however, to prove security, we need the underlying encryption
4Indeed, they only achieve sender-deniability, but in adaptively secure encryption equivocation
should be possible for both the sender and the receiver.
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to possess some technical properties). Adaptively secure encryption with erasures
can in turn be constructed from obfuscation: we take a PRF-based encryption as
an underlying encryption, and let the secret key be an obfuscated program which
decrypts and outputs the result. Since parties are allowed to erase everything except
for the secret key, the receiver can throw away randomness of obfuscation and only
keep the obfuscated program as its key; obfuscation ensures that the underlying PRF
keys are hidden. This encryption also has very short ciphertexts, since ciphertexts of
PRF-based encryption we use can be made as small as λ+ |m|, where λ is a security
parameter. The problem is that this scheme has a long public key, which makes the
rate suboptimal5. We deal with this by adding a key incapsulation, by letting the
receiver send only a short seed, instead if a long public key, and then letting the sender
locally sample a long public key from the short seed.
Adaptively secure protocols. Adaptively secure MPC inherits all the difficulties
of building adaptively secure encryption, and adds new difficulties of equivocating
computation. This is because any MPC protocol essentially makes parties perform the
computation in some “encrypted” way - be it garbling, secret sharing, or anything else
- and the adversary who progressively corrupts parties may learn how this encrypted
computation proceeds before learning actual inputs of the parties. This means that
the simulator has to present some simulated encrypted computation first, and later
“open” it to match given inputs of the parties.
While it was known how to equivocate encryption since (CFGN96), the state of
equivocating computation was somewhat strange: on one hand, for many statically
secure protocols, e.g. the one by Yao (Yao86), it was not clear at all how to equivocate
the computation. On the other hand, some information-theoretic protocols, such as
5Recall that in adaptively secure encryption the public key cannot be reused and has to be resent
for each ciphertext. Therefore, to achieve optimal rate, it is important that the whole communication
(both the public key and the ciphertext) is short.
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(GMW87), were already adaptively secure for free, assuming some form of adaptively
secure communication channels (concretely, as noted in (CLOS02), (GMW87) require
adaptively secure OT). In other words, while adaptively secure protocols were known,
the techniques used to build them were somewhat limited. As a result, the best round
complexity of adaptively secure protocols withstanding corruption of all parties6 was
proportional to the depth of the circuit being computed (CLOS02). This stands in
sharp contrast with the static case, where 2-round protocols were known since (Yao86).
In section 2.1, we build the first 2-round adaptively secure protocol for two parties.
Our core observation is that the mechanism of (SW14) allows to sample obliviously not
only ciphertexts, but, for instance, the garbled circuit. In other words, by combining
their technique with the Yao protocol, we get a protocol where the garbler itself
doesn’t know inactive set of labels. It is noteworthy that the reason why the original
Yao protocol is not adaptively secure is exactly because it is hard for the simulator to
come up with inactive labels, consistent with a simulated garbled circuit and inputs
provided later.
In section 2.2 we build the first 2-round adaptively secure MPC protocol which is
leakage tolerant. Besides being a useful property on its own, leakage tolerance turns
out to be closely related to what is called corruption-oblivious simulation. Roughly,
this property states that the simulator has to simulate randomness of each party
independently, i.e. it cannot use its knowledge of several inputs of corrupted parties
in order to craft fake randomness consistent across these parties. Recall that a similar
property was one of the distinguishing properties between adaptive security (where
the simulator has to fake on behalf of all parties) and deniability (where parties fake
6This case is important when protocols are used as subrountines in larger protocols; a number of
participants turning dishonest in the larger protocol could mean that in some sub-protocols everyone
is already dishonest. Despite the fact that in the sub-protocol there is no honest party left to be
protected, proving security in this case would guarantee that remaining honest parties in the larger
protocol are still protected.
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on their own, without consulting with each other). Thus, this protocol can be viewed
as a first step toward building a deniable MPC protocol, and indeed, in our later work
described in chapter 4 we crucially rely on the existence of 2-round adaptively secure
protocol with corruption-oblivious simulation. To the best of our knowledge, as of
August 2019 our protocol from section 2.2 is still the only known protocol with such
property. Another important property of this protocol is that it is conceptually very
simple: in the first round parties exchange commitments to their inputs, in the second
round they exchange encryptions of their input (together with some information about
commitments), and then each party locally runs an obfuscated program which decrypts
all ciphertexts, computes the function and outputs the result, as long as some natural
consistency checks pass.
Note that so far all constant-round adaptively secure protocols were based on obfus-
cation. Our next work described in section 2.3 gets rid of this strong assumption by
providing a completely different way of equivocating computation. Concretely, we
show that Yao protocol can be made adaptively secure by replacing each garbled gate
with another specially crafted garbled circuit. This allows the simulator to generate
the set of inactive labels by garbling the just-learned input. Then the garbled circuit
of each gate can use the knowledge of the input to figure out which bit the active label
corresponds to, and therefore, how the garbled gate should look like. This technique
was inspired by the work of (HPV15), who used hardwire tokens to implement each
garbled gate. We show that this technique can be implemented using one-way func-
tions only. Along the way, we introduce and construct a new primitive, which we call
functionally equivocal encryption, which is essentially a fine-tuned adaptively secure
encryption: in standard adaptively secure encryption, the ciphertext can be opened
to any plaintext m, but for a price of the secret key length being at least |m|. In
functionally equivocal encryption, the ciphertext can be opened only to some subset
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of all message space, but the secret key can be smaller than |m|. This saving is crucial
in our construction, since we chain the garbled circuits and need to fine-tune sizes to
avoid their blowup.
Deniable encryption. Recall that the challenge of building deniable encryption
is related to the challenge of building adaptively secure encryption (since ciphertexts
need to be equivocable), but things get complicated by the fact that parties cannot
coordinate their faking, and that they cannot keep any secret trapdoors to help them
equivocate. Each of these two issues adds its own challenge. For a long time we didn’t
have any techniques to achieve even the sender deniability: indeed, the notion of
deniable encryption was introduced in 1996 (CDNO97), while the first (and, to date,
the only) sender-deniable encryption appeared in 2014 (SW14).
Still, the question of building deniable encryption which withstands coercion of
all parties remained open. While (SW14) essentially proposed a way to make any
algorithm deniable, it didn’t suffice to build a bideniable encryption. At a first glance,
it may seem that one could trivially get bideniable encryption simply by taking any
encryption scheme and making all algorithms - KeyGen, Enc, and Dec - deniable.
However this is not the case: while such a scheme would provide “local consistency”7,
it still won’t be bideniable. The reason is that the resulting encryption will have only
2 rounds of communication, but bideniable encryption in 2 rounds is known to be
impossible (BNNO11). In fact, their impossibility result is based on a very concrete
attack on any 2-round scheme, including our attempt from above, which essentially
tells us that the adversary can do much more than merely check local consistency!
Indeed, their attack involves generating many ciphertexts and then using a given sk
(which is potentially already fake) to fake all of given ciphertexts. In other words,
7I.e. encrypting the claimed plaintext with the claimed randomness indeed results in the ciphertext
which was sent; similarly, decrypting the ciphertext with the claimed key results in the claimed
plaintext.
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the problem at a high level is that the adversary, given a single ciphertext, keys, and
randomness of both parties, can generate many “related values” (in case of 2 round
encryption, those are ciphertexts under the same public key, and secret keys which
are fake for different subsets of these ciphertexts). It then can check the behavior of
the system on this whole set of related values, and not just a single ciphertext and
a secret key it started with. Thus, to remain deniable, the scheme should posess a
certain “internal logic” - i.e. a rule about how different related keys should decrypt
different related ciphertexts - and the result of (BNNO11) says that such logic cannot
be implemented in 2 rounds.
In other words, building a bideniable encryption scheme in 3 rounds requires two
different components. First, we need a way to achieve local consistency, which was
already done in the previous works. Second, we need to set up the scheme such
that even playing with related values won’t compromise its security. In chapter 3
we identify which exactly related values the adversary can generate and design a
mechanism to protect against the attack mentioned above. As part of this protection
mechanism, we need to build an encryption scheme with special properties: it should
be a deterministic encryption which allows to homomorphically increment plaintexts
inside the ciphertexts, and in addition allows to homomorphically compare them (with
the result given in the clear). Security property, roughly, says that an encryption of 0
should be indistinguishable from an encryption of 1, even though the adversary can
increment and compare ciphertexts as many times as it likes8.
Our construction of bideniable encryption is ideologically very simple: in the first
two rounds parties exchange “hashes” (implemented using a special PRF) of what
they know so far: that is, of randomness and the plaintext for the sender, and of
8For technical reasons, the actual definition is somewhat more involved; however, the main idea
remains the same.
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randomness and the sender’s hash for the receiver. In the third round the sender
encrypts its plaintext together with the two hashes and sends the resulting ciphertext.
Note that the parties never do anything themselves: they encrypt, decrypt, and fake
using preobfuscated programs. These programs are equipped with the mechanism of
(SW14) to ensure local consistency, and their main code is set up to output messages
of our encryption scheme and, in addition, implement the internal logic to protect
against related values attacks.
Despite the construction being simple, the proof is quite involved since we essentially
need to argue that adversary can only generate a certain class of related values and
no more than that, and that our protection mechanism indeed preserves security even
given these related values.
Incoercible MPC. Prior work on incoercible MPC, as defined in
(CG96), is somewhat sparse, which is not that surprising, given the slow progress even
in the case of encryption. Roughly, there are two approaches of building incoercible
MPC:
• The initial approach of (CG96) was to use standard MPC to secret-share
decryption keys of a sender-deniable encryption, then let each party encrypt
its input, and then use another standard MPC to compute the functionality
which restores keys from the shares, decrypts all ciphertexts, and computes the
function. Note that this approach doesn’t work when all parties may be coerced:
in this case parties would have to lie about the secret key, and therefore the
underlying MPC would have to be deniable as well9.
• The subsequent works on adaptively secure 2PC and MPC (CGP15), (DKR14)
achieve deniability using the mechanism of (SW14), but only for a single party.
9In fact, their protocol only withstands coercion of up to half of participants.
16
In particular, fully deniable protocols were not know at all - no matter the assumptions,
number of rounds, and so on. We present the first fully deniable protocol in section 4.
More concretely, our results are as follows:
First, we show that our deniable encryption from section 3 satisfies special proper-
ties, which allows to build deniable Oblivious Transfer (OT) out of it. Recall that
static/adaptive OT is sufficient to build static/adaptive MPC: indeed, given ideal OT,
it is possible to construct MPC protocols with information-theoretic security. One
could hope that similarly, deniable OT can be used to build deniable MPC. However,
we currently don’t know how to do this. The core problem lies in required coordination
between parties. Recall that in the definition of deniable encryption, parties cannot
coordinate their faking, and in particular cannot agree on the fake plaintext. Rather,
we presume that the fake plaintext (or possibly two different plaintexts) are known to
them from “real life”. In other words, choosing or agreeing on fake plaintexts is not a
cryptographic problem; rather, the goal of deniable encryption is to do its best for any
given fake plaintexts - that is, provide full deniability when parties claim the same
fake plaintext, or at least hide who is lying when parties claim two different plaintexts.
Everything changes when we use deniable encryption (or OT) in a larger protocol.
Now the problem of agreeing on the same plaintext becomes the responsibility of the
outer protocol: indeed, the outer protocol should specify what the faking algorithm
does, and in particular should specify how the sender and the receiver generate their
consistent fake plaintexts, given fake inputs to the outer protocol. It is not clear how
to overcome this coordination issue, and therefore it is not clear how to build generic
deniable MPC out of deniable OT. Yet, deniable OT immediately gives deniable 2PC
for the case when one of the parties’ inputs is short.
Our second result is a transformation from an adaptively secure MPC to deniable MPC,
using deniable encryption. For our technique to work, we need the adaptive protocol
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to possess special properties, such as corruption-oblivious simulation mentioned above
in the discussion of adaptive MPC, and a global CRS (or none). To the best of our
knowledge, the only 2-round protocol with these properties is our protocol described
in section 2.2. The number of rounds of the underlying protocol is important since it
immediately affects the number of rounds of the final, deniable protocol: concretely,
our resulting protocol has 4 rounds. An impossibility of a 2-round deniable encryption
immediately translates to the same impossibility for deniable protocols, and therefore
a natural question - whether 3-rounds deniable MPC is possible - remains open.
Our protocol can be roughly split into two parts: first, we let parties run the underlying
adaptive MPC, where each message is additionally encrypted with deniable encryption.
Second, in parallel with this, we let parties execute a “coordination” protocol, which
lets them agree on some randomness, deniably; this jointly-known randomness later
helps them to fake in a consistent way. The downside of our protocol is that deniability
is only guaranteed when all parties “play together”: that is, either all parties tell the
truth, or all parties lie. If some parties decide to tell the truth, and others decide to lie,
our protocol doesn’t give any guarantees. Whether this is problematic or not, depends
on the function being computed: generally, for functions which are very dependent on
their inputs, such as evaluation of a PRF, this is not an issue, since simply giving out
inconsistent inputs and outputs would already alert the adversary, and no protocol
can fix that. On the other hand, for functions which are not as sensitive to changes in
inputs, such as voting, it would be desirable to maintain security even in case when
some parties reveal their true vote and some lie. It is an interesting open problem to





2.1 Two-Round Adaptive 2PC from Indistinguishability Ob-
fuscation
2.1.1 Our Results.
We present a two-message, two party secure function evaluation protocol that is secure
against adaptive honest-but-curious corruption of all parties — thereby resolving a long
standing open problem in the theory of secure computation. Furthermore, the protocol
has non-erasing oblivious simulation, implying leakage tolerance. Security is based on
subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation for all circuits and one way
functions, as well as augmened non-committing encryption as in (DN00, CLOS02).
The protocol requires a global, non-programmable reference string. Specifically, the
string contains an obfuscated program to be run by parties. We call this mild version
of the reference string model the factory model, since it is reminiscent of a setting
where the obfuscated program is generated by a “trusted factory”.
The protocol is also incoercible (CG96) for one of the parties. That is, it provides one
of the parties with a mechanism to present “convincing evidence” that explains its
outgoing messages as resulting from any arbitrary input value (that may be different
than the input value actually used). This holds even when the “coercer” expects to
see the full internal state of the party. That is, we show:
Theorem 7. Assume existence of sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfus-
cators for all circuits and one way functions, as well as augmented non-committing
encryption. Then there exists a two-message, two party protocol, in the factory model,
for evaluating any function with UC security in the presence of adaptive, honest-but-
curious corruption of both parties. Furthermore:
(a) The protocol is leakage tolerant as in (BCH12).
(b) The protocol is incoercible with respect to one of the parties.
In fact we show that the protocol satisfies a stronger variant of the
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(CG96) definition, that avoids a weakness in the original definition and is also univer-
sally composable. Furthermore, new definition may be of interest independently of
the present protocol; in particular, it applies also to multi-party protocols and general
(Byzantine) corruptions.
Compiling this protocol via the (GMW87, CLOS02) compiler, we obtain a constant-
round, adaptively secure UC protocol for Byzantine adversaries in the standard CRS
model. While the protocol remains leakage resilient, it is no longer incoercible.
2.1.2 High-Level Overview of the Protocol
Before presenting the protocol, let us recall the definition of adaptive security. Security
requires existence of a simulator that has access only to the trusted party for the
function, and still emulates for the adversary (or, rather, the environment) an execution
with the actual protocol. Since we are in the honest but curious model, we can assume
without loss of generality that the adversary first waits to see the entire communication
of the protocol to the end, and then corrupts all parties. The simulator should first
create a simulated public transcript of the computation; then, when a party is corrupted
and the simulator learns the input and the output of that party, the simulator should
present the adversary with the appropriate random choices of the party that are
consistent with the party’s input and messages sent.
Our starting point is Yao’s garbled circuit two party protocol, together with a two-
message oblivious transfer. Recall that the first message in the protocol is the first
OT message from the evaluator to the garbler. The second message, from the garbler
to the evaluator, consists of the second OT message together with the garbled circuit.
The evaluator then outputs the result of the computation. (If both parties wish to
learn the output then they run another copy of the protocol in parallel, with reverse
roles; or the evaluator can send the result to the garbler, but this adds one more
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round.)
When the OT is adaptively secure (as in, say, (CLOS02)) and the garbler’s message is
encrypted using non-commiting encryption, the protocol becomes adaptively secure
with respect to the corruption of the evaluator. That is, the simulator can indeed
create the transcript of the communication ahead of time (this is just ciphertexts of
non-committing encryption) and when the evaluator is corrupted, provide the receiver
message for the adaptively secure OT protocol. Note however that here the simulator
has to commit to the garbled circuit, without knowing the garbler’s input.
Now, simulating the corruption of the garbler gets stuck: Here the environment expects
to see the internal randomness of the garbler, including the random choices used for
the generation of the garbled circuit. This we do not know how to do efficienty. In
fact, in some cases such valid opening simply does not exist.
Our approach to get around this apparently inherent difficulty is to provide the garbler
with an obfuscated version of his program. That is, let the common reference string
contain an obfuscated version of the garbler’s program. The garbler will then run the
obfuscated program on its input and random input and send the resulting message.
The hope is that this will hide the internal randomness of the garbling, even when the
environment sees the random input of the party.
However, this naive attempt does not work by itself, since the randomness for the
protocol may well be correlated with the internal randomness that’s not supposed to
be leaked. We address this issue by applying a pseudorandom function to the random
and real inputs, and using the result as randomness to the protocol. In addition, to
make the simulation go through with only indistinguishability obfuscation we follow
the lead of Sahai and Waters (SW14) and use puncturable PRFs and an “explain”
algorithm that allows the simulator to generate randomness that “explains” any given
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outgoing message.
As simple as the protocol is, the proof of security is rather delicate. One subtle point
that deserves highlighting is the treatment of adaptivity in the choice of inputs. We
first prove security in a model where the inputs are “selective”: the environment
determines the inputs to the computation before it sees the reference string (namely
the obfuscated programs). This is a rather weak security model. We then extend the
analysis to the setting where the environment chooses the inputs adaptively. Here
is where we use the sub-exponential security of the indistingushability obfuscator:
the analysis here requires as many hybrids as the number of potential inputs to the
computation. This number can be exponential. We note, however, that since the
parameters of the obfuscation can be chosen to be larger than the size of the inputs
to the computation, this requires only sub-exponential security of the iO in use.
Finally we remark that the trust requirements from the reference string are relatively
mild. First, it is non-programmable, in the sense that the simulator need not know
any secret information related to the string. This means that the same instance of
the reference string (namely, the same obfuscated program) can be used by multiple
protocols and instances thereof without compromising security (CDPW07). Second,
static security holds even if the secrets associated with the reference string, namely
the secrets of the obfuscation and the secret keys, are exposed.
Concurrent work. Concurrently to and independently from this work, two other
works develop fully adaptively secure protocols using indistinguishability obfuscation
(GP14, DKR14). We give account of these works. Like ours, both works describe
protocols for evaluating general functions, not only adaptively well formed ones as
in (CLOS02). Furthermore, all works obtain resilience against adaptive corruption
for all parties. Finally, all works use the CRS model, where the CRS contains
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indistinguishability-obfuscated programs.
Dachman-Soled, Katz and Rao (DKR14) describe a general mechanism to transfrom
programs into deniable ones, and use this mechanism to construct a four-round,
multiparty, adaptively secure protocol against honest-but-curious corruptions. They
then compile their protocol using the (CLOS02) compiler to handle Byzantine cor-
ruptions. Their analysis assumes only indistinguishability obfuscator and one way
functions that are secure against polysize adversaries. Garg and Polychroniadou
(GP14) directly describe a multi-party, two round, adaptively secure protocol against
Byzantine corruptions. Similarly to this work, their analysis assumes sub-exponentially
secure indistinguishability obfuscation and one way functions. Both protocols need a
programmable (i.e., non-global) CRS, and neither protocol is incoercible.
2.1.3 The Models of Computation
We consider the standard UC model of computation (as in (Can01)) with adaptive,
honest-but-curious party corruptions. The parties and the environment have access to
a global, public common reference string functionality. That is, the functionality first
draws the reference string from a predefined distribution; next, all parties, including
the adversary and the environment, obtain that string.
In our protocol the reference string is a description of programs run by parties; these
programs are obfuscated and contain secret keys which shouldn’t be known to the
parties. We refer to such a global reference string model as “the factory model”, since
it is intended to represent a situation where all parties obtain the program from a
trusted “factory”.
Leakage tolerance. We will show that our protocol is leakage-tolerant. The
leakage tolerance model we consider is the one in (BCH12), which is aimed as capturing
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protocols that are tolerant to arbitrary amount of leakage, and where the security loss
grows gradually with the amount of leakage. More specifically, in that model a protocol
π computes a function f in a leakage tolerant way if no adversarial environment can
tell whether it is interacting with the parties running π, while obtaining some `-bit
leakage function of the individual internal states of the participants, or alternatively
with a simulator and an ideal process for evaluating f , in which the simulator obtains
some arbitrary `-bit function of each of the inputs of the parties.
It is shown there that if a protocol is shown to be adaptively secure with a special type
of simulator, called corruption oblivious simulator (defined below), then the protocol
is leakage tolerant.
A simulator is corruption oblivious if the information it gathers upon corruption of
a party, namely the secret input (and potentially also the secret output) of that
party, is used only to generate a simulated view of the local state of that party. This
information is not used anywhere else in the simulation. Formally, the simulator
creates a special subroutine for simulating the internal state of that party. The newly
learned input of the corrupted party does not leave the confines of this subroutine. It
is shown in (BCH12) that if a protocol is adaptively secure with a corruption oblivious
simulator then it is also leakage tolerant.
Incoercibility. Incoercibility aims to protect the protocol participants from ex-
ternal authoritative (or otherwise coercive) entities that try to entice a party to
reveal its state voluntarily. The idea is to provide parties with a “faking” algorithm
that takes any desired fake value of the secret input, and exhibits “fake randomness”
that is consistent with both the newly decided fake value and all the past messages
sent by the party so far. Incoercible computation was defined in (CG96), where a
generic construction from any deniable encryption scheme (CDNO97, SW14) is given.
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However, the construction there has a large number of rounds and works only when
strictly less than half of the parties are either coerced or corrupted.
We revisit the definition of coercion-free computation, providing a new definition that
is significantly stronger than the one in (CG96). Specifically, the security guarantees
provided by the new definition are preserved under universal composition. The
definition also overcomes another weakness in the (CG96), as explained below. The
definition here fleshes out ideas from (Can01, P. 59).
Informally, the definition captures incoercibility by asking that the protocol in ques-
tion emulates an ideal functionality that employs the following “ideally incoercible”
corruption process. Whenever the ideal functionality is asked by the ideal-model
adversary to provide the internal information of some participant P in the protocol,
the ideal functionality first asks the environment (representing the entity that invoked
party P to participate in the protocol) whether to reveal the real input that P con-
tributed to the computation, or alternatively whether to report some fake input. If
the environment instructs to reveal the real input, then the functionality returns the
real input of P to the adversary. If the environment provides a fake value x, then
the functionality returns x to the adversary. Crucially, the adversary does not learn
whether the value provided was fake or real.1 We say that a functionality with such
behavior is incoercible.
Now, consider a protocol π that realizes such an ideal functionality F , and consider a
party P that runs π. Now, upon receiving a corruption message from the adversary, π
must instruct P to first ask the environment (which, again, represents the entity that
1We remark that the definition in (CG96) reveals to the ideal-model adversary whether the value
provided by the functionality is real or fake. This renders that definition weak. For instance, consider
a protocol with a faking algorithm that outputs the empty string as “fake randomness”. While this
protocol should clearly not be considered as “incoercible”, it could be accepted by a simulation based
definition — as long as the simulator knows which parties are coerced and which ones are corrupted,
since there is no problem for the simualtor to output an empty string upon coercion request.
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invoked party P to participate in the protocol) whether to report the real internal
state or to provide a fake one. If the response is to reveal the real input, then we
require that P reveals its true internal state. If the response is to fake input value x,
then P runs a special procedure Fake, which should be specified as part of a protocol
description, and reveals the output of Fake instead of its true internal state.
We say that π is incoercible if it UC-emulates an incoercible ideal functionality F .
Such definition captures our intuitive notion of incoercibility: Indeed, F provides
“ideal incoercibility” in the sense that there the ideal adversary learns nothing about
whether a party revealed the real or the fake input - beyond what is revealed by
the legitimate outputs of the corrupted parties. Thus, the same must hold also with
respect to the real adversary that interacts with π - or else the environment could tell
the difference between the two interactions. Note however that this argument hinges
on two facts: (a) in the real world the corrupted party must reveal its real input upon
corruption, when instructed so by the environment, and (b) that the ideal adversary
is not being told whether the input value it received upon corruption is real or fake.
Now let us give a more formal definition. First, we slightly change the model and
define a notion of corruption compliant protocols, similar in spirit to the notion of
compliant protocols in the plain UC. Intuitively, a protocol is corruption compliant
if it reveals its true internal state when asked by the adversary. We only consider
corruption-compliant protocols in our framework. Below we give a more precise
definition.
Corruption-compliant protocols. A protocol is corruption-compliant if it
consists of two processes, a body and a shell. When a message is written to an input,
subroutine output, or communication tape of a party, it is first processed by the shell,
which may decide to forward it to the body, possibly modified. Similarly, any message
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the body decides to send is first processed by the shell. The body doesn’t see the
internal state of the shell.
In addition, the shell should behave in a certain way upon receiving a “corrupt P”
message. Namely, it notifies the calling entity CP of the party about the corruption,
and expects to receive further instructions from CP . CP can reply either with “corrupt”
or with “fake to ~x∗” message (where ~x∗ is a set of fake inputs and outputs). In the
first case the shell should send the whole internal state I of P to the adversary. In
case it was told to fake to ~x∗, it runs Fake(I, ~x, ~x∗) on its internal state, true and fake
inputs to obtain fake internal state I∗, and reports I∗ to the adversary.
The second requirement describes what the shell should do upon receiving a notification
of corruption from its subprocess. If the shell previously received a “corrupt” message
from CP , then it sends “corrupt” to its subprocess as well. If the message which the
shell received from CP was “fake to ~x
∗”, then the shell sends to its subprocess “fake
to ~y∗”, where ~y∗ = Inputs(~x∗, I∗), and Inputs is a function which determines an input
of a subprocess, given an input and randomness of the main party.
Note that if ρ and π are both corruption-compliant, then so is ρπ.
Incoercible functionalities. We consider ideal functionalities F where each input
to F is associated with two party identities: the first, P , represents the identity of
the protocol participant that holds this input, and the second, CP , is the identity
of the “calling party”, namely the party that provided the input value(s) to P , and
will obtain the output value(s) from the computation. Such an ideal functionality F
is incoercible if it behaves as follows upon receiving a corrupt P message from the
adversary. F first outputs to CP a corrupted value. Next, if CP responds with do
not fake then F returns to the adversary all the inputs received from CP and all the
output passed to CP in this interaction so far. If CP responds with fake to ~x
∗ then
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F interprets ~x∗ as a list of inputs and outputs and hands this list to the adversary
instead of the real one.
Incoercible protocols. We now give a definition of incoercible protocols:
Definition 1. A protocol π is incoercible if it is corruption-compliant and it UC-
emulates an incoercible ideal functionality F .
We also provide a definition of incoercible distributed function evaluation. Let
f : ({0, 1}∗)n → ({0, 1}∗)n be an n-party function, and let Ff be the incoercible ideal
functionality that computes f , say with respect to some fixed set of party identities
P1, ..., Pn. That is, upon receiving inputs from the calling parties of P1, ..., Pn, Ff
evaluates f on these inputs and provides the caller of each Pi with its corresponding
output value f(x1, ..., xn)i. Party corruptions are handled in an incoercible way as
described above.
Definition 2. Protocol π realizes an n-party function f : ({0, 1}∗)n → ({0, 1}∗)n if
it UC-emulates Ff . In addition, if Ff is an incoercible ideal functionality and π is
corruption-compliant, we say that π incoercibly realizes f .
Note that the above definition of incoercibility did not specify whether the corruptions
are honest-but-curious or Byzantine. Indeed, this definition is meaningful in both
cases.
It follows from the universal composition theorem (Can01) that incoercible protocols
can be composed together:
Theorem 8. Let π be an incoercible protocol realizing F given access to G, and ρ be
an incoercible protocol realizing G. Then ρπ/G incoercibly realizes F .
This theorem directly follows from composition theorem of (Can01), after noticing
that composition of corruption-compliant protocols is corruption-compliant as well.
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Concurrent work. In a concurrent and independent work of Alwen, Ostrovsky,
Zhou and Zikas (AOZZ15) another UC definition of incoercibility is presented. Their
framework is called IUC and is built on top of the UC framework (IUC security implies
basic UC security). However, unlike us they change the framework (in particular, they
introduce a notion of a deception strategy, and the definition of IUC-secure protocol
has two additional quantifiers over real and ideal deception strategies.)
They also give a composition theorem for IUC security, which says that two composed
IUC-secure protocols result in a IUC-secure protocol.
Although our definition is syntactically different from their, the crux of both definitions
is the same: the protocol is incoercible if in the ideal world the simulator can convincely
simulate an internal state of the party without knowing whether it is simulating an
internal state for real input or for fake input; this means that the real-world adversary
cannot distinguish between real and fake inputs as well.
The rigorous comparison of the two definitions is yet to be determined.
2.1.4 Description of the Protocol
Let’s first recall how the original Yao protocol looks like. Let’s say parties P0 and P1
have inputs x0 and x1 and they want to evaluate y = C(x0, x1) for some circuit C. P0
generates a garbled circuit: that is, for every wire of C P0 creates two random labels
l0, l1, and a garbled circuit consists of 4 encryptions of output label under input labels
as keys, and the result table, which lists 0 and 1 labels for output gates.
P0 sends to P1 the garbled circuit together with the labels corresponding to P0’s input.
Then for every P0’s input bit P0 and P1 run OT protocol, after which P1 learns the
keys corresponding to his input. At this point P1 has all information he needs to
evaluate the circuit: it has all input labels, and it keeps evaluating the circuit gate by
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gate, until finally it learns output labels. Then it uses result table to learn the output.
As shown in (LP09), the original Yao protocol is statically secure, given augmented
non-committing encryption (DN00), (CLOS02). In particular, when P1 is corrupted,
Simulator learns x1 and y and shows a fake garbled circuit which always evaluates to y
and is indistignuishable from the real garbled circuit. (It cannot show the real garbled
circuit since it doesn’t know x0.) Also the simulator shows labels corresponding to
P0’s and P1’s inputs. Here it is crucial that an adversary sees only one label per each
input bit and therefore cannot distinguish between a fake circuit and a real one.
The same simulation works in adaptive case with erasures: P0 should erase its internal
state before sending the second message. However, in the adaptive case without
erasures this simulation fails: an adversary could corrupt P0 after corrupting P1 and
learning a fake garbled circuit. For every P1’s input bit, a simulator has to show both
labels since these labels were P0’s input in OT protocol. Now the adversary sees one
label for each one of P0’s input bits and both labels for P1’s input bit. This allows the
adversary to detect that the garbled circuit is not valid.
Indeed, consider a circuit that consists of just one AND gate. The simulator corrupts
P1 and learns its input x1 = 0 and y = 0. At this point the simulator still doesn’t
know P0’s input, but it has to show the garbled circuit, therefore it shows fake circuit
where all four ciphertexts encrypt the same key l0, and it shows the result table where
l0 is decrypted to 0. Now the simulator corrupts P0 and learns x0 = 1. It has to
show keys corresponding to both x1 = 0 and x1 = 1. This means that the adversary
knows the keys for x0 = 1, x1 = 0 and x1 = 1 and can evaluate the circuit on inputs
(1, 1) and (1, 0). Since the circuit is just an AND gate, the result should be different.
However, since our garbled circuit contained the same key in all four encryptions,
an adversary trying to evaluate the circuit will get 0 in both cases and will detect
cheating.
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The problem is that an adversary learns too much at the moment of corruption:
learning both keys for P1’s input allows him to evaluate the circuit on many inputs
and to check that the circuit is a fake. To avoid this problem, we change the protocol
such that P0 himself doesn’t know the keys for P1’s input. In order to achieve this, we
“glue together” the garbled circuit generation, the input labels generation and the OT
into one program P which outputs the next message function for the Yao protocol.
This program will be obfuscated by the factory. Now, P0 will run this program on his
input and local randomness and send its output to P1.
Naively one may hope that, since the program is obfuscated, P0 himself doesn’t know
more than just inputs he used and output it sent to P1 (in particular, it doesn’t know
the keys for P1’s input). However, this is not enough: it might be the case that the
input itself reveals the keys (say, if the keys are just set to be some substring of the
random input). To deal with this problem, we don’t use the random input directy
in the protocol. Instead, we first apply a pseudorandom function to the input and
random input, and then use the output of the pseudorandom function as the random
input to the protocol.
The next set of challenges deals with making the above plan to work with an obfuscation
mechanism that only guarantees indistinguishability obfuscation. Here we follow the
lead of Sahai and Waters (SW14) and use similar constructs and techniques as there.
Specifically, we use the technique of embedding “hidden triggers” in the random input
to the program P . If the program recognizes a hidden trigger then it just outputs
the value encrypted in that trigger. Else, the program used the randomness as in the
Yao protocol. We publish P together with a “faking” algorithm Explain that allows
anyone to generate hidden triggers of one’s choice. This addition has a twofold effect:
For one it provides for incoercibility for the garbler. In addition it also simplifies the
proof of security.
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Throughout, and following (SW14), we employ constrained, or puncturable pseudoran-
dom functions (GGM84), (BGI13), (BW13), which enables applying indistinguisha-
bility obfuscation to pseudorandom function in a meaningful way.
We describe and analyze the scheme in a simple setting where the parties have secure
communication channels, and with only honest but curious corruptions. Once we have
such a protocol, we can implement secure channels using non-committing encryption.
We can also deal with Byzantine corruptions by forcing semi-honest behavior.
We also assume without loss of generality that only the evaluator learns the output.
If both parties need to obtain outputs from the computation then they can run the
same protocol twice, on the same inputs but with reverse roles. (Alternatively, at the
cost of adding a message to the protocol, the evaluator can send the function value to
the garbler.)
Implementing secure channels. As we will see later, only the second message in our
protocol should be sent over a secure channel. This means that P1 can send EKNCE in
the first message, and the protocol still remains two-round after implementing secure
channels.
Corruption obliviousness and leakage resilience. The naive protocol, described above,
does not naturally lend to corruption-oblivious simulation. Indeed, to simulate the
corruption of the garbler, the simulator needs to come up with a second message,
namely a garbled circuit, that outputs the correct output of the computation. This
needs to be done without knowing the input or output of the evaluator, and only
using the input of the garbler. Furthermore, when the evaluator is corrupted, the
simulator needs to come up with the same garbled circuit, without knowing the input
of the garbler. This is not known to be possible in general. We get around this issue
by making a simple modification to the protocol: Instead of evaluating f(x0, x1), the
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parties will use the above protocol to evaluate f ′(x0, (x1, z)) = f(x0, x1) ⊕ z. The
evaluator, P1, will choose z at random, and after obtaining the output value y, it will
set its output to be y ⊕ z.
With this modification in place, the simulator can set the output of the garbled circuit
to be a random value fixed in advance and then deal with the corruption of the parties
in an oblivious way.
Incoercibility. We provide incoercibility for the garbler. This is done in a straighforward
way: Since the explain procedure is public, a coerced garbler can demonstrate random
input that explains any input value of its choice, in the same way as in (SW14).
Handling Byzantine corruptions. Here we use the generic transformation of
(CLOS02) (based on (GMW87)) that transforms a protocol that is secure against
adaptive honest but curious corruptions into a protocol that is secure against adaptive
Byzantine corruptions.
2.1.5 Detailed Description and Analysis
Preliminaries. In our construction we use the following primitives. The reader
is referred to the papers cited for detailed definitions.
1. Indistinguishability obfuscation iO for polynomial-size circuits, as defined, con-
structed and used in (BGI+01, GR14, GGH+13, SW14).
2. Augmented non-committing encryption scheme Enc ((DN00, CLOS02)). We
denote its generation, oblivious generation and inverting algorithms as Enc.Gen,
Enc.oGen and Enc.Inv.
3. Puncturable PRFs which are additionally extracting or injective (BGI13, BW13,
SW14).
4. The garbled circuit generation algorithm Gen together with an algorithm SimGen
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for generating fake garbled circuit from (LP09). These programs use a special
encryption scheme which they call a public key encryption with elusive efficiently
verifiable range.
Deterministic single-party-output functionalities. First, we recall that it
suffices to be able to compute deterministic functionalities: indeed, there exists a
standard reduction of any randomized functionality to a deterministic one, given
by fdet((x0, r0), (x1, r1)) = frand(x0, x1; r0 ⊕ r1). Second, it is enough to compute
functionalities where only one party gets the output (and the other party gets nothing):
parties can run in parallel two instances of the protocol with the same input, where in
the first execution only the first party generates output and in the second execution
only the second party generates output.
In our protocol P0 is the garbler and P1 is the evaluator for the Yao protocol. The
natural thing to do would be to create a garbled circuit for the functionality they
want to compute (−; f(x0, x1)). However, in this case the simulation is not corruption-
oblivious.2 We therefore slightly modify a protocol: P1 first generates random z, and
P0 generates a garbled circuit for the function f
′(x0, (x1, z)) = f(x0, x1)⊕ z. As we’ll
see, this will suffice for making the simulation corruption-oblivious.
Oblivious transfer. We use the following one out of two OT protocol, based on
(EGL85): assume P0 has k0, k1 and P1 has a bit b; we want P1 to learn kb. First, P1
generates keys (EKb, DKb) and EK1−b without corresponding decryption key (this
encryption scheme, in addition to normal key generation, should have oblivious key
generation algorithm which outputs encryption keys without corresponding decryption
2Indeed, for the simulation to be corruption-oblivious, the subroutine for generating P1’s internal
state should be able to create a fake garbled circuit without knowing x0. At the same time, the
subroutine for creating P0 internal state should be able to create (the same) fake garbled circuit
without knowing the output y. It is not clear how to do that for the above “natural” garbling method.
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keys, in such a way that this encryption keys are indistinguishable from normal encryp-
tion keys. For this we use augmented non-committing encryption). P1 sends EK0, EK1
to P0. P0 sends back encryptions c0 = Enc(EK0; k0) and c1 = Enc(EK1; k1). Since
P1 has DKb, he can decrypt kb = Dec(DKb; cb). However, since there is no DK1−b
generated , the second value k1−b remains unknown to P1. Following (CLOS02), we
make the OT adaptively secure by using non-committing encryption for the encryption
scheme.
With this implementation of OT, the Yao protocol consists of the following two
messages:
1. First, P1 generates two sets of encryption keys PK0, PK1 and one set of decryp-
tion keys SKx1 (such that for every input bit x
i




PK0, PK1 to P0.
2. P0 generates a garbled circuit GC and sends to P1 GC, keys for P0’s input bits,
and keys for all possible P1’s input bits encrypted under PK0, PK1 (we will call
this a Yao message). P1 decrypts the keys corresponding to its input, and, since
it has GC and all input labels, it evaluates the circuit gate by gate.
Protocol description. We have parties P0, P1 with inputs x0, x1 respectively.
The protocol for allowing P1 to learn the value f(x0, x1) for some function f is described
in Figure 2·1. The referece string consists of programs P and Explain, described in
Figures 2·3 and 2·4. The circuit C that prorgam P evaluates will be the circuit that
computes the function f ′(x0, (x1, z)) = f(x0, x1)⊕ z. (The value z will be chosen by
P1 at random as part of the protocol.)
The protocol consists of two rounds. In round one, P1 (the evaluator) chooses
randomness s and z and sets x′1 = (x1, z) to be its new input. It samples secret and
public keys for oblivious transfer using s (public keys which do not correspond to P1’s
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input are sampled obliviously). P1 sends all public keys to P0. In the second round
P0 chooses its randomness r and runs a program P on its input x0, randomness r and
a set of public keys from P1. The program P internally generates new randomness u
and runs the underlying subroutine Gen to generate a Yao message, which becomes
the program output. P0 sends this message to P1. P1 gets the labels for x0, decrypts
the labels for x1 and evaluates the circuit, obtaining f(x0, x1)⊕ z. Then P1 xor’s the
result with z and gets the output f(x0, x1).
The program Explain is not used in the protocol directly. However, it is used in the
case when parties want to deny their inputs, as well as in the proof.
The Protocol:
1. P1 chooses random z and sets x
′
1 ← (x1, z). Then it chooses random s and
generates PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← Enc.Gen(s[0]) and PK1−x′1 ← Enc.oGen(s[1]). It sets
α∗ ← PK0, PK1 and sends α∗ to P0.
2. P0 chooses random r
∗, runs β∗ ← P (x0, α∗; r∗) and sends β∗
3. P1 evaluates the garbled circuit taken from β
∗, using the labels and output table
from β∗, and outputs the result xor’ed with z.
Figure 2·1: Protocol description
Program P
inputs: P0’s input x, P1’s 1-round message α, randomness r = r[1]r[2]
P (x, α; r) :
1. check if r has encoded value inside:
(a) M ′ ← Fk(r[2])⊕ r[1]; if IkI (M ′) 6= r[2] then goto 2;
(b) parse M ′ as β′, x′, α′, ρ̂′. If (x′, α′) 6= (x, α) then goto 2;
(c) output β′
2. else run Gen:
(a) u← EkE(x, α, r)
(b) output Gen(x, α;u)
Figure 2·2: Program P is used by P0 to generated the second protocol
message. It calls Gen as a subroutine; Gen is a program which outputs
a Yao message: that is, a garbled circuit, labels for P0’s input and




Constants: circuit C with m wires and s output wires; let’s assume that first 2n
wires are input wires and last s wires are output wires
Input: P0’s input x0; P1’s two sets of public keys PK0, PK1;
randomness u = u1u2u3u4
Gen(x0, PK;u):
1. Create labels for wires: (k01, k
1





2. Create encryptions of labels:
(a) Partition u2 into u21, . . . , u2m, and each u2t into u2t1, . . . , u2t4
(b) Partition u3 into u31, . . . , u3m, and each u3t into u3t1, . . . , u3t4
(c) For every gate t in C create 4 encryptions:
• if t is an AND gate:
GCt[0, 0]← SEnck0i (SEnck0j (k
0
l ;u2t1);u3t1)
GCt[0, 1]← SEnck0i (SEnck1j (k
0
l ;u2t2);u3t2)
GCt[1, 0]← SEnck1i (SEnck0j (k
0
l ;u2t3);u3t3)
GCt[1, 1]← SEnck1i (SEnck1j (k
1
l ;u2t4);u3t4)
• if t is an OR gate:
GCt[0, 0]← SEnck0i (SEnck0j (k
0
l ;u2t1);u3t1)
GCt[0, 1]← SEnck0i (SEnck1j (k
1
l ;u2t2);u3t2)
GCt[1, 0]← SEnck1i (SEnck0j (k
1
l ;u2t3);u3t3)
GCt[1, 1]← SEnck1i (SEnck1j (k
1
l ;u2t4);u3t4)
(d) shuffle GCt[0, 0], GCt[1, 0], GCt[0, 1], GCt[1, 1]
3. Create encryptions of labels for P1’s input:
(a) Partition u4 into u401, . . . , u40n, u411, . . . , u41n








(a) GCi[0, 0], GCi[0, 1], GCi[1, 0], GCi[1, 1] for i = 1..m (garbled circuit)
(b) (0 : k0m−s+1; 1 : k
1
m−s+1), . . . , (0 : k
0
m; 1 : k
1
m) (the result table)
(c) k
x10
1 , . . . , k
xn0
n (labels for P0’s input)
(d) (c01, c
1




n) (encrypted labels for P1’s input)
Figure 2·3: Program Gen.
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Program Explain
inputs: message m which should be encoded; randomness ρ
P (m; ρ) :
1. M ← m, prg(ρ)
2. r[2]← IkI (M), r[1]← Fk(r[2])⊕M
3. output r = r[1]r[2]
Figure 2·4: Program Explain.
Theorem 9. Let:
• SEnc be CPA-secure symmetric key encryption scheme with an elusive efficiently
verifiable range ((LP09))
• Enc be an augmented non-committing encryption scheme
• E = {EkE} be an extracting puncturable PRF family
• I = {IkI} be an injective puncturable PRF family
• F = {Fk} be a puncturable PRF family
• PRG be an input-doubling PRG
• iO be indistinguishability obfuscator
then the protocol is adaptively secure with oblivious simulation in the factory model in
the presence of semi-honest adversaries given secure channels.
The choice of parameters. Since we use different types of PRFs (in particular,
extracting PRFs and injective PRFs) in the construction, we must ensure that the
lengths of all values fit the requirements for these PRFs. Indeed, as shown in (SW14),
there exist:
• injective puncturable PRFs which map n(λ) bits to m(λ) bits where injectivity
holds with probability 1− 2−e(λ) (over the choice of a key), as long as m(λ) ≥
2n(λ) + e(λ);
• extracting puncturable PRFs which map n(λ) bits to m(λ) bits for distribution X
with min-entropy k(λ) with statistical distance between (k, Fk(X)) and (k, Um)
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at most 2−e(λ), as long as n(λ) ≥ k(λ) ≥ m(λ) + 2e(λ) + 2.
Let’s recall how we use these PRFs in the computation. Let’s denote the lengths of a
Yao message β and randomness used to create it u as |β| and |u|; also we denote the
length of M (the hidden value prepared by a simulator and encoded inside randomness)
as |M |. All these lengths are polynomial in security parameter as well as a circuit
size and inputs length. We have to choose randomness length to guarantee that both
injective and extracting PRFs exist. Recall that randomness r (denoted as er in
simulated case) consists of two parts r[1] and r[2]. Note that the way er[1], the first
part of randomness, is generated (er[1] ← Fk(er2) ⊕M) implies that its length is
exactly |M |.
1. IkI should be an injective PRF with negligible failure. It takes as input M and
outputs er[2]. Thus, it should be the case that |er[2]| ≥ 2|M |+ λ.
2. EkE should be an extracting PRF with negligible distance. It takes as input
(x0, PK, r[1]r[2]) and outputs u. We are going to use extracting property
when r = r[1]r[2] is chosen at random, and min-entropy of input is at least
|r| = |r[1]|+ |r[2]|. Thus, it should be the case that |x0|+ |PK|+ |r[1]|+ |r[2]| ≥
|r[1]|+ |r[2]| ≥ |u|+ 2λ+ 2.
Once a security parameter and a circuit are fixed, all values above are also fixed except
|r[2]|. Note that by choosing |r[2]| large enough (but still polynomial in the security
parameter), we can satisfy both inequalities.
Proof. The outline of the proof is the following. First, we give a description of our
simulator. Then we prove that no environment can distinguish between a real execution
and a simulation. We do this in two steps. In step one we deal with the case of
non-adaptively chosen inputs; that is, the environment first chooses parties’ inputs
and only then sees a CRS. In order to show indistinguishability in non-adaptive case,
we consider an intermidiate middle hybrid where all protocol messages are generated
as in a real execution, but the randomness is explained. In two lemmas we prove that
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this middle hybrid is indistinguishable from both real execution and simulation. In
step two we consider the case of adaptive inputs choice, thus proving the theorem
statement.
Simplifying assumptions. In our honest-but-curious setting we can assume that
corruptions happen after the protocol execution and that both parties are corrupted.
Since our simulator, as we see later, is corruption-oblivious (information learned in
one party corruption is not used in the other party corruption), we don’t need to think
about different order of corrupting parties. Also we assume secure channels, therefore
our simulator has to show the protocol transcript only after one of the parties is
corrupted.
In our proofs of lemmas instead of having an interactive game with the adversary we
just run an experiment and show to the adversary the resulting distribution, asking it
to guess which hybrid it sees. Indeed, by itself the security definition is interactive:
an environment first sees a CRS and then outputs inputs; after this, it sees protocol
messages. Then it can send corruption requests and get back parties’ internal states.
Given this information, the adversary chooses which hybrid it sees. However, in the
case of non-adaptively chosen inputs, we can use a non-interactive security definition:
the inputs are fixed in advance, therefore we can send a CRS later with other values the
adversary should see. Next, we assumed that all parties are corrupted, and therefore
the adversary doesn’t need to send corruption requests; the simulator will send it
all parties’ internal states itself. Therefore, instead of playing an interactive game
with the adversary, in our security definitions the simulator generates all protocol
information ( protocol messages, parties’ internal states) and sends it to the adversary,
who should distinguish between hybrids.
Description of the simulator. Our simulator is described in Figure 2·23. It gets
a CRS, generates randomness needed (sPKE to create P1’s keys for encryption scheme,
sGC to create a fake garbled circuit, and sy, a random value which is the result of
z ⊕ y in a real execution), and sets its state to be s = (CRS, sPKE, sGC , sy).
Since we assume secure channels, the simulator doesn’t need to show a transcript
before corruptions. Upon corruption of a party Pi, the simulator calls its subroutine
SimPi(CRS, sPKE, sGC , sy) to simulate Pi’s internal state. Each subroutine has to
show randomness used by a party and the communication it sees. SimPi first generates
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The simulation:
1. Obtain the public programs CRS = P,Explain
2. Choose randomness for simulation (sPKE, sGC , sy). Set the state to be s =
(CRS, sPKE, sGC , sy)
3. upon corruption of P0: output SimP0(s)
4. upon corruption of P1: output SimP1(s)
SimP0(CRS, sPKE, sGC , sy)
1. learn x0
2. generate PK0, SK0, PK1, SK1 ← Enc.Gen(sPKE); set α∗ ← PK0, PK1
3. set β∗ ← SimGen(sy, PK; sGC)
4. choose random ρ∗ and set er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, PK; ρ∗)
5. output (er∗, α∗)
SimP1(CRS, sPKE, sGC , sy)
1. learn x1, y
2. generate PK0, SK0, PK1, SK1 ← Enc.Gen(sPKE)
3. set β∗ ← SimGen(sy, PK; sGC)
4. set z ← sy ⊕ y, x′1 ← (x1, z)
5. set es∗ ← Enc.Inv(s, x′1)
6. output (es∗, z; β∗)
Figure 2·5: Simulation
secret and public keys for P1 and sets α
∗ to be P1’s public keys (note that since all
three programs (Sim, SimP0 and SimP1) use the same state to generate values,
they get the same result - public keys and garbled circuit). Then it generates a
fake garbled circuit and encryptions for OT β∗ ← SimGen(sy, α∗; sGC). The next
step depends on the party. A simulator for P0 computes explained randomness
er∗ ← Explain((β∗;x0, PK; ρ∗) for randomly chosen ρ∗ and shows er∗ (internal state)
and α∗ (communication). A simulator for P1 sets its randomness z to be consistent
with the garbled circuit output and the protocol output (that is, z = y ⊕ sy) and
then, using an invertion algorithm, creates randomness es∗, which produces obliviously
sampled keys PK1−x1 . The simulator shows es
∗ and z as P1’s internal state and β
∗ as
the communication seen.
Note that to simulate a party during corruption, the simulator doesn’t use internal
information of the other party; only this party’s input/output is used, together with
randomness s which acts as a state of the simulator. Therefore this simulator is
corruption oblivious.
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Step one - non-adaptive inputs case. In the following two lemmas, we prove
that real and simulated experiments are indistinguishable. To achieve this we consider
a middle hybrid where all protocol messages are generated honestly like in a real
execution, but the randomness shown to the adversary is obtained using Explain
algorithm. In the first lemma we show that this middle hybrid is indistinguishable from
the simulation; indistinguishability between the middle hybrid and a real execution
is shown in lemma 2. In both proofs we first give an overview of hybrids, and then
present a detailed description with reductions.
Our notation. To denote the first and the second part of randomness, we write
r[1] and r[2]. By PK we denote a set of public keys for each possible input bit of
P1’s input; PK0 and PK1 mean sets of public keys for input bits 0 and input bits




, . . . , PKnxn1 ). By PK1−x1 we mean the opposite set of public keys.
We mark the values obtained in the experiment with a star to distinguish these values
from variables in programs. We denote the first round message (P1’s public keys) as
α∗ and the second round message (a garbled circuit, an output table, labels for P0’s
input, encrypted labels for all possible P1’s inputs) as β
∗.
Lemma 1. The results of the following two experiments are indistinguishable:
Experiment Simulation:
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sGC , sy. Set z = y ⊕ sy. Set x′1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, internal keys for Gen, and choose ran-
domness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs
P ← O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PK0, PK1, SK0, SK1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE).
Set α∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. run β∗ ← SimGen(sy, α∗; sGC)
5. choose ρ∗ at random
6. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗), es∗ ← Enc.Inv(sPKE, x′1)





1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sGC , sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗
5. run β∗ ← P (x0, α∗; r∗)
6. choose ρ∗ at random
7. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
An adversary sees protocol transcript (α∗, β∗), internal states er∗ and (sPKE, z),
programs (P,Explain).
Proof. We show indistinguishability using several hybrids as described below:
1. H0 = Simulation
2. H1: like a simulation, but OT public keys PK1−x1 (which do not correspond to
P1’s input) are sampled obliviously
3. H2: like H1, but β∗ is chosen as a result of Gen(x0;α
∗;u∗) for some random u∗;
previously β∗ was the result of SimGen. Based on indistinguishability between
a fake and a real garbled circuit.
4. H3: Like H2, but u∗ is chosen as EkE(x0, α
∗, r∗) for random r∗; previously it was
chosen at random. Based on extracting property of EkE
5. H4 = Middle: Like H3, but β∗ ← P (x0, α∗; r∗) (which means that now first
check 1 is performed on randomness r∗ before generating the output). Based
on the fact that r∗ is random and for a random value this check passes with
negligible probability.
H1.
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sGC , sy. Set z = y ⊕ sy. Set x′1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;x), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
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PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. run β∗ ← SimGen(sy, α∗; sGC)
5. choose ρ∗ at random
6. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
An adversary sees protocol transcript (α∗, β∗), internal states er∗ and (sPKE, z),
programs (P,Explain).
In this hybrid we generate public keys for OT which do not correspond to P1’ input
obliviously and show to the adversary the real randomness sPKE which was used to
generate these keys. Indistinguishability holds because of the property of augmented
non-committing encryption: no adversary can distinguish between a real randomness
used for oblivious key generation and a randomness obtained as a result of inverting
algorithm.
H2.
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sGC , sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random u∗
5. run β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗)
6. choose ρ∗ at random
7. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
An adversary sees protocol transcript (α∗, β∗), internal states er∗ and (sPKE, z),
programs (P,Explain).
In this hybrid we changed the way β∗ is generated. Previously it contained a fake
garbled circuit which always evaluates to sy, now it contains a real garbled circuit.
Indistinguishability is based on indistinguishability between a fake garbled circuit and
a real one, as shown in (LP09).
H3.
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS,sGC , sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
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2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗. Set u∗ ← EkE(x0, α∗, r∗)
5. run β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗)
6. choose ρ∗ at random
7. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
An adversary sees protocol transcript (α∗, β∗), internal states er∗ and (sPKE, z),
programs (P,Explain).
In this hybrid we choose u∗ as u∗ ← EkE(x0, α∗, r∗), instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds because of extracting property of EkE . Indeed, since min-
entropy of the PRF input is at least |r∗|, then by our choice of parameters the output
of this PRF is indistinguishable from random. We can reduce these hybrids to an
extracting prf game as follows: given kE and random w or w = EkE(x0, α
∗, r∗) for
random r∗, we choose other keys and obfuscate programs, and then compute other
variables using u∗ = w. Depending on whether w is random or not, we are either in
H2 or in H3.
H4 (Middle).
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sGC , sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗.
5. run β∗ ← P (x0, α∗; r∗)
6. choose ρ∗ at random
7. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
An adversary sees protocol transcript (α∗, β∗), internal states er∗ and (sPKE, z),
programs (P,Explain).
In this hybrid we generate β∗ as a result of a program P . In other words, before
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computing u∗ we perform check 1 in P . Since for randomly chosen r∗ this check passes
with negligible probability, hybrids are statistically close to each other.
Thus lemma 1 is proved.
Lemma 2. No PPT adversary can distinguish between the following two distributions:
Experiment Middle:
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗
5. run β∗ ← P (x0, α∗; r∗)
6. choose ρ∗ at random
7. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
An adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
Experiment Real:
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗
5. run β∗ ← P (x0, α∗; r∗)
An adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
Proof. The lemma states that the view of an adversary in the real execution is
indistinguishable from its view in the experiment when instead of real randomness,
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explained randomness is shown (which we called a middle experiment). To prove the
lemma statement, we consider a sequence of hybrids Real = H00 ∼ . . . ∼ H06 ∼ H16 ∼
. . . ∼ H10 = Middle. For b = 0, 1 we will show that Hb0 is indistinguishable from Hb6.
After this, we show that H06 and H
1
6 are indistinguishable as well. This proves that a
middle hybrid and a real execution are indistinguishable.
Hybrids overview:
1. InH1b we skip check 1 in the program P and directly compute u∗ ← EkE(x0, α∗; r∗),
β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗). Since r∗ is random, the check passes with negligible prob-
ability.
2. In H2b, instead of computing ρ̂∗ ← prg(ρ∗) (and then evaluating er∗ using this
ρ̂∗), we choose ρ̂∗ at random. Indistinguishability is based on security of a PRG.
3. In H3b we show punctured programs P : 1 and Explain : 1 instead of original
ones. We prove that new programs have the same functionality and rely the
indistinguishability on the security of iO.
4. In H4b we choose u∗ at random instead of EkE(x
∗
0, α
∗; r∗). Based on punctured
PRF EkE .
5. In H5b we choose er∗[2] at random instead of IkI (β
∗;x0, α
∗; ρ̂∗). Based on
punctured PRF IkI .
6. In H6b we choose er∗[1] at random instead of Fk(er
∗[2])⊕ (β∗;x0, α∗; ρ̂∗). Based
on punctured PRF Fk.
H0b
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗
5. run β∗ ← P (x0, α∗; r∗)
6. choose ρ∗ at random
7. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
If b = 0, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
If b = 1, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
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H1b
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗, u∗ ← EkE(x0, α∗; r∗),
5. β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗).
6. choose ρ∗ at random
7. er∗ ← Explain(β∗;x0, α∗; ρ∗)
If b = 0, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
If b = 1, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
In this hybrid we omit check 1 in the program P while computing β∗. Since for randomly
chosen r∗ the check passes with negligible probability, hybrids are statistically close.
H2b
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗, u∗ ← EkE(x0, α∗; r∗),
5. β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗).
6. choose ρ̂∗ at random
7. set M∗ ← β∗;x0, α∗; ρ̂∗
8. er∗[2]← IkI (M∗)
9. er∗[1]← Fk(er∗[2])⊕M∗
If b = 0, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
If b = 1, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P,Explain).
In this hybrid we use randomly chosen ρ̂∗ instead of the result of applying a PRG to
ρ∗ while generating er∗. Indistinguishability of hybrids immediately follows from the
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security of a PRG.
H3b
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random r∗, u∗ ← EkE(x0, α∗; r∗),
5. β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗).
6. choose ρ̂∗ at random
7. set M∗ ← β∗;x0, α∗; ρ̂∗
8. er∗[2]← IkI (M∗)
9. er∗[1]← Fk(er∗[2])⊕M∗
If b = 0, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).
If b = 1, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).
In this hybrid we show punctured programs P : 1 (Fig. 2·7) and Explain : 1 (Fig.
2·8) instead of their normal versions. We rely the indistinguishability on iO secu-
rity: modified programs have the same functionality as original ones, as proven in
(SW14) in their proof for deniable encryption scheme (with a natural modification of
the input from their input m, r to our input (x0, PK, r)). However, for the sake of
self-containment we briefly sketch it here:
Program P:
1. we add a line “if (x, α, r) = (x0, α
∗, r∗) or (x, α, r) = (x0, α
∗, er∗) then output
β∗”, this is exactly what the original program outputs on these inputs.
2. add “f r[2] = r∗[2] or r[2] = er∗[2] then goto 2”. If r[2] = r∗[2], then the check in
step one will not pass since a random r∗[2] with high probability is outside the
image of IkI , so we can go to step 2. If r[2] = er
∗[2], then either the check doesn’t
pass and we can go to step 2, or, if it passes, then the encoded message M ′ = M∗
(due to injectivity of IkI ), and therefore r[1] = er
∗[1], (x′, α′) = (x0, α
∗), which
would be detected in the first added line in P:1.
3. now Fk is never called on r
∗[2] or er∗[2], therefore we can safely puncture at
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these points.
4. add “if M ′ = M∗ then goto 2”. If M ′ = M∗ and the check passes, then
r[2] = er∗[2], r[1] = er∗[1], and this would be detected in the first line in P:1.
5. now IkI will not be called on M
∗, and we can puncture at this point.
6. we can puncture Fk1{(x0,α∗,r∗),(x0,α∗,er∗)}, since these inputs are treated in the first
line of P:1.
Program Explain:
1. we puncture kI at M
∗, since ρ̂∗ (which is a part of M∗) is generated at random
(instead of prg(ρ∗)) and with high probability is outside the image of a PRG;
therefore no input results in M = M∗ in Explain.
2. we puncture k at both points r∗[2] and er∗[2]. Since r∗[2] is randomly chosen,
with high probability it is outside the image of a PRF IkI , therefore no input
for Explain results in r[2] = r∗[2] and therefore Fk is never called on r
∗[2].
Furthermore, as we said no input for Explain results in M = M∗, and due to IkI
injectivity no input for Explain results in er∗[2] = IkI (M
∗), which means that
Fk is not called on er
∗[2] as well.
H4b
1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose randomness for
obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P : 1 ← O(P :
1kE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain : 1← O(Explain : 1kI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random u∗, r∗
5. β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗).
6. choose ρ̂∗ at random
7. set M∗ ← β∗;x0, α∗; ρ̂∗
8. er∗[2]← IkI (M∗)
9. er∗[1]← Fk(er∗[2])⊕M∗
If b = 0, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).
If b = 1, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).




Security follows from pseudorandomness of a puncturable PRF. Indeed, given a
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punctured key kE{(xk, α∗1−k, r∗)} and w, which is random or EkE(xk, α∗1−k, r∗), we
choose other keys ourselves and create programs. Then we evaluate variables in the
experiment setting u∗ = w and showing the resulting destribution to the adversary. If




1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose randomness for
obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P : 1 ← O(P :
1kE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain : 1← O(Explain : 1kI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random u∗, r∗
5. β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗).
6. choose ρ̂∗ at random
7. set M∗ ← β∗;x0, α∗; ρ̂∗
8. choose random er∗[2]
9. er∗[1]← Fk(er∗[2])⊕M∗
If b = 0, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).
If b = 1, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).
In this hybrid we choose er∗[2] at random instead of choosing it as IkI (M
∗). Security
follows from pseudorandomness of a puncturable PRF. Indeed, given a punctured
key kI{M∗} and w, which is random or IkI (M∗), we choose other keys ourselves and
create programs. Then we evaluate variables in the experiment setting er∗[2] = w
and showing the resulting destribution to the adversary. If w was random, then the




1. choose randomness sPKE, sCRS, sy. Choose random z. Set x
′
1 ← (x1, z)
2. generate a CRS: prf keys kE, kI , k, Gen internal keys and choose random-
ness for obfuscation xP , xExpl using sCRS. Create obfuscated programs P ←
O(PkE ,kI ,k;Gen;xP ), Explain← O(ExplainkI ,k;xExpl).
3. sample P0’s keys PKx′1 , SKx′1 ← PKE.Gen(sPKE[0]),
PK1−x′1 ← PKE.oGen(sPKE[1]). Set α
∗ ← PK0, PK1
4. choose random u∗, r∗
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5. β∗ ← Gen(x0, α∗;u∗).
6. choose ρ̂∗ at random
7. set M∗ ← β∗;x0, α∗; ρ̂∗
8. choose random er∗[2]
9. choose random er∗[1]
If b = 0, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, r∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).
If b = 1, an adversary sees (α∗, β∗, er∗, sPKE, z), programs (P : 1, Explain : 1).
In this hybrid we choose er∗[1] at random instead of choosing it as Fk(er
∗[2])⊕M .
Security follows from pseudorandomness of a puncturable PRF. Indeed, given a
punctured key k{er∗[2]} and w, which is random or Fk(M∗), we choose other keys
ourselves and create programs. Then we evaluate variables in the experiment setting
er∗[2] = w and showing the resulting destribution to the adversary. If w was random,
then the adversary sees Hb6, otherwise H
b
5.
Finally we notice that distributions H06 and H
1
6 are the same, since both programs and
the experiment treat r∗ and er∗ in the same manner (i.e. both r∗ and er∗ are chosen
at random and are not connected to other variables in the protocol). Therefore no
adversary can distinguish between these two hybrids, and lemma statement is proved.
Step two - dealing with adaptive inputs. In order to deal with adaptively
chosen inputs, we guess which inputs will be chosen by the adversary. Let us denote
by I the internal state of the parties. Define the variables of the real experiment
as CRSr ← GenCRS, Ir ← Un, transcriptr ← π(x0, x1, I); also define the variables of
the ideal experiment as (transcripts,CRSs)← Sim, Is ← Sim(x0, x1). Here (x0, x1)←
Adv1(CRS) is the result of running an adversary on a given CRS.
3 Then the advantage
of the adaptive adversary is
Pr[Adv2(CRS








s, transcripts, Is, x∗0, x
∗
1) = 1]−
3We can assume that both Adv1, Adv2 are deterministic, and thus there is no need to pass the
state from Adv1 to Adv2, since Adv2 can always run Adv1.
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s, transcripts, Is, x∗0, x
∗
1) = 1]−
−Pr[Adv2(CRSr, transcriptr, Ir, x∗0, x∗1) = 1]).
If iO and PRFs are subexponentially secure, then the advantage of the adversary is
negligible in the security parameter.
2.1.6 Obtaining Incoercibility
Recall that, to be incoercible, the protocol should be augmented by faking algorithms
for the two parties. The faking algorithm for a party takes as input a value x′,
representing a fake input value for the party, as well as the party’s local state and
the messages sent by that party so far, and outputs a “fake random input” r′ for the
party, such that running the party’s program on input x′ and random input r′ results
in the messages sent by the party so far, and furthermore r′ “looks random” given
the rest of the view of the adversary. More precisely, the protocol together with the
faking algorithm should be simulatable as in the definition of incoercible computation
presented in Section 2.1.3.
To show incoercibility for the garbler, we demonstrate a faking algorithm: Having
received message α, sent message β, and given the fake input value x′, simply run the
Explain algorithm with input message m = β, x′, α and some fresh randomness. Then
output the output of Explain.
It is straightforward to see that the same simulation actually demonstrates incoercibility




Constants: circuit C with m wires and s output wires; let’s assume that first 2n
wires are input wires and last s wires are output wires
Input: the result of the computation y; P1’s two sets of public keys PK0, PK1;
randomness u = u1u2u3u4
Gen(y, PK;u):
1. Create labels for wires: (k01, k
1





2. Create encryptions of labels:
(a) Partition u2 into u21, . . . , u2m, and each u2t into u2t1, . . . , u2t4
(b) Partition u3 into u31, . . . , u3m, and each u3t into u3t1, . . . , u3t4
(c) For every gate t in C create 4 encryptions (all 4 encryptions encrypt the
same label):
GCt[0, 0]← SEnck0i (SEnck0j (k
0
l ;u2t1);u3t1)
GCt[0, 1]← SEnck0i (SEnck1j (k
0
l ;u2t2);u3t2)
GCt[1, 0]← SEnck1i (SEnck0j (k
0
l ;u2t3);u3t3)
GCt[1, 1]← SEnck1i (SEnck1j (k
0
l ;u2t4);u3t4)
(d) shuffle GCt[0, 0], GCt[1, 0], GCt[0, 1], GCt[1, 1]
3. Create encryptions of labels for P1’s input:
(a) Partition u4 into u401, . . . , u40n, u411, . . . , u41n








(a) GCi[0, 0], GCi[0, 1], GCi[1, 0], GCi[1, 1] for i = 1..m (garbled circuit)
(b) (y1 : k
0
m−s+1; 1− y1 : k1m−s+1), . . . , (ys : k0m; 1− ys : k1m) (the result table)
(c) k01, . . . , k
0
n (labels for P0’s input)
(d) (c01, c
1




n) (encrypted labels for P1’s input)




constants: α∗, r∗, er∗, β∗,M∗, x0.
inputs: protocol input x, 1-round message α, randomness r = r[1]r[2]
P (x, α; r) :
1. check if r has encoded value inside:
(a) if (x, α, r) = (x0, α
∗, r∗) or (x, α, r) = (x0, α
∗, er∗) then output β∗
(b) if r[2] = r∗[2] or r[2] = er∗[2] then goto 2
(c) M ′ ← Fk{r∗[2],er∗[2]}(r[2])⊕ r[1];
(d) if M ′ = M∗ then goto 2;
(e) if IkI{M∗}(M
′) 6= r[2] then goto 2;
(f) parse M ′ as β′, x′, α′, ρ̂′. If (x′, α′) 6= (x, α) then goto 2;
(g) output β′
2. else run Gen:
(a) u← EkE{(x0,α∗,r∗),(x0,α∗,er∗)}(x, α, r)
(b) output Gen(x, α;u)
Figure 2·7: Program P:1.
Program Explain:1
constants: M∗, r∗, er∗
inputs: message m which should be encoded; randomness ρ
P (m; ρ) :
1. M ← m, prg(ρ)
2. r[2]← IkI{M∗}(M), r[1]← Fk{r∗[2],er∗[2]}(r[2])⊕M
3. output r = r[1]r[2]
Figure 2·8: Program Explain:1.
56
2.2 Two-Round Adaptive MPC from Indistinguishability Ob-
fuscation
2.2.1 Our Results: Semi-Honest Setting
Our main result is the first two-round MPC protocol with global (non-programmable)
CRS, which is secure against adaptive semi-honest corruption of all parties. Besides
globality, our protocol has other features: First, the protocol allows to securely com-
pute even randomness-hiding functionalities, and furthermore, it guarantees leakage
tolerance even when every party can be leaked from (for the discussion on why this is
usually not the case, see the paragraph about randomness-hiding functionalities in the
first part of the introduction). Second, the protocol is RAM-friendly, i.e. the amount
of communication in our protocol only depends on the RAM size of a function, not on
its circuit size, and the work of each party which obtains the output is proportional
to RAM complexity of the function. Third, we assume only polynomially secure IO
and injective OWFs.
Theorem 10. Assuming injective one way functions and indistinguishability obfus-
cation for circuits, there exists a two-round multiparty protocol with global CRS for
computing any randomized functionalities, even randomness-hiding ones. The protocol
is adaptively secure against honest-but-curious corruptions of possibly all parties, with
oblivious simulation. Its communication complexity depends on λ, {|xi|}ni=1, y, |f |RAM
(logarithmic parameters omitted), and time and space of every party depends on λ,
{|xi|}ni=1, y, |f |RAM, and time or space needed to evaluate RAM f(x1, . . . , xn) in the
worst case.
Our result improves the state of the art in a number of ways. In particular, this is:
• The first 2-round fully adaptive semi-honest MPC with global setup4
4We underline that the approach of (GP14) requires a local CRS even in the honest-but-curious
setting.
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• The first 2-round fully adaptive semi-honest MPC which doesn’t require subex-
ponential security of iO;
• The first 2-round fully adaptive semi-honest MPC which supports all (even
randomness-hiding) functionalities, and which therefore is fully leakage tolerant.
Making this protocol secure against malicious adversaries. The common techniques
(CLOS02) can be applied to compile this protocol into its malicious version. The
resulting protocol needs 4 rounds - two rounds should be added in the beginning
to do a malicious coin toss by first committing to inputs and randomness and then
partially opening randomness. We observe however that the first round of the semi-
honest protocol is a commitment round as well, and thus in the malicious version
we can use CLOS commitments as if they were round-1 messages of the semi-honest
protocol. Thus, then protocol requires only three rounds (round 1 for commitments,
round 2 for partial opening randomness, and round 3 for round 2 of the semi-honest
protocol). The resulting protocol preserves all properties of the semi-honest version (in
particular, it remains randomness-hiding as long as there is at least one uncorrupted
party during round 2, which could be corrupted later). The only property that is lost
is globality of the CRS, which is inherent in the malicious setting). The resulting
protocol outperforms the protocol by Dachman-Soled et al (DKR14), which is a
4-round protocol against semi-honest adversaries.
2.2.2 Our Results: Malicious Setting
As an additional result, we show how to make the protocol of
(GP14) RAM-efficient: namely, we construct the first RAM-efficient statistically-sound
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and then plug this NIZK into the protocol of
(GP14). Compared to the malicious version of our first protocol, this protocol needs
only two rounds (instead of three), however, it requires subexponentially-secure iO,
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and is not randomness-hiding.
Theorem 11 ((GP14)). Assuming the existence of RAM-efficient statistically sound
NIZK, subexponentially secure iO for circuits, and one way functions, there ex-
ists a two-round multiparty protocol with local CRS adaptively secure against ma-
licious corruptions of possibly all parties. Its communication complexity depends on
λ, {|xi|}ni=1, y, |f |RAM (logarithmic parameters omitted), and time and space of every
party depends on λ, {|xi|}ni=1, y, |f |RAM, and time or space needed to evaluate RAM
f(x1, . . . , xn) in the worst case.
RAM-efficient statistically sound NIZK. We construct the first RAM-efficient
NIZK with statistical soundness, assuming statistically-sound NIZK for circuits (which
can be obtained from trapdoor permutations) and a RAM-efficient garbling scheme
(which can be built from iO and OWFs (CH16)) :
Theorem 12. (Informal) Assuming statistically sound non-interactive zero knowledge
(NIZK) for circuits and a succinct garbling scheme for RAM, there exists a NIZK
for RAM, where the work of the prover and the size of the proof depends on |R|RAM,
and the work of the verifier depends on the RAM complexity of R (where R(x,w) is a
relation which defines the language for the proof).
We note that our succinct NIZK is useful also in other settings. For instance, in the
two-round protocol of Garg et. al. ((GGHR14)) the parties exchange obfuscated
programs which compute next message functions (of some underlying many-round
protocol) together with a proof that the computation was done correctly. If the
underlying protocol has number of rounds proportional to the RAM complexity of the
function (say, the protocol by Damgard et. al., (DMN11)), plugging our RAM-efficient
NIZK makes (GGHR14) protocol RAM-efficient.
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2.2.3 Related Work
Fully adaptively secure protocols. Until now, only three constant-round
fully adaptively secure protocols were known. (CGP15) is a two-round protocol for
two-party computation; (DKR14) is an MPC protocol, but requires 4 rounds; both
protocols have global CRS and allow to compute randomness-hiding functionalities.
(GP14) is a two-round MPC protocol secure against malicious adversaries; thus their
reference string is necessarily local5. Their protocol doesn’t support randomness-hiding
functionalities.
All three protocols require the function to be represented as a circuit: namely, the
core part in both (CGP15, DKR14) are Yao garbled circuits6. The protocol of (GP14)
requires a statistically-sound NIZK for the statement f(x1, . . . , xn) = y, and prior to
our work such proofs required verification time proportional to the size of the circuit.
In addition, (CGP15, GP14) require subexponentially-secure iO.
RAM-efficient protocols. Existing protocols for (even static) RAM MPC follow
one of the two approaches. The work of Boyle et al ((BCP15)) shares a paradigm of
Damgard et al ((DMN11)) which instructs parties to jointly evaluate steps of a RAM
CPU; this approach results in number of rounds proportional to the number of CPU
steps needed to compute a function.
The other approach, introduced by Ishai and Kushilevitz ((IK02), (AIK06)), requires
parties to jointly evaluate a randomized encoding of the function and input and
then locally compute the output of this randomized encoding. Thus, plugging a
5We note however that merely using their protocol in the semi-honest case doesn’t allow for a
local CRS: their approach requires proving statements to an obfuscated program, which requires
NIZK (and therefore a local CRS) even in the honest-but-curious case.
6Which cannot be easily switched to the garbling scheme for RAM. For instance, in both protocols
the underlying garbling scheme should support bit-by-bit garbling of an input. (DKR14) makes even
further use of the actual construction of garbled circuits.
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RAM-efficient garbling scheme ((CHJV15, CH16)) into known constructions results
in statically-secure RAM-efficient protocols. However, in order to achieve adaptive
security, the underlying protocol must support randomness-hiding functionalities.
Prior to our work, no fully adaptive, two round protocol with randomness hiding was
known.
Constant round adaptively secure RAM-efficient protocols. Combining
several existing techniques, it is possible to construct adaptively secure protocols for
RAM. Namely, following the Ishai-Kushilevitz approach outlined above, we can plug
the succinct garbling schemes for RAM into constant-round adaptively secure MPC
(such as (DKR14, GP14)). The first protocol yields a fully adaptive MPC for RAM
with 4 rounds; we refer to this protocol as “augmented (DKR14)”.
The second construction, however, loses full security, since evaluating a garbling is
a randomized functionality, and since their protocol doesn’t guarantee secrecy of
randomness of the function when everybody is corrupted. Namely, the simulator
of the composed scheme will not be able to simulate the random coins of each
party, since it needs to simulate generation randomness of the garbling scheme,
consistent with simulated garbled values. This can be circumvented by using a
garbling scheme where the simulator can also simulate random coins of the garbling,
i.e. “adaptively secure” garbling 7 It is possible to construct such a garbling scheme
by putting a mechanism allowing deniability (like in deniable encryption of (SW14))
on top of a garbling algorithm of RAM-efficient garbling scheme, say, (CH16), and
obfuscating the whole circuit. This obfuscated circuit is a CRS of an adaptive garbling
scheme8. Such a construction seems to give a RAM-efficient MPC protocol, which even
7Note that usually the term “adaptive security” in the context of garbling is used to denote a
different property: that the adversary can choose new inputs and functions after seeing garbled
values.
8With this approach the environment has to fix inputs before seeing the CRS, i.e. this garbling
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allows to compute randomness-hiding functionalities (roughly, because the deniability
mechanism of (SW14) generates random coins which are hidden from everybody). Still,
this approach, which we call “augmented (GP14)”, requires subexponentially-secure
iO, and, since they use NIZK even in the semi-honest case, a local CRS.
In the table below we compare our result with existing work on constant round fully
adaptive MPC((DKR14, GP14)), as well as with augmented versions of these protocols
described above. All parameters are for the semi-honest setting.
Rounds supports global randomness assumptions
RAM CRS hiding
DKR14 4 - + + iO+OWF
GP14 2 - - - subexp. iO+OWF
augmented DKR14 4 + + + iO+OWF
augmented GP14 2 + - + subexp. iO+OWF
our result 2 + + + iO+OWF
Succinct NIZK proofs. The only approach for building NIZK proof systems
where the length of the proof is independent of a circuit is based on encrypting
satisfying assignment via FHE and making the verifier homomorphically evaluate
the SAT circuit. This includes the work of (Gen09), who proposed the approach,
and (Gro11), who shows how to bring the size of the proof down from |w| · poly(λ)
to |w| + poly(λ) (where w is the witness and λ is a security parameter); thus, the
question of communication complexity of NIZK is resolved. However, in both schemes
the verifier needs to do the work proportional to the circuit complexity of the function.
Up to now we didn’t know any fully succinct NIZK proof system (i.e. NIZK where
both communication complexity and work of both parties is smaller than the circuit
size).
scheme is only selectively secure. However, this is good enough for the protocol of (GP14), since
they anyway use complexity leveraging and subexponentially-secure iO.
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2.2.4 Our Techniques: Semi-Honest Case
Our MPC protocol takes a different approach than either of
(GP14),(DKR14, CGP15). We present and motivate the approach.
First attempt. A natural idea for building MPC protocols is to use an obfuscated
program to emulate a trusted party. That is, the CRS contains an obfuscated program
which collects all inputs, does the computation, and outputs the result.
More precisely, the CRS should contain an encryption program Enc, which takes an
input xi and outputs its encryption ci, and a decryption/evaluation program Eval,
which takes c1, . . . , cn, decrypts them, computes y = f(x1, . . . , xn) and outputs y. The
parties can compute f(x1, . . . , xn) by encrypting ci = Enc(xi), broadcasting ci, and
computing y ← Eval(c1, . . . , cn). However, such a protocol is clearly insecure: each
party (say, P1) can compute many different y
′ = f(x′1, x2, . . . , xn) for any desired x
′
1
by generating c′1 = Enc(x
′
1) and running Eval(c
′
1, c2, . . . , cn).
A natural way to mitigate such an attack is to make the parties commit to their input
first, and only then exchange ciphertexts and do the computation. Therefore we now
have two rounds: in the first round parties exchange their commitments ai, and in the
second round they exchange ciphertexts ci. To make sure that no party can run Eval
on a different input than the one he committed to, Eval should check that xi in ci is
consistent with the commitment ai in the previous round. To achieve this, we need to
put into ci not only xi, but also ai together with its opening. Note however that this
still allows a curious party to generate a different c′i encrypting a different x
′
i and a
different, but valid commitment a′i to x
′
i, and then run Eval; thus we have to include
all first-round commitments a1, . . . , an within each ci (together with an opening for
ai), so that a curious party couldn’t modify its own ai without being noticed.
At this point the protocol looks like this:
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1. The CRS: Programs Enc and Eval, a CRS for a commitment scheme µbind
2. Round 1: Each party broadcasts ai ← Commit(xi), and keeps decommitment
information ri;
3. Round 2: Each party broadcasts ci ← Enc(xi; ri; a1, . . . , an)
4. Evaluation: Each party computes y ← Eval(c1, . . . , cn)
Here Eval decrypts each ci and performs two checks: first, it checks that the set of
(a1, . . . , an) is the same in each ci. Second, it checks that for all i ri is a correct opening
of ai to xi. If all checks pass, it outputs f(x1, . . . , xn).
While this idea works in general, the exact implementation becomes a challenge. Our
goal is to show that a real execution is indistinguishable from a simulated one, where
the simulated execution (and in particular, programs and communication) is generated
by a simulator who doesn’t know inputs of parties. One difficulty is to be able to
switch the ciphertext from real (encrypting xi) to simulated, and at the same time
be able to generate Eval with the secret key of encryption inside. Several ways to
accomplish this are known. One approach is to use a “double encryption + NIZK”
paradigm ((NY90)); this method is chosen by (GP14) and it leads to a protocol secure
against malicious adversaries. However, one disadvantage of this approach is that the
CRS is necessarily local, even in the semi honest case.
The approach we take in order to switch ci from real to simulated in the presence
of the secret key is the “punctured key” technique, which guarantees that real and
dummy ciphertexts are indistinguishable, even in the presence of “almost all” key -
i.e. the key which decrypts everything except for this ciphertext. This allows us to
first indistinguishably modify Eval such that it needs only a punctured key, and then
switch a ciphertext (which the punctured secret key cannot decrypt) to a dummy
ciphertext.
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However, this approach has two shortcomings, which are not obvious from this
discussion, but which would appear if we went deeper into the simulation and proofs.
First, the technique requires hardwiring input-dependent values (such as xi and ci)
into the program in the proof. This means that the inputs have to be fixed before
the adversary sees Eval (and therefore the whole CRS), giving only selective security.
Second, with this approach the programs in the simulated CRS have to contain
simulated ciphertexts, and therefore we can only hope to get local, or programmable,
CRS.
Second attempt. To solve both issues, we exploit an indirection technique similar
to the one used in (KSW14, CPR17): namely, we generate Enc and Eval during the
runtime instead of fixing them in the CRS. Note that Enc is needed only in round
2 (and Eval is needed even later). Therefore we can let parties agree on generation
randomness rGen in round 1, and then, after round 1 is complete, each party can run a
special generation program Gen (which is now in the CRS instead of Enc and Eval)
to produce a fresh pair of Enc and Eval, which are then used as before. In addition,
we add to the CRS a special program Explain, which inverts Gen, i.e. for any given
output it produces consistent randomness rGen; this is used by the simulator only.
Therefore the protocol now looks like this:
• The global CRS: programs Gen,Explain, a CRS for a commitment scheme
µbind
• Round 1: parties broadcast commitments ai = Commit(xi; ri) together with
randomness rGen,i;





• Round 2: each party broadcasts ci ← Enc(xi; ri; a1, . . . , an);
• Evaluation: each party computes y ← Eval(c1, . . . , cn).
The simulator works as follows. First it generates programs Enc′,Eval′ (which, as we
said earlier, are different from real world programs). Next it uses Explain to generate
randomness rGen on which Gen outputs these simulated Enc
′,Eval′. It generates all
rGen,i such that they xor to rGen, and sets ai and ci to be a dummy commitment and
a dummy ciphertext. (rGen,i, ai, ci) constitute simulated communications. To handle
corruption of a party, the simulator equivocates the commitment; also the simulator
needs to show the randomness for encryption, which it can do as long as underlying
encryption is non-committing or deniable. Note that the the only reason why the
simulator needs to generate the CRS is a commitment scheme.
Third attempt. So far our CRS is still local due to a commitment scheme.
However, it turns out that we don’t need the full power of the commitments; for the
proof of security our commitment scheme should be statistically binding only at round-
1 commitments, not everywhere. Since we are in the semi-honest setting, it is enough
to have a commitment scheme that is statistically binding only on honestly generated
commitments. We call this primitive honest-but-curious (HBC) commitments.
Such a primitive can be easily constructed from one way functions: consider a length-
doubling prg mapping {0, 1}l to {0, 1}2l. For random s ∈ {0, 1}l, r ∈ {0, 1}2l, let
(prg(s), r) be a commitment to 0 and (r, prg(s)) be a commitment to 1. To open the
commitment, show s. As long as a commitment was generated honestly, i.e. r was
truly random, it doesn’t have a valid prg preimage and therefore this commitment
is statistically binding. The simulator can simulate the commitment by generating
prg(s0), prg(s1) and later open it to any bit. (Note that dishonest sender could cheat in
the same way, and therefore binding holds only for honestly generated commitments.
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But it suffices for our MPC protocol, since we need a statistical binding property only
for round 1 commitments ai, which are generated by honest parties.)
Note that HBC commitments don’t require a CRS, and therefore the CRS of the
overall scheme is now global.
The choice of encryption scheme for the MPC protocol. As we said earlier,
perhaps the most challenging part of the proof is to switch ciphertexts from real to
simulated, while keeping the decryption key inside Eval. For this we take a punctured
programming approach, and therefore we need an encryption scheme where it is
possible to give a partial key, called a punctured key, which doesn’t reveal anything
about the challenge ciphertext. Our goal is the following: first we want to modify
Eval so that it uses a punctured key instead of a real one; this should be done without
changing the functionality of Eval, since we want to base security on iO. Importantly,
modified Eval should not contain xi, or any input-dependent values, since Eval should
be generated by a simulator during the protocol execution, when the simulator might
not know inputs of the parties yet. Next we want to use security of the punctured key
and switch the ciphertext from real to simulated.
The puncturable deterministic encryption ((Wat15)), which is commonly used in this
scenario, doesn’t help us: if we were using this scheme, the punctured program would
depend on inputs, making the simulation impossible. We therefore use a different
encryption scheme, which we call a puncturable randomized encryption (PRE)9. In
addition, this primitive may be viewed as a simulation-secure variant of PDE, and
might be of independent interest.
Puncturable randomized encryption (PRE). In a definition of a semantically
secure encryption scheme a real ciphertext is indistinguishable from a simulated one,
9Note that merely randomizing the PDE plaintext doesn’t yield a PRE.
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even in the presence of a public key. A much stronger CCA security requires that
ciphertexts are still indistinguishable even given access to a decryption oracle, i.e. to
the functionality of a secret key everywhere except the challenge ciphertext. One
can consider an ultimate version of CCA security and require that ciphertexts are
indistinguishable even when the secret key itself is given in the clear (of course, for
this to be meaningful, the secret key shouldn’t be able to decrypt the challenge
ciphertext, just like in case of standard definition of CCA-security). This is exactly
what our puncturable randomized encryption achieves. In other words, a PRE scheme
is a symmetric key encryption scheme secure under simulation security definition,
where the simulator needs to simulate a punctured key as well: that is, we require
that a real-world punctured key and a ciphertext (k{c}, c) are indistinguishable from
simulated (k{c}, c).
We build a secret key version of this primitive using puncturable PRFs and an
injective public key encryption scheme (injective means that there doesn’t exist a tuple
(x, r, x′, r′) such that (x, r) 6= (x′, r′) and Encpk(x; r) = Encpk(x′; r′)). The secret key of
a PRE consists of a public key of encryption scheme pk and a PRF key k. To encrypt
a message m with randomness r, compute T ← Encpk(m; r), C ← Fk(T )⊕ (m, r), and
set the ciphertext to be (T,C). To decrypt (T,C), compute (m, r)← C ⊕ Fk(T ) and
verify that T = Encpk(m; r).
To puncture a key at a ciphertext (T ∗, C∗) = PRE.Enc(m; r), output (pk, k{T ∗}), i.e.
puncture PRF key k at T ∗. This punctured PRE key doesn’t give any information
about plaintext of the ciphertext (T ∗, C∗): intuitively, C∗ looks uniformly random
since k is punctured at T ∗, and T ∗ itself doesn’t reveal m since it is a ciphertext of a
public key encryption. On the other hand, the punctured key still allows to encrypt
all other plaintexts-randomness pairs and decrypt all other ciphertexts: note that for
a given T there is only a single C which makes (T,C) a valid encryption; therefore
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puncturing out k{T ∗} affects exactly one valid ciphertext, i.e. (T ∗, C∗).
The simulator can generate a dummy ciphertext (T ∗, C∗) by setting T ∗ ← Encpk(0; r)
and choosing C∗ at random. It can also generate a corresponding punctured key as
(pk, k{T ∗}). This simulated ciphertext and punctured key (T ∗, C∗), (pk, k{T ∗}) can
be shown to be indistinguishable from real ones by invoking security of a punctured
PRF and an encryption scheme.
Computing randomness-hiding functionalities. So far we described a proto-
col for deterministic functionalities. Here we describe how we handle randomized
functionalities in a randomness-hiding way, i.e. the actual randomness used to compute
the function should remain hidden even when all parties are corrupted and all their
randomness is learned by the adversary.
It might seem first that to achieve randomness hiding we can use ideas of
(SW14) and let the encryption program internally choose randomness by applying
an extractor to the random input provided by a party - the technique used in both
(CGP15, DKR14) to achieve randomness hiding. Namely, let the encryption program
B generate a ciphertext containing not only input xi of a party, but also randomness
ri derived internally by the program without help of the party. Later Eval can decrypt
ciphertexts, learn all xi and ri and compute the function as f(x1, . . . , xn;
⊕
ri).
However, this approach is bound to fail in our case: for our proof of security to
go through, we crucially need the fact that round-1 messages (i.e. commitments)
completely determine the computation, and therefore parties would have to commit to
ri in round 1. This means that parties have to know ri themselves, and therefore the
randomness of the computation will be revealed upon corruption.
Another idea to let our protocol compute randomized functionalities while hiding the
randomness is to randomize program Eval in a natural way, i.e. let Eval apply a PRF
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on its inputs, and use the resulting randomness for computing the function. Hopefully,
security of a PRF will guarantee that this randomness remains hidden. However, this
idea still doesn’t work in of itself: it again violates our crucial property that round-1
messages should determine the computation. Namely, if randomness was derived as
a PRF of inputs to Eval (recall that Eval takes round-2 ciphertexts as inputs), this
property would be violated, since for a given set of round-1 messages there may be
many corresponding round-2 ciphertexts, and thus many possible randomness of the
computation.
Our actual solution modifies the previous attempt so that the crucial computation-
fixing property is not violated. For this, we let program Eval decrypt ciphertexts,
compute a PRF on round-1 commitments and evaluate a randomized functionality
with resulting randomness. Intuitively, security of a PRF (and obfuscation on top of
it) guarantees that this value remains hidden. The simulator can generate simulated
Eval where this PRF is punctured and the result of the computation is hardcoded.
For this idea to work it is important that Eval is generated during the runtime; if it
was fixed in the CRS, we would have to hardwire outputs for every execution and
therefore the CRS would have to grow with the number of executions.
Achieving RAM efficiency. There are two ways to use our construction in
order to achieve an efficient protocol. One way is to use iO for RAM in all programs
involved. However, iO for RAM requires sub-exponential security of underlying iO for
circuits. The other way, which only needs polynomially-secure iO for circuits, is to
use the protocol to evaluate a functionality which takes parties’ inputs and a function
and outputs garbled function and garbled inputs; then parties can evaluate garbling
themselves locally. If a RAM-efficient garbling scheme is used ((CH16)), then the
whole protocol becomes RAM-efficient. Note that it is enough to use statically secure
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garbling scheme, since our base protocol supports randomness-hiding functionalities,
i.e. doesn’t reveal randomness of the computation even when everybody is corrupted10.
The composed scheme also supports randomized randomness-hiding functionalities:
to evaluate such a functionality f(x1, . . . , xn; r), parties should use basic protocol to
evaluate a randomized function F (x1, . . . , xn; (r1, r2)) which uses r1 as randomness to
garble function f and inputs x1, . . . , xn, r2 (r2 being random input of f).
2.2.5 Our Techniques: Malicious Case
To obtain a two-round RAM efficient protocol in a malicious setting, we observe that
the protocol of (GP14) becomes RAM-efficient, as long as statistically-sound NIZK
they use is RAM-efficient. Let us briefly describe their protocol. Very roughly, in their
protocol parties exchange commitments in round 1, and in round 2 they broadcast
their input encrypted twice together with a NIZK proof that plaintexts are the same
(the actual statement for the proof is more complicated, as discussed below). The
CRS contains an obfuscated program which expects to see commitments from round
1, together with ciphertexts from round 2 and corresponding proofs. This program
checks NIZKs and uses a hardwired decryption key of a double encryption to decrypt
the ciphertexts and evaluate the function. Each party can feed its transcript to this
program and obtain the output.
So far the protocol seems to work in any model of computation: indeed, if we use
iO for RAM to obfuscate the evaluation program in the CRS, then the work of each
party becomes proportional to RAM complexity of a function. However, the problem
10If the protocol revealed randomness of the computation, then the garbling scheme would have
to be adaptively secure , i.e. the simulator of the garbling scheme would have to first simulate it
and then, once it learned inputs, provide consistent generation randomness of the garbling scheme
(note that the term “adaptive security” is ambiguous: in the context of garbling it usually denotes a
different property, saying that simulation is possible even if inputs or functions are chosen adaptively
after seeing some garbled values. Here by adaptive security we mean that random coins can be
generated by the simulator).
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is that the NIZK statement is more complicated than described above: it also requires
proving that y = f(x1, . . . , xn), which is needed for the security proof to go through.
As usual in “iO + NIZK” techniques, the NIZK has to be statistically sound. For all
known NIZKs, this means that the verifier (in our case, the obfuscated evaluation
program) has to do work proportional to the circuit complexity of f , even if the
program is obfuscated with iO for RAM.
Therefore to make this protocol RAM-efficient, it suffices to build RAM-efficient
statistically sound NIZK.
RAM-efficient statistically sound NIZK for NP. Let a language L be specified
by a relation R(x,w). We build a statistically sound NIZK where, roughly, the work of
the prover and NIZK length depends on |R|RAM, and the work of the verifier depends
on worst-case RAM complexity of R.
Our main idea is the following: to prove that x∗ ∈ L, the prover should send to a
verifier a garbled program GProg(R(x,w)), a garbled input GInp(x∗, w∗), and a NIZK
proof (for circuits) that the garbling was done correctly: i.e. that the prover followed
the garbling algorithm, and that it garbled correct function R and input x. The
verifier should accept the proof if the NIZK proof verifies, and if the evaluation of a
garbled program on a garbled input results in 1.
However, there are two issues. First, since we assume that we only have a NIZK for
circuits, we need to make sure that the statement which we prove (i.e. that garbling
was done correctly) is independent of the circuit complexity of R (in particular, we
need a garbling scheme where the size of circuits which generate garbling, i.e the size
of GInp,GProg, only depend on a size of RAM description of a program to be garbled).
Second, note that this scheme guarantees that the garbler follows the garbling instruc-
tions (because of the NIZK), but there is no way to guarantee that the prover uses
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truly random coins to garble. This might introduce problems. Consider a garbling
scheme which is not perfectly correct: say, for some choice of parameters the garbled
program always outputs 1, no matter what the underlying program does11. In this case
a malicious and unbounded prover could choose these bad parameters and therefore
convince the verifier in wrong statements, since the evaluation of a garbled program
results in 1 no matter whether R(x,w) holds or not. Thus, we need a garbling scheme
where the evaluation can never result in the wrong answer, i.e. where the computation
always results in either a correct result or ⊥. We call this property perfect correctness
with abort.
We observe that the garbling scheme of Canetti and Holmgren ((CH16)) already has
both properties; see full version (CPV16) for details. Thus, our scheme yeilds a NIZK
system when instantiated with the garbling scheme by (CH16).
2.2.6 Building Blocks
In this section we define and build puncturable randomized encryption (PRE) and an
honest-but-curious commitment - primitives used in our MPC protocol (section 2.2.7).
Puncturable randomized encryption
Puncturable randomized encryption (PRE) is a randomized, symmetric key encryption.
Besides standard algorithms Gen,Enc,Dec, there is additional procedure Puncture(k,
c∗) which takes as input a key k and a ciphertext c∗ = Enc(m∗; r∗) and outputs a
partial, or punctured, key k{c∗}. Such a key has two properties. First, it doesn’t
reveal any information about the plaintext of c∗; this is captured by requiring that
a simulator should simulate a ciphertext and a punctured key without knowing a
plaintext. Second, the key should still have the same functionality in all other points:
11Note that the proof of garbling done correctly doesn’t save us, since the garbler followed the
garbling algorithm; it’s just the scheme itself allows for wrong garbling.
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namely, it should correctly decrypt all other c 6= c∗, and it should correctly encrypt
all other (m, r) 6= (m∗, r∗).
PRE can be viewed as a randomized, simulation-secure analog of a puncturable
deterministic encryption (PDE) (SW14).
Definition 1. Puncturable randomized encryption (PRE) is a tuple of algorithms
(Gen,Enc,Dec,Puncture, Sim), which satisfy the following properties:
• Statistical correctness: With overwhelming probability over the choice of the
key k ← Gen(1λ), for any message m and randomness r Deck(Enck(m; r)) = m.
• Statistical correctness of the punctured key: With overwhelming probabil-
ity over the choice of the key k ← Gen(1λ), for any message m∗ and randomness
r∗, let c∗ ← Enck(m∗; r∗), and k{c∗} ← Puncture(k, c∗). Then:
– for any (m, r) such that (m, r) 6= (m∗, r∗), Enck(m; r) = Enck{c∗}(m; r);
– for any c 6= c∗ Deck(c) = Deck{c∗}(c) (in particular, both decryptions should
output ⊥ on the same set of ciphertexts, except c∗).
• Simulation security with the punctured key: For any PPT adversary
A and for any message m∗, consider the following experiment: k ← Gen(1λ),
r∗ is chosen at random, c∗ ← Enck(m∗; r∗), k{c∗} ← Puncture(k, c∗), and
(cSim, k{cSim})← Sim(). Then
Pr[A(k{c∗},m∗, c∗) = 1]− Pr[A(k{cSim},m∗, cSim) = 1] < negl(λ).
Simulation security says that even if an adversary has almost all key, it cannot tell
whether it sees an encryption of a known message m∗ or a simulated encryption (as
long as randomness of encryption remains hidden). Note that simulation security with
the punctured key implies normal security of PRE as a secret-key encryption, since
with k{c∗} the adversary can answer encryption-decryption queries itself.
Our construction in a nutshell. The key of a PRE consists of a key K of
a puncturable PRF and a public key pk of an injective encryption scheme. To
encrypt message m under randomness r, the sender computes T ← Encpk(m; r),
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C ← FK(T ) ⊕ (m, r), and sets its ciphertext to be (T,C). To decrypt, the receiver
computes (m, r)← FK(T )⊕C and checks whether T = Encpk(m; r). To puncture the
key at a ciphertext (T,C), output (pk,K{T}), where K{T} is a PRF key punctured
at T .
In this construction the encryption scheme should be injective for both message and
randomness. We observe that the encryption scheme by (SW14), where the ciphertext
is (prg(r), Fk(prg(r)) ⊕ m), satisfies this property, as long as the underlying prg is
injective. In turn, (the family of) injective prgs exists assuming iO and injective OWFs:
indeed, the fact that iO(PRF) is a hardcore function (BST14) immediately implies
that this is also a prg family; this prg can be made injective by putting an injective
PRF (SW14) inside. Note that injective PRF doesn’t require injective OWFs; instead,
the existence of injective OFWs is required for the proof of (BST14) (that iO(PRF) is
a hardcore function) to go through.
Therefore we obtain PRE assuming iO and injective OWFs.
More detailed description. We construct PRE from puncturable PRFs and a
public key encryption which is injective with respect to both message and randomness
(i.e. it should hold that Encpk(m1; r1) = Encpk(m2; r2) implies (m1, r1) = (m2, r2)).
Lemma 3. (SW14, BST14) Assuming indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and
injective one way functions, there exists a public key encryption which is statistically
injective with respect to both message and randomness.
Proof. In short, the work of (BST14) essentially builds an injective prg, which can
be plugged into encryption scheme of (SW14) to obtain injective PKE. We briefly
present all constructions here for completeness.
Overall encryption scheme. Recall that in the PKE scheme of
(SW14) the public key is an obfuscated program which takes (m, r) as input, computes
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t = prg(r), and outputs (t, Fk(t)⊕m) as a ciphertext. Note that this scheme is only
injective for messages, but not for randomness, since underlying prg could map two
different randomness to the same output. Thus for this encryption to be injective, we
need an injective prg. In addition, note that for this construction it is enough to have
a family of prgs (which is statistically injective): the prg could be chosen from the
family during the process of the key generation for the encryption scheme.
Injective prg family. We note that the work of Bellare et al.(BST14), which proves
that iO(PRF) is a hardcore function for any injective OWF12, also implies that iO(PRF)
is a prg family, as long as there exist injective OWFs. Indeed, in their work they show
that H = iO(PRF) is a hardcore function for any injective OWF f , i.e. that for random
r (f,H, f(r), H(r)) ≈c (f,H, f(r), U|H(r)|). This implies the following: as long as there
exists an injective OWF f , it holds that (f,H, f(r), H(r)) ≈c (f,H, f(r), U|H(r)|) and
therefore it also holds that (H,H(r)) ≈c (H,U|H(r)|), which means that this is a prg
family.
This prg family is statistically injective, as long as the underlying PRF is statistically
injective.
Injective PRF family. Sahai and Waters (SW14) build a statistically injective
puncturable PRF family from a PRF family {Fk(x)} (which in turn can be built
from OWFs) and a 2-universal hash function h(x) (which exists unconditionally) as
Fk(x) ⊕ h(x), as long as the output of a PRF is large enough. Namely, they show
that as long as m(λ) > 2n(λ) + e(λ), there exists such a statistically injective PRF
family which maps n(λ) bits to m(λ) bits and has a failure probability 2−e(λ) (i.e.
with probability 2−e(λ) over the choice of the PRF key the PRF is not injective).
This concludes the proof that a statistically injective PKE exists assuming iO and
injective OWFs. We underline that this PKE is only statistically injective, since
underlying PRFs might be non-injective with some negligible probability.
From injective PKE to PRE. Our PRE is constructed as follows (see fig. 2·9
for a more concise description):
12In fact, for them it is enough that OWF is poly-to-one. Thus we can relax our assumptions for
MPC protocol from injective OWF to poly-to-one OWF.
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• Key generation: PRE.Gen(1λ, rGen) uses rGen to sample a PRF key K and
generate (pk, sk)-pair of a public key encryption scheme which is statistically
injective for messages and randomness. It sets PRE.k ← (K, pk).
• Encryption: PRE.EncPRE.k(m; r) sets T ← Encpk(m; r) and C ← FK(T ) ⊕
(m, r) (if the key K is punctured at point T , encryption outputs ⊥). It outputs
the ciphertext c = (T,C).
• Decryption: PRE.DecPRE.k(c) parses c as (T,C) and sets (m, r)← FK(T )⊕C
(if the key K is punctured at point T , decryption outputs ⊥). Next it verifies
that Encpk(m; r) = T ; if this check passes, it outputs m, otherwise it outptus ⊥.
• Puncture: PRE.Puncture(PRE.k, c) parses c as (T,C) and punctures the PRF
key at T ; it outputs the PRE punctured key (pk,K{T}).
• Simulation: PRE.Sim() first chooses the key PRE.k by sampling a PRF key K
and generating (pk, sk)-pair of a public key encryption scheme. Next it generates
T = Encpk(0; r) for random r and sets C to be a random string. It sets the
simulated ciphertext cSim to be (T,C) and outputs it. Next, it punctures the
PRF key K at T and sets the simulated punctured key k{cSim} to be (pk,K{T}).
Theorem 13. Assuming that PKE is a public key encryption scheme, injective for
both messages and randomness, and assuming one way functions, the construction
presented on fig. 2·9 is a puncturable randomized encryption.
Proof. Before showing correctness and security, we note the following useful property
of our encryption:
First part of a ciphertext determines the second. For a given T ∗, there exists
at most one C∗ such that (T ∗, C∗) is a valid (i.e. decrypted to non-⊥) ciphertext.
Indeed, due to injectivity of underlying PKE, there exists at most one (m∗, r∗) pair
such that T ∗ = PKE.Encpk(m
∗; r∗). Therefore the check in the decryption algorithm
will only pass for C∗ = FK(T
∗)⊕ (m∗, r∗).
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Construction of a PRE
PRE.Gen(1λ, rGen):
1. Sample PRF.K and (PKE.pk,PKE.sk);
2. Output (PRF.K, PKE.pk)
PRE.EncPRE.k(m; r):
1. T ← Encpk(m; r)
2. If K is punctured at T , output ⊥ and halt;
3. C ← FK(T )⊕ (m, r).
4. outputs (T,C).
PRE.DecPRE.k(T,C):
1. If K is punctured at T , output ⊥ and halt;
2. (m, r)← FK(T )⊕ C
3. If Encpk(m; r) = T then output m, else ⊥.
PRE.Puncture(PRE.k, c = (T,C)):
1. Output PRE.k{c} = (pk,K{T})
PRE.Sim():
1. PRE.k ← PRE.Gen(rGen) for random rGen;
2. T = Encpk(0; r) for random r;
3. C ← random ;
4. output c = (T,C), PRE.k{c} = (pk,K{T});
Figure 2·9: Construction of a PRE from a puncturable PRF and
injective PKE.
Correctness. This scheme is statistically correct, as immediately follows from
correctness of encryption C = FK(T ) ⊕ (m, r) and the fact that the check T =
Encpk(m; r) passes for honestly generated ciphertext.
Next, correctness of the punctured key also holds, as long as underlying PKE is
injective: indeed, there is only a single (m, r)-pair which results in T = T ∗, and
therefore puncturing out T ∗ in k only affects encryption of m∗ with r∗. On a decryption
side, since only (T ∗, C∗) is a valid ciphertext with T = T ∗, puncturing k only affects
the decryption of (T ∗, C∗). Indeed, ciphertexts of the form (T 6= T ∗, C) are decrypted
in the same way regardless of which key is used, the full key or the punctured one.
On the other hand, ciphertexts of the form (T ∗, C 6= C∗) are rejected by decryption
with both real and punctured keys: indeed, decryption with the full key rejects it
since the ciphertext is invalid, and decryption with the punctured key rejects it since
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decryption tries to evaluate the PRF at the punctured point T ∗, so the check in line 1
of decryption fails.
Security. To show security, we need to show that the punctured key, the message,
and the ciphertext, i.e. ((K{T ∗}, pk),m∗, (T ∗, C∗)), is indistinguishable in the two
cases: in one case T ∗ = Encpk(m
∗; r∗), C∗ = FK(T
∗) ⊕ (m∗, r∗), and in the other
case T ∗ = Encpk(0) and C
∗ is randomly chosen. We do this by considering a middle
distribution where T ∗ is real, i.e. T ∗ = Encpk(m
∗; r∗), but C∗ is random. The middle
and the real distribution are indistinguishable due to the property of a punctured
PRF: FK(T
∗) is indistinguishable from random, therefore so is FK(T
∗) ⊕ (m∗, r∗).
Middle and simulated distributions are indistinguishable by security of a PKE.
Honest-but-curious Equivocal Commitments
Motivated by the fact that standard non-interactive commitments are unnecessary
strong for our protocol (i.e. support malicious behavior of the sender) and at the
same time make the CRS local, we consider a weaker semi-honest commitment which
doesn’t have this disadvantage.
Namely, an honest-but-curious commitment scheme (HBCCommit,Verify) can be used
to commit to a value x with randomness r using c← HBCCommit(x; r), which later
can be opened to convince the verifier that it was x that was committed to. The
difference between this primitive and the standard commitment is in the security
guarantee. Here we only require that an honestly generated commitment cannot be
opened in a different way, even by an unbounded adversary. The other way to state
this property is to say that for overwhelming fraction of randomness, commitments are
statistically binding; this means that a semi-honest sender will generate a statistically
binding commitment. (Still, there can be a negligible fraction of commitments which
can be easily opened in both ways).
In addition, we require the commitment scheme to be equivocal, or adaptively secure,
i.e. the simulator should be able to provide randomness consistent with the simulated
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commitment.
Unlike its stronger counterpart, honest-but-curious commitment can be constructed
in a plain model, in a fairly simple way.
Definition 2. An honest-but-curious commitment scheme for a message space M is
a pair of PPT algorithms (HBCCommit(x; r),Verify(x, r, c)), such that the following
properties hold:
• Correctness: For any x, r Verify(x, r,HBCCommit(x; r)) = 1;
• Most commitments are statistically binding: For any x ∈M
Pr
r
[∃r′, x′ s.t. x′ 6= x ∧ Verify(x′, r′,HBCCommit(x; r)) = 1] < negl(λ).
• Computational hiding and equivocation: There exist a PPT simulator
Sim such that for any x ∈M it holds that
{(r, x, c) : c←HBCCommit(x; r), r ← {0, 1}|r|} ≈c
{(r, x, c) : (c, state)← Sim(), r ← Sim(x, state)}.
Construction. We build a semi-honest commitment scheme for message space
M = {0, 1}. Consider a prg with exponentially sparse range (say, length-doubling prg,
mapping λ bits to 2λ bits). To commit to 0, output (prg(s), r), and to commit to 1,
output (r, prg(s)), where s is a random value of size λ, and r is a random value of size
2λ. To open the commitment, show (s, r).
Since honestly generated (i.e. random) r is outside the image of the prg with over-
whelming probability, there is no s such that prg(s) = r, and therefore for honestly
generated commitment there doesn’t exist the wrong opening. On the other hand,
the simulator can generate its commitment as (prg(s0), prg(s1)) and later open it to
any bit b, showing sb and claiming that the other value is randomly chosen. Thus we
proved the following statement:
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Theorem 14. Assuming the existence of one way functions, the above scheme is an
honest-but-curious commitment scheme for the message space M = {0, 1}.
2.2.7 Our MPC Protocol against Semi-Honest Adversaries
In this section we present our two-round, RAM-efficient, semi-honest protocol with
global CRS.
Our protocol is described in Fig. 2·10 and corresponding programs are given in Fig.
2·11, Fig. 2·12. The CRS consists of two programs, Gen and ExplainGen. Gen is
a generation algorithm which produces “encryption” program B, “decryption-and-
evaluation” program Eval and program ExplainB. Both ExplainGen and ExplainB are
not used in the protocol execution; they are used in the simulation only in order to
provide consistent randomness for Gen and B.
In the first round everybody uses the semi-honest commitment scheme (defined and
constructed in section 2.2.6) to “commit” to (i, xi) with randomness rcom,i. In addition,
parties exchange randomness rGen,i and everybody sets (the same) rGen ←
⊕
rGen,i.
Everybody runs Gen(rGen) to obtain the same programs B,Eval,ExplainB.
In round 2 everybody runs bi ← B(i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an; rB,i) (which essentially
encrypts all round 1 messages together with a party’s own opening of a commit-
ment, under some randomness rB,i) and sends out bi. Then everybody computes
The protocol
CRS: programs Gen and ExplainGen
inputs: xi; randomness: rcom,i, rB,i, rGen,i
1. Round 1: Each party Pi computes ai ← HBCCommit(i, xi; rcom,i) and broad-
casts (ai, rGen,i);
2. Each party sets rGen ←
⊕
rGen,i and runs {B,Eval,ExplainB} ← Gen(rGen);
3. Round 2: Each party broadcasts bi ← B(i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an; rB,i);
4. Each party sets its output to be y ← Eval(b1, . . . , bn).
Figure 2·10: MPC protocol.
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y ← Eval(b1, . . . , bn). Eval decrypts every ciphertext, validates each commitment
using opening provided in corresponding ciphertext, and in addition checks that all
ciphertexts agree on the set of round-one commitments. If these checks pass, Eval does
the computation (computing randomness as a PRF of commitments, if the function is
randomized) and outputs y.
The central encryption scheme used by program B to encrypt and by Eval to decrypt
is a puncturable randomized encryption (PRE), which we built in section 2.2.6) from
iO and injective OWFs. In addition, both Gen and B have a trapdoor branch which
helps the simulator to generate consistent randomness with the help of programs
ExplainGen,ExplainB. Essentially helper programs ExplainGen,ExplainB use a special
encryption scheme (puncturable deterministic encryption, PDE, (Wat15)), in order
to encode an instruction “output output∗ and halt” into a random-looking value,
which pretends to be true randomness of a party. Gen and B try to decrypt this
value in a trapdoor branch and follow the instruction encoded. In addition, this
technique requires to use a special PRF, called extracting PRF, FExt ((SW14)) We
don’t elaborate on this mechanism further since it closely follows the original idea of
(SW14), (DKR14).
Theorem 15. Assuming injective one way functions13 and indistinguishability obfus-
cation for circuits, the presented protocol is a two-round multiparty protocol with global
CRS adaptively secure against honest-but-curious corruptions of possibly all parties.
The protocol allows to compute any randomized functionalities, even randomness-hiding
ones. Its communication complexity depends on λ, {|xi|}ni=1, y, |f |RAM (logarithmic pa-
rameters omitted), and time and space of every party depends on λ, {|xi|}ni=1, y, |f |RAM,
and time or space needed to evaluate RAM f(x1, . . . , xn) in the worst case.
13In fact, this requirement can be relaxed down to one way functions with at most polynomial-size
preimage, since such OWF suffices to prove that the construction of (BST14) is secure; and therefore
the PRE scheme (section 2.2.6) exists under this assumption and iO.
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Programs in the CRS:
Program Gen(rGen)
Constants: an extracting PRF key ExtGen, faking PDE key fGen
• Trapdoor branch:
1. set (Prog1,Prog2,Prog3, ρ̃) ← PDE.DecfGen(rGen). If decryption returns ⊥
then goto normal branch;
2. output Prog1,Prog2,Prog3 and halt;
• Normal branch:
1. uGen ← FExtGen(rGen);
2. use uGen to sample extracting PRF key ExtB, PRE key K, PRF key k, faking
PDE key fB and obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB;
3. output obfuscated programs B[ExtB, fB, K],Eval[K, k],ExplainB[fB].
Program ExplainGen(Prog1,Prog2,Prog3; ρ)
Constants: faking PDE key fGen
1. Set M = ((Prog1,Prog2,Prog3), prg(ρ));
2. Set rGen ← PDE.EncfGen(M);
3. output rGen.
Figure 2·11: Programs in the CRS of our protocol. Program Gen
chooses keys and outputs obfuscated programs B,Eval,ExplainB, defined
in figure 2·12. Program ExplainGen is only used by the simulator in
order to generate consistent random coins for Gen.
2.2.8 The Proof of the Main Theorem
On achieving RAM efficiency. There are two ways to use our construction in
order to achieve an efficient protocol. One way is to use iO for RAM in all programs
involved (in particular, the program Gen, which obfuscates three programs, should
use an obfuscator for RAM). The other way is to use the protocol to evaluate a
functionality which takes parties’ inputs and a function and outputs garbled function
and garbled inputs; then parties can evaluate garbling themselves locally. If a RAM-
efficient garbling scheme is used ((CH16)), then it suffices to use iO for circuits to
make the whole protocol RAM-efficient. Note that it is enough to use statically secure
garbling scheme, since our base protocol supports randomness-hiding functionalities,
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Programs produced by the CRS:
Program B(i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an; rB,i)
Constants: an extracting PRF key ExtB, faking PDE key fB, PRE key K
• Trapdoor branch:
1. set (i′, x′, r′com,i, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n, b
′, ρ̃) ← PDE.DecfB(rB,i). If decryption returns
⊥ then goto normal branch;
2. if (i′, x′, r′com,i, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n) 6= (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an) then goto normal
branch;
3. output b′ and halt;
• Normal branch:
1. Set M = (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an)
2. uB,i ← FExtB(M, rB,i)
3. Set b← PRE.EncK(M ; prg(uB,i))
4. Output b
Program Eval(b1, . . . , bn)
Constants: PRE key K, key k of a PRF G
1. For every i decrypt:
(a) Set Mi ← PRE.DecK(bi);
(b) Parse Mi as (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an). If the format is wrong (in particular,
if i is wrong), output ⊥.
2. For every i check consistency:
(a) Verify that the set (a1, . . . , an) is the same in all M1, . . . ,Mn;
(b) Verify that ai = HBCCommit(i, xi; rcom,i)
3. Set R← Gk(a1, . . . , an).
4. Output y ← f(x1, . . . , xn;R). (If f is deterministic, ignore R).
Program ExplainB(i, x, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an; b; ρ)
Constants: PDE key fB
1. Set M = ((i, x, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an), b, prg(ρ))
2. Set rB,i ← PDE.EncfB(M)
3. output rB,i
Figure 2·12: Programs used in the protocol.
i.e. doesn’t reveal randomness of the computation even when everybody is corrupted14.
14If the protocol revealed randomness of the computation, then the garbling scheme would have
to be adaptively secure , i.e. the simulator of the garbling scheme would have to first simulate it
and then, once it learned inputs, provide consistent generation randomness of the garbling scheme
(note that the term “adaptive security” is ambiguous: in the context of garbling it usually denotes a
different property, saying that simulation is possible even if inputs or functions are chosen adaptively
after seeing some garbled values. Here by adaptive security we mean that random coins can be
generated by the simulator).
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The composed scheme also supports randomized randomness-hiding functionalities:
to evaluate such a functionality f(x1, . . . , xn; r), parties should use basic protocol to
evaluate a randomized function F (x1, . . . , xn; (r1, r2)) which uses r1 as randomness to
garble function f and inputs x1, . . . , xn, r2 (r2 being random part of input).
Unlike the first approach, the second approach doesn’t require subexponentially-secure
iO (which is an assumption currently required for iO for RAM).
In both cases, we assume that the simulator gets all necessary information about the
computation (such as worst-case running time, space, etc) from the ideal functionality.
As discussed in the introduction, setting a lower (than the worst-case) bound on the
running time/space of the computation might be useful if parties agree to sacrifice
some security for efficiency.
Correctness. Correctness of the scheme can be immediately verified. Note that in
case of randomized functionalities the randomness for the computation is obtained
via a PRF G, and therefore the distribution of the output is only computationally
close to the ideal distribution.
Simulation. The simulator works as follows:
CRS: The simulator generates the CRS honestly.
Round 1: Each a∗i is simulated by a simulator of a semi-honest commitment scheme.
Each b∗i is simulated by PRE.Sim, together with a punctured key K{{b∗i }ni=1}. Eval1,B1
are generated as in fig. 2·13 (using punctured keys K{{b∗i }ni=1} and k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)}),
and ExplainB is generated as in fig. 2·11. r∗Gen is set to explain these B1,Eval1,ExplainB
(i.e. it is generated as r∗Gen ← ExplainGen(Eval1,B1,ExplainB; ρ) for random ρ). Each






Gen,i) is a simulated first message of each party.
Round 2: b∗i (generated in round 1) is a simulated second message of each party.
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Simulating internal state: r∗com,i ← HBCCommit.Sim(a∗i , xi) is generated, and
r∗B,i is set to explain b
∗






1, . . . , a
∗
n) (i.e. it is generated as
r∗B,i ← ExplainB((i, x∗i , r∗com,i, a∗1, . . . , a∗n), b∗i ; ρi)) for some random ρi. (r∗com,i, r∗B,i) is
internal state of each party.
Simulator’s knowledge of the output. Note that the simulator is required to
hardwire the output y∗ into Eval1 (fig. 2·13); Eval1 has to be generated at the end
of round 1, since r∗Gen (which is determined right after round 1 ends) depends on it.
It could be that at that moment nobody is corrupted, and the simulator, formally
speaking, doesn’t know the output y∗.
However, we can always assume that it knows y∗ as soon as the simulation starts. The
idea is similar to the idea allowing parties to compute different outputs: they should
evaluate a different function
f ′((x1, r1), . . . , (xn, rn)) = f1(x1, . . . , xn)⊕ r1|| . . . ||fn(x1, . . . , xn)⊕ rn,
where ri is randomness chosen by party i. In this new protocol the simulator can set
the output to be a random value z (which can be chosen even before the protocol
starts), and as soon as party i is corrupted and the simulator learns yi, it can set
ri ← zi ⊕ yi (where zi is the i-th block of z corresponding to the output of party i).
Leakage Resilience. For an adaptively secure protocol to be leakage resilient,
the simulator has to be corruption oblivious, i.e. when simulating leakage from a
party, the simulator can only use ideal-world leakage from this party; even if some
information was leaked from other parties before (and therefore the simulator knows
the information and simulated leakage), it cannot be used in simulation of leakage of
the current party.
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A convenient way to think about this is to imagine that the simulator S should have
special subroutines S1, . . . , Sn (each Si handles leakage from party i), such that the
only possible information flow between them all is S → Si. In other words, Si gets as
input ideal leakage together with necessary information from S (e.g. trapdoors, but
not leakage from other parties, since S doesn’t know it) and simulates leakage based
on this information. S itself doesn’t see anything Si learns from the ideal functionality
or simulates. For a more formal treatment, see (BCH12).
Our simulation is corruption oblivious. Each internal state of the party (i.e. r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i)
can be simulated by a subroutine Si which gets from S a trapdoor to open HBC




i . Si can first
set r∗com,i by opening the commitment appropriately, and then it can generate r
∗
B,i ←
ExplainB((i, xi, rcom,i, a
∗




i ; ρ) for random ρ.
An Overview of the Hybrids
Here we present an overview of the hybrids. The full proof with security reductions is
in section 2.2.8.




Gen are randomly chosen, each a
∗
i is set
to HBCCommit(i, x∗i ; r
∗
com,i), (B,Eval)← Gen(r∗Gen), b∗i ← B(i, x∗i , r∗com,i, a∗1 . . . , a∗n; r∗B,i),
y∗ ← Gk(a∗1, . . . , a∗n).
Hybrid 1: We make challenge programs B, Eval, and ExplainB independent of Gen:
Namely, we choose internal keys of B,Eval,ExplainB, as well as their obfuscation
randomness, at random (instead of generating these values by running Gen). In
addition, r∗Gen is now a simulated randomness such that Gen(r
∗
Gen) outputs B,Eval via
the trapdoor branch (instead of r∗Gen being randomly chosen). Indistinguishability
holds by selective indistinguishability of source and explanation for program Gen (sec.
2.2.9).
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Hybrid 2: We make randomness for challenge ciphertexts b∗i independent of B:
Namely, we use randomness prg(u∗i ), where u
∗
i is chosen at random (instead of u
∗
i
being computed according to B). In addition, r∗B,i is now a simulated randomness such










i via the trapdoor branch (instead of r
∗
B,i
being randomly chosen). Indistinguishability holds by selective indistinguishability of
source and explanation for program B (sec. 2.2.9).
This modification is done for every party.
Hybrid 3: For every party i we switch randomness used to generate challenge b∗i
from prg(u∗B,i) to truly random ũ
∗
B,i, by security of a prg.
Hybrid 4: We modify programs B, Eval so that they only use a punctured version of
a PRE key K{{b∗i }ni=1} and a PRF key k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)} (see fig. 2·14. Note that K is
punctured at several points, while k is punctured at a single point (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n)). We
don’t change functionality of these programs and rely on security of iO.
In program B we can puncture the key K directly (since challenge ciphertexts use truly
random ũ∗B,i as randomness for encryption, and since B always computes randomness
as prg(u∗i ), the program never tries to compute a ciphertext with challenge randomness
ũ∗B,i; by correctness of a punctured PRE key, this key correctly computes ciphertexts
with randomness different from randomness used for puncturing, i.e. ũ∗B,i).
Eval is modified as follows: if it gets as input the challenge set (b∗1, . . . , b
∗
n), then it just
outputs hardwired y∗. If none of the input ciphertext is a challenge ciphertext, then it
just uses a punctured key K{{b∗i }ni=1} to do its normal computation (by correctness of
a PRE punctured key, these ciphertexts are decrypted correctly). The only difference
is that it uses punctured PRF key k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)} to compute randomness R for the
computation. (If it happened that b’s decrypted to the challenge set a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n, then
the program outputs hardwired y∗, if consistency checks pass. Recall that honestly
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Programs used in the proof and the simulation
Program B1(i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an; rB,i)
Constants: an extracting PRF key ExtB, faking PDE key fB, punctured PRE key
K{{b∗i }ni=1}
• Trapdoor branch:
1. set (i′, x′, r′com,i, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n, b
′, ρ̃) ← PDE.DecfB(rB,i). If decryption returns
⊥ then goto normal branch;
2. if (i′, x′, r′com,i, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n) 6= (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an) then goto normal
branch;
3. output b′ and halt;
• Normal branch:
1. Set M = (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an)
2. uB,i ← FExtB(M, rB,i)
3. Set b← PRE.EncK{{b∗i }ni=1}(M ; prg(uB,i))
4. Output b
Program Eval1(b1, . . . , bn)
Constants: punctured PRE key K{{b∗i }ni=1}, punctured PRF key k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)} ,








Case 0: If there is i 6= j such that bi = b∗j , output ⊥.
Case 1: If for all i bi = b
∗
i , then output y
∗ and halt.
Case 2: If for some i bi = b
∗
i (denote such set as I), then:
1. For every i 6∈ I decrypt:
(a) Set Mi ← PRE.DecK{{b∗i }ni=1}(bi);
(b) Parse Mi as (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an)
2. For every i 6∈ I check consistency:
(a) Verify that the set (a1, . . . , an) is the same as (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n)
(b) Verify that ai = HBCCommit(i, xi; rcom,i)
3. Output y∗.
Case 3: If for all i bi 6= b∗i , then:
1. For every i decrypt:
(a) Set Mi ← PRE.DecK{{b∗i }ni=1}(bi);
(b) Parse Mi as (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an)
2. For every i check consistency:
(a) Verify that the set (a1, . . . , an) is the same in all M1, . . . ,Mn;
(b) Verify that ai = HBCCommit(i, xi; rcom,i)
3. If (a1, . . . , an) = (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n) then output y
∗
4. Set R← Gk{(a∗1,...,a∗n)}(a1, . . . , an).
5. Output y ← f(x1, . . . , xn;R).
Figure 2·13: Programs used in the proof and the simulation.
89
generated {a∗i }ni=1 completely define all inputs and randomness of the computation,
therefore y∗ is the only non-⊥ output in this case). Thus the evaluation of both
punctured keys on punctured inputs is avoided.
The question is what to do in Eval when some inputs are challenge ciphertexts and
some are not. We claim that in this case the program should output either y∗ or ⊥
(but cannot output a different y′ 6= y∗): indeed, since at least one of the ciphertexts is
a challenge ciphertext, it contains challenge a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n, and by statistical binding of an
honest-but-curious commitment, each a∗i can be verified only for x
∗
i . R is completely
determined by (a1, . . . , an) too; thus Eval can only output y




⊥. Therefore we modify the program as follows: we decrypt only non-challenge
ciphertexts, and compare their a1, . . . , an with challenge a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n. In addition, we
check that their openings of commitments are correct. If these checks pass, we output
hardwired y∗, otherwise ⊥.





a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) to a simulated one. At the same time we switch the PRE key from the
real punctured key to the simulated punctured key. Indistinguishability holds by the
simulation security of a PRE with the punctured key.
Hybrid 6: We exploit the computational hiding property of an equivocal honest-but-
curious commitment scheme and switch commitments a∗i to simulated, together with
commitment randomness r∗com,i, for each party.
Hybrid 7: Finally, using security of a PRF G with punctured key k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)},
we switch randomness R∗ from Gk(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n) to truly random value, thus making the
output y∗ = f(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n;R
∗) independent of our programs.
At this point the transcript can be simulated by a simulator who might not know
inputs during the execution of the protocol (and only gets them upon corruption of a
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party), but knows the output, as explained in the beginning of the proof. Namely,
commitments a∗i and ciphertexts b
∗
i are simulated; Eval,B,ExplainB are programs
generated by the simulator using the PRE key K{{b∗i }ni=1}, PRF key k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)}.
Hardwired variables inside programs B,Eval are {a∗i }ni=1, {b∗i }ni=1, y∗, which are all
known to the simulator at the end of round 1; thus, Eval,B,ExplainB, and therefore
r∗Gen and each r
∗
Gen,i, can be simulated. Internal state of the party can be generated by
opening the commitment and by running ExplainB to get randomness consistent with
simulated Eval,B,ExplainB.
The Full Descrition of Hybrids.
Next we present the full description of hybrids and security reductions.
Real execution
Here all variables are generated as in a real execution of the protocol, i.e.:
• CRS generation:
1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
Fig. 2·11.
3. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of communication in the protocol:
1. For all i r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. For all i r∗Gen,i is chosen at random;
3. r∗Gen ←
⊕
r∗Gen,i and B[ExtB, fB, K],Eval[K, k],ExplainB[fB]← Gen(r∗Gen);
4. For all i r∗B,i is chosen at random and b
∗
i ← B(i, x∗i , r∗com,i, a∗1, . . . , a∗n; r∗B,i);
5. For every party i (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message and b
∗
i to be the
second message of this party.
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• Internal state
1. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.




1, . . . , a
∗
n)) (in case of f being deter-
ministic, PRF-generated randomness is ignored).
Hybrid 1
In this hybrid (B,Eval,ExplainB) are real-world programs generated using freshly
sampled keys (as opposed to using keys produced by an extractor inside Gen). In
addition, r∗Gen, instead of being chosen at random, is fake randomness explaining these
(B,Eval,ExplainB). Each r∗Gen,i are set to sum up to r
∗
Gen, i.e. first n − 1 r∗Gen,i are
chosen at random and the last one is set such that r∗Gen =
⊕
r∗Gen,i.
Indistinguishability holds because of selective indistinguishability of explanations and
source (sec. 2.2.9) for program Gen, i.e. (Gen,ExplainGen, output← Gen(ρ), ρ) ∼ (Gen,
ExplainGen, output← Gen′(u), rGen ← ExplainGen(output)) for some random u, where
Gen′ is a program which takes randomness u, uses it to sample keys and obfuscation
randomness and outputs obfuscated programs. Note that all variables here can be
generated at a CRS generation stage (in particular, nothing depends on inputs) and
therefore it is enough to use selective explainability.
• CRS generation:
1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
fig. 2·11.
3. u∗Gen is generated at random and used to sample keys ExtB, K, k, fB and
obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB
4. B[ExtB, fB, K],Eval[K, k],ExplainB[fB] are generated and obfuscated using
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keys from previous step (see the code in fig. 2·11).
5. ρ∗2 is chosen at random and r
∗
Gen ← ExplainGen[fGen](B,Eval,ExplainB; ρ∗2) ;
6. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of communication in the protocol:
1. For all i r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. For all i r∗Gen,i is chosen at random, except chronologically the last one
which is set so that r∗Gen =
⊕
r∗Gen,i.
3. For all i r∗B,i is chosen at random and b
∗
i ← B(i, x∗i , r∗com,i, a∗1, . . . , a∗n; r∗B,i);
4. For every party i (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message and b
∗
i to be the
second message of this party.
• Internal state
1. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.
Hybrid 2
In this hybrid for every party i u∗B,i is chosen at random, instead of applying FExtB











1, . . . , a
∗
n)). In addition, r
∗
B,i, instead
of being chosen at random, is fake randomness explaining these b∗i on input M
∗
i .
Indistinguishability is proven by invoking, one by one for each party i, selective indistin-
guishability of explanations and source (sec. 2.2.9) for program B, i.e. (B,ExplainB, bi ←
B(M ; rB,i), rB,i) ∼ (B,ExplainB, bi ← PRE.Enc(Mi; prg(uB,i)), rB,i ← ExplainB(M, b)),
for random uB,i. Note that programs B,Eval,ExplainB need to be determined only
with the last message in round 1 (i.e. when rGen becomes defined), but by this point all




1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
fig. 2·11.
3. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of chronologically first n− 1 messages in round 1:
1. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. r∗Gen,i is chosen at random;
3. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of the last message in round 1:
1. u∗Gen is generated at random and used to sample keys ExtB, K, k, fB and
obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB;
2. B[ExtB, fB, K],Eval[K, k],ExplainB[fB] are obfuscated programs defined in
fig. 2·11.
3. ρ∗2 is chosen at random and r
∗
Gen ← ExplainGen[fGen](B,Eval,ExplainB; ρ∗2);
4. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗









6. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of round 2 messages:
1. Set M∗i ← (i, x∗i , r∗com,i, a∗1, . . . , a∗n);
2. For all i u∗B,i is chosen at random and b
∗
i ← PRE.EncK(M∗i ; prg(u∗B,i));
3. For every party i b∗i is set to be the second message of this party.
• Internal state
1. r∗B,i ← ExplainB(M∗i ; b∗i ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
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2. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.
Hybrid 3
In this hybrid instead of using prg(u∗B,i) as randomness when computing b
∗
i , we use a
random value ũ∗B,i.
Indistinguishability holds by an invocation of security of prg for every i.
• CRS generation:
1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
fig. 2·11.
3. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of chronologically first n− 1 messages in round 1:
1. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. r∗Gen,i is chosen at random;
3. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of the last message in round 1:
1. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. u∗Gen is generated at random and used to sample keys ExtB, K, k, fB and
obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB;
3. B[ExtB, fB, K],Eval[K, k],ExplainB[fB] are obfuscated programs defined in
fig. 2·11.
4. ρ∗2 is chosen at random and r
∗
Gen ← ExplainGen[fGen](B,Eval,ExplainB; ρ∗2);




6. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
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• Generation of round 2 messages:
1. Set M∗i ← (i, x∗i , r∗com,i, a∗1, . . . , a∗n);
2. For all i ũ∗B,i is chosen at random and b
∗
i ← PRE.EncK(M∗i ; ũ∗B,i);
3. For every party i b∗i is set to be the second message of this party.
• Internal state
1. r∗B,i ← ExplainB(M∗i ; b∗i ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
2. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.
Hybrid 4
In this hybrid we generate different programs Eval1,B1, defined in fig. 2·14. The goal
of this hybrid is to use a punctured PRE key K{{b∗i }ni=1} (punctured at n points) and
a punctured PRF key k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)} (punctured at a single point) while preserving
the functionality of both programs.
In program B1 the key is punctured without any other modifications: note that ũ∗B,i is
random, thus it doesn’t have a prg preimage and no input to the program B requires
computing PRE with randomness ũ∗B,i.
In program Eval1 significant modifications are made.
First, there is a check (case 0 on the figure), which says that if any b∗j appears in the
wrong place of the input, i.e. if any bi in the input is equal to b
∗
j for j 6= i, the program
immediately outputs ⊥. Note that the original program does the same, since b∗j would
decrypt to an index j, not i, and the format of i-th plaintext would be wrong. Thus
after this check is made we can assume that if b∗i is a part of the input, it is at position
i.
Second, on input b∗1, . . . , b
∗
n Eval1 outputs y
∗ (note that original Eval does the same).
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Third, on a mixed input (when some bi = b
∗
i , but not all) Eval1 does the following:
it decrypts bi 6= b∗i , but doesn’t decrypt b∗i . Then it runs the code of original Eval by
doing consistency checks, but only for bi 6= b∗i : it checks if the sets of (a1, . . . , an) are
the same in all b’s (since some of bi are b
∗
i , each ai should be equal to a
∗
i inside each
decrypted b), and it checks the commitment (note that there is no need in commitment
check for hardcoded values since they are generated honestly and thus always pass
the check). If consistency checks pass, it outputs hardcoded y∗. To see why it doesn’t
change the functionality of Eval, note two things. First, in this case Eval and Eval1
output ⊥ simultaneously. Second, if they output non-⊥, their output could be only
y∗: this is because as long as there is at least one b∗i in the input, all input b’s has to
encrypt a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n, and, due to statistical binding property of the honest-but-curious
commitment, verification could pass only if the set of inputs in b’s is x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n. In
addition, a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n completely determine randomness for the computation. Thus the




1, . . . , a
∗
n)) (or ⊥).
Finally, in the last case (when all bi 6= b∗i ), the program just executes original Eval
(with punctured PRE keys), with the difference that if each ai = a
∗
i , then the output
should be y∗ (again, this is because a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n completely fix inputs and randomness
and therefore determine the computation). After this “if”, k can be safely punctured
at (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n).
It is easy to see that PRE decryption is never invoked on any b∗i , and PRF G is never
called on (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n), and therefore both keys can be punctured.
Indistinguishability holds by iO.
• CRS generation:
1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
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fig. 2·11.
3. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of chronologically first n− 1 messages in round 1:
1. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. r∗Gen,i is chosen at random;
3. ũ∗B,i is chosen at random;
4. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of the last message in round 1:
1. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. ũ∗B,i is chosen at random;
3. Set M∗i ← (i, x∗i , r∗com,i, a∗1, . . . , a∗n);
4. For all i b∗i ← PRE.EncK(M∗i ; ũ∗B,i);
5. u∗Gen is generated at random and used to sample keys ExtB, K, k, fB and
obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB;
6. R∗ is set to be Gk(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n);




8. B1[ExtB, fB, K{{b∗i }ni=1}],Eval1[K{{b∗i }ni=1}, k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)}, y∗],ExplainB[fB]
are obfuscated programs defined in fig. 2·14.
9. ρ∗2 is chosen at random and r
∗
Gen ← ExplainGen[fGen](B1,Eval1,ExplainB; ρ∗2);




11. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of round 2 messages:
1. For every party i b∗i is set to be the second message of this party.
• Internal state
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1. r∗B,i ← ExplainB(M∗i ; b∗i ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
2. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.
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Programs used in the proof and the simulation
Program B1(i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an; rB,i)
Constants: an extracting PRF key ExtB, faking PDE key fB, punctured PRE key
K{{b∗i }ni=1}
• Trapdoor branch:
1. set (i′, x′, r′com,i, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n, b
′, ρ̃) ← PDE.DecfB(rB,i). If decryption returns
⊥ then goto normal branch;
2. if (i′, x′, r′com,i, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
n) 6= (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an) then goto normal
branch;
3. output b′ and halt;
• Normal branch:
1. Set M = (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an)
2. uB,i ← FExtB(M, rB,i)
3. Set b← PRE.EncK{{b∗i }ni=1}(M ; prg(uB,i))
4. Output b
Program Eval1(b1, . . . , bn)
Constants: punctured PRE key K{{b∗i }ni=1}, punctured PRF key k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)} ,








Case 0: If there is i 6= j such that bi = b∗j , output ⊥.
Case 1: If for all i bi = b
∗
i , then output y
∗ and halt.
Case 2: If for some i bi = b
∗
i (denote such set as I), then:
1. For every i 6∈ I decrypt:
(a) Set Mi ← PRE.DecK{{b∗i }ni=1}(bi);
(b) Parse Mi as (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an)
2. For every i 6∈ I check consistency:
(a) Verify that the set (a1, . . . , an) is the same as (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n)
(b) Verify that ai = HBCCommit(i, xi; rcom,i)
3. Output y∗.
Case 3: If for all i bi 6= b∗i , then:
1. For every i decrypt:
(a) Set Mi ← PRE.DecK{{b∗i }ni=1}(bi);
(b) Parse Mi as (i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an)
2. For every i check consistency:
(a) Verify that the set (a1, . . . , an) is the same in all M1, . . . ,Mn;
(b) Verify that ai = HBCCommit(i, xi; rcom,i)
3. If (a1, . . . , an) = (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n) then output y
∗
4. Set R← Gk{(a∗1,...,a∗n)}(a1, . . . , an).
5. Output y ← f(x1, . . . , xn;R).
Figure 2·14: Programs used in the proof and the simulation.
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Hybrid 5
In this hybrid we switch each b∗i from a real PRE ciphertext to a simulated ciphertext.
In addition, we switch the punctured PRE key K{{b∗i }ni=1} to simulated.
Indistinguishability holds by security of PRE (def. 1).
• CRS generation:
1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
fig. 2·11.
3. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of chronologically first n− 1 messages in round 1:
1. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. r∗Gen,i is chosen at random;
3. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of the last message in round 1:
1. r∗com,i is chosen at random and a
∗





2. u∗Gen is generated at random and used to sample keys ExtB, k, fB and
obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB;
3. R∗ is set to be Gk(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n);




5. K{{b∗i }ni=1}, b∗1, . . . , b∗n are generated by a simulator for the PRE.
6. B1[ExtB, fB, K{{b∗i }ni=1}],Eval1[K{{b∗i }ni=1}, k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)}y∗],ExplainB[fB]
are obfuscated programs defined in fig. 2·14.
7. ρ∗2 is chosen at random and r
∗
Gen ← ExplainGen[fGen](B1,Eval1,ExplainB; ρ∗2);





9. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of round 2 messages:
1. For every party i b∗i is set to be the second message of this party.
• Internal state
1. r∗B,i ← ExplainB(M∗i ; b∗i ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
2. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.
Hybrid 6
In this hybrid we switch each a∗i from a real honest-but-curious commitment to a
simulated commitment. In addition, we switch its randomness r∗com,i to simulated.
Security holds by computational hiding of the equivocal honest-but-curious commit-
ment (def. 2).
• CRS generation:
1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
fig. 2·11.
3. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of chronologically first n− 1 messages in round 1:
1. a∗i is a simulated commitment of an honest-but-curious commitment
2. r∗Gen,i is chosen at random;
3. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of the last message in round 1:
1. a∗i is a simulated commitment of an honest-but-curious commitment
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2. u∗Gen is generated at random and used to sample keys ExtB, k, fB and
obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB;
3. R∗ is set to be Gk(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n);




5. K{{b∗i }ni=1}, b∗1, . . . , b∗n are generated by a simulator for the PRE.
6. B1[ExtB, fB, K{{b∗i }ni=1}],Eval1[K{{b∗i }ni=1}, k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)}],ExplainB[fB] are
obfuscated programs defined in fig. 2·14.
7. ρ∗2 is chosen at random and r
∗
Gen ← ExplainGen[fGen](B1,Eval1,ExplainB; ρ∗2);




9. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of round 2 messages:
1. For every party i b∗i is set to be the second message of this party.
• Internal state
1. r∗B,i ← ExplainB(M∗i ; b∗i ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
2. r∗com,i is a simulated opening of a
∗
i to (i, x
∗
i );
3. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.
Hybrid 7
In this hybrid we switch R∗ from Gk(a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
n) to a truly random value. Therefore




1, . . . , a
∗
n)) to
y∗ = f(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n;R
∗) for random R∗.
Security holds by security of a punctured PRF G.
• CRS generation:
1. Keys fGen, ExtGen are sampled;
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2. Programs Gen[ExtGen, fGen],ExplainGen[fGen] are obfuscated programs from
fig. 2·11.
3. (Gen,ExplainGen) is set to be the CRS.
• Generation of chronologically first n− 1 messages in round 1:
1. a∗i is a simulated commitment of an honest-but-curious commitment
2. r∗Gen,i is chosen at random;
3. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of the last message in round 1:
1. a∗i is a simulated commitment of an honest-but-curious commitment
2. R∗ is set to be random;




4. u∗Gen is generated at random and used to sample keys ExtB, k, fB and
obfuscation randomness for B,Eval,ExplainB;
5. K{{b∗i }ni=1}, b∗1, . . . , b∗n are generated by a simulator for the PRE.
6. B1[ExtB, fB, K{{b∗i }ni=1}],Eval1[K{{b∗i }ni=1}, k{(a∗1, . . . , a∗n)}, y∗],ExplainB[fB]
are obfuscated programs defined in fig. 2·14.
7. ρ∗2 is chosen at random and r
∗
Gen ← ExplainGen[fGen](B1,Eval1,ExplainB; ρ∗2);




9. (a∗i , r
∗
Gen,i) is set to be the first message of a party i.
• Generation of round 2 messages:
1. For every party i b∗i is set to be the second message of this party.
• Internal state
1. r∗B,i ← ExplainB(M∗i ; b∗i ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
2. r∗com,i is a simulated opening of a
∗




3. For every i (r∗com,i, r
∗
B,i) is secret randomness of party i.
This hybrid corresponds to the simulation described in the beginning of the proof.
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2.2.9 Explainability Compiler
The original construction of a deniable encryption by (SW14) gives a way to make a
single algorithm “adaptively secure”: i.e. it transforms a randomized program Alg(x; r)
into a different one Ãlg(x; r) (by adding a trapdoor branch and rerandomizing the
program) so that is possible to generate fake randomness consistent with a given input
and output.
The important property which we use in our proofs is indistinguishability of source
and explanation. Roughly speaking, indistinguishability of source says that for random
r Alg(x; r) and Ãlg(x; r) are indistinguishable. Indistinguishability of explanations
says that real randomness r is indistinguishable from fake randomness r which results
in the same output a = Ãlg(x; r). These properties combined together state that
random r and the output a = Ãlg(x; r) are indistinguishable from the output of
original program a = Alg(x;u) on some random u, together with fake randomness
r which makes compiled Ãlg(x; r) output a. This holds even when the program to
generate fake randomness is publicly available.
The way to think about indistinguishability of source and explanation is the following:
it is possible to move from “a real world” (random r, a ← Ãlg(x; r)) to a “hybrid”
where a← Alg(x;u), and r is fake, but pretending to be real randomness. Essentially
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this step allows to “detach” a from a complicated Ãlg and make it the result of a
simpler Alg. Because of this detaching, in the next hybrid we could use security of the
primitive realized by Alg while still being able to generate internal state r: say, if Alg
is an encryption scheme, then in the next hybrid we could switch it to encryption of a
different value.
We also note that this indistinguishability is only selective, i.e. the input x has to
be known before the indistinguishability game can be played. This imposes some
restrictions on the constructions and proofs (in particular, this is one of the reasons
why we need nested programs).
Since this technique became standard in the world of adaptive security, we only briefly
outlined it here. For formal definitions, constructions, and proofs, we refer the reader
to the paper of Dachman-Soled et al ((DKR14)) who formalized the technique under
the name of explainability compiler.
2.2.10 Three Round MPC against Malicious Adversaries
In this section we present our three-round, RAM-efficient, maliciously secure protocol
with local CRS. Our protocol is described in Fig. 2·15. The CRS consists of two
programs, Gen and ExplainGen. The CRS will also contain a CRS σCLOS corresponding
to the adaptively secure commitment scheme of (CLOS02) and a CRS σNIZK corre-
sponding to a NIZK argument system that is simulation sound and secure against
adaptive adversaries (GOS06).15 We will denote by adComx(msg; r) the procedure to
commit using the commitment scheme of (CLOS02) where x is the common reference
string for the commitment, msg is the message and r is the randomness required. We
will rely exactly on the same programs for Gen and ExplainGen from the semi-honest
protocols described in Figures 2·11 and 2·12. Recall that Gen is a generation algorithm
15We remark that the (GOS06) do not explicitly claim simulation soundness. It is easy to obtain a
simulation-sound argument by sampling an independent CRS for every pair of parties.
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The protocol
CRS: σCLOS, σNIZK and programs Gen and ExplainGen,






com,i, {rB,i,j}j=1,...,n , rGen,i
1. Round 1: Each party Pi computes ai ← adComσCLOS(i, xi; r1com,i), r̃Gen,i ←
adComσCLOS(rGen,i; r
2
com,i), r̃B,i,j ← adComσCLOS(rB,i,j; r3com,i) and broadcasts
(ai, r̃Gen,i, r̃B,i,j);
2. Round 2: Each party Pi broadcasts rGen,i, {rB,i,j}j 6=i and proof Πi of the
statement Si using an NIZK proof with CRS σNIZK;
3. Each party sets rGen ←
⊕
rGen,i and runs {B,Eval,ExplainB} ← Gen(rGen);




5. Each party sets its output to be y ← Eval(b1, . . . , bn).
Language Si used in the protocol:
Si := ((r̃Gen,i, rGen,i, r̃B,i,j, rB,i,j) : ∃r2com,i, r3com,i, such that
r̃Gen,i = adComσCLOS(rGen,i; r
2
com,i) and r̃B,i,j = adComσCLOS(rB,i,j; r
3
com,i))
Figure 2·15: Malicious MPC protocol.
which produces “encryption” program B, “decryption-and-evaluation” program Eval
and program ExplainB.
In the first round everybody uses the commitment scheme of (CLOS02) to separately
commit to (i, xi), {rB,i,j}j=1,...,n (to be used as a coin toss for encryption randomness)
and rGen,i (to be used as a coin toss for generation randomness).
In the second round, all parties reveal rGen,i and {rB,i,j}j 6=iand prove using an NIZK
proof that this is indeed the string committed to in the first round. More formally,
party Pi proves the following NP-statement:
Si := ((r̃Gen,i, rGen,i, r̃B,i,j, rB,i,j) : ∃r2com,i, r3com,i, such that
r̃Gen,i = adComσCLOS(rGen,i; r
2
com,i) and r̃B,i,j = adComσCLOS(rB,i,j; r
3
com,i)),
where r̃Gen,i is defined in round 1 of the protocol and rGen,i is the message revealed
by party Pi in round 2. Then everybody sets (the same) rGen ←
⊕
rGen,i. Everybody
runs Gen(rGen) to obtain the same programs B,Eval,ExplainB.
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In the third round, all parties perform exactly the same instructions as they executed
in round 2 of the semi-honest protocol. Namely, everybody runs the program B as:
bi ← B(i, xi, rcom,i, a1, . . . , an; rB,i) (using randomness rB,i =
⊕
j rB,j,i) and broadcasts
bi. Then everybody computes y ← Eval(b1, . . . , bn).
Theorem 16. The protocol described above UC-securely implements Fmulti−f for any
functionality f in the presence of malicious adaptive adversaries.
We present a formal proof of the Theorem in the full version (CPV16).
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2.3 Constant-Round Adaptive MPC
2.3.1 Our Results
We show constant-rounds, adaptively secure protocols in both semi-honest and mali-
cious cases. Our protocols use minimal hardness assumptions - analogous assumptions
to those needed for obtaining static security. Specifically:
Theorem (informal): Assume existence of non-committing encryption schemes.
Then there exist:
• A minimum interaction (i.e., two-message) two-party general function evaluation
protocol that withstands adaptive honest-but-curious corruption of both parties.
The protocol is in the plain model and does not use data erasures.
• A constant-round multiparty general function evaluation protocol in the plain
model that withstands adaptive honest-but-curious corruption of all parties.
Assuming in addition collision resistant hashing and dense cryptosystems, there exist:
• A constant-round multiparty general function evaluation protocol in the plain
model that withstands adaptive Byzantine corruption of all parties, in the non-
concurrent security model (Can00).
• A constant-round UC-secure multiparty general function evaluation protocol in
the common random string model, in face of adaptive Byzantine corruption of
all parties.
Application to leakage tolerant secure computation. (GJS11, BCH12).
A more nuanced (and considerably stronger) notion of security for multi-party
computation protocols considers adversaries who, in addition to corrupting parties,
can mount side-channel attacks on the uncorrupted parties. This is modeled by allowing
the adversary to obtain the value of some arbitrary polytime “partial information
function” f applied to the state of any target uncorrupted party. Security against
such adversaries requires the ability to efficiently simulate the adversary view, when
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the simulator is allowed to obtain the value of a fuction f ′ applied to the state of
the party in the ideal world (namely the input and output of the party), where the
output of f ′ is no longer than the output of f . It is stressed that there is no bound on
the output length of f ; furthermore, both f and f ′ are applied to the state of each
party individually. This way, the notion of leakage tolerance guarantees “graceful
degradation” of security, bounding the rate of degradation of security with the increase
in leakage.16
Currently, leakage-tolerant general secure computation protocols are known only based
on indistinquishability obfuscation and only in the common reference string model (or,
equivalently, in a model where the parties can ineract in an initial leak-free stage in
order to jointly sample correlated random strings for themselves) (CGP15, CPV16).
Earlier, (BDL14, DLZ15) constructed leakage-tolerant protocols in the same leak-free
preprocessing, but where security is guaranteed only as long as the amount of leakage
is less than some threshold value which is some fraction of the security parameter.
(BGJ+13) describe a protocol in the plain model that obtains only the significantly
weaker variant where the leakage from the state of each individual party can be
simulated given leakage on the inputs and outputs of all parties, pooled together.
We show that a variant of our multi-party protocol provides a leakage tolerant protocol
in the same leak-free preprocessing model as (BDL14),
(DLZ15, CGP15, CPV16), with two differences. One the one hand, the initial leak-free
computation suffices only for a bounded number of protocol executions. On the other
hand, the only assumption needed is existence of non-committing encryption:
Theorem (informal): If there exist non-committing encryption schemes then
16Leakage tolerance should not be confused with a related but different notion of sf leakage resilience.
Leakage resilience guarantees that, as long as the leakage is no more than a certain threshold, the
adversary learns nothing about the secret - say, about the message in case of encryption; however,
when the leakage is more than the set threshold, no security guarantees are given.
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there exists a multi-party leakage tolerant general function evaluation protocol in the
plain model. The protocol consists of an off-line leak-free stage, followed by a bounded
number of function evaluations where leakage can be obtained from all parties. Both
stages take a constant number of rounds.
2.3.2 Our Techniques
Yao’s two-party protocol. We first recall Yao’s protocol for two-party circuit
evaluation. Yao’s protocol consists of two main components: a garbling scheme and
oblivious transfer (OT). Recall that a garbling scheme allows to transform a circuit C
and an input x into their garbled versions C̃, x̃. Given C̃ and x̃, it should be possible
to compute y = C(x). On the other hand, security guarantees that C̃, x̃ do not reveal
anything about x (except for what is revealed by the output y). This is formalized by
requiring that the simulator produces good-looking garbled values C̃ and x̃, given only
C and y (but not x). To be useful in Yao two-party protocol, the garbling scheme
needs an additional property called bit-decomposability, which states that it should be
possible to garble each input bit separately, i.e. without knowing other input bits nor
the circuit.
The Yao protocol for evaluating C(x1, x2) for a public circuit C then proceeds as
follows. One of the parties (the garbler G) generates the garbled circuit C̃ and its
own garbled input x̃1 and sends C̃, x̃1 to the other party (the evaluator E). To enable
evaluation C̃(x̃1, x̃2), E should also get x̃2; however, G doesn’t know x2 and cannot
garble it directly. Instead, G sends x̃2 to E via OT: For each position i = 1, . . . , |x2|,
G garbles both input value 0 and and input value 1. Next, G lets E learn exactly
one of the two garbled bits for each input location i. E chooses to take the bit which
corresponds to its input value for that location. After E receives x̃2, it can evaluate
the garbled circuit C̃(x̃1, x̃2) and learn the output y. Since OT can be implemented
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in two messages (one message from E to G, and then one message from G to E), the
resulting protocol requires only two messages.
Static security of this protocol (i.e. security against either an a-priori corrutped G or
an a-priori corrupted E) follows from security of the garbling scheme and the OT.
Specifically, if the garbler is corrupted, the simulator learns the garbler’s input x1 and
generates the garbled circuit and garbled input honestly. If the evaluator is corrupted,
or if nobody is corrupted, the simulator shows the simulated garbled circuit and
simulated garbled input.
The challenge of adaptive security. Recall that in the setting of adaptive
security, the adversary can corrupt parties as the protocol proceeds; upon each
corruption, the adversary learns the whole internal state (e.g. inputs and random
coins) of that party. In the ideal world the simulator obtains only the input and
output of the corrupted party and has to produce consistent random coins of that
party. Furthermore, inputs and outputs are learnt only at the time of corruption.
The above static-corruptions simulation of the Yao protocol fails in in the adaptive
setting, even if ideally secure communication is provided. To illustrate the problem,
consider the adversary that waits until the protocol is finished, then corrupts the
evaluator E, and then the garbler G. Upon corruption of E, the simulator S is given
E’s input x2 and output y and is required to present the garbled circuit and both
garbled inputs; however, S doesn’t know G’s input x1 at this point, and therefore can
only present the simulated garbled circuit and inputs. Upon corruption of G, however,
the adversary expects to see G’s internal state - and in particular randomness which
was used to garble the circuit and inputs. Now S is in trouble: not only does it have
to convince that the (simulated) garbled circuit was generated honestly - which is
already hard for S to do - it also needs to make sure that the simulated garbled input
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x̃1 looks like a garbling of the value x1, which S just learned.
Equivocal garbling schemes. We get around this difficulty by constructing a
scheme that allows the simulator to generate “fake garbled circuits” and “fake garbled
inputs” that can be later consistently “opened” (by presenting consistent randomness
of the garbling) to a given input x. We call such garbling schemes equivocal. In a
bit more detail, an equivocal garbling scheme allows the simulator to first generate a
garbled circuit Ĉ together with garbled input x̂, given only C and y = C(x). Later,
given x, the simulator generates a fake randomness of the garbling that makes Ĉ, x̂
look like a real garbling of C, x. 17
Our equivocal garbling scheme can then be used in a straightforward way, together
with adaptively secure OT and non-committing encryption, to obtain our first main
result, namely adaptively secure, two-message, two-party computation.
Our equivocal garbling scheme is a modification of the traditional Yao garbling scheme;
thus, we first recall how the latter works. Given a public circuit C and an input x,
for each wire w in C, the garbler chooses two random labels, k0w and k
1
w, where each
label is a λ-bit string, λ being the security parameter. Then for each gate g in C, the






g , where c
b1,b2
g is an encryption of k
b3
w3
under a combination of the keys kb1w1 and k
b2
w2
, where w1, w2 are the input wires to g,
w3 is the output wire of g, and b3 = g(b1, b2) is the value of the output bit of gate
g on input bits b1, b2 (there are several standard ways to implement the underlying
encryption mechanism using any one way function). Output gates encrypt output bits
instead of labels.
Each garbled gate consists of the four ciphertexts listed in random order, and the
17We do not use the term adaptive garbling since this term has already been used in the literature
to denote a very different form of adaptivity for garbling schemes (GKR08, BHR12). See section
2.3.3 for details.
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garbled circuit C̃ consists of all garbled gates. The garbled input x̃ consists of labels for
input wires corresponding to bits of x, i.e. kxii for every i = 1, . . . , |x|. Given garbled
circuit and garbled input, the circuit can be evaluated gate by gate, by decrypting an
appropriate ciphertext and learning the label for its output wire.
This scheme satisfies the standard (i.e. non-equivocal) definition of the garbling
scheme. Indeed, to simulate the garbled circuit given C and y, the simulator, instead
of encrypting k0w, k
1
w for each gate, will encrypt the same random label kw four
times (output gates should instead encrypt y). The input is garbled by giving ki for
i = 1, . . . , |x|. Intuitively, this simulation is good, since evaluation results in y, and
since the adversary can only decrypt one ciphertext per gate, which decrypts to a
random label, just like in the real case. However, this scheme is not equivocal: if
the simulator has to explain how ciphertexts were generated, then it has to show
randomness of encryption and all keys, but in this case the adversary would see that
all four ciphertexts encrypt the same label.
This problem would be solved if the simulator was able to pretend that a ciphertext c,
encrypting kw, actually encrypts a different value k̄w. And indeed, the first attempt
to solve this problem may be to use non-committing encryption (NCE) for generating
the four ciphertexts that comprise each garbled gate. (Recall that NCE allows the
simulator to generate “dummy ciphertexts” c that can be later opened to any message
m in some domain. In the case of symmetric encryption, which suffices here, this means
demonstrating a dummy ciphertext c and then, given a message m, demonstrating
a key km and random input rm for the encryptor such that Enc(m, km, rm) = c and
Dec(km, c) = m. )
If the garbling scheme is instantiated with NCE, it indeed becomes equivocal: roughly,
the simulator can generate dummy ciphertexts first, but “open” them appropriately
later, so that they appear encrypting kw, kw, kw, and k̄w. However, we know that for
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NCE the key size must be at least the message size (Nie02). Since each label for an
input wire to a gate is used to encrypt two out of four ciphertexts, we have that with
NCE the labels for the input wire to a gate must be at least twice as long as the labels
for the output wire. This means that circuits of at most logarithmic depth can be
garbled in polynomial time. (In fact, for such circuits the one-time-pad provides a
perfect NCE with statistical security.)
A number of attempts to save on the length of NCE keys, at the price of limiting
the equivocation capabilities, have been proposed, although in a different context
(HJO+16), (GWZ09). We note that neither of these methods seem to suffice in our
setting. We give more details at the end of the introduction in section 2.3.3.
Functionally equivocal encryption (FEE). We avoid this exponential blowup
in label size by using a new type of symmetric encryption scheme, which we call
functionally equivocal encryption (FEE). FEE behaves much like symmetric NCE,
except that the keys are significantly shorter — at the price of somewhat restricted
equivocation capabilities. That is, consider the case where the plaintext space is large
({0, 1}l), but we want to “open” dummy ciphertexts to messages only from a much
smaller, but still exponential, subset R ⊂ {0, 1}l, where |R| = 2n, and n << l. (Say,
R may be the set of English sentences, or the range of a pseudorandom generator from
λ bits to 2λ bits.) If NCE is used, keys still have to be as long as l; in FEE length
of keys instead depends on n which is much shorter than l. It turns out that such a
scheme can be constructed for any set R which has a short description - that is, for
which there exists an efficient circuit f : {0, 1}n → R which enumerates its elements.
At a high level, the syntax of FEE is the following: an encryption algorithm can
encrypt any message m ∈ {0, 1}l (for technical reasons, encryption also needs to know
parameters of f , i.e. its description size, input size, and output size). The simulator
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can fix a set R, which it wants to equivocate to, by choosing its description function
f , and simulate a dummy ciphertext c ← Sim(f). Later the simulator can open c
to any m′ ∈ R, as long as it knows preimage x such that f(x) = m′, by running
(rEnc, k)← Sim(c, x, f). However, for our garbling scheme we need a slightly different
syntax, as we describe below.
More formally, an instance of an FEE scheme is parameterized by the length parameters
s, n, l, where {0, 1}l is the message space, n is equivocality parameter (i.e. the size of
set R we want to equivocate to is 2n), and s is the size of description of the function
f : {0, 1}n → R, which defines the set. In addition to standard key generation,
encryption and decryption algorithms, there is a simulator that operates in three steps,
where each step involves a different algirithm as follows.
First, the simulator uses algorithm SimEnc to generate dummy ciphertexts. Let f be
a function from n bits to l bits with description size s. Algorithm SimEnc takes as
input a description of this function and generates a dummy ciphertext cf together
with a trapdoor.
Then, the simulator uses algorithm Equiv to generate a fake secret key. Algorithm
Equiv takes the trapdoor and a value x ∈ {0, 1}n and generates a key kx such that
Dec(kx, cf ) = m, where m = f(x).
Finally, the simulator uses algorithm Adapt to generate fake randomness for the
encryption process. Algorithm Adapt takes the trapdoor, x, and kx, and outputs
dummy randomness rx such that Enc(kx,m, rx) = cf , where m = f(x).
The values kx, rx, cf should be distributed indistinguishably from a real key, real
randomness and real ciphertext in the process of encryption and decryption of m. In
particular, the function f and the value x should remain hidden even given m, kx, rx, cf .
We also stress that the function f is used only in the generation of dummy values.
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Real encryption and decryption works for arbitrary messages in {0, 1}l, and does not
need to know f .
Importantly, besides security we also require efficiency; that is, FEE keys should have
size n · poly(λ) - potentially much shorter than NCE keys for l-bit messages, which
size has to be at least l. This efficiency requirement will make sure that the size of
labels (i.e. FEE keys) in the garbled circuit doesn’t grow with the depth of the circuit,
thus allowing to garble any polynomial-sized circuit C. At the same time, we will be
able to prove security of the garbling, given this limited equivocation, as we describe
below.
From FEE to equivocal garbling. Our equivocal garbling scheme uses FEE as
the underlying encryption mechanism. The garbling process is the standard one: the
garbler chooses FEE keys and generates garbled gates as double-encryptions of the
next level keys (the difference is that FEE encryption needs to know parameters of the
function f to be used in equivocation; these parameters are some fixed polynomials in
|C|, λ, and |x|). The simulation however is done differently: the idea is to have the
adaptive simulator S for the garbling scheme choose the functions for the different
dummy ciphertexts so that it can later equivocate the keys, plaintexts and randomness
to complete the simulation.
This is done as follows. At the first stage of the simulation (i.e. when the simulator
has to produce C̃, x̃, given C and y), the simulator chooses at random one label kw
for each wire in the circuit C; these labels will be the active labels, namely the wire
labels that are exposed to the adversary at this stage. Next, the simulator computes
the simulated garbled gates, in sequence, gate by gate from the output wire of the
circuit to the input wires, in topological order (we remark that this sequentiality is
imposed for exposition purposes only not crucial, we later show how to garble all gates
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in parallel.)
Let g be a gate with input wires w1, w2 and output wire w3. The four ciphertexts
c00g , ..., c
11
g are computed, using an FEE scheme, as follows. The simulator chooses a
random index among 00, 01, 10, 11, say, 00. Then c00g is set to be a real FEE encryption
of kw3 with keys kw1 and kw2 (the output gate instead encrypts y). The other three




g are dummy ciphertexts, created using the SimEnc procedure of
the FEE scheme with respect to special functions f 01, f 10, f 11, which will be explained
later and which will help the simulator in equivocation. (Recall that SimEnc outputs
not only the dummy ciphertext but also the trapdoor tdw for later equivocation).
The simulator presents these FEE ciphertexts as the garbled circuit, and gives
k1, . . . , k|x| as the garbled input.
At the second stage of the simulation, i.e. when the simulator has to present randomness
used to garble, the simulator first will set each inactive key to be k̄w = Equiv(x, tdw),
and give it to the adversary. Thus the adversary now possesses all keys, both active
and inactive, and therefore can decrypt all ciphertexts and check whether the gates
were garbled correctly. We construct functions f such that the gates will indeed
appear correct to the adversary: namely, each gate will encrypt one key 3 times and
the other key once (assuming a NAND gate), and furthermore, one of these keys will
exactly be kw3 , and the other key will be k̄w3 (where w3 is an output wire of the gate).
Finally, it will be consistent with the computation, in particular, if w3 gets assigned 1
in the computation C(x), then kw3 appears in 3 ciphertexts of a NAND gate; it w3
is 0, then only once. To achieve this, we define functions f b1b2(x) as follows (with
hardwired values b1, b2, C, wire indices w1, w2, w3, the active labels kw1kw2kw3 , and a
trapdoor value tdw3 that comes from the FEEs associated with the gate g
′ that takes
wire w3 as input.):
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Given input x, do:
• Evaluate C(x) and find the bit assignments σ1, σ2, σ3 to wires w1, w2, w3,
respectively.
• Associate the label kw3 (hardwired) with bit σ3. Compute k̄w3 =
Equiv(x, tdw3) and associate it with the bit 1 − σ3 (We call k̄w3 the
inactive label for wire w3.)
• Return a label according to the logical value of the gate. That is,
if the gate is a NAND gate and (b1 ⊕ σ1) NAND (b2 ⊕ σ2) = σ3 then
output the active label kw3 . Else, output the inactive label k̄w3 .
To illustrate why the gate looks like a normal Yao garbled gate under keys kw1 , k̄w1 ,
kw2 , k̄w2 , consider the example where w1 was assigned 0, w2 was assigned 1, and w3
was assigned 0 NAND 1 = 1 by the computation C(x). Thus, the job of the simulator is
to open four ciphertexts so that they encrypt kw3 three times and k̄w3 only once, since
active key kw3 should look like a label for 1. To simplify things, let us ignore the fact
that ciphertexts are double encryptions; let us pretend that all four ciphertexts are
only encrypted once - under kw1 and k̄w1 . Since our goal is to demonstrate how inactive
key k̄w1 will decrypt things correctly, we focus on ciphertexts which are encrypted
under this key, namely, c10 and c11.(Recall that c00 will be decrypted correctly to
kw3 under kw1 , kw2 , since it was an honest encryption. The other ciphertext, c
01, is
a dummy ciphertext under keys kw1 and k̄w2 . The inactive key k̄w2 will make sure it
decrypts appropriately, using a mechanism similar to described above.)
First let’s see how these two ciphertexts should be decrypted: since c00 is the active
ciphertext corresponding to wire assignments 0, 1, c10 should correspond to 1, 1, (indeed,
c00 and c10 are ciphertexts for the opposite bits of w1, but the same bit of w2) and thus
it should pretend to encrypt the key for 1 NAND 1 = 0, i.e. k̄w3 . Similarly, c
11 should
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correspond to 1, 0, and thus it should pretend to encrypt the key for 1 NAND 0 = 1,
i.e. active key kw3 .
Now let’s compare to how these ciphertexts will be decrypted. Since c10 was generated
under the function f 10, decrypting it with k̄w1 = Equiv(x) will result in f
10(x); c11
will decrypt to f 11(x). A closer look at these functions reveals that f 10(x) and f 11(x)
are exactly k̄w3 and kw3 , as it should be. Indeed, each f takes hardcoded active kw3 ,
computes inactive key k̄w3 , and decides which to output, using, in fact, exactly the
same reasoning as the one we used above to decide which key should be the output!
While in the actual proof we have to deal with slightly more complicated functions
due to the fact that each cb1b2 is a double encryption, the idea is exactly the same: let
functions f evaluate C(x) and themselves decide, what to output.
It remains for the simulator to explain randomness of encryption; this is done by
running the Adapt algorithm of the FEE on input x, along with the appropriate keys
and trapdoors.
Finally, we comment on the sizes of the keys, since this was the reason why we couldn’t
simply use NCE. Since each function f takes x as input, the size of equivocable set is
2|x|, and by the property of NCE, the key size only depends on |x|, but not on the
plaintext size (in fact, with our implementation of FEE the key size will be just λ|x|).
Thus, even though each key has to equivocate two plaintexts of size |k| each and
would otherwise have to grow, with FEE the key size can be set to λ|x| throughout
the circuit. We remark that, prior work (?) uses a variant of our approach in the
tamper proof hardware model. More precisely, they rely on individual to implement
garbled gates and the mechanism to reconstruct inactive keys and decide which key
to reveal is embedded in the token in such a way that provides the simulator with a
trapdoor to reveal the inactive keys when the garbler is corrupted.
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Constructing FEE. We construct FEE using the Yao garbled circuits again —
whereas this time it is the standard, statically secure version. In a nutshell, a real
FEE key k is a simulated garbled input in the Yao garbled circuit, i.e. a set of n
random labels for the input wires of a garbled circuit with n-bit input. A real FEE
ciphertext encrypting message m with respect to the key k is a simulated garbled
circuit (consistent with labels from k) with output m. Decryption works by evaluating
the ciphertext (i.e. the simulated garbled circuit with output m) using the key (i.e.
simulated input), which results in m.
A simulated FEE ciphertext for function f is a real garbling of f . A simulated FEE
key, equivocating c for message m (such that f(x) = m for some x), is a real garbled
input x. Indeed, note that the real ciphertext and the key are indistinguishable from
simulated by security of the garbling scheme; in particular, decrypting the simulated
ciphertext (i.e. a real garbled f) with the simulated key (i.e. a real garbled x) results
in computing f(x) = m.
In a bit more detail, recall that an FEE scheme is parameterized by s, n, l where
2l is the size of the plaintext space, 2n is the size of the set R of messages that a
dummy ciphertext can open to, and s is the size of the description of the function
f : {0, 1}n → R. The scheme proceeds as follows. Let Us,n,l be the universal circuit
that takes an s-bit description of a function f from n to l bits, and an n-bit value
x, and outputs the l-bit value f(x). The key k consists of n labels k1, ..., kn, where
as usual each label is a random λ-bit string. To encrypt an l-bit message m, let Im
describe the constant function that outputs m on all inputs, and construct a simulated
(using the static simulator) garbled evaluation of U(Im, 0
n), where the n labels that
correspond to the input of Im are the key k1, ..., kn. Specifically, the ciphertext consists
of one label for each wire of Us,n,l, except for the labels that correspond to the 0
n
input. The FEE ciphertext also contains four ciphertexts per gate of Us,n,l. One of
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these four ciphertexts is an encryption of the output label using the two input labels
as the key, and the other three ciphertexts are just random strings. The ciphertexts
are computed using a standard symmetric encryption scheme that is compatible with
Yao static garbling.
Decryption amounts to evaluating the garbled circuit in the ciphertext using the labels
k1, ..., kn in the key for the input wires.
To generate a dummy ciphertext cf for function f , prepare a real Yao static garbling
of the circuit U(f, ·), along with one label for each function wire and two labels for
each input wire. cf consists of the garbled gates and the labels for the function wire
for U(f, ·), and the trapdoor consists of the two labels for each input input wire for
U(f, ·).
To demonstrate a key kx such that Dec(kx, cf) = f(x), give the label for each input
wire for U(f, ·) that corresponds to input value x. To show randomness rx such that
Enc(kx, f(x), rx) = cf , give the randomness used to encrypt the active ciphertext in
each garbled gate in cf . The other three ciphertexts in each garbled gate are presented
as randomly chosen strings.
It can be seen that all the FEE properties are met. In particular, the tuple m =
f(x), kx, rx, cf is indistinguishable from m, k, r, c where k, r are random and c =
Enc(k,m, r). (We note that above account is a bit of of an oversimplification of the
definition and construction of FEE. See more details within.)
Two-party secure computation. Constructing two-party secure computation
from equivocal garbling in secure channel setting (which can be implemented using
any NCE), given adaptively secure OT (e.g. OT based on augmented NCE (CLOS02))
is straightforward: First P2 (the evaluator) sends the first message in n 1-out-of-2
OTs to P1 (the garbler). Then P1 generates the garbled circuit and sends it to P2. P1
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then sends the second OT messages, where P2’s input to the ith OT is his ith input
bit, and P1’s inputs to the ith OT are the two labels for the ith input wire for P2.
Finally P2 evaluates the garbled circuit and announces the results.
Here we will describe the simulation for the harder case (where the adversary waits
until the protocol ends, then corrupts the evaluator, and then the garbler). Since we
assumed secure channels, the simulator doesn’t need to do anything until the first
corruption. When the evaluator is corrupted, the simulator learns x2 and y, simulates
the garbled input x̃1, x2 (without even using x2), and simulates the garbled circuit
for output y. It also simulates OT messages (for OT output x̃2). When the garbler
is corrupted, the simulator learns x1 (and therefore now it knows the whole input
x1x2), and uses the simulator of equivocal garbling to come up with randomness used
to garble the circuit (in particular, both sets of keys). Next it uses OT simulator to
simulate random coins of OT for inputs k0w, k
1
w for each input wire of P2.
The multiparty case. Our muliparty protocol is a variant of the BMR protocol
(BMR90). Recall that the idea of the BMR protocol is to have the parties jointly
generate a single garbled circuit in such a way that all parties obtain all the garbled
gates, and in addition each party Pi obtains one label for each input wire that’s
associated with itself. The label will correspond to Pi’s input value for this wire.
Then the parties broadcast their labels to each other (without the association between
labels and values, of course). Finally each party locally evaluates the garbled circuit
and obtains the output value. Since all gates can be garbled in parallel, the number
of rounds of the protocol corresponds to the number of rounds needed to evaluate
a single garbled gate. If generic MPC is used (e.g. (GMW87)) then the number of
rounds is proportional to the security parameter. To get around that, BMR use the
structure of Yao garbling to come up with a constant rounds protocol. Essentially,
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each party chooses labels and encrypts them locally, and the only computation that’s
joint is the xoring of the plaintexts, the additive sharing of the labels, and the choice
of the random ordering of the four ciphertexts in each garbled gate. This simple
computation can indeed be done in a constant number of rounds.
We keep this structure; however now we are faced with a number of additional
challenges. First, since each of the four ciphertexts associated with a garbled gate
now consists of multiple “individual ciphertexts”, where each individual ciphertext is
generated by a single party, it is not a priori clear how to make sure that the functions
embedded in the dummy ciphertexts can be evaluated on the entire input to the
computation. Indeed, it does not suffice that each of the ciphertexts has access to the
input of only one party. Furthermore, since now all parties generate ciphertexts, the
simulator now has to generate simulated encryption randomness whenever any party
is corrupted — even before the entire input is known.
We get around these problems by designing different functions to be embedded in the
dummy ciphertexts. In a nutshell, each party contributes one FEE ciphertext to each
of the four ciphertexts for each gate. The function embedded in each dummy ciphertext
has two modes: in the “random” mode, the function outputs a predetermined random
value. In the “compute” mode, the function expects to get the full input to the circuit,
and returns the appropriate output label xored with the all the predetermined random
values. Later on, the simulator will make sure that the keys exhibited for all but
the last party to be corrupted activate the random mode in their functions. The
keys presented by the last party to be corrupted activate the “compute” mode of the
embedded function. This way, overall, the labels of the simulated garbled circuits play
the same role as in the two-party case.
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The Byzantine case. We compile our BMR-style honest-but-curious multiparty
protocol to a protocol that withstands Byzantine faults. This is done in two steps:
First we obtain a constant-rounds protocol in the CRS model. This is done generically
using the (CLOS02) compiler. Note that this compiler preserves adaptive security
while increasing the number of rounds by a factor of at most 3. Any hardness
assumption that implies augmented NCE suffices. (In contrast, all existing constant-
rounds adaptively secure multiparty computation protocols in the CRS model use
indistinguishability obfuscation in an essential way.)
The second step replaces the CRS modeling with the constant-rounds adaptively
secure coin tossing protocol of (GS12). (Recall that while the overall protocol of
(GS12) only obtains adaptive security for all-but-one corruptions, their underlying
coin tossing protocol is indeed secure even if all parties are eventually corrupted.) We
note that in order to be able to use the (GS12) protocol the CRS must be “public
coins” - i.e. it should essentially be uniformly distributed. We can still use (CLOS02)
to do that, at the price of assuming dense cryptosystems. In addition, the (GS12)
protocol uses collision resistant hash functions.
Obtaining leakage resilience. As discussed earlier in the introduction, we also
construct a variant of the above multiparty protocol that’s leakage tolerant as in
(BCH12, BDL14). It was shown in (BCH12) that any adaptively secure protocol
where the simulation is oblivious is also leakage tolerant. Here oblivious simulation
means that the simulated state of each corrupted party must be computed “locally”,
based only on the input and output of that party, plus perhaps some joint randomness
that was sampled ahead of time and is available upon corruption of any party. In
particular, the simulated state of a party cannot depend on the input or output of
another party, even if that party is already corrupted.
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Following (BDL14), we assume that the parties can first interact in a leak-free
environment to sample some joint random state before the inputs are known. A first
thought might be to simply run the above BMR-style protocol, where the initial
sampling of the garbled circuit is done in the leak-free stage, and furthermore all
randomness other than the output of that computation is erased. However note that
the simulation in that protocol is inherently non-oblivious, since the simulator of the
last party to be corrupted need to know the inputs of all parties.
We thus construct a new protocol that implements the BMR paradigm in a very
different way. We start by extending the notion of FEE to the setting where each
key and each ciphertext is generated jointly by a several participants. We call this
new notion “Functional Equivocal Group Encryption (FEGE)”. Now, rather than
having each of the four ciphertexts in a garbled gate consist of multiple individual FEE
ciphertexts, we let each one of these four ciphertexts be a single FEGE ciphertext that
was generated by all the parties. This allows creating dummy ciphertexts that embed
functions f that depend on values encoded in different pieces of the joint “group
key”. Now, when each party is corrupted, the simulator for that party will make sure
that the simulated labels associated with that party will encode the input of that
party. This way, as soon as all parties are corrupted, the overall input to f will encode
the entire input to the circuit and the same functional equivocation mechanism will
operate when the simulated garbled circuit is evaluated.
We can only make this idea work in the setting where the joint sampling of the labels
takes place in a leak-free environment where all randomness except for the output of
the preprocessing stage can be erased. Still, we obtain the first multiparty computation
protocols in the plain model where all parties can be eventually corrupted, and the
simulation is oblivious (modulo the initial offline sampling stage).
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Public-key FEE. We extend FEE to the public-key setting. Similarly to symmetric
FEE, a public-key FEE, or PK-FEE scheme is parameterized by the set Fs,n,l of
functions from n bits to l bits, whose description size is at most s bits. (Again,
we consider the case where n << l.) Key generation, encryption and description
are standard, where the size of the public and private keys is Oλ(n) and the size of
ciphertexts is Oλ(s).
The algorithms for generating dummy ciphertexts and dummy encryption randomness
have similar functionality as in the symmetric case. The algorithm for generating
dummy secret keys is now naturally extended to generate not only a dummy decryption
key; rather it should generate dummy randomness for the key generation algorithm,
that will be consistent with the existing public encryption key and the dummy
decryption key.
PK-FEE can be used to shorten the size of keys beyond what is possible in the case of
standard non-committing encryption (NCE), while preserving the ability to generate
dummy ciphertexts that can be opened to messages of choice. The ability to choose f
and x separately provides additional flexibility. For instance, if f is a pseudorandom
generator from n to l bits, then the scheme can be used to encrypt arbitrary l-bit
messages, and then to generate dummy ciphertexts that later open to random-looking
l-bit messages, and get away with keys of size Oλ(n).
We construct PK-FEE from symmetric FEE and NCE, as follows. Key generation
generates a keypair (ke, kd) for an NCE scheme for encrypting a key for the symmetric
FEE scheme, namely Oλ(n) bits. To encrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}l, choose an FEE
key k, compute c1 = FEE.Enc(k,m), c2 = NCE.Enc(ke, k), and let c = c1, c2.
Decryption is done accordingly.
To generate a dummy ciphertext for function f run FEE.SimEnc(f) to obtain cf and
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NCE.Sim to obtain a dummy ciphertext c̃, and output cf , c̃, along with the state
information from both simulators as trapdoor.
To generate a dummy key kx for value x ∈ {0, 1}n, first obtain kx = FEE.Equiv(x, td),
where td is the trapdoor generated by FEE.SimEnc. Next use NCE.Sim again to
obtain the key generation randomness that leads to decryption of c̃ to kx.
Finally, to generate encryption randomness, run FEE.Adapt(x, kx, td) and NCE.Sim
again. The definition of security and the analysis follow naturally.
2.3.3 Related Notions
Some definitions, mentioned in the introduction and related to our work, have very
subtle differences between them, and similar names. In this section we comment on
the differences.
Definitions related to FEE. Recall that the reason for introducing FEE was to
shorten the NCE secret key, by limiting equivocation. We remark that somewhere
equivocal encryption (HJO+16) and somewhat non-committing encryption (GWZ09)
were introduced to achieve very similar goals (although not in the context of equivocal
garbling). Despite the fact that our definition of FEE is similar in spirit, it is in fact a
stronger primitive. We underline that previous definitions do not seem to suffice for
our construction of equivocal garbling.
Roughly, somewhere equivocal encryption allows to encrypt l bits such that later bits in
n predetermined positions, but not other bits, can be equivocated; the secret key has
to be proportional to n, but not l (where n is significantly smaller than l). This is a
special case of FEE for 2n-sized set R with fixed l− n bits. However, our construction
of equivocal garbling requires equivocating to more complicated sets.
Somewhat non-committing encryption is closer to our FEE, since it allows to explain a
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dummy ciphertext for l-bit messages as any message from a predetermined set of size
2n; however, the construction of (GWZ09) works only for polynomial-sized sets, since
their communication is proportional to 2n. In contrast, for our construction we need
to be able to equivocate to sets of size 2|x|, which could be exponential. In addition,
their construction is an interactive protocol, rather than a non-interactive encryption
required in Yao garbled circuits.
Definitions of adaptive garbling. Note that our equivocal garbling is essentially
an adaptively secure garbling, where “adaptive security” means security against
adaptive corruptions. That is, the garbling should remain secure even if the adversary
prefers to see the communication first (i.e. the garbled circuit and garbled input), and
later corrupt the garbler and see its internal state (i.e. randomness used to garble the
circuit).
However, we prefer to use a different name - equivocal garbling - since the term
“adaptive garbling” was used to denote a different security definition. Adaptive garbling,
or garbling with adaptive choice of inputs (GKR08, BHR12), requires that the garbled
circuit and input can be simulated even though the input is chosen after the adversary
sees the garbled circuit. That is, they allow the adversary to first determine C and
see garbled C̃, and only then determine x and see x̃. C̃ should be simulatable given
only C, and x̃ should be then simulated given in addition y = C(x), but not x.
This definition is incomparable to our definition of equivocal garbling: indeed, in
adaptively-chosen-inputs garbling the simulator doesn’t have to simulate random coins
of the party. On the other hand, here x can be chosen adaptively by the adversary
after seeing C̃, whereas in equivocal garbling x has to be fixed in advance. (Such
selective choice of inputs suffices for two party computation, since in the Yao protocol
both inputs of the parties are already fixed by the time the garbled circuit has to be
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generated, i.e. after the first message is sent).
2.3.4 Definitions
A garbling scheme. Intuitively, a garbling scheme takes a circuit C and an input
x and generates their garbled versions C̃, x̃ such that:
• Given C̃, x̃, it is possible to compute y = C(x);
• C̃, x̃ don’t reveal anything about x except y = C(x).
The latter requirement is formalized by requiring that the simulator, who only knows
C and y, can simulate the garbled circuit C̃ and the garbled input x̃ without knowing
x.
In this paper we consider definitions of garbling with additional property called bit
decomposability, which states that each bit of input x can be garbled without knowing
other bits. This property will be required both for constructing FEE from statically
secure garbling and for constructing two-party computation from adaptively secure
garbling.
Definition 3 (Statically Secure Garbling Scheme). We say that
(Gen,GarbleProg,GarbleInp,Eval) is a statically secure garbling scheme, if the following
properties hold:
• Correctness:
Pr[r ← {0, 1}|r| ;K ← Gen(1λ); C̃ ← GarbleProg(K,C; r); {x̃i}ni=1 ←
GarbleInp(K, xi, i) : Eval(C̃, x̃) = C(x)] > 1− negl(λ);
• Static security: There exists a PPT algorithm Sim, such that any PPT adver-
sary A wins the following game with at most negligible advantage:
1. A(1λ) gives a circuit C and an input x to the challenger;
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2. The challenger flips a bit b.
If b = 0:
– It chooses random key K ← Gen(1λ) and randomness of garbling r;
– It sets (C̃ ← GarbleProg(K,C; r), {x̃i}ni=1 ← GarbleInp(K, xi, i);
– It sends C̃, x̃ to the adversary.
If b = 1:
– It sets y = C(x);
– It runs the simulator (C̃, x̃)← Sim(1λ, C, y)
– It sends C̃, x̃ to the adversary.
3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
The adversary wins if b = b′.
We will require one additional property of the statically-secure garbling scheme which
is obliviousness. Roughly speaking, this property requires that there be a mechanism
to reveal an honestly computed garbling as one that was computed by the simulation.
A standard garbling mechanism using the Yao’s garbling scheme computed using an
encryption scheme which has pseudorandom ciphertexts can be shown to have this
obliviousness property. On a high level it will suffice for the simulator to generate the
inactive garbled rows as random strings and have the real ciphertexts in the inactive
rows of an honestly computed garbling revealed as random strings. We define this
obliviousness property next.
Oblivious sampling. There exists a PPT algorithm oSamp such that for any
polynomial-time circuit C and for all input output pairs (x, y) such that C(x) = y it
holds that the following two distributions are indistinguishable.
{r ← {0, 1}|r| ;K ← Gen(1λ); C̃ ← GarbleProg(K,C; r); x̃← GarbleInp(K, x) :
(oSamp(r,K, x), C̃, x̃)}{R← {0, 1}|R| ; (C̃, x̃)← Sim(1λ) : (R, C̃, x̃)}
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Equivocal Garbling Scheme
Definition 4 (Equivocal garbling scheme). We say that (GarbleProg,GarbleInp,Eval) is
an equivocal (adaptively secure) garbling scheme, if the following properties hold:
• Correctness:
Pr[r ← {0, 1}|r| ;K ← Gen(1λ); C̃ ← GarbleProg(K,C; r); {x̃i}ni=1 ←
GarbleInp(K, xi, i) : Eval(C̃, x̃) = C(x)] > 1− negl(λ);
• Security: There exists a pair of PPT algorithm (Sim1, Sim2), such that any
PPT adversary A wins the following game with at most negligible advantage:
1. A gives a circuit C and an input x to the challenger;
2. The challenger flips a bit b.
If b = 0:
– It chooses random garbling key K and randomness r;
– It sets (C̃ ← GarbleProg(K,C; r), {x̃i}ni=1 ← GarbleInp(K, xi, i);
– It sends C̃, x̃,K, r to the adversary.
If b = 1:
– It sets y = C(x);
– It runs the simulator (C̃, x̃, state)← Sim1(C, y)
– It runs the simulator (K, r)← Sim2(state, x)
– It sends C̃, x̃,K, r to the adversary.
3. The adversary outputs a bit b′.
The adversary wins if b = b′.
As explained before (see section 2.3.3), we reiterate here that our notion of equivocal
garbling is different from the notion of adaptive garbling that requires security against
an adaptive choice of inputs (GKR08, BHR12).
Convention for Garbling Schemes
We rely heavily on the Yao garbling scheme. We will follow some conventions when
we describe garbling schemes.
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• λ denotes the security parameter.
• We will use C to denote a circuit with description size |C|.
• Suppose C has an n-bit input and 1-bit output. The wires are numbered from 1
through m where we assume that wires are from 1 to n are input wires, and wire
m is an output wire. We use κ to denote the size of keys k0w, k
1
w for each wire w.
• We denote by bitw the bit assigned to wire w by the computation C(x).
• Typically, when we discuss a particular gate g, we use the notation α, β to
denote the wire numbers of the input wires of the gate and γ the wire number
for the output wire of the same gate.
• Induction. We will carry out induction by demonstrating as base case that
the property holds for the input wires of the circuit. Then in an induction step
we show that if for any gate the property holds for the input wires of a gate
then it holds for the output wire of that gate. Then by considering a standard
topological ordering of the gates the property will hold for output wires by the
principle of mathematical induction.
A common property (invariant) that we will repeatedly use in this work is
the following: for every wire there will be three bits associated, bitw that will
represent the “actual” value flowing through that wire, λw a hidden masks
and Λw the visible masks. We will maintain the invariant that bitw = λw⊕Λw.
These masks have been so labelled to reflect what is visible and hidden from the
evaluator of the garbled circuit.
• A garbled circuit comprises of garbled gates and each garbled gate comprises
of 4 garbled rows. The garbled rows will be permuted according to the visible
masks.
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Table 2.1: Quick reference for convention for contents of Row (b, b′) in
Gate g.
• We call keys kbitww (participating in the computation C(x)) active keys, and
the other key for wire w, namely, k1⊕bitww as inactive keys. Analogously, the
garbled row that corresponds to two active keys will be called the active rows
and the remaining three rows as inactive rows.
• Point-and-permute. For a gate with input wires α, β and output wire γ, in
row (b, b′) for b, b′ ∈ {0, 1}, we will use keys corresponding b⊕λα and b′⊕λβ and
we will encrypt the key corresponding to v = g(b⊕ λα, b′⊕ λβ) and mask v⊕ λγ .
According to this convention, it is easy to see that the active row determined by
bitα and bitβ is (Λα = bitα ⊕ λα,Λβ = bitβ ⊕ λβ) and the value encrypted will
be g(bitα, bitβ).
A note on how the garbled rows are computed. Typically in a Yao garbling
scheme the key (or message) to be encrypted in a row will be “double encrypted”,
i.e. first encrypted with the key for wire β and next with key for wire α. We use
a different double encryption: we will apply XOR-based secret sharing to the key:
kγ = sleft⊕ sright, and encrypt one share with the one key and the other share with the
other key, thus obtaining a pair of ciphertexts cleft, cright. Table 2.1 describes how the
shares and ciphertexts will be denoted for a gate g with input wires α, β and output
wire γ in Row (b, b′). Without loss of generality α will be the left wire and β will be
the right wire.
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2.3.5 Functionally Equivocal Encryption
In this section we define and construct the symmetric-key encryption called functionally
equivocal encryption (FEE). This encryption is adaptively secure, meaning that the
simulator can generate a dummy ciphertext (without knowing the plaintext m ∈M)
and later equivocate it to some plaintext m′: that is, it can show encryption randomness
rEnc and the key k which are consistent with plaintext m
′ and the simulated ciphertext.
What makes FEE different from a non-committing encryption is that the equivocation
is limited: the simulator cannot equivocate to any m′ ∈M , it can only equivocate to
messages in the range of some function f (f has to be determined at the moment when
the simulated ciphertext is generated). That is, the simulated ciphertexts (generated
with respect to a function f) can be equivocated to a message m′ only if m′ = f(x)
for some x; x can be thought of as a “a short description” of m′ with respect to a
function f . Another important difference is that FEE keys are succinct: that is, the
size of the key only depends on the size of description x (which we call equivocation
parameter) , and not the size of the plaintext, which could be much larger.
Definitions
We present two definitions of FEE. In the first, basic, definition we present FEE
as a natural generalization of non-committing encryption. Our second definition is
a “garbling-friendly” definition, where we do several syntactic changes and consider
security with respect to several functions. We will be using the second definition in
our main construction of equivocal garbling.
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Basic definition. We first describe the syntax:
• Key generation. Gen(1λ, 1n; rGen) takes as input security parameter λ,
equivocation parameter n, and randomness of size poly(λ, n). It sets the key
k = rGen and outputs it.
Note that the key size only depends on equivocation parameter and security
parameter, but not on the plaintext size.
• Encryption. Enck(f,m; rEnc) outputs an encryption of m using randomness
rEnc and key k.
• Decryption. Deck(c) decrypts ciphertext c using key k and outputs plaintext
m.
• Ciphertext simulation. Sim1(f, rSim) uses its random coins to generate a
simulated ciphertext ceq together with a trapdoor td which can later be used for
equivocation of ceq to any message in the range of f .
• Equivocation. Sim2(td, f, x, ceq) uses the equivocation trapdoor td and a short
description x of plaintext f(x) to generate a key keq and randomness req consistent
with ciphertext ceq and plaintext f(x); that is, Enckeq(params(f), f(x); req) = ceq
and Deckeq(ceq) = f(x).
Definition 5. (Functionally equivocal encryption: basic definition.)
A tuple of algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec, Sim1, Sim2) is a functionally equivocal encryption
for a message space M = {0, 1}l with equivocation parameter n, if the following
properties hold:
• Correctness. For any m ∈M Pr[Deck(Enck(f,m; r)) = m : r ← {0, 1}|r| , k ←
Gen(1λ, 1n)] > 1− negl(λ).
• Security. For every PPT adversary A on input 1λ, there exists a negligible
function ν(·) such that the probability that it wins the following game with




1. The adversary A sends a circuit f : {0, 1}n →M and an input x ∈ {0, 1}n
to C;
2. C computes the plaintext m← f(x) and chooses a bit b at random.
3. If b = 0, C generates the real distribution:
– C samples random FEE key k using Gen(1λ, 1n) and picks encryption
randomness rEnc.
– C sets ci ← Enck(f,m; rEnc), where params(f) = (|f |, n, l).
– C sends (k, rEnc, c) to the adversary A.
4. If b = 1, C generates the simulated distribution:
– C simulates the ciphertext (ceq, td)← Sim1(f, rSim) using random rSim;
– C equivocates (keq, req)← Sim2(td, f, x, ceq);
– C sends (keq, req, ceq) to the adversary A.
5. A outputs a bit b′ and wins if b = b′.
• Succinctness: The size of the key is polynomial in λ, n and independent of l.
Garbling-friendly definition. Our construction of equivocal garbling will
require a slightly modified definition of FEE, which we present here. The main
differences are:
1. We split Sim1 into two separate algorithms SimTrap (which generates the trap-
door) and SimEnc (which simulates a ciphertext). We also split Sim2 into
two separate algorithms Equiv (which equivocates the key) and Adapt (which
equivocates randomness of encryption).
2. We consider security with respect to multiple ciphertexts (possibly correspond-
ing to different functions f1, . . . , ft); that is, the simulator should present a
single equivocated key keq which decrypts multiple ciphertexts c1, . . . , ct to
f1(x), . . . , fn(x) for a single description x.
3. We require that the encryption algorithm doesn’t need to know the function f ,
and only needs to know its parameters params(f), which consist of description
size |f |, its input length and its output length.
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We describe the syntax:
• Key generation. Gen(1λ, 1n; rGen) takes as input security parameter λ,
equivocation parameter n, and randomness of size poly(λ, n). It sets the key
k = rGen and outputs it.
Note that the key size only depends on equivocation parameter and security
parameter, but not on the plaintext size.
• Encryption. Enck(params,m; rEnc) interprets params as function description
size |f |, input length n and output length l. It outputs an encryption of m with
respect to parameters params using randomness rEnc and key k.
• Decryption. Deck(c) decrypts ciphertext c using key k and outputs plaintext
m.
• Ciphertext simulation. Simulating a ciphertext comprises of two algorithms
(SimTrap, SimEnc) where SimTrap on input (1λ, 1n; rtd) outputs the trapdoor
td and SimEnc on input (f, td; rSim) outputs a ciphertext c with respect to a
function f .
• Equivocation. Equiv(x, td) uses the equivocation trapdoor td to generate a
single fake key keq so that each simulated ciphertext ceq,i, which was generated
with respect to some function fi and trapdoor td, decrypts to fi(xi) under keq.
• Randomness sampling. Adapt(f, td, rSim, x) generates randomness req, such
that
Enckeq(params(f), f(x); req) = c, where c = SimEnc(f, td; rSim).
Definition 6. (Garbling-friendly FEE). A tuple of algorithms
(Gen,Enc,Dec, SimTrap, SimEnc,Equiv,Adapt) is a garbling-friendly functionally equiv-
ocal encryption, if the following properties hold:
• Correctness. For any m ∈M Pr[Deck(Enck(f,m; r)) = m : r ← {0, 1}|r| , k ←
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Gen(1λ, 1n)] > 1− negl(λ).
• t-functional security. For every PPT adversary A on input 1λ, there exists
a negligible function ν such that the probability that it wins the following game
with challenger C(1λ) is at most 1
2
+ ν(λ).
1. The adversary A sends t functions f1, . . . , ft (where each fi maps n bits to
li bits) and an input x ∈ {0, 1}n to C;
2. C computes the messages {mi ← fi(x)}i=1,...,t.
3. Next it generates keys and ciphertexts in two different ways:
– C samples random FEE key k using Gen(1λ, 1n) and random strings
rEnc,1, . . . , rEnc,n. For 1 ≤ i ≤ t, it computes
ci ← Enck(paramsi,mi; rEnc,i)
where paramsi ← (|fi|, n, li).
– C computes ciphertexts using SimEnc as follows:
td← SimTrap(1λ, 1n; rtd),
ci ← SimEnc(fi, td; rSim,i) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ t
Next it computes keq ← Equiv(x, td) and
req,i ← Adapt(fi, td, rSim,i, x) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
4. C tosses a coin b.
– If b = 0, C sends (k, (c1, rEnc,1), . . . , (ct, rEnc,t)) to A.
– If b = 1, C sends (keq, (ceq,1, req,1), . . . , (ceq,t, req,t)) to A.
5. A outputs a bit b′.
A wins if b = b′.
Overview of FEE construction
We now construct a FEE scheme using oblivious version of Yao garbled circuits;
oblivious means that a real garbled circuit can be claimed simulated by presenting
convincing random coins of the simulation.
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An overview. First we describe how to achieve the basic definition. On a high-level
the construction works as follows:
The key k of the scheme with equivocation parameter n will be a simulated garbled
input x̃, where |x| = n (recall that simulated x̃ can be generated without knowing x).
The encryption of m with respect to f under key x̃ will be a simulated garbled circuit
f̃ (consistent with simulated garbled x̃), for output set to m. To decrypt a ciphertext
(f̃) using the key (x̃), evaluate Eval(f̃ , x̃). Note that this evaluation results in m.
To simulate the ciphertext, the simulator generates the real garbled circuit f̃ and
sets the trapdoor to be the garbling key. To equivocate FEE key k to plaintext f(x),
generate a real garbled input x̃ using the garbling key. Note that the simulated
ciphertext decrypts to f(x) under key x̃, since decryption runs evaluation of real
garbled circuit f̃ on real garbled input x̃.
Finally, to simulate randomness of encryption, we use obliviousness of the Yao scheme
and generate random coins of the simulation which are consistent with the real garbled
circuit f̃ .
Garbling-friendly FEE. Now we explain how to achieve garbling-friendly FEE.
First note that the scheme can support multiple functions, since it is possible to
generate a single garbled input x and many garbled circuits consistent with it.
To make encryption independent of description of f , we apply a universal transfor-
mation: namely, the key is still the simulated garbled input, but the ciphertext will
be the garbled universal circuit together with the simulated garbled function f̃ . The
simulator can instead generate the ciphertext by creating real garbled circuit and
garbling f honestly.
Finally, a closer look at the structure of Yao garbled circuits reveals that we can
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indeed achieve syntactic changes of garbling-friendly definition.
Construction of FEE
We now provide a formal description of the algorithms. Let (GenCPA,EncCPA,DecCPA) be
a private-key encryption scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts. Furthermore, we need
the property that decrypting a random string with the key results in pseudorandom
plaintext. We note that the PRF-based scheme (r, Fk(r)⊕m) satisfies this property.
Key Generation: Gen on input (1λ, 1n; rGen) outputs n independent keys k1, . . . , kn
sampled using GenCPA(1λ) along with n random bits Λ1, . . . ,Λn.
Encryption: Enc with key k = (k1, . . . , kn) on input (params = (|f |, n, l),m; rEnc),
where |m| = l, generates ciphertext c as follows:
1. Let U be universal circuit which takes input of size n and function of size
|f | as input, and outputs an output of size |m|.
2. Consider an arbitrary topological order of the gates in U and label them in
order 1, . . . , s.
3. Let W be the number of wires in the circuit that are given labels 1, . . . ,W
so that all input wires are listed first and output wires are listed last.
Sample a random bit Λw and a random key kw using Gen
CPA(1λ) for every
wire n+ 1 ≤ w ≤ W that is not an output wire.
4. For g = 1 to s:
Garble gate g: Let α, β be the input wire numbers and γ be the output
of gate g. Let d be the length of ciphertexts when encrypting messages
of length |kw| twice. Compute garbled gate Gg = (R00g , R01g , R10g , R11g )
as follows: Let c = EncCPAkα (Enc
CPA
kβ
(kγ||Λc)) if the output of the gate is




where the output wire corresponds to the jth output bit of the function
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c if Λα = b and Λβ = b
′
r ← {0, 1}d o.w.
5. Set simulated f̃ to be (kn+1, . . . , kn+|f |) together with (Λn+1, . . . ,Λn+|f |).
6. Finally, set c = (G1, . . . , Gs, f̃).





1 ≤ j ≤ n using GenCPA(1λ) and 2n random bits λ1, . . . , λn and outputs td =
((k01, k
1




n), (λ1, . . . , λn)).
SimEnc on input (f, td; rSim), where f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}|m|, computes ceq as
follows:
1. Let U be universal circuit which takes input of size n and function of size
|f | as input, and outputs an output of size |m|.
2. Consider an arbitrary topological order of the gates in the U and label
them in order 1, . . . , s where s is the number of gates in U .
3. Let W be the number of wires in the circuit that are given labels 1, . . . ,W
so that all input wires are listed first. Sample a random mask λw and a
pairs of random keys k0w, k
1
w using Gen
CPA(1λ) for every wire n+1 ≤ w ≤ W
that is not an output wire.
4. For g = 1 to s:
Garble gate g: Let α, β be the input wire numbers and γ be the output
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g ) as follows:
χ1 = k
v
































g be the randomness used to compute the encryptions in R
bb′
g for
b, b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
5. Set f̃ to be (kf1n+1, . . . , k
f|f |
n+|f |) together with (λn+1 ⊕ f1, . . . , λn+|f | ⊕ f|f |).
6. Finally, set ceq = (G1, . . . , Gs, f̃).
Equivocation. Equiv on input (x, td) uses the trapdoor td = ((k01, k
1





(λ1, . . . , λn)) to compute the key keq = ((k
x1
1 , λ1 ⊕ x1), . . . , (kxnn , λn ⊕ xn)) where
x = x1 · · ·xn.
Randomness sampling. Adapt on input (f, td, rSim, x) needs to generate a random
string req so that Enckeq(params = params(f), f(x); req) = ceq. To generate req,
it proceeds as follows:









2. Reconstruct k0w, k
1
w, λw and the randomness used to generate each gate g
from rSim. Compute the real value in each wire when the input is x. Let
bitw be the value in wire w. Set
Λw = λw ⊕ bitw.
3. For each gate g, the randomness used for Gg is the concatenation of the
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randomness used for each row Rbb
′
g (b, b
′ ∈ {0, 1}) which is computed as
follows: Let α, β be the input wires and γ be the output wire. Let rbb
′
g be
the randomness used to compute Rbb
′
g by SimEnc.










4. set randomness rf used to compute f̃ to be kf1n+1, . . . , k
f|f |
n+|f | and the masks
Λn+1, . . . ,Λn+|f |.
5. Output req = {(r̃00g , r̃01g , r̃10g , r̃11g )}g∈[s], together with rf .
Theorem 17. (Gen,Enc, SimTrap, SimEnc,Equiv,Adapt) described above is a garbling-
friendly functionally equivocal encryption scheme.
Proof. On a high-level, the proof of correctness and indistinguishability will follows
from the standard properties of Yao garbling and the pseudorandomness of the
ciphertexts computed using the underlying CPA secure encryption scheme. We
provide a formal proof below.
Correctness. Correctness of the scheme follows from the fact that with overwhelm-
ing probability the simulated garbled circuit (for output m) on the simulated garbled
input outputs m.
Security. Recall that the definition of a FEE requires to show that honestly
generated encryptions and simulated encryptions along with the messages, random
coins, and the key, are indistinguishable for t messages f1(x), . . . , ft(x) where x ∈
{0, 1}n and fi is a function from {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`i for 1 ≤ i ≤ t. More formally,
we need to show that for any PPT adversary A the following two distributions are
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indistinguishable:
Dn0 = {(f1, . . . , ft, x)← A(1λ, 1n);
k ← Gen(1λ, 1n);
ci ← Enck(paramsi,mi; rEnc,i) where paramsi ← (|fi|, n, li)
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ t : (k, (c1, rEnc,1), . . . , (ct, rEnc,t))}
Dn1 = {(f1, . . . , ft, x)← A(1λ, 1n);
td← SimTrap(1λ, 1n);
ceq,i ← SimEnc(fi, td, rSim,i) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ t;
keq ← Equiv(td, x)
req,i ← Adapt(fi, td, rSim,i, x) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ t;
(keq, (ceq,1, req,1), . . . , (ceq,t, req,t))}
We will consider a sequence of hybrids starting from the simulation to the real
encryption.
Hybrid Hn1 . The output of this experiment is identical to D
n
1 .
Hybrid Hn2 [j](1 ≤ j ≤ n + |f1| + . . . + |ft|). For all possible input wire of any
universal circuit Ui (where Ui is a universal circuit for paramsi), we consider the
hybrid Hn2 [j]; it is identical to H
n
2 [j − 1] except for that for every ciphertext
ceq,i and every gate g that has j as one of its input wires, we make the following
modification:








g ). Let (bitw, λw,Λw) be the real value, hidden mask
and visible mask computed for each wire 1 ≤ w ≤ Wi of Ui . Let α = j, β be






g ) be the
randomness reported as in hybrid Hn1 (i.e. real simulation). Let xj be the j
th
bit of the input x. Then Λj = λj ⊕ xj.
In Hn2 [j], for every ciphertext ci and every gate g that has j as its input wire,


















(cb′ , rEnc) if b = Λj ⊕ xj
r ← {0, 1}d o.w.
for each bit b′. By our definition Hn2 [0] = H
n
1 . In Hybrid H
n
2 [j] for 1 ≤ j ≤
n + |f1| + . . . + |ft| we replace all ciphertexts, that use inactive key for wire
j as one of the encryption keys, to a random string. After this modification
there will be no ciphertext encrypted under this key in any gate. Now, we can
rely on the pseudorandomness property of encryptions under this key to argue
indistinguishability of Hn2 [j] and H
n
2 [j + 1] for 0 ≤ j < n + |f1| + . . . + |ft|.
Therefore we have that
Hn1 ≈ Hn2 [n+ |f1|+ . . .+ |ft|]
Hybrid Hn3 [i, g]. We consider a sequence of hybrids in the following order for every
1 ≤ i ≤ t and a gate g in Ui, which does not contain an input wire of the circuit
(as they have been taken care of in the previous hybrid). Hybrid Hn2 [i, g] is
identical to Hn2 [i, g−1] (if g > 1 and identical to Hn2 [i−1, si−1] if g = 0) with the
only exception that in ceq,i, the part corresponding to gate g is modified as follows:















real value, hidden mask and visible mask computed for each wire 1 ≤ w ≤ Wi







g ) be the randomness reported as in hybrid H
n
1 . In H
n
2 [i, g] we





















(c, rEnc) if b = Λα and b
′ = Λβ
r ← {0, 1}` o.w.
We will inductively show the following:
Claim 18. For every i, we will show that Hn3 [i, g] ≈ Hn3 [i, g + 1] for 0 ≤ g < si.
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Proof. Just as in the previous hybrid, indistinguishability follows from the pseu-
dorandom ciphertext property of the underlying encryption scheme. Consider a
gate g that contains no input wire from the Circuit that has input wires α, β and
output γ. We will prove that for any such gate, in Hybrid Hn3 [i, g − 1], k1⊕Λαα
and k
1⊕Λβ
β have been removed from all ciphertexts. We will prove by induction





been removed from the ciphertexts, then for any gate g′ that contains γ as in
input wire it holds that in Hybrid Hn3 (i, g
′) the key k
1⊕bitγ
γ would have been
removed. We will show that we remove this key in the current hybrid and then
the induction hypothesis follows as g′ will always come after g in the topological
order. On a high-level, only the “active keys” will survive and the rows encrypted
using inactive keys will be set to random. This inductive step can be easily
see from the modification we do in Hybrid Hn3 [i, g]. Namely, we replace three
rows with a random string and one row remains the same. The one row that




β . The remaining





This completes the proof of the inductive step.
Given our induction hypothesis, arguing that Hn3 [i, g] ≈ Hn3 [i, g+ 1] are indistin-





β (which have been removed).
This concludes the proof of Theorem 17.
2.3.6 From Functionally Equivocal Encryption to Equivocal Garbling
In this section we describe our construction of equivocal garbling according to Def-
inition 4, based on a functionally equivocal encryption (FEE), defined and built in
Section 2.3.5. We start with an overview of the construction, and then proceed with
the formal description and the proof.
An Overview
Conventions. Let C be a circuit with description size |C| which takes as inputs
n-bit strings. For simplicity, we present our construction for circuits that output a
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single bit; however, our construction can be naturally extended to multiple-bit output
circuits. We denote by m = n + gates(C) the total number of “different” wires in
C, i.e. if a gate has a fan-out more than 1, only one wire is counted. The wires are
numbered from 1 through m where we assume that wires are from 1 to n are input
wires, and wire m is an output wire. We use κ to denote the size of keys k0w, k
1
w for
each wire w. We also denote by bitw the bit assigned to wire w by the computation
C(x). Typically, when we discuss a particular gate g, we use the notation α, β to
denote the wire numbers of the input wires of the gate and γ the wire number for the
output wire of the same gate.
Garbling. The garbling procedure will follow closely the standard Yao garbling
scheme (Yao86) that includes the so called point-and-permute feature (MNPS04),
except that we use an FEE scheme instead of a CPA-secure encryption. Namely, the
garbler first chooses a pair of FEE keys (k0w, k
1
w) for each wire w of the circuit C. (We
assume that output wires of the same gate are labeled with the same index w and
therefore are assigned the same pair of keys.)
Next the garbler garbles each gate using double encryption. Our double encryption
of message m will consist of an encryption of shares of the message m, sleft and sright
such that sleft ⊕ sright = m where sleft will be encrypted under the key of the left wire
entering the gate and sright using the right key. This guarantees that with both left
and right keys it is possible to reconstruct m, but having only one key doesn’t reveal
any information about m.




































random XOR sharings of k
g(b,b′)
γ . Ciphertexts for output gates encrypt output bits
(padded to the size of the key) instead of the key. Note that FEE is a randomized
encryption; the garbler encrypts each of 8 ciphertexts under freshly chosen randomness,
which we omitted here for brevity.
As we said, the difference from the Yao garbled circuits is that Enc is an FEE scheme,
which means that encryption algorithm should also take as input parameters params
of a function which image can later be equivocated to. The garbler sets params to be
(|F |, n, κ), where |F | is the size of functions F described on figure 2·16. This guarantees
that the simulator will be able to generate dummy ciphertexts for plaintext size κ and
later open them only to messages of the form f(x), where |f | = |F |, |f(x)| = κ and
|x| = n. Such limited equivocation is, on one hand, enough to show adaptive security,
and on the other hand, it guarantees that keys are not growing with the depth of the
circuit. In particular the keys are proportional to |x|.
Each garbled gate Gg consists of all 4 pairs of ciphertexts as described above, shuffled
in random order.
The garbled circuit consists of garbled gates {Gg}g∈[gates(C)]. The garbled input consists
of keys corresponding to input bits, i.e. (kx11 , . . . , k
xn
n ).
Evaluation of the garbled circuit. The evaluator evaluates the circuit gate by
gate, starting from input gates. Assume the evaluator already learned keys kbitαα , k
bitβ
β ,
assigned to input wires α, β of gate g by C(x). The evaluator tries to decrypt
each double encryption of this gate, using this pair of keys and only one double
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(cright) and learns two shares sleft, sright of the next key. It reconstructs the
key as k
g(bitα,bitβ)
γ = sleft ⊕ sright. The evaluator continues the process, until it learns
the output of the computation after decrypting the last gate.
Simulation. The simulation can be described in two parts: simulating the Garbled
Circuit and simulating the internal randomness.
Simulating the Garbled Circuit. The simulator starts with preparing active keys,
i.e keys corresponding to the execution C(x): for this it chooses a random
key kw for each wire w of C. Also for each wire it generates an FEE trapdoor
tdw ← SimTrap, which later will be used to equivocate inactive keys of all wires.
For each gate the simulator randomly chooses which one of 4 rows will be an
active row (i.e. for which pair of ciphertexts the evaluator will know both keys),
by choosing random bits Λw for each wire w: for each gate, the active row will
be row number (Λα,Λβ), where α, β are input wires of that gate.
The simulator encrypts active pair of ciphertexts like in the real world, i.e. it














g,right that should be
encrypted under the key kα selected for the active row, but under a different
second key k̂β. Furthermore, each encrypt shares that will add up to the intended
18For the purpose of this overview, we assume that decrypting double ciphertext with the wrong
pair of keys results in a detectable failure. This can be achieved by appending 0λ string to the
plaintext during encryption, and by verifying that the last λ bits of the decrypted plaintext is 0λ
during decryption. In our full construction however we don’t need this assumption on the encryption
scheme. We instead use a “point-and-permute” technique which tells the evaluator which one of 4
double encryptions it needs to decrypt.
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key on wire γ. However, note that at the time of creating the ciphertexts, the
simulator does not know what key to encrypt in this row. Since the key is secret
shared it can of course encrypt a random share s
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,left under the known key
kα to generate the left ciphertext c
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,left . The right ciphertext is simulated
using FEE simulator (to be later opened in such a way that two shares xor to
the correct key).
More precisely, we will generate the right ciphertext c
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,right using SimEnc with
respect to a particular function that will later allow us to define both the key k̂β
and the right message this second ciphertext needs to be revealed as. In fact,
the right ciphertext should encrypt masked key s
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,right = k ⊕ s
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,left , but at
this moment the simulator doesn’t know whether the key should be active kγ or
inactive k̂γ as it will depend on the real bit assignment bitα, bitβ on wires α, β
when evaluated on the real input x. Therefore, to generate the ciphertexts in














g,left is a random string and F
Λα,1⊕Λb is a specially crafted function
that we describe in Figure 2·16. The third row of ciphertexts is generated similar
to the second, except that in this row the key for wire β is the active key kβ
which is known and the key for the other wire α and the message is unknown.















g,right is a random string and F
1⊕Λα,Λb is described in Figure 2·16.
Simulating the last pair is slightly different, since it is encrypted under the
inactive keys k̂α, k̂β, neither of which are determined yet by the simulator. Thus,
the simulator generates both ciphertexts using FEE simulator. It simulates the
first ciphertext with respect to a constant function that always outputs a share
s
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ
















where the function Const1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ [s
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,left ] ≡ s
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,left and function
F 1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ [mask] is the third specially crafted function.
Finally, the gate looks like as follows:
Row number Left ciphertext FEE. Right ciphertext FEE.
(Λα,Λβ) Enckα(s
Λα,Λβ
g,left ) Enckβ (s
Λα,Λβ
g,right )











g,right ]) Enckβ (s
1⊕Λα,Λβ
g,right )







Table 2.2: Garbled gate g generated by the simulator.
The ciphertexts for an output gate are generated in a similar way, with the
difference that the active double encryption encrypts the output y = C(x)
instead of the key. In essence, these functions will be the same as F , except that
they output masked output bits instead of masked keys for the next gate (See
Figure 2·16).
The simulator reorders 4 ciphertexts in each gate according to (Λα,Λβ) and





Constants: C, g, kγ , tdγ .
1. Evaluate C(x) and learn bit assignments bitα, bitβ of input wires α, β of gate
g.
2. Generate k̂γ ← FEE.Equiv(tdγ , x).
3. If g(bitα, bitβ) = g(bitα, 1⊕ bitβ) then output kγ ⊕mask;




Constants: C, g, kγ , tdγ .
1. Evaluate C(x) and learn bit assignments bitα, bitβ of input wires α, β of gate
g.
2. Generate k̂γ ← FEE.Equiv(tdγ , x).
3. If g(bitα, bitβ) = g(1⊕ bitα, bitβ) then output kγ ⊕mask;




Constants: C, g, kγ , tdγ .
1. Evaluate C(x) and learn bit assignments bitα, bitβ of input wires α, β of gate
g.
2. Generate k̂γ ← FEE.Equiv(tdγ , x).
3. If g(bitα, bitβ) = g(1⊕ bitα, 1⊕ bitβ) then output kγ ⊕mask;
4. else output k̂γ ⊕mask.
Program Const1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ [mask](x).
Pad the program to the size of programs F with dummy gates. Output mask.
Output gates: If g is an output gate, we will the same four functions described
above with the exception that we will use the actual value instead of the key
in the output. For example, for the function F
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g [mask](x), we will output
g(bitα, bitβ) ⊕ mask if g(bitα, bitβ) = g(bitα, 1 ⊕ bitβ) and 1 ⊕ g(bitα, bitβ) ⊕ mask
otherwise.
Figure 2·16: Programs F .
as a garbled input.
Simulation of the internal state of the garbler. When the simulator is given
input x, it needs to present inactive key k̂w for each wire w. It generates these
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keys by running k̂w ← FEE.Equiv(tdw;x) for each gate w.
Intuitively, this is indistinguishable from real garbling, since each simulated gar-
bled gate looks like it was a real garbled gate generated using keys kα, k̂α, kβ, k̂β,
where kα, kβ are active for the computation C(x): Recall that the definition of
FEE guarantees that the key k̂w generated as FEE.Equiv(tdw;x) decrypts the ci-
phertext c = FEE.SimEnc(F ) to F (x). This means that decrypting, say, c
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g,right




right ](x), which is equal to the share that is either
kγ ⊕ s
Λα,1⊕Λβ
right or k̂γ ⊕ s
Λα,1⊕Λβ
right , depending on the assignment bitα, bitβ. Thus the
second double encryption will decrypt to the correct key (kγ or k̂γ) under kα, k̂β.
This in particular means that each garbled gate looks like a real garbled gate
with active keys kγ ; for instance, if the gate was an AND gate and C(x) assigned,
say, 1, 0 to wires α, β, then the garbled gate would decrypt to kγ, kγ, kγ and k̂γ
(in some order) under keys kα, k̂α, kβ, k̂β. If bit assignment was instead 1, 1, then
the garbled gate would decrypt to kγ, k̂γ, k̂γ, k̂γ instead.
Finally, the simulator uses FEE.Inv to simulate random coins of all 8 ciphertexts
per gate.
The simulator presents all randomness of encryption, 8 secret shares s per gate,
and a pair of keys per gate as internal state of the garbler.
A note on multiple fan-out. In our construction if a wire w is used as an input
to multiple gates, we will reuse the keys (i.e. keys kw, k̂w, trapdoors tdw) across all of
them. This is possible, as our FEE scheme accomodates reusing a single key to simulate
multiple ciphertexts (each instantiated with a different function). Furthermore, a key
for a wire can be safely used as the left key in one gate and as an right key in another.
This will not result in any increase in key sizes since we encrypt shares of the key
using the left and right key separately and the sizes of both the keys and the plaintexts
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remains the same in every gate.19
A sketch of the security proof. Starting from the real execution, we will switch
the key k̂w of each wire from being honestly generated using Gen to a simulated key,
starting from m− 1-th key20 and traversing the circuit according to its topological
sorting all the way to input keys. Namely, suppose that we want to switch a key
k̂w∗ = k
1⊕bitw∗
w∗ to a simulated key. We perform the reduction to security of the FEE
scheme as follows. First we generate keys and encryption randomness for each wire
w = w∗ + 1, . . . ,m − 1 according to the simulation (i.e generate kw honestly, but
equivocate k̂w using trapdoor tdw; randomness is equivocated via FEE.Adapt), and
generate keys and encryption randomness for wires w = 1, . . . , w∗ − 1 according to
the real world (i.e. both keys are generated honestly, randomness of encryption is
truly random). Also we generate kw∗ and its ciphertexts honestly. Recall that the key
corresponding to wire w will be used in generating 2 · fanout ciphertexts where fanout
is the number gates that have one of its input wires as w∗. The functions that the
adversary needs to provide in the security game of FEE for all challenge encryptions
(i.e. encryptions which should be generated under the key k̂w∗), namely f1, . . . , f2·fanout,
are set appropriately according to Figure 2·16. We play FEE security game with an
input x and functions f1, . . . , f2·fanout; note that the description of each function Fg
contains the trapdoor tdγ for an output wire of the gate g, but since we replace keys
with simulated keys in reverse topological order, we would have already switched the
(other) key corresponding to the output wire γ to simulated, and therefore trapdoors
tdγ are well defined. The challenger in the FEE game on input x and the functions,
responds with 2 · fanout challenge ciphertexts, 2 · fanout random coins of the encryption
and a single key k̂w∗ ; these values are either real or simulated. The experiment can
19If we had relied on encrypting the first message with one key followed by the other key, it could
possibly result in growing key sizes.
20Recall that m-th key doesn’t exist, since m-th wire is an output wire.
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be reconstructed by placing these ciphertexts in the garbled gates. Now, depending
on how the challenge ciphertexts were generated, the resulting experiments yield the
corresponding hybrid experiments.
Point-and-permute. In our construction we use a technique from (MNPS04),
which tells the evaluator which row out of 4 rows should be decrypted, in the same
way as described in Section 2.3.5. Namely, the garbler should additionally choose a bit
λw per wire, and encrypt not only the key, but “half of a pointer” to the correct row
in the next gate. That is, each encryption is cb1⊕λα,b2⊕λβ = Enc(k
g(b1,b2)
c ||g(b1, b2)⊕λγ),
and keys for input bits now also contain pointers xw ⊕ λw. This way the evaluator
always knows a pointer Λα = bitα ⊕ λα and Λβ = bitβ ⊕ λβ, and therefore knows that
it should decrypt ciphertext cΛα,Λβ in the next gate. We refer to λα as the hidden
mask and Λα as the visible mask.
Full Description of the scheme
Notation. Let λ be security parameter. Let C be a circuit with description size
|C| which takes as inputs n-bit strings. We assume that the circuit outputs a single
bit; our construction can be adapted for multiple-bit outputs in a straightforward
manner. We denote by m = n + gates(C) the total number of “different” wires in
C, i.e. if a gate has a fan-out more than 1, only one wire is counted. We assume
that wires from 1 to n are input wires, and wire m is an output wire. Let |F | be the
description size of circuits presented in Figure 2·16.
Assumptions. We assume there is only one output gate. Our construction can be
generalized to multi-bit output circuits in a straightforward manner. We also assume
without loss of generality that all gates are fan-in two gates: we do this by changing
NOT gates to XOR 1 gates and therefore replacing the complete system (AND, OR,
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NOT) with another complete system (AND, OR, XOR 1), where 1 is a constant
gate. In the garbling scheme we can always implement a constant gate 1 by setting
an additional input wire which the garbler should always set to 1. That is, to garble
input x in the circuit with constant gate 1, the garbler should instead garble input
x̃||1 in the circuit without constant gates.
Parameters of the FEE scheme. In Section 2.3.5 we showed that there exists an
FEE scheme for inputs of size n with key size κ = λn+ 1.
Key generation: Gen(1λ, C, rGen) takes as input security parameter, the circuit, and
randomness rGen of size 2(m− 1)κ+m− 1. It interprets this randomness as 2(m− 1)




1, . . . , k
1
m−1) of size κ (a pair of keys per wire, except
the output wire of C) and m− 1 random bits λw. Output wires of the same output
gate are assigned the same pair of keys and the same values λw. Finally the program




1, . . . , k
1
m−1, λ1, . . . , λm−1).
Circuit garbling: GarbleProg(K,C; rGarble) takes as input the garbling key K (which




1, . . . , k
1
m−1, λ1, . . . , λm−1)), the circuit C to be
garbled, and randomness rGarble which it interprets as random strings rgg used to encrypt
























The program sets params = (|F |, n, κ+ 1). Next for every gate g with input wires α, β
and output wires γ it prepares the following 4 plaintexts:
M00g = k
g(0,0)
γ ||g(0, 0)⊕ λγ, s00g,left = M00g ⊕ s00g,right
M01g = k
g(0,1)
γ ||g(0, 1)⊕ λγ, s01g,left = M01g ⊕ s01g,right
M10g = k
g(1,0)
γ ||g(1, 0)⊕ λγ, s10g,left = M10g ⊕ s10g,right
M11g = k
g(1,1)
γ ||g(1, 1)⊕ λγ, s11g,left = M11g ⊕ s11g,right.









































































in this order. It outputs the garbled circuit C̃ = {Gg}g∈[gates(C)].
Bit-decomposable input garbling: GarbleInp(K, xi, i) takes as input the garbling




1, . . . , k
1
m−1, λ1, . . . , λm−1)), and
i-th input bit xi together with its position i. The program outputs a garbled i-th bit
x̃i = (k
x1
i , λi ⊕ xi).
Evaluation: Eval(C̃, x̃) works by evaluating keys k
bit(w)
w (where bit(w) is a bit
assigned to wire w by the computation C(x)), going from input gates to an output
gate. Assume the evaluator already knows keys and external indices kα,Λα and kβ,Λβ





Constants: C, g, kγ , tdγ ,Λγ .
1. Evaluate C(x) and learn bit assignments bitα, bitβ of input wires α, β of gate
g.
2. Generate k̂γ ← FEE.Equiv(tdγ , x).
3. If g(bitα, bitβ) = g(bitα, 1⊕ bitβ) then set M
Λα,1⊕Λβ
g = kγ ||Λγ ;
4. else set M
Λα,1⊕Λβ







Constants: C, g, kγ , tdγ ,Λγ .
1. Evaluate C(x) and learn bit assignments bitα, bitβ of input wires α, β of gate
g.
2. Generate k̂γ ← FEE.Equiv(tdγ , x).
3. If g(bitα, bitβ) = g(1⊕ bitα, bitβ) then set M
1⊕Λα,Λβ
g = kγ ||Λγ ;
4. else set M
1⊕Λα,Λβ







Constants: C, g, kγ , tdγ ,Λγ .
1. Evaluate C(x) and learn bit assignments bitα, bitβ of input wires α, β of gate
g.
2. Generate k̂γ ← FEE.Equiv(tdγ , x).
3. If g(bitα, bitβ) = g(1⊕ bitα, 1⊕ bitβ) then set M
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ
g = kγ ||Λγ ;
4. else set M
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ





The program is padded to the size of programs F and is the function that outputs
the constant const.
Figure 2·17: Functions used in FEE simulation




g,right ) and proceeds to the next




Simulating garbled circuit and garbled input. Sim1(1
λ, C) uses its knowledge
of C to determine the size of input n and the number of “different” wires m. It sets
κ = λn+ 1 to be the size of the key. Then for each wire w of C except for the output
wire the simulator chooses:
• random κ-bit FEE key kw;
• random bit Λw;
• an FEE trapdoor tdw ← FEE.SimTrap(1λ, n).


































































g,left = (kγ||Λγ)⊕ s
Λα,Λβ
g,right , and s
Λα,Λβ
g,right are chosen at random.



















in this order. It outputs the garbled circuit C̃ = {Gg}g∈[gates(C)]. It sets simulated
garbled input x̃ = ((k1,Λ1), . . . , (kn,Λn)).


























g,left , for every gate g of C.
Simulating internal state of the garbler. Sim2(x, state) first sets k̂w ←
FEE.Equiv(tdw, x) for wires w = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Next for every gate g it sets ran-



































The simulator sets kbitww ← kw, k1⊕bitww ← k̂w for wires w = 1, . . . ,m − 1 (where bitw
is the bit assigned to wire w by the computation C(x)). In addition, for every input
















The simulator outputs (k0w, k
1




















each gate g as internal state of the garbler.
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Proof
Correctness. Correctness follows from correctness of underlying encryption
similar to the correctness of Yao garbled circuit. Namely, it can be shown by induction
that at each step the evaluator gets the correct key k
bitγ
γ and the correct pointer Λγ
for the next gate’ row.
Security. We consider a sequence of hybrid experiments starting from real world
experiment where C̃, x̃, r are generated honestly to the simulated experiment where
C̃, x̃ are simulated given only C and output y = C(x), and r is equivocated to x. We
consider m−1 intermediate hybrids, where in hybrid Hi we switch the key kbitm−im−i from
real to simulated. Here we assume that wires are sorted according to the topological
order of the circuit, i.e. that output wires of each gate have larger index than both
input wires of that gate (note that our notation 1, . . . , n for input wires and m for an
output wire is consistent with topological order).
Hybrid H0. In this hybrid we change how the permutation of ciphertexts is generated,
without changing the distribution of the hybrid. Roughly speaking, instead of choosing
λw at random and setting Λw = λw ⊕ bitw, we choose Λw at random and set λw =
Λw ⊕ bitw, which clearly results in the same distributions. More precisely, recall that
in the real execution we choose random λw for each wire w and set each ciphertext
cb1⊕λα,b2⊕λβ to be an encryption of k
g(b1,b2)
γ ||λγ ⊕ g(b1, b2), for all bits b1, b2. In this
hybrid we instead choose a random bit Λw for each wire and set each ciphertext
cb1⊕Λα,b2⊕Λβ to be an encryption of k
g(bitα⊕b1,bitβ⊕b2)
γ ||Λγ ⊕ g(bitα⊕ b1, bitβ ⊕ b2). When
internal state of the garbler needs to be presented, we set each λw to be Λw ⊕ bitw.
Hybrid 0 is identical to the real experiment.
Hybrid Hi, i = 1, . . . ,m − 1. Denote the wire number m − i by w∗. We refer to
k1⊕bitw∗w∗ as the challenge key, and to all (single-encryption) ciphertexts encrypted
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under this key as challenge ciphertexts. The randomness and plaintexts of challenge
ciphertexts are denoted as challenge randomness, and challenge plaintexts. In this
hybrid we switch k1⊕bitw∗w∗ from real to simulated.
We choose m − 1 random bits Λw. For all wires w = 1, . . . , w∗ the we choose FEE
keys k0w, k
1
w at random. For all wires w = w
∗ + 1, . . . ,m− 1 we choose the key kbitww ,
which we denote as kw, at random and choose the trapdoor for the other key as td←
FEE.SimTrap(rw,SimTrap) with random coins rw,SimTrap. For each w = w
∗ + 1, . . . ,m− 1
we set the other key k1⊕bitαα ← FEE.Equiv(tdw, x); we denote it as k̂w. Next we generate




















γ ||Λγ ⊕ g(bitα, bitβ)⊕ g(1⊕ bitα, 1⊕ bitβ).



















Next we send an input and functions to the challenger of the FEE security game. For
this, we set the input to be x and functions f1, . . . , fl to be functions corresponding to
ciphertexts encrypted under key k̂w∗ (since each gate with input wire w
∗ contains two
such ciphertexts, there are l = 2 · fanout functions in total, where fanout is fanout of
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the gate with output wires w∗). More specifically, we prepare the following functions:





g ] and Const[S
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ
g ].










Note that each function Fg has C, g, kγ, tdγ,Λγ (where γ is an output wire of g) in its
description. Since we switch keys to simulated according to the topological order of
the circuit, output keys k̂γ of gates where w
∗ is an input wire are already switched to
simulated, which means that their trapdoor tdγ , and therefore the desecription if each
required function F , is well defined.
The challenger of FEE security game responds with a key k̂w∗ , l ciphertexts and l
randomness of encryption, which are either real (encrypting F (x)) or simulated. More
specifically, we get the following values from the challenger:
• For each gate g where k̂w∗ is used to encrypt left ciphertexts:
– In the real case, we get
c
1⊕Λw∗ ,Λβ
g,left = FEE.Enck̂w∗ (params, S


















































• For each gate g where k̂w∗ is used to encrypt right ciphertexts:
– In the real case, we get
cΛα,1⊕Λw∗g,right = FEE.Enck̂w∗ (params, s
Λα,1⊕Λw∗ ; rΛα,1⊕Λw∗g,right ),





We also get both randomness of encryption rΛα,1⊕Λw∗g,right and r
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λw∗
g,right .












g ], tdw∗ ; r
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λw∗
Sim,g,right ).
We also get both randomness of encryption
rΛα,1⊕Λw∗g,right ← FEE.Adapt(FΛα,1⊕Λw∗g [SΛα,1⊕Λw∗g ], r
Λα,1⊕Λw∗
Sim,g,right ), x),
r1⊕Λα,1⊕Λw∗g,right ← FEE.Adapt(F 1⊕Λα,1⊕Λw∗g [S1⊕Λα,1⊕Λw∗g ], r
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λw∗
Sim,g,right , x).
• Finally, we get the key k̂w∗ , which is either randomly chosen or simulated as
k̂w∗ ← FEE.Equiv(tdw∗ , x).
We then generate the garbled gate as follows:
1. The first pair of left encryptions (under active key kα) is generated as follows:
c
Λα,Λβ












2. Then we generate the second pair of left encryptions (under inactive key k̂α) as
follows:














g ], tdα; r
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ
Sim,g,left ),

















• If α < w∗ (i.e. the key k̂α is still honestly generated), then we instead
generate these two ciphertexts as
c
1⊕Λα,Λβ











• If α = w∗, then we use challenge ciphertexts c1⊕Λw∗ ,Λβg,left , c
1⊕Λw∗ ,1⊕Λβ
g,left .
3. Similarly, we generate a pair of right ciphertexts under active key kβ as follows:
c
Λα,Λβ











4. Then we generate the second pair of right encryptions (under inactive key k̂β)
as follows:
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g ], tdβ; r
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λβ
Sim,g,right ),



















• If β < w∗ (i.e. the key k̂β is still honestly generated), then we instead
generate these two ciphertexts as
c
Λα,1⊕Λβ












• If β = w∗, then we use challenge ciphertexts cΛα,1⊕Λw∗g,right , c
1⊕Λα,1⊕Λw∗
g,right .




g,right generated above (for all
bits b1, b2), and we set the garbled circuit C̃ to be {Gg}g∈[gates(C)]. We set the garbled
input to be k1, . . . , kn. We set the internal state of the garbler to be:
• Keys k1, . . . , km−1, k̂1, . . . , k̂m−1;
• Encryption randomness rb1,b2g,left, r
b1,b2
g,right, for each gate g and each pair of bits b1, b2.
• Masks sb1,b2g for every gate g and each pair of bits b1, b2.
• Random bits λw = Λw ⊕ bitw.
It follows directly from our construction that if the challenge ciphertexts were honestly
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generated according to FEE.Gen and FEE.Enc, the resulting experiment would be Hw∗−1
and if they are simulated the experiment would be Hw∗ . Therefore indistinguishability
of Hw∗−1 and Hw∗ directly reduces to the security game of the underlying FEE scheme.
Hybrid Hm. In this hybrid we change how masks are generated, without changing
the distribution of the hybrid m− 1. Since all keys k̂w are now simulated, each double
encryption depends on only one value s (S, respectively), but not on all three values
S = s⊕M . Thus, each encryption can be generated by the simulator who doesn’t
know x (and therefore M), but first picks random s (S, respectively) and later opens
s = S ⊕M . Therefore the generation of a garbled circuit is now independent of x
(and only depends on y = C(x), and therefore can be simulated before x is known.
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2.4 Rate-1 Non-committing Encryption
2.4.1 Our Results
We present two NCE schemes with constant-rate in the programmable CRS model.
We first present a simpler construction which gives us rate 13, and then, using more
sophisticated techniques, we construct the second scheme with rate 1 + o(1).
Our first construction is given by a rate-preserving transformation from any NCE
with erasures to full NCE, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and one
way functions (OWFs). The known construction of constant-rate NCE with erasures
((CHK05)) requires decisional composite residuosity assumption and has rate 13.
Our second construction assumes only iOand OWFs and achieves rate 1 + o(1). To
be more precise, the public key, which is the first protocol message in our scheme, has
the size O(λ). The ciphertext, which is the second message, has the size O(λ) + |m|.
The CRS size is O(poly(mλ)), but the CRS is reusable for any polynomially-many
executions without an a priori bound on the number of executions. Thus when the
length |m| of a plaintext is large, the scheme has overall rate that approaches 1.
In addition, this NCE scheme is the first to guarantee perfect correctness. Note
that NCE in the plain model cannot be perfectly correct, and therefore some setup
assumption is necessary to achieve this property.
High-Level Overview of the Construction and Proof Techniques
Definition of NCE. Before describing our construction, we recall what a non-
committing encryption is in more detail. Such a scheme consists of algorithms
(Gen,Enc,Dec, Sim), which satisfy usual correctness and security requirements. Addi-
tionally, the scheme should remain secure even if the adversary first decides to see the
communications in the protocol and later corrupt the parties. This means that the
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simulator should be able to generate a dummy ciphertext cf (without knowing which
message it encrypts). Later, upon corruption of the parties, the simulator learns a
message m, and it should generate internal state of the parties consistent with m and
cf - namely, encryption randomness of the sender and generation randomness of the
receiver.
First attempts and our first construction. Recall that the recent puncturing
technique adds a special trapdoor to a program, which allows to “explain” any input-
output behavior of a program, i.e. to generate randomness consistent with a given
input-output pair ((SW14, DKR14)). Given such a technique, we could try to build
NCE as follows. Start from any rate-efficient non-committing encryption scheme in a
model with erasures. Obfuscate key generation algorithm Gen and put it in the CRS.
The protocol then proceeds as follows: the receiver runs Gen, obtains (pk, sk), sends
pk to the sender, gets back c and decrypts it with sk. In order to allow simulation of
the receiver, augment Gen with a trapdoor which allows a simulator to come up with
randomness for Gen consistent with (pk, sk). However, this approach doesn’t allow to
simulate the sender.
One natural way to allow simulation of the sender is to modify Gen: instead of
outputting pk, it should output an obfuscated encryption algorithm E = iO(Enc[pk])
with the public key hardwired, and the receiver should send E (instead of pk) to the
sender in round 1. In the simulation Enc[pk] can be augmented with a trapdoor, thus
allowing to simulate the sender. The problem is that this scheme is no longer efficient:
in all known constructions the trapdoor (and therefore the whole program E) has the
size of at least λ|m|, meaning that the rate is at least λ (this is due to the fact that
this trapdoor uses a punctured PRF applied to the message m, and, to the best of
our knowledge, in all known constructions of PPRFs the size of a punctured key is at
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least λ|m|).
Another attempt to allow simulation of the sender is to add to the CRS an obfuscated
encryption program E ′ = iO(Enc(pk,m, r)), augmented with a trapdoor in the
simulation. Just like in the initial scheme, the receiver should send pk to the sender;
however, instead of computing c directly using pk, the sender should run obfuscated
program E ′ on pk,m and r. This scheme allows to simulate both the sender and
the receiver, and at the same time keeps communication as short as in the original
PKE. However, we can only prove selective security, meaning that the adversary has
to commit to the challenge message m before it sees the CRS. This is a limitation of
the puncturing technique being used: in the security proof the input to the program
Enc, including message m, has to be hardwired into the program.
We get around this issue by using another level of indirection, similar to the ap-
proach taken by (KSW14) to obtain adaptive security. Instead of publishing E ′ =
iO(Enc(pk,m, r)) in the CRS, we publish a program GenEnc which generates E ′ and
outputs it. The protocol works as follows: the receiver uses Gen to generate (pk, sk)
and sends pk to the sender. The sender runs GenEnc and obtains E ′, and then executes
E ′(pk,m, r)→ c and sends c back to the receiver. Note that GenEnc doesn’t take m
as input, therefore there is no need to hardwire m into CRS and in particular there is
no need to know m at the CRS generation step.
When this scheme uses (CHK05) as underlying NCE with erasures, it has rate 13.
The scheme from (CHK05) additionally requires the decisional composite residuosity
assumption.
Our second construction. We give another construction of NCE, which achieves
nearly optimal rate. That is, the amount of bits sent is |m|+ poly(λ), and by setting
m to be long enough, we can achieve rate close to 1. The new scheme assumes only
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indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions; there is no need for composite
residuosity, used in our previous scheme.
Our construction proceeds in two steps. We first construct a primitive which we
call same-public-key non-committing encryption with erasures, or seNCE for short;
essentially this is a non-committing encryption secure with erasures, but there is an
additional technical requirement on public keys. Our seNCE scheme will have short
ciphertexts, i.e. ciphertext size is m+ poly(λ). However, the public keys will still be
long, namely poly(mλ).
The second step in our construction is to transform any seNCE into a full NCE scheme
such that the ciphertext size is preserved and the public key size depends only on
security parameter. We achieve this at the cost of adding a CRS.
Same-public-key NCE with erasures (seNCE). As a first step we construct a
special type of non-committing encryption which we can realize in the standard model
(without a CRS). This NCE scheme has the following additional properties:
• security with erasures: the receiver is allowed to erase its generation random-
ness (but not sk); the sender is allowed to erase its encryption randomness.
(This means that sk is the only information the adversary expects to see upon
corrupting both parties.)
• same public key: the generation and simulation algorithms executed on the
same input r produce the same public keys.
Construction of seNCE. The starting point for our seNCE construction is the
PKE construction from iO by Sahai and Waters (SW14). Similarly to that approach
we set our public key to be an obfuscated program with a key k inside, which takes
as inputs message m and randomness r and outputs a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) =
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(prg(r), Fk(prg(r))⊕m), where F is a pseudorandom function (PRF). However, instead
of setting k to be a secret key, we set the secret key to be an obfuscated program
(with k hardwired) which takes an input c = (c1, c2) and outputs Fk(c1)⊕ c2. Once
the encryption and decryption programs are generated, the key k and the randomness
used for the obfuscations are erased, and the only thing the receiver keeps is its secret
key. Note that ciphertexts in the above scheme have length m+ poly(λ).
To see that this construction is secure with erasures, consider the simulator that sets
a dummy ciphertext cf to be a random value. To generate a fake decryption key skf ,
which behaves like a real secret key except that it decrypts cf to a challenge message
m, the simulator obfuscates a program (with m, cf , k hardwired) that takes as input
(c1, c2) and does the following: if c1 = cf1 then the program outputs cf2 ⊕ c2 ⊕m,
otherwise the output is Fk(c1) ⊕ c2. Encryption randomness of the sender, as well
as k and obfuscation randomness of the receiver, are erased and do not need to be
simulated. (Note that the simulated secret key is larger than the real secret key. So,
to make sure that the programs have the same size, the real secret key has to be
padded appropriately.)
Furthermore, the scheme has the same-public-key property: The simulated encryption
key is generated in exactly the same way as the honest encryption key.
Note that this scheme has perfect correctness.
From seNCE to full NCE. Our first step is to enhance the given seNCE scheme,
such that the scheme remains secure even when the sender is not allowed to erase
its encryption randomness. Specifically, following ideas from the deniable encryption
of Sahai and Waters (SW14), we add a trapdoor branch to the encryption program,
i.e. the public key. This allows the simulator to create fake randomness rf,Enc, which
activates this trapdoor branch and makes the program output cf on input m. In order
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to create such randomness, the simulator generates rf,Enc as an encryption (using a
scheme with pseudorandom ciphertexts21) of an instruction for the program to output
cf . The program will first try to decrypt rf,Enc and check whether it should output cf
via trapdoor branch, or execute a normal branch instead.
The above construction of enhanced seNCE still has the following shortcomings. First,
its public key (recall that it is an encryption program) is long: the program has to
be padded to be at least of size poly(λ) · |m|, since in the proof the keys for the
trapdoor branch are punctured and have an increased size, and therefore the size of
an obfuscated program is poly(mλ). 22 Second, the simulator still cannot simulate
the randomness which the receiver used to generate its public key, e.g. keys for the
trapdoor branch and randomness for obfuscation. Third, the scheme is only selectively
secure, meaning that the adversary has to fix the message before it sees a public key.
This is due to the fact that our way for explaining a given output (i.e. trapdoor branch
mechanism) requires hardwiring the message inside the encryption program in the
proof.
We resolve these issues by adding another “level of indirection” for the generation of
obfuscated programs. Specifically, we introduce a common reference string that will
contain two obfuscated programs, called GenEnc and GenDec, which are generated
independently of the actual communication of the protocol and can be reused for
unboundedly many messages. The CRS allows the sender and the receiver to locally
and independently generate their long public and private keys for the underlying
enhanced seNCE while communicating only a short token. Furthermore, we will only
need to puncture these programs at points which are unrelated to the actual encrypted
21For this purpose we use a puncturable deterministic encryption scheme (PDE), since it is
iO-friendly and has pseudorandom ciphertexts.
22To the best of our knowledge, in all known puncturable PRFs the size of a punctured key applied
to m is at least λ|m|
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and decrypted messages. The protocol proceeds as follows.
Description of our protocol. The receiver chooses randomness rGenDec and runs
a CRS program GenDec(rGenDec). This program uses rGenDec to sample a short token
t. Next the program uses this token t to internally compute a secret generation
randomness rseNCE, from which it derives (pk, sk) pair for underlying seNCE scheme.
Finally, the program outputs (t, sk). In round 1 the receiver sends the token t (which
therefore is a short public key of the overall NCE scheme) to the sender.
The sender generates its own randomness rGenEnc and runs a CRS program GenEnc(t,
rGenEnc). GenEnc, in the same manner as GenDec, first uses t to generate secret rseNCE
and sample (the same) key pair (pk, sk) for the seNCE scheme. Further, GenEnc
generates trapdoor keys and obfuscation randomness, which it uses to compute
a public key program PEnc[pk] of enhanced seNCE, which extends the underlying
seNCE public key with a trapdoor as described above. PEnc[pk] is the output of
GenEnc. After obtaining PEnc, the sender chooses encryption randomness rEnc and
runs c← PEnc[pk](m, rEnc). In its response message, the sender sends c to the receiver,
who decrypts it using sk.
Correctness of this scheme follows from correctness of the seNCE scheme, since at
the end a message is being encrypted and decrypted using the seNCE scheme. To
get some idea of why security holds, note that the seNCE generation randomness
rseNCE is only computed internally by the programs. This value is never revealed to
the adversary, and therefore can be thought of as being “erased”. In particular, if we
had a VBB obfuscation, we could almost immediately reduce security of our scheme
to security of seNCE. Due to the fact that we only have iO, the actual security proof
becomes way more intricate.
To see how we resolved the three issues from above (namely, with the length of the
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public key, with simulating the receiver, and with selective security), note:
(a) The only information communicated between sender and receiver is the short token
t which depends only on the security parameter, and the ciphertext c which has size
poly(λ) + |m|. Thus the total communication is poly(λ) + |m|.
(b) The simulator will show slightly modified programs with trapdoor branches inside;
they allow the simulator to “explain” the randomness for any desired output, thus
allowing it to simulate internal state of both parties.
(c) We no longer need to hardwire message-dependent values into the programs in
the CRS, which previously made security only selective. Indeed, in a real world the
inputs and outputs of these programs no longer depend on the message sent. They
still do depend on the message in the ideal world (for instance, the output of GenDec
is skm); however, due to the trapdoor branches in the programs it is possible for the
simulator to encode skm into randomness rGenDec rather than the program GenDec
itself. Therefore m can be chosen adaptively after seeing the CRS (and the public
key).
To give more details about adaptivity issues which come up in the analysis of the
simulator, let us look closely at the following three parts of the proof:
• Starting from a real execution, the first step is to switch real sender generation
randomness rGenEnc to fake randomness rf,GenEnc (which “explains” a real output
PEnc). During this step we need to hardwire PEnc inside GenEnc, which can be
done, since PEnc doesn’t depend on m yet.
• Later in the proof we need to switch real encryption randomness rEnc to fake
randomness rf,Enc. During this step we need to hardwire m into PEnc. However,
at this point PEnc is not hardwired into the program GenEnc; instead it is being
encoded into randomness rGenEnc, and therefore it needs to be generated only
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when the sender is corrupted (which means that the simulator learns m and can
create PEnc with m hardwired).
• Eventually we need to switch real seNCE values pk, c, sk to simulated pk, cf , skf .
Before we can do this, we have to hardwire pk into GenEnc. Luckily, in the
underlying seNCE game the adversary is allowed to choose m after it sees pk,
and therefore the requirement to hardwire pk into the CRS program doesn’t
violate adaptive security.
In the proof of our NCE we crucially use the same public-key property of underlying
seNCE: Our programs use the master secret key MSK to compute the generation
randomness rseNCE from token t, and then sample seNCE keys (pk, sk) using this
randomness. In the proof we hardwire pk in the CRS, then puncture MSK and choose
rseNCE at random. Next we switch the seNCE values, including the public key pk,
to simulated ones. Then we choose rseNCE as a result of a PRF, and unhardwire
pk. In order to unhardwire (now simulated) pk from the program and compute
(pk, sk) = FMSK(rseNCE) instead, simulated pk generated from rseNCE should be exactly
the same as the real public key pk which the program normally produces by running
seNCE.Gen(rseNCE). This ensures that the programs with and without pk hardwired
have the same functionality, and thus security holds by iO.
An additional interesting property of this transformation is that it preserves the
correctness of underlying seNCE scheme, meaning that if seNCE is computationally
(statistically, perfectly) correct, then the resulting NCE is also computationally (sta-
tistically, perfectly) correct. Therefore, when instantiated with our perfectly correct
seNCE scheme presented earlier, the resulting NCE achieves perfect correctness. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first NCE scheme with such property.
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Shrinking the secret key. The secret key in the above scheme consists of an
obfuscated program D, where D is the secret key (i.e. decryption program) for the
seNCE scheme, together with some padding that will leave room to “hardwire”, in the
hybrid distributions in the proof of security, the |m|-bit plaintext m into D. Overall,
the description size of D is |m|+O(λ); when using standard IO, this means that the
obfuscated version of D is of size poly(|m|λ).
Still, using the succinct Turing and RAM machine obfuscation of (KLW15, CHJV15,
BGL+15, CH16) it is possible to obtain program obfuscation where the size of the
obfuscated program is the size of the original program plus a polynomial in the security
parameter. This can be done in a number of ways. One simple way is to generate
the following (short) obfuscated TM machine OU : The input is expected to contain
a description of a program that is one-time-padded, and then authenticated using a
signed accumulator as in (KLW15), all with keys expanded from an internally known
short key. The machine decrypts, authenticates, and then runs the input circuit. Now,
to obfuscate a program, simply one time pad the program, authenticate it, and present
it alongside machine OU with the authentication information and keys hardwired.
Augmented explainability compiler. In order to implement the trapdoor
branch in the proof of our NCE scheme, we use among other things the “hidden
sparse triggers” method of Sahai and Waters (SW14). This method proved to be
useful in other applications as well, and Dachman-Soled et al (DKR14) abstracted
it into a primitive called “explainability compiler”. Roughly speaking, explainability
compiler turns a randomized program into its “trapdoored” version, such that it
becomes possible, for those who know faking keys, to create fake randomness which is
consistent with a given input-output pair.
We use a slightly modified version of this primitive, which we call an augmented
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explainability compiler. The difference here is that we can use the original (unmodified)
program in the protocol, and only in the proof replace it with its trapdoor version. This
is important for perfect correctness of NCE: none of the programs GenEnc, GenDec,
and Enc in the real world contain trapdoor branches (indeed, if there was a trapdoor
branch in, say, encryption program Enc, it would be possible that an honest sender
accidentally chooses randomness which contains an instruction to output an encryption
of 0, making the program output this encryption of 0 instead of an encryption of m).
2.4.2 Preliminaries
Non-committing Encryption and its Variants.
Non-committing encryption. Non-committing encryption is an adaptively
secure encryption scheme, i.e., it remains secure even if the adversary decides to see
the ciphertext first and only later corrupt parties. This means that the simulator
should be able to first present a “dummy” ciphertext without knowing what the real
message m is. Later, when parties are corrupted and the simulator learns m, the
simulator should be able to present receiver decryption key (or receiver randomness)
which decrypts dummy c to m and sender randomness under which m is encrypted to
c.
Definition 3. A non-committing encryption scheme for a message space M = {0, 1}l
is a tuple of algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec, Sim), such that correctness and security hold:
• Correctness: For all m ∈ M Pr
[
m = m′







• Security: An adversary cannot distinguish between real and simulated cipher-
texts and internal state even if it chooses message m adaptively depending on
the public key pk. More concretely, no PPT adversary A can win the following
game with more than negligible advantage:
A challenger chooses random b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, it runs the following experiment
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(real):
1. It chooses randomness rGen and creates (pk, sk)← Gen(1λ, rGen). It shows
pk to the adversary.
2. The adversary chooses message m.
3. The challenger chooses randomness rEnc and creates c← Enc(pk,m; rEnc).
It shows (c, rEnc, rGen) to the adversary.
If b = 1, the challenger runs the following experiment (simulated):
1. It runs (pks, cs)← Sim(1λ). It shows pks to the adversary.
2. The adversary chooses message m.
3. The challenger runs (rsEnc, r
s
Gen)← Sim(m) and shows (cs, rsEnc, rsGen) to the
adversary.
The adversary outputs a guess b′ and wins if b = b′.
Note that we allow Sim to be interactive, and in addition we omit its random coins.
In this definition we only spell out the case where both parties are corrupted, and
all corruptions happen after the execution and simultaneously. Indeed, if any of the
parties is corrupted before the ciphertext is sent, then the simulator learns m and
can present honest execution of the protocol; therefore we concentrate on the case
where corruptions happen afterwards. Next, m is the only information the simulator
needs, and after learning it (regardless of which party was corrupted) the simulator
can already simulate both parties; thus we assume that corruptions of parties happen
simultaneously. Finally, without loss of generality we assume that both parties are
corrupted: if only one or no party is corrupted, then the adversary sees strictly less
information in the experiment, and therefore cannot distinguish between real execution
and simulation, as long as the scheme is secure under our definition.
Note that this definition only allows parties to encrypt a single message under a given
public key. This is due to impossibility result of Nielsen (Nie02), who showed that a
secret key of any NCE can support only bounded number of ciphertexts. If one needs
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to send many messages, it can run several instances of a protocol (each with a fresh
pair of keys). Security for this case can be shown via a simple hybrid argument.
Non-committing encryption in a programmable common reference string
model. In this work we build NCE in a CRS model, meaning that both parties and
the adversary are given access to a CRS, and the simulator, in addition to simulating
communications and parties’ internal state, also has to simulate the CRS. Before
giving a formal definition, we briefly discuss possible variants of this definition.
Programmable CRS. One option is to consider a global (non-programmable) CRS
model, where the CRS is given to the simulator, or local (programmable) CRS model,
where the simulator is allowed to generate a CRS. The first variant is stronger and
more preferable, but in our construction the simulator needs to know underlying
trapdoors and we therefore focus on a weaker definition.
Reusable CRS. Given the fact that in a non-committing encryption a public key can
be used to send only bounded number of bits, a bounded-use CRS would force parties
to reestablish CRS after sending each block of messages. Since sampling a CRS is
usually an expensive operation, it is good to be able to generate a CRS which can be
reused for any number of times set a priori. It is even better to have a CRS which can
be reused any polynomially many times without any a priori bound. In our definition
we ask a CRS to be reusable in this stronger sense.
Security of multiple executions. Unlike NCE in the standard model, in the CRS
model single-execution security of NCE does not immediately imply multi-execution
security. Indeed, in a reduction to a single-execution security we would have to, given a
challenge and a CRS, simulate other executions. But we cannot do this since we didn’t
generate this CRS ourselves and do not know trapdoors. Therefore in our definition
we explicitly require that the protocol remains secure even when the adversary sees
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many executions with the same CRS.
Definition 4. An NCE scheme for a message space M = {0, 1}l in a common
reference string model is a tuple of algorithms (GenCRS,Gen, Enc,Dec, Sim) which
satisfy correctness and security.




(pk, sk)← Gen(1λ,CRS; rGen);
c← Enc(m,CRS; rEnc);
m′ ← Dec(CRS, c)
 ≥ 1 −
negl(λ).
If this probability is equal to 1, then we say that the scheme is perfectly correct. 23
Security: For any PPT adversary A, advantage of A in distinguishing the following
two cases is negligible:
A challenger chooses random b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, it runs the following experiment
(real):
First it generates a CRS as CRS ← GenCRS(1λ, l). CRS is given to the adversary.
Next the challenger does the following, depending on the adversary’s request:
• On a request to initiate a protocol instance with session ID id, the challenger
chooses randomness rGen,id and creates (pkid, skid) ← Gen(1λ,CRS, rGen,id). It
shows pkid to the adversary.
• On a request to encrypt a message mid in a protocol instance with session ID id,
the challenger chooses randomness rEnc,id and creates cid ← Enc(pkid,mid; rEnc,id).
It shows cid to the adversary.
• On a request to corrupt the sender of a protocol instance with ID id, the challenger
shows rEnc,id to the adversary.
• On a request to corrupt the receiver of a protocol instance with ID id, the
challenger shows rGen,id to the adversary.
If b = 1, it runs the following experiment (simulated):
First it generates a CRS as CRSs ← Sim(1λ, l). CRSs is given to the adversary. Next
the challenger does the following, depending on the adversary’s request:
23Note that this definition implies that there are no decryption errors for any CRS.
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• On a request to initiate a protocol instance with session ID id, the challenger
runs (pksid, c
s
id)← Sim(1λ) and shows pksid to the adversary.
• On a request to encrypt a message mid in a protocol instance with session ID id,
the challenger shows csid to the adversary.
• On a request to corrupt the sender of a protocol instance with ID id, the challenger
shows rsEnc,id ← Sim(mid) to the adversary.
• On a request to corrupt the receiver of a protocol instance with ID id, the
challenger shows rsGen,id ← Sim(mid) to the adversary.
The adversary outputs a guess b′ and wins if b = b′.
Constant rate NCE. The rate of an NCE scheme is how many bits the sender
and receiver need to communicate in order to transmit a single bit of a plaintext: NCE
scheme for a message space M = {0, 1}l has rate f(l, λ), if (|pk|+ |c|)/l = f(l, λ). If
f(l, λ) is a constant, the scheme is said to have constant rate.
Same-public-key non-committing encryption with erasures (seNCE). Here
we define a different notion of NCE which we call same-public-key non-committing
encryption with erasures (seNCE). First, such a scheme allows parties to erase unnec-
essary information: the sender is allowed to erase its encryption randomness, and the
receiver is allowed to erase its generation randomness rGen (but not its public or secret
key). Furthermore, this scheme should have “the same public key” property, which
says that both real generation and simulated generation algorithms should output
exactly the same public key pk, if they are executed with the same random coins.
Definition 5. The same-public-key non-committing encryption with erasures (seNCE)
for a message space M = {0, 1}l is a tuple of algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec, Sim), such
that correctness, security, and the same-public-key property hold:
• Correctness: For all m ∈ M Pr
[
m = m′








• Security with erasures: No PPT adversary A can win the following game
with more than negligible advantage:
A challenger chooses random b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0, it runs a real experiment:
1. The challenger chooses randomness rGen and creates (pk, sk)← Gen(1λ, rGen).
It shows pk to the adversary.
2. The adversary chooses a message m.
3. The challenger chooses randomness rEnc and creates c← Enc(pk,m; rEnc).
It shows c to the adversary.
4. Upon corruption request, the challenger shows to the adversary the secret
key sk.
If b = 1, the challenger runs a simulated experiment:
1. A challenger generates simulated public key and ciphertext (pks, cs) ←
Sim(1λ)24. It shows pks to the adversary.
2. The adversary chooses a message m.
3. The challenger shows the ciphertext cs to the adversary.
4. Upon corruption request, the challenger runs sks ← Sim(m) and shows to
the adversary simulated secret key sks.
The adversary outputs a guess b′ and wins if b = b′.
• The same public key: For any r if Gen(1λ, r) = (pk, sk); Sim(1λ, r) =
(pkf , cf ), then pk = pkf .
Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Circuits
The goal of obfuscation is to provide a method that transforms any program in an
obfuscated version that hides the details of the implemented functionality but still
provides the capability to evaluate it on any input. The study of obfuscation was
initiated by Hada (Had00) and Barak et al. (BGI+01, BGI+12).
There are several different security notions for obfuscation. In our constructions we
will be using indistinguishability obfuscation(iO) which we define next. Indistinguisha-
24We omit the random coins and state of Sim.
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bility obfuscation was introduced by Barak et al. (BGI+01) and the first candidate
construction for iO for any polynomial size circuit was presented by the work of Garg
et a. (GGH+13).
Definition 6 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO)). A uniform PPT machine iO
is called an indistinguishability obfuscator if the following conditions are satisfied:
• For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ Cλ, for all inputs x, we have that
Pr[C ′(x) = C(x) : C ′ ← iO(1λ, C)] = 1
• There is a polynomial p such that for every circuit C ∈ Cλ, it holds that |iO(c)| ≤
p(|C|).
• For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT distinguisher D, there exists a negligible
function α such that the following holds: For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for
all circuit families C0 = {C0λ}λ∈N, C1 = {C1λ}λ∈N of size |C0λ| = |C1λ|, we have
that if C0λ(x) = C
1
λ(x) for all inputs x, then
∣∣∣Pr[D(iO(1λ, C0λ)) = 1]− Pr[D(iO(1λ, C1λ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ)
Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions and their variants
Puncturable PRFs. In puncrurable PRFs it is possible to create a key that is
punctured at a set S of polynomial size. A key k punctured at S (denoted k{S})
allows evaluating the PRF at all points not in S. Furthermore, the function values at
points in S remain pseudorandom even given k{S}.
Definition 7. A puncturable pseudorandom function family for input size n(λ) and
output size m(λ) is a tuple of algorithms {Sample,Puncture,Eval} such that the follow-
ing properties hold:
• Functionality preserved under puncturing: For any PPT adversary A
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which outputs a set S ⊂ {0, 1}n, for any x 6∈ S,
Pr[Fk(x) = Fk{S}(x) : k ← Sample(1λ), k{S} ← Puncture(k, S)] = 1.
• Pseudorandomness at punctured points: For any PPT adversaries
A1, A2, define a set S and state state as (S, state)← A1(1λ). Then
Pr[A2(state, S, k{S}, Fk(S))]− Pr[A2(state, S, k{S}, U|S|·m(λ))] < negl(λ),
where Fk(S) denotes concatenated PRF values on inputs from S, i.e. Fk(S) =
{Fk(xi) : xi ∈ S}.
The GGM PRF (GGM85) satisfies this definition.
Statistically injective puncturable PRFs. Such PRFs are injective with over-
whelming probability over the choice of a key. Sahai and Waters (SW14) show that if
F is a puncturable PRF where the output length is large enough compared to the input
length, and h is 2-universal hash function, then F′k,h = Fk(x)⊕ h(x) is a statistically
injective puncturable PRF.
Extracting puncturable PRFs. Such PRFs have a property of a strong extractor:
even when a full key is known, the output of the PRF is statistically close to uniform,
as long as there is enough min-entropy in the input. Sahai and Waters (SW14) showed
that if the input length is large enough compared to the output length, then such
PRF can be constructed from any puncturable PRF F as F′k,h = h(Fk(x)), where h is
2-universal hash function.
Augmented Explainability Compiler
In this section we describe a variant of an explainability compiler of
(DKR14). This compiler is used in our construction of NCE, as discussed in the
introduction.
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Roughly speaking, explainability compiler modifies a randomized program such that
it becomes possible, for those who know faking keys, to create fake randomness rf
which is consistent with a given input-output pair. Explainability techniques were
first introduced by Sahai and Waters (SW14) as a method to obtain deniability for
encryption (there they were called “a hidden sparse trigger meachanism”). Later
Dachman-Soled, Katz and Rao (DKR14) generalized these ideas and introduced a
notion of explainability compiler.
We modify this primitive for our construction and call it an “augmented explainability
compiler”. Before giving a formal definition, we briefly describe it here. Such a
compiler Comp takes a randomized algorithm Alg(input;u) with input input and
randomness u and outputs three new algorithms:
• Comp.Rerand(Alg) outputs a new algorithm Alg′(input; r) which is a “rerandom-
ized” version of Alg. Namely, Alg′ first creates fresh randomness u using a PRF
on input (input, r) and then runs Alg with this fresh randomness u.
• Comp.Trapdoor(Alg) outputs a new algorithm Alg′′(input; r) which is a “trap-
doored” version of Alg′, which allows to create randomness consistent with a
given output: namely, before executing Alg′, Alg′′ interprets its randomness r
as a ciphertext and tries to decrypt it using internal key. If it succeeds and r
encrypts an instruction to output output, then Alg′′ complies. Otherwise it runs
Alg′.
• Comp.Explain(Alg) outputs a new algorithm Explain(input, output) which outputs
randomness for algorithm Alg′′ consistent with given input and output. It uses
an internal key to encrypt an instruction to output output on an input input,
and outputs the resulting ciphertext.
Definition 8. An augmented explainability compiler Comp is an algorithm which takes
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as input algorithm Alg and randomness and outputs programs PRerand,PTrapdoor,PExplain,
such that the following properties hold:
• Indistinguishability of the source of the output. For any input it holds
that
{(PTrapdoor,PExplain, output) : r ← U, output← Alg(input; r)}
and
{(PTrapdoor,PExplain, output) : r ← U, output← PTrapdoor(input; r)}
are indistinguishable.
• Indistinguishability of programs with and without a trapdoor. PRerand
and PTrapdoor are indistinguishable.
• Selective explainability. Any PPT adversary has only negligible advantage
in winning the following game:
1. Adv fixes an input input∗;
2. The challenger runs PRerand,PTrapdoor,PExplain ← Comp(Alg);
3. It chooses random r∗ and computes output∗ ← PTrapdoor(input∗; r∗);
4. It chooses random ρ and computes fake r∗f ← PExplain(input∗, output∗; ρ)
5. It chooses random bit b. If b = 0, it shows (PTrapdoor,PExplain, output
∗, r∗),
else it shows (PTrapdoor,PExplain, output
∗, r∗f )
6. Adv outputs b′ and wins if b = b′.
Differences between [DKR15] compiler and our construction. For the
reader familiar with (SW14), (DKR14), we briefly describe the differences.
First, we split compiling procedure into two parts: the first part, rerandomization,
adds a PRF to the program Alg, such that the program uses randomness F(input, r)
instead of r. The second part adds a trapdoor branch to rerandomized program. This
is done for a cleaner presentation of the proof.
Second, we slightly change a trapdoor branch activation mechanism: together with
faking keys we hardwire an image S of a pseudorandom generator into the program.
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Whenever this program decrypts fake r, it follows instructions inside r only if these
instructions contain a correct preimage of S. This trick allows us to first change S
to random and then to indistinguishably “delete” the whole trapdoor branch from
the program. Thus it becomes possible to use a program without a trapdoor in the
protocol (and only in the proof change it to its trapdoor version), which is crucial for
achieving perfect correctness.
Construction. Our explainability compiler is described in Figure 2·18. It takes as
input algorithm Alg and randomness r. It uses r to sample keys Ext (for an extracting
PRF), f (for a special encryption scheme called puncturable deterministic encryption,
or PDE(SW14)), as well as random s, and randomness for iO. It sets S = prg(s).
Then it obfuscates programs Rerand[Alg,Ext], Trapdoor[Alg,Ext, f, S], and Explain[f, s].
It outputs these programs.
Theorem 19. Algorithm Comp presented in Figure 2·18 is an augmented explainability
compiler.
The proof of security can be found in the full version of the paper.
2.4.3 Optimal-Rate Non-committing Encryption in the CRS Model.
In this section we show how to construct a fully non-committing encryption with rate
1 + o(1). A crucial part of our protocol is the underlying seNCE scheme with short
ciphertexts, which we will transform into a full NCE in section 2.4.5.
2.4.4 Same-Public-Key Non-committing Encryption with Erasures
In this section we present our construction of the same-public-key non-committing
encryption with erasures (seNCE for short) (defined in section 2.4.2, definition 5),
which is a building block in our construction of a full fledged NCE.




Inputs: Algorithm Alg, randomness r
1. Use r to sample keys Ext (for extracting PRF), f (for PDE), as well as random
s and randomness for iO r1, r2, r3.
2. Set S ← prg(s);
3. Set PRerand ← iO(Rerand[Alg,Ext]; r1), Pv ← iO(Trapdoor[Alg,Ext, f, S]; r2), and
PExplain ← iO(Explain[f, s]; r3).
4. Output PRerand, PTrapdoor, and PExplain.
Program Rerand
Program Rerand[Alg,Ext](input; r)
Constants: underlying randomized algorithm Alg(input;u), a key for extracting prf
Ext
Inputs: input input, randomness r
1. Create randomness u← FExt(input, r);
2. output output← Alg(input;u)
Program Trapdoor
Program Trapdoor[Alg, f ,Ext,S](input; r)
Constants: underlying randomized algorithm Alg(input;u), a faking key f , a key
for extracting prf Ext, prg image S
Inputs: input input, randomness r
1. Trapdoor branch:
(a) decode out← PDE.Decf (r); if out = ⊥ then goto normal branch;
(b) parse out as (input′, output′, s′, ρ̃). If input = input′ and prg(s′) = S then
output output′ and halt, else goto normal branch;
2. Normal branch:
(a) Create randomness u← FExt(input, r);
(b) output output← Alg(input;u)
Program Explain
Program Explain[f , s](input,output; ρ)
Constants: a faking key f , secret s, which is a prg preimage of S
Inputs: input and output (input, output), randomness ρ
1. output r ← PDE.Encf (input, output, s, prg(ρ))
Figure 2·18: Explainability compiler and programs used.
190
into a public-key encryption, we set our public key to be an obfuscated encryption
algorithm pk = iO(Enc[k]) (see Figure 2·19). To allow the simulator to generate a fake
secret key, we apply the same trick to the secret key: we set the secret key to be an
obfuscated decryption algorithm with hardcoded PRF key, namely sk = iO(Dec[k]).
In other words, the seNCE protocol proceeds as follows: the receiver generates the
obfuscated programs pk, sk and then erases generation randomness, including the
key k. Then it sends pk to the sender; the sender encrypts its message m, erases
his encryption randomness, and sends back the resulting ciphertext c, which the
receiver decrypts with sk. We present the detailed description of the seNCE protocol
in Figure 2·19.
Theorem 20. The scheme given on Fig. 2·19 is the same-public-key non-committing
encryption scheme with erasures, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits
and one way functions. In addition, it has ciphertexts (the second message in the
protocol) of size poly(λ) + |m|. The protocol is also perfectly correct.
Proof. We show that the scheme from Figure 2·19. is a seNCE and has short cipher-
texts.
Perfect correctness. The underlying secret key encryption scheme is perfectly
correct, since Dec(Enc(m, r)) = Fk(c1)⊕ (Fk(c1)⊕m) = m. Due to perfect correctness
of iO, our seNCE protocol is also perfectly correct.
Security with erasures: We need to show that real and simulated pk, c, sk are
indistinguishable, even when the adversary can choose m adaptively after seeing pk.
1. Real experiment. In this experiment PEnc and PDec are generated honestly





2. Hybrid 1. In this experiment c∗1 is generated at random instead of prg(r
∗).
Indistinguishability from the previous hybrid follows by security of the PRG.
3. Hybrid 2. In this experiment we puncture key k in both programs Enc and
Dec, more specifically, we obfuscate programs PEnc = iO(Enc:1[k{c∗1}]),
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PDec = iO(SimDec[k{c∗1}, c∗,m∗]). We claim that functionality of these programs
is the same as that of Enc and Dec:
The seNCE Protocol:
Inputs: sender’s message m
• Round 1. The receiver chooses randomness rGen and generates keys
(PEnc,PDec)← Gen(rGen). It sends PEnc to the sender and erases rGen.
• Round 2. The sender chooses randomness rEnc and generates a ciphertext
c← PEnc(m; rEnc). It sends c to the receiver and erases rEnc.
• The receiver decrypts m′ ← PDec(c) and outputs m′.
Program Gen(r)
Inputs: randomness r which consists of three parts r = (r1, r2, r3)
(a) Set k ← r1 and generate PEnc ← iO(Enc[k]; r2) and PDec ← iO(Dec[k]; r3).
(b) Output (PEnc,PDec)
Program Enc[k](m, r) // hardcoded PRF key k
Inputs: message m, randomness r
Program Size: this program is padded to be of the maximum size of Enc and Enc:1
(a) Set c1 ← prg(r) and c2 ← Fk(c1)⊕m.
(b) output c = (c1, c2)
Program Dec[k](c) // hardcoded PRF key k
Inputs: ciphertext c consisting of two parts (c1, c2)
Program Size: this program is padded to be of the maximum size of Dec and
SimDec.
(a) Output Fk(c1)⊕ c2.
Figure 2·19: seNCE protocol
Indeed, in Enc:1 (defined in Figure 2·21), c∗1 is random and thus with high
probability it is outside the image of the PRG; therefore no input r results
in evaluating F at the punctured point c∗1, and we can puncture safely. In
SimDec (defined in Figure 2·28), if c1 6= c∗1, then the program behaves exactly
like the original one (i.e. computes Fk(c1)⊕ c2); if c1 = c∗1, then SimDec outputs
c∗2 ⊕ c2 ⊕m = (Fk(c∗1)⊕m)⊕ c2 ⊕m = Fk(c∗1)⊕ c2, which is exactly what Dec
outputs when c1 = c
∗
1. Note that c
∗
1 is random (and thus independent of m),
therefore pk = Enc:1[k{c∗1}] can be generated before the message m∗ is fixed.
Indistinguishability from the previous hybrid follows by the security of iO.
4. Hybrid 3. In this hybrid we switch c∗2 from Fk(c
∗
1)⊕m∗ to random. This hybrid
relies on the indistinguishability between punctured value Fk(c
∗
1) and a truly
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random value, even given a punctured key k{c∗1}.
Indeed, to reconstruct this hybrid, first choose random c∗1 and get k{c∗1} and val∗
(which is either random or Fk(c
∗
1)) from the PPRF challenger. Show obfuscated
Enc : 1[k{c∗1}] as a public key. When the adversary fixes message m∗, set
c∗2 = val
∗ ⊕m∗ and upon corruption show obfuscated SimDec[k{c∗1}, c∗,m∗]. If
val∗ is truly random, then c∗2 = val
∗ ⊕m∗ is distributed uniformly and thus we
are in hybrid 3. If val∗ is the actual PRF value, then c∗2 = Fk(c
∗
1)⊕m∗ and we
are in hybrid 2.
Indistinguishability holds by security of a punctured PRF.
Simulation:
(a) Generate a simulated public key PEnc as follows: choose a random PRF key k
and randomness r, set
PEnc ← iO(Enc[k]; r).
(b) Generate a simulated ciphertext c∗ = (c∗1, c
∗





(c) Generate a simulated receiver’s internal state PDec for message m
∗ as follows:
PDec ← iO(SimDec[k, c∗,m∗]).
Program SimDec[k, c∗, m∗](c) // hardcoded PRF key k, dummy ciphertext
c∗, challenge message m∗
Inputs: ciphertext c which consists of two parts (c1, c2)
Program Size: this program is padded to be of the maximum size of Dec and
SimDec.




2 ⊕ c2 ⊕m∗. Otherwise, output Fk(c1)⊕ c2.
Figure 2·20: seNCE Simulator.
Program Enc:1[k{c∗1}](m, r) // hardcoded punctured PRF key k{c∗1}
Inputs: message m, randomness r
Program Size: this program is padded to be of the maximum size of Enc and Enc:1
(a) Set c1 ← prg(r) and c2 ← Fk{c∗1}(c1)⊕m.
(b) Output c = (c1, c2).
Figure 2·21: Program Enc:1 used in the proof.
5. Hybrid 4 (Simulation). In this hybrid we unpuncture the key k in both
programs and show PEnc ← iO(Enc[k]), PDec ← iO(SimDec[k, c∗,m∗]).
This is without changing the functionality of the programs: Indeed, in Enc no
random input r results in prg(r) = c∗1, thus we can remove the puncturing. In
Dec:1 due to preceding “if” no input c causes evaluation of Fk{c∗1}, thus we can
unpuncture it as well.
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The indistinguishability from the previous hybrid follows by the security if the
iO.
We observe that the last hybrid is indeed the simulation experiment described in
Figure 2·28: c∗ is a simulated ciphertext since c∗1 is random, c∗2 = Fk(c∗1), PEnc is
honestly generated, and PDec is a simulated key SimDec[k, c
∗,m∗], which decrypts c∗
to m∗. Thus, we have shown that this scheme is non-committing with erasures.
The same public key. Both real generation algorithm Gen and the simu-
lator on randomness rGen = (r1, r2, r3) produce exactly the same public key pk =
iO(Enc[r1]; r2).
Efficiency: Our PRG should be length-doubling to ensure that its image is sparse.
Thus |c1| = 2λ, and |c2| = |m|. Thus the size of our ciphertext is 2λ+ |m|.
2.4.5 From seNCE to Full NCE
In this section we show how to transform any seNCE (for instance, seNCE constructed
in Section 2.4.4) into full non-committing encryption in the CRS model. We start
with a brief overview of the construction:
Construction. Our CRS contains algorithms Comp.Rerand(GenEnc) and Comp.
Rerand (GenDec) which share master secret key MSK. Both programs can internally
generate the parameters for the underlying seNCE scheme using their MSK and then
output an encryption program or a decryption key. More specifically, GenDec takes
a random input, produces generation token t and then uses this token and MSK to
generate randomness rNCE for seNCE.Gen. Then the program samples seNCE keys
pk, sk from rNCE. It outputs the token t and the generated decryption key sk for a
seNCE scheme. The receiver keeps sk for itself and sends the token t to the sender.
GenEnc, given a token t, can produce (the same) pair (pk, sk) and outputs an algorithm
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Comp.Rerand(Encpk), which has pk hardwired. This algorithm takes a message m and
outputs its encryption c, which the sender sends back to the receiver. Then receiver
decrypts it using sk.
We present our full NCE protocol and its building block functions GenEnc, GenDec,
Enc in Figure 2·22.
Theorem 21. Assuming Comp is a secure explainability compiler, seNCE is a secure
same-public-key NCE with erasures with a ciphertext size O(poly(λ)) +m, and assum-
ing one-way functions, the described construction is a constant-rate non-committing
public key encryption scheme in a common reference string model. Assuming perfect
correctness of underlying seNCE and Comp, our NCE scheme is also perfectly correct.
Proof of the Theorem 21
Proof. We first show correctness of the scheme. Next we present a simulator and
argue that the scheme is secure. Finally we argue that the scheme is constant-rate.
Correctness. The presented scheme is perfectly correct, as long as the underlying
seNCE and Comp are perfectly correct: First, due to perfect correctness of Comp, using
compiled versions Comp.Rerand(GenEnc), Comp.Rerand(GenDec), Comp.Rerand(Enc)
is as good as the using original programs. Next, both the sender and receiver generate
public and secret seNCE keys as (pk, sk) ← seNCE.Gen(FMSK(t)). The sender also
generates c, which is an encryption of m under pk, which is decrypted under sk by
receiver. Thus the scheme is as correct as the underlying seNCE scheme is.
Since the protocol for seNCE which we give in section 2.4.4 has perfect correctness, the
overall NCE scheme, when instantiated with our seNCE protocol from section 2.4.4,
also achieves perfect correctness.
Description of the simulator
In this subsection we first explain which variables the adversary sees and then describe
our simulator.
The view of the adversary. The view of the adversary consists of the CRS
(programs P∗GenEnc,P
∗
GenDec), as well as the communication and the internal states of
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The NCE Protocol
CRS: programs PGenEnc and PGenDec, where
PGenEnc = Comp.Rerand(GenEnc[MSK]), PGenDec = Comp.Rerand(GenDec[MSK])
Inputs: sender’s message m
1. Round 1. The receiver chooses randomness rGenDec and generates (t, sk) ←
PGenDec(rGenDec). The receiver sends t to the sender.
2. Round 2. The sender chooses randomness rGenEnc and generates PEnc ←
PGenEnc(t; rGenEnc). Then the sender chooses randomness rEnc and encrypts
c← PEnc(m; rEnc). The sender sends c to the receiver.
3. The receiver decrypts m′ ← seNCE.Decsk(c) and outputs m′
Program GenEnc[MSK](t; e)
// hardcoded values: master key MSK
Inputs: token t, randomness e
1. Set the randomness rNCE ← FMSK(t), run (pk, sk)← seNCE.Gen(rNCE).
2. Generate PEnc ← Comp.Rerand(Enc[pk]; e).
3. Output the program PEnc.
Program Enc[pk](m; u)
// hardcoded values: seNCE public key pk
Inputs: message m, randomness u
1. Output ciphertext c← seNCE.Encpk(m;u).
Program GenDec[MSK](w)
// hardcoded values: master key MSK
Inputs: randomness w
1. Generate token t← prg(w).
2. Set the randomness rNCE ← FMSK(t), run pk, sk ← seNCE.Gen(rNCE).
3. Output (t, sk).
Figure 2·22: The NCE Protocol.
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several protocol instances. Namely, for each protocol instance the adversary sees the
following variables:
1. The first protocol message t∗, after which the adversary assigns an input m for
this protocol instance;
2. The second protocol message c∗;
3. The sender internal state r∗Enc, r
∗
GenEnc;
4. The receiver internal states r∗GenDec.
Other values, such as P∗Enc and sk
∗, can be obtained by the adversary by running
programs in the CRS: P∗Enc ← P∗GenEnc(t∗, r∗GenEnc), (sk∗, t∗)← P∗GenDec(r∗GenDec).
Simulation. The simulator runs the compiler Comp on programs Enc,GenEnc,
GenDec and sets a simulated CRS to be a description of programs
Comp.Trapdoor(GenEnc), Comp.Trapdoor(GenDec). The difference from the real-world
CRS is that these simulated programs have a trapdoor branch inside them, which allows
the simulator to produce randomness such that a program outputs a desired output
on this randomness. The simulator keeps programs ExplEnc = Comp.Explain(Enc),
ExplGenEnc = Comp.Explain(GenEnc),ExplGenDec = Comp.Explain(GenDec) for later use.
• CRS generation. The simulator sets the CRS to be a description of programs
P∗GenEnc = Comp.Trapdoor(GenEnc), P
∗
GenDec = Comp.Trapdoor(GenDec).
Next the simulator responds to requests of the adversary. The adversary can
interactively ask to setup a new execution of the protocol (where the input
m can be chosen based on what the adversary has already learn from other
executions), or ask to deliver messages or corrupt parties in protocols which are
already being executed. Below we describe what our simulator does in each case:
• Simulation of the first message. If the receiver is already corrupted, then
the simulator generates the first message by choosing random r∗GenDec and running
(t∗, sk∗)← P∗GenDec(r∗GenDec). Otherwise the simulator chooses random t∗ as the
first message.
• Simulation of the second message. If either the sender or the receiver is
already corrupted, then the simulator learns m and therefore can generate the sec-
ond message honestly. If neither the sender nor the receiver in this execution are
corrupted by this moment, the simulator runs (pk∗f , c
∗
f )← seNCE.Sim(FMSK(t∗))
and gives c∗f to the adversary as the second message.
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• Simulation of the sender internal state. If either the sender or the receiver
had been corrupted before the second message was sent, then the simulator
has generated the second message honestly and can thus show true sender
randomness.
Otherwise it first generates a program P∗Enc = Comp.Trapdoor(Enc[pk
∗
f ]) with
simulated pk∗f hardwired inside. Next it encodes m
∗, c∗f into sender encryption
randomness, i.e. sets r∗f,Enc ← ExplEnc(m∗, c∗f ; ρ3) for random ρ3; so that P ∗Enc on
input (m∗, r∗f,Enc) outputs c
∗
f .
Finally, it encodes P∗Enc into r
∗
f,GenEnc, i.e. sets the sender’s generation randomness
r∗f,GenEnc ← ExplGenEnc(t∗,P∗Enc; ρ2) for random ρ2, so that P∗GenEnc outputs P∗Enc on
input (t∗, r∗f,GenEnc).
The pair (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗
f,Enc) is set to be the sender internal state.
• Simulation of the receiver internal state. If the corruption happens before
the first message is sent, then the simulator has generated the first message
honestly and thus can show true receiver internal state.
If corruption happens after the first message, but before the second, then the
first message t∗ was generated at random. In this case the simulator computes
sk∗ ← seNCE.Gen(FMSK(t∗)). It encodes (t∗, sk∗) into receiver randomness, i.e.
sets
r∗f,GenDec ← ExplGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ1) for random ρ1, so that P ∗GenDec on input r∗f,GenDec
outputs (t∗, sk∗).
If corruption happens after the second message, then the simulator runs seNCE




by the adversary. Next it encodes (t∗, sk∗f) into receiver randomness, i.e. sets
r∗f,GenDec ← ExplGenDec(t∗, sk∗f ; ρ1) for random ρ1, so that P ∗GenDec on input r∗f,GenDec
outputs (t∗, sk∗f ).
Note that simulation of each protocol instance is independent of simulation of other
protocol instances (except for the fact that they share the same CRS). Therefore
in order to keep the description of the simulator simple enough, in Figure 2·23 we
present a detailed description of the simulator for a single execution only; it can be
trivially generalized to a multiple-execution case according to what is written above. In
addition, the simulator is presented for a difficult case, i.e. when nobody is corrupted
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Simulation
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Choose a PRF key MSK and randomness ρGenEnc, ρGenDec
(b) Compute P∗GenEnc ← Comp.Trapdoor(GenEnc[MSK]; ρGenEnc),
ExplGenEnc ← Comp.Explain(GenEnc[MSK]; ρGenEnc).
(c) Compute P∗GenDec ← Comp.Trapdoor(GenDec[MSK]; ρGenDec),
ExplGenDec ← Comp.Explain(GenDec[MSK]; ρGenDec).
(d) Set the CRS to be (P∗GenEnc,P
∗
GenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) Choose a random t∗ and generate r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗). Show t∗ as the first
message in the protocol.
(b) Run the seNCE simulator to simulate the public key pk∗f ← seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE)
(c) After the adversary decides on the message m∗, run the seNCE simulator
c∗f ← seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE) to generate a simulated ciphertext.
(d) Show c∗f as the second message in the protocol.
3. Generate parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and com-
munications:
(a) Run the seNCE simulator to create a simulated secret key: sk∗f ←
seNCE.Sim(st,m∗)
(b) Set the receiver’s randomness r∗f,GenDec ← ExplGenDec(t∗, sk∗f ; ρ1) for random
ρ1.
(c) Compute P∗Enc ← Comp.Trapdoor(Enc[pkf ]; ρEnc),
ExplEnc ← Comp.Explain(Enc[pkf ]; ρEnc).
(d) Set the sender’s generation randomness r∗f,GenEnc ← ExplGenEnc(t∗,P∗Enc; ρ2) for
random ρ2.
(e) Set the sender’s encryption randomness r∗f,Enc ← ExplEnc(m∗, c∗f ; ρ3) for ran-
dom ρ3.
(f) Show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗






by the time the ciphertext is sent, and therefore the simulator has to present a dummy
c and later open it to a correct m.
Next we outline the intuition for the security proof and after that provide the detailed
description of the hybrids.
Overview of the analysis of the simulator
Before presenting hybrids, let us give a roadmap of the proof: Starting from the real
execution, we first switch the programs in the CRS: instead of compiling them with
Comp.Rerand, we compile them using Comp.Trapdoor; in other words, we add trapdoor
branches to the programs in the CRS, in order to allow creating fake randomness
which explains a given output. Next we change what the simulator shows as internal
states of the parties: instead of showing their real randomness, the simulator shows
fake randomness (which explains outputs of programs from a real execution, i.e.
this randomness explains honestly generated sk∗, c∗, and P ∗Enc). Our next step is to
puncture the key MSK{t∗} in both CRS programs. This allows us to switch seNCE
generation randomness r∗NCE from FMSK(t
∗) to a random value; this means that seNCE
parameters (pk∗, sk∗) are now freshly generated and do not depend on the rest of
an experiment anymore. Therefore we can use security of seNCE and switch seNCE
values (pk∗, c∗, sk∗) from real to simulated (in particular, the simulator hardwires
these simulated c∗f , sk
∗
f into fake randomness, instead of hardwiring real-execution
c∗, sk∗). Next we undo previous hybrids: we set r∗NCE as the result of FMSK(t
∗), and
then unpuncture MSK{t∗} in both CRS programs.
In security proof we will be using the following properties of explainability compiler
Comp for any algorithm Alg:
1. Indistinguishability of programs with and without trapdoor branch;
Comp.Rerand(Alg) ≈ Comp.Trapdoor(Alg).
2. Indistinguishability of explanations:
given programs P(x; r) = Comp.Trapdoor(Alg) and Expl = Comp.Explain(Alg), it
is impossible to distinguish between real randomness and input (x, r) and fake
randomness (x, rf ← Comp.Expl(x,P(x, r)). In particular, evaluating P(x; rf)
results in P(x, r), with the only difference that the computation P(x; rf) uses
the trapdoor branch, which is however undetectable.
3. Indistinguishability of source of the output:
given programs P(x; r) = Comp.Trapdoor(Alg) and Expl = Comp.Explain(Alg), it
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is infeasible to tell whether a given output y was obtained by running original
program Alg or its compiled version Comp.Trapdoor(Alg).
We omit proofs of these statements, since they generally follow the proofs of explain-
ability compiler in previous works (DKR14), with some adaptations for our scenario
(such as added indistinguishablity of programs with and without a trapdoor). Formal
proofs appear in the full version of our paper.
We now briefly describe each hybrid. The full description with detailed security
reductions is given in the full version of the paper.
• Hybrid 0. We start with a real execution of the protocol.
• Hybrids 1a-1b. We change how we generate the CRS programs: instead of ob-
taining them as Comp.Rerand(GenEnc) and Comp.Rerand(GenDec), we generate
them as Comp.Trapdoor(GenEnc) and Comp.Trapdoor(GenDec). Security holds
by indistinguishability of programs with and without trapdoor branch.
Next for every execution i, in which the receiver is corrupted between
the first and the second messages, we run hybrids 2i − 3i.
– Hybrid 2i. Instead of showing the real randomness r
∗
GenDec, the simu-
lator shows fake r∗f,GenDec, which encodes t
∗, sk∗. These experiments are
indistinguishable because of the indistinguishability of explanation: indeed,





∗, sk∗, therefore true
randomness r∗GenDec is indistinguishable from randomness r
∗
f,GenDec, which
explains the output t∗, sk∗.
Note that since there is no non-random input to our program PGenDec, it is
enough to use the selective indistinguishability of explanation.
– Hybrid 3i. We set t
∗ = prg(w∗) for random w∗ and then compute sk∗ as
(pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(FMSK(t∗)). In other words, we compute (t∗, sk∗) as
the result of running GenDec instead of Comp.Trapdoor(GenDec). Indistin-
guishability holds by indistinguishability of the source of the output for the
compiler Comp and program GenDec.
– Hybrid 4i. Finally we set t
∗ to be randomly chosen instead of being the
result of prg(w∗). Security follows from security of the prg.
This is the simulation for the case when the receiver is corrupted between
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the first and the second message.
For every execution i, in which both corruptions happen after the
second message is sent, we run hybrids 2i − 5hi.
• Hybrid 2i. Instead of showing the real randomness r∗GenEnc, the simulator shows
fake r∗f,GenEnc, which encodes t
∗,P∗Enc. These experiments are indistinguishable
because of the indistinguishability of explanation: indeed, P∗GenEnc on both inputs
t∗, r∗GenEnc and t
∗, r∗f,GenEnc outputs P
∗
Enc, and by the theorem true randomness
r∗GenEnc is indistinguishable from fake randomness r
∗
f,GenEnc which explains P
∗
Enc
on input t∗. Note that non-random input to our program PGenEnc is t
∗, obtained
by running t∗ ← P ∗GenDec(r∗GenDec) for random r∗GenDec, i.e., it can be generated
before a CRS is shown to the adversary. Thus it is enough to use the selective
indistinguishability of explanation.
• Hybrid 3i. In the next step instead of showing the real r∗GenDec, the simulator
shows fake r∗f,GenDec, which encodes t
∗, sk∗. These experiments are indistinguish-
able because of the indistinguishability of explanation: indeed, P∗GenDec on both
inputs r∗GenDec and r
∗
f,GenDec outputs t
∗, sk∗, therefore true randomness r∗GenDec is
indistinguishable from randomness r∗f,GenDec, which explains the output t
∗, sk∗
on empty non-random input.
Note that since there is no non-random input to our program PGenDec, it is
enough to use the selective indistinguishability of explanation.
• Step 4i. Next global step is to switch random r∗Enc to fake r∗f,Enc which encodes
(m∗, c∗). We do this in several steps:
– Hybrid 4ai. We obtain t
∗, sk∗ by running GenDec on random w∗ instead of
running P∗GenDec = Comp.Trapdoor(GenDec) on r
∗
GenDec. Indistinguishability
holds by indistinguishability of a source of the output for programs GenDec
and Comp. Trapdoor(GenDec).
– Hybrid 4bi. We choose t
∗ at random instead of choosing it as prg(w∗) for
random w∗. (pk∗, sk∗) are then obtained from r∗NCE = FMSK(t
∗). Indistin-
guishability holds by security of a prg.
– Hybrid 4ci. We generate P
∗
Enc by running GenEnc on t
∗ and random
e∗, instead of running P∗GenEnc = Comp.Trapdoor(GenEnc) on (t
∗, r∗GenEnc).
Security holds by indistinguishability of source of the output for programs
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GenEnc and Comp.Trapdoor(GenEnc).




instead of Comp.Rerand(Enc[pk∗]). Security holds by indistinguishability of
programs with and without trapdoor branch for program Enc.




f,Enc as follows: we first
create a CRS and give it to the adversary. Then we generate random t∗ and
show t∗ to the adversary as the first message in the protocol. Next the adver-
sary fixes an input m∗. Then we generate pk∗, sk∗ as seNCE.Gen(FMSK(t
∗))
and give Enc() = seNCE.Encpk∗() to the explainability challenger as the
underlying program. The challenger chooses random e∗, runs Comp(Enc; e∗)
and gives us either (r∗Enc,m
∗, c∗,P∗Enc) or (r
∗
f,Enc,m
∗, c∗,P∗Enc), where r
∗
Enc
is random, P∗Enc = Comp.Trapdoor(Enc; e
∗), c∗ = P∗Enc(m
∗; r∗Enc), and r
∗
f,Enc
encodes m∗, c∗. We show the given c∗ as the second message in the protocol.
Once asked to open the internal state, we present the given r∗Enc or r
∗
f,Enc,
generate r∗GenEnc explaining the given P
∗




We can rely on the selective indistinguishability of explanation for program
Comp.Trapdoor(Enc) since at the moment when we need to see the challenge
in explanation game (i.e., when we need to show c∗ to the adversary), P∗Enc’s
input m∗ is already fixed.
• Step 5i. Our next global step is to change the underlying seNCE values to
simulated. We proceed in several steps:
– Hybrids 5ai-5bi. We puncture MSK at t
∗. In P∗GenDec we can puncture
immediately, since due to the sparseness of the length-doubling prg, t∗
lies outside of the prg image and therefore FMSK is never called at t
∗. In
P∗GenEnc we hardwire pk
∗ and use it whenever t = t∗; otherwise, we use the
punctured key MSK{t∗} to generate rNCE and then sample pk.
– Hybrid 5ci. Once MSK{t∗} is punctured, we can choose the generation
randomness for underlying seNCE scheme r∗NCE at random.
– Hybrids 5di. We generate c
∗ as a result of running Enc on m∗ and random
u∗ instead of running P∗Enc = Comp.Trapdoor(Enc) on (m
∗; r∗Enc). We rely
on indistinguishability of the source of the output for program Enc.
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– Hybrid 5ei. Next we switch the seNCE values from real to simulated:
namely, c∗f is now simulated and sk
∗
f is now a simulated key decrypting c
∗
f
to m∗. We rely on the security of the underlying seNCE. Here we crucially
use the fact that in the underlying NCE scheme pk∗ is shown before the
adversary chooses a message, since we hardwire this pk∗ into the CRS (in
P∗GenEnc).
– Hybrid 5fi. We switch back r
∗
NCE to be the result of FMSK(t
∗).
– Hybrid 5gi-5hi. We unpuncture MSK{t∗} in P∗GenEnc and P∗GenDec and
remove the hardwired pk∗ from P∗GenEnc. To remove hardwired pk
∗, we
crucially use the fact that pk∗, although simulated, is the same as real
pk∗, generated from randomness FMSK(t
∗), which is guaranteed by the
same-public-key property of seNCE.
Full analysis of the simulator
Assume the adversary decides to run N executions in total. In the proof we first switch
programs in the CRS to their trapdoor versions and then start switching executions
from real to simulated one by one.
In each hybrid we only describe variables specific to a target execution being changed,
but we also comment on why other executions are still generated properly.
We consider the following sequence of hybrids that transforms the adversary’s view in
the real execution to the simulated execution and we argue that the view in each two
consecutive hybrids are indistinguishable.
Real execution.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample a key ExtGenEnc and obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc[MSK,ExtGenEnc]),
(c) Sample a key ExtGenDec and obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec[MSK,ExtGenDec]);
(d) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) choose random r∗GenDec and run (t
∗, sk∗)← PGenDec(r∗GenDec)
(b) choose random r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc and run P
∗




(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) show (r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
GenDec as receiver internal
state.
This hybrid corresponds to the real world. All executions are generated honestly,
according to the protocol.
Hybrid 1a - switch GenDec in the CRS to its trapdoor version.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample a key ExtGenEnc and obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc[MSK,ExtGenEnc]),
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]) ;
(d) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) choose random r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc and run P
∗
Enc ← PGenEnc(t∗, r∗GenEnc), c∗ ←
P∗Enc(m
∗, r∗Enc)
(b) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) show (r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
GenDec as receiver internal
state.
In this hybrid we add a trapdoor branch to the program GenDec. In other words,
instead of generating PGenDec as iO(GenDec[MSK,ExtGenDec]), we generate it as
iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]), where keys are chosen at random
and SGenDec = prg(sGenDec) for random sGenDec.
Indistinguishability between this and previous hybrid holds by indistinguishability
of programs with and without a trapdoor for Alg = GenDec:clean, Alg : r = GenDec,
Alg : td = GenDec:Sim. Let us show a reduction. We generate MSK and set Alg =
GenDec:clean[MSK] as an algorithm for the game. The challenger runs the compiler
and outputs either Alg : td = iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]) or
Alg : r = iO(GenDec[MSK,ExtGenDec]). We set a given program to be P∗GenDec and then
run the rest of the hybrid.
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Here all executions are generated honestly according to the protocol; the only difference
is that instead of using program GenDec, GenDec:Sim is used to generate (t, sk).
Hybrid 1b - switch GenEnc in the CRS to its trapdoor version.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
(d) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) choose random r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc and run P
∗
Enc ← PGenEnc(t∗, r∗GenEnc), c∗ ←
P∗Enc(m
∗, r∗Enc)
(b) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) show (r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
GenDec as receiver internal
state.
In this hybrid we add a trapdoor branch to program GenEnc. In other words, instead
of generating PGenEnc as iO(GenEnc[MSK,ExtGenEnc]), we generate it as
iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]), where keys are chosen at random
and SGenEnc = prg(sGenEnc) for random sGenEnc.
Indistinguishability between this and previous hybrid holds by indistinguishability
of programs with and without a trapdoor for Alg = GenEnc:clean, Alg : r = GenEnc,
Alg : td = GenEnc:Sim. Let us show a reduction. We generate MSK and set Alg =
GenEnc:clean[MSK] as an algorithm for the game. The challenger runs the compiler
and outputs either Alg : td = iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]) or
Alg : r = iO(GenEnc[MSK,ExtGenEnc]). We set a given program to be P∗GenEnc and then
run the rest of the hybrid.
Here all executions are generated honestly according to the protocol; the only difference
is that instead of using program GenEnc and GenDec, GenEnc:Sim and GenDec:Sim
are used to generate PEnc and (t
∗, sk∗), respectively.
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Next we run the sequence hybrids Hyb2l - Hyb5gl for all executions l =
1, . . . , N .
Hybrid 2l - fake sender generation randomness.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
(c) choose random r∗GenDec and run (t
∗, sk∗)← PGenDec(r∗GenDec);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) choose random r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc and run P
∗
Enc ← PGenEnc(t∗, r∗GenEnc), c∗ ←
P∗Enc(m
∗, r∗Enc)
(b) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗,P∗Enc; ρ) for some random ρ
(b) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
GenDec as receiver internal
state.
In this hybrid we generate t∗, sk∗ before we publish a CRS (they depend on PGenDec and
random r∗GenDec, so we can do this). We also show fake r
∗
f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗,P∗Enc; ρ)
instead of showing real random r∗GenEnc.
Indistinguishability of this and previous hybrid holds by selective indistinguishability
of explanations of algorithm Alg : td = PGenEnc. Let’s show a reduction. First we
sample keys MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, sGenDec and create obfuscated PGenDec. We choose
random r∗GenDec and generate (t
∗, sk∗)← PGenDec(r∗GenDec). We fix t∗ as a selective input
for indistinguishability of explanations game. We set an algorithm for the game to be
Alg = GenEnc:clean[MSK].
GM runs the compiler and obtains programs Alg : r,Alg : td,Explain. Note that
Alg : td = iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK,






Alg : td(t∗, r∗GenEnc) on selective input t
∗. Next it sets fake randomness r∗f,GenEnc ←






We set the CRS to be PGenDec (generated by us) and Alg : td from the challenge. We
show this CRS to the adversary.
Next we show to the adversary the first message t∗. After it chooses input m∗, we
choose random r∗Enc and run challenge P
∗
Enc on (m
∗, r∗Enc). Then we show c
∗ as the
second message in the protocol.
To show parties’ internal state, we output our own r∗Enc, output challenge generation
randomness (which is either r∗GenEnc or r
∗
f,GenEnc), and output our own r
∗
GenDec.
Generating other executions. In simulated executions we generate fake rjf,GenEnc using
challenge program Explain. Real executions are not changed.
Hybrid 3l - fake receiver generation randomness.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(c) choose random r∗GenDec and run (t
∗, sk∗)← PGenDec(r∗GenDec);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) choose random r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc and run P
∗
Enc ← PGenEnc(t∗, r∗GenEnc), c∗ ←
P∗Enc(m
∗, r∗Enc)
(b) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
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(c) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
f,GenDec as receiver internal
state.
In this hybrid we show fake r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) instead of showing
real random r∗GenDec.
Indistinguishability of this and previous hybrid holds by selective indistinguishability of
explanations of algorithm Alg : td = PGenDec. Let’s show a reduction. First we sample
keys MSK and fix an empty input for selective indistinguishability of explanations
game. We set an algorithm for the game to be Alg = GenDec:clean[MSK].
GM runs the compiler and obtains programs Alg : r,Alg : td,Explain. Note that
Alg : td = iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK,




Alg : td(r∗GenDec). Next it sets fake randomness r
∗
f,GenDec ← Explain(t∗, sk∗; ρ) for some
random ρ. It outputs Alg : td,Explain, (t∗, sk∗) and either r∗GenDec or r
∗
f,GenDec.
Next we choose necessary keys for GenEnc:Sim and set the CRS to be PGenEnc
(generated by us) and Alg : td from the challenge. We show this CRS to the adversary.
Next we show to the adversary the first message t∗ from the challenge output.
After it chooses input m∗, we choose random r∗GenEnc and r
∗





∗ ← P∗Enc(m∗, r∗Enc). Then we show c∗ as the second message
in the protocol.
To show parties’ internal state, we output our own r∗Enc, output challenge generation
randomness (which is either r∗GenDec or r
∗




∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1).
Generating other executions. In simulated executions we generate fake rjf,GenDec using
challenge program Explain. Real executions are not changed.
Hybrid 4al - token t
∗ is generated at random
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(c) choose random t∗ , set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
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(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) choose random r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc and run P
∗
Enc ← PGenEnc(t∗, r∗GenEnc), c∗ ←
P∗Enc(m
∗, r∗Enc)
(b) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
f,GenDec as receiver internal
state.
In this hybrid we generate (t∗, sk∗) by running GenDec:clean(t∗) instead of running
GenDec:Sim(r∗GenDec).
Indistinguishability holds because of indistinguishability of the source of the output
for the program GenDec. Let us show the reduction:
We choose MSK and set Alg = GenDec:clean[MSK] as an algorithm and and an
empty input for indistinguishability of the source of the output game. The chal-
lenger runs the compiler to obtain programs Alg : r,Alg : td,Explain. Note that
Alg : td = iO(GenDec:Sim). Then the challenger chooses random r∗GenDec and
random t∗ and generates (t∗, sk∗) either as Alg : td(r∗GenDec) or Alg(t
∗) (note that
Alg = GenDec:clean[MSK] indeed outputs its input t). The challenger gives us
(Alg : td,Explain, (t∗, sk∗)).
We choose the keys for GenEnc:Sim and create PGenEnc and PExplainGenEnc. We set the
CRS to be Alg : td and PGenEnc.
We show t∗ as the first message in the protocol. When the adversary fixes an input m∗,
we choose random r∗GenEnc, r
∗
Enc and generate P
∗
Enc ← PGenEnc(t∗; r∗GenEnc) using challenge
t∗. Next we set c∗ ← P ∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc).
Later we generate r∗f,GenDec using challenge Explain(t
∗, sk∗; ρ2) for random ρ2 and
generate r∗f,GenEnc using PExplainGenEnc.
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Generating other executions. Other executions are generated in the same way as in
the previous hybrid. Changing how t in execution l was generated doesn’t affect other
executions.
Hybrid 4bl - keys for Enc are generated at random
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(c) choose random t∗, set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc ← GenEnc:clean[MSK](t∗; e∗) for random e∗:
i. choose random e∗, sample Ext∗Enc, r
∗
iO,Enc ← e∗





(b) choose random r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc):
(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
f,GenDec as receiver internal
state.
In this hybrid we generate P ∗Enc by running GenEnc:clean instead of GenEnc.
Indistinguishability holds because of indistinguishability of the source of output for
program GenEnc. Let us show the reduction:
We choose MSK, generate the keys for GenDec and obfuscate it to get PGenDec,PExplainGenDec.
Next we choose random t∗, set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
We set Alg = GenEnc:clean[MSK] as an algorithm and t∗ as an input for indistin-
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guishability of the source of the output game. The challenger runs the compiler
to obtain programs Alg : r,Alg : td,Explain. Note that Alg : td = iO(GenEnc:Sim).
Then the challenger chooses random r∗GenEnc and random e
∗ and generates P∗Enc either
as Alg : td(t∗; r∗GenEnc) or Alg(t
∗; e∗). The challenger gives us (Alg : td,Explain,P∗Enc).
We set the CRS to be Alg : td and P∗GenDec.
We show t∗ as the first message in the protocol. When the adversary fixes an input m∗,
we choose r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P ∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc) using the challenge program P∗Enc.
Later we generate r∗f,GenDec using PExplainGenDec and generate r
∗
f,GenEnc as challenge
Explain(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ2).
Generating other executions. Other executions are generated in the same way as
in the previous hybrid. Changing how keys for PEnc in execution l were generated
doesn’t affect other executions.
Hybrid 4cl - P
∗
Enc is an obfuscation of Enc:Sim
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(c) choose random t∗ and set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:







Set S∗Enc ← prg(s∗Enc).







(b) choose random r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc):
(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
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(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗
Enc) as sender internal state and r
∗
f,GenDec as receiver internal
state.







Indistinguishability holds because of indistinguishability of programs with and without
a trapdoor for program Enc. Let us show a reduction.
We first generate the CRS programs (together with corresponding Explain programs),
choose random t∗ and set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE). We show
the CRS, as well as the first message t∗, to the adversary.
We set Alg = Enc:clean[pk∗] as a program for indistinguishability game. The challenger
runs its compiler to obtain Alg : r,Alg : td,Explain. It gives us a challenge program P
which is either Alg : r or Alg : td.
We choose random r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P(m∗; r∗Enc) using challenge program P. We
show c∗ to the adversary.
Finally we complete the hybrid by generating fake randomness r∗f,GenEnc ←
PExplainGenEnc(t
∗,P; ρ1), encoding challenge P, and r
∗
f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2).




Enc to the adversary.
Generating other executions. Other executions are generated in the same way as in
the previous hybrid. Changing how PEnc in execution l was generated doesn’t affect
other executions.
Hybrid 4dl - fake encryption randomness
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(c) choose random t∗ and set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]),
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obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) choose random r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc):
(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(d) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we show fake r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗; ρ3) instead of showing real
random r∗Enc.
Indistinguishability of this and previous hybrid holds by selective indistinguishability
of explanations of algorithm Alg : td = Enc:Sim. Let’s show a reduction. First we
generate a CRS, choose random t∗ and compute (pk∗, sk∗). We show the CRS and
the first message, t∗, to the adversary. The adversary chooses m∗.
We fix input m∗ and program Alg = Enc:clean[pk∗] for selective indistinguishability
of explanations game.
GM runs the compiler and obtains programs Alg : r,Alg : td,Explain. Note that
Alg : td = iO(Enc:Sim[pk∗, fEnc,
ExtEnc, SEnc]). The challenger chooses random r
∗
Enc, runs c
∗ ← Alg : td(r∗Enc). Next
it sets fake randomness r∗f,Enc ← Explain(m∗, c∗; ρ) for some random ρ. It outputs
Alg : td,Explain, c∗ and either r∗Enc or r
∗
f,Enc.
We show challenge c∗ as the second message in the protocol to the adversary.
To show parties’ internal state, we output r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗,Alg : td; ρ1),
output
r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2), and output challenge randomness (r∗Enc or r∗f,Enc),
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Generating other executions. Other executions are generated in the same way as in
the previous hybrid. Changing the generation of r∗Enc in execution l was generated
doesn’t affect other executions.
Hybrid 5al - puncture MSK{t∗} in GenEnc:Sim
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(c) choose random t∗ and set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc,
SGenEnc, t
∗, pk∗]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) choose random r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc):
(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(d) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we use a punctured key MSK{t∗} in PGenEnc, i.e.




∗, pk∗]) (Fig. 2·24), with a punctured MSK{t∗} inside and hardwired
t∗ and pk∗. In GenEnc:Sim1 normal branch first checks if t = t∗; in this case it uses
hardwired public key pk∗ to generate program PEnc. If t 6= t∗, then it proceeds as
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before, computing rNCE ← FMSK{t∗}(t), pk, sk ← NCE.Gen(rNCE), and using this pk to
generate PEnc. Indistinguishability of this and previous hybrid holds by iO:
Note that we didn’t change a trapdoor branch, thus the set of inputs on which the
trapdoor branch is executed (and therefore also the set on which the normal branch is
executed) is the same for both programs. Consider three cases:
1. If input (t, r) results in executing trapdoor branch, then both programs output
the same answer, since their trapdoor branch code is the same.
2. If input (t, r) results in executing normal branch, and t 6= t∗, then both pro-
grams execute the same steps to compute PEnc, with the only difference that
GenEnc:Sim uses full key MSK and GenEnc:Sim1 uses punctured MSK{t∗}.
Since we assumed that t 6= t∗, the output is the same in both programs.
3. If input (t, r) results in executing normal branch, and t = t∗, then GenEnc:Sim
computes r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), sets pk∗, sk∗ ← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE), and uses pk∗ to
generate PEnc; GenEnc:Sim1 on input t = t
∗ directly sets pk∗ to be used in
generating PEnc. Therefore they are using the same public key pk
∗, and other
variables needed to generate PEnc (keys fEnc,ExtEnc, SEnc, obfuscation randomness
riO,Enc) are all sampled from the same e = FExtGenEnc(t
∗, r); thus they generate
exactly the same obfuscated program PEnc = iO(Enc[pk∗, fEnc,ExtEnc]; riO,Enc]).
Generating other executions. The difference is that GenEnc:Sim1 is now used to
generate PEnc in all other executions. In simulated executions t is chosen at random
and thus with overwhelming probability t 6= t∗; this means that other simulated
executions are still generated normally, as if original program GenEnc:Sim was used.
Now consider the first message in a real execution t = GenDec:Sim(rGenDec). Since
rGenDec is random, with overwhelming probability normal branch is executed and thus
t = FExtGenDec(rGenDec). But random t
∗ is outside the image of FExtGenDec due to sparseness
of this PRF, thus t∗ 6= t, and therefore with overwhelming probability over the choice
of t∗ other executions are not affected by the change.
Hybrid 5bl - puncture MSK{t∗} in GenDec:Sim
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) choose random t∗ and set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), (pk∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
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obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc,
t∗, pk∗]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) choose random r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc):
(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(d) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we puncture MSK{t∗} in program
PGenDec , i.e. PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenDec,
ExtGenDec, SGenDec]) (Fig. 2·25); the use of the punctured key instead of the full one is
the only difference between programs.
Indistinguishability of this and previous hybrid holds by iO; note that we didn’t
change a trapdoor branch, thus the set of inputs on which the trapdoor branch is
executed (and therefore also the set on which the normal branch is executed) is the
same for both programs. Consider two cases:
1. If input (t, r) results in executing the trapdoor branch, then both programs
output the same answer, since their trapdoor branch code is the same.
2. If input (t, r) results in executing the normal branch, then, since t∗ is randomly
chosen, with overwhelming probability over the choice of t∗ it is outside the




Program GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc,SGenEnc, t∗,pk∗](t, rGenEnc)
Constants: punctured master key MSK{t∗}, faking key fGenEnc, key for sparse
extracting prf ExtGenEnc, prg image SGenEnc, a point t
∗, seNCE public key pk∗
Inputs: token t, randomness rGenEnc
1. Trapdoor branch:
(a) decode out← PDE.DecfGenEnc(rGenEnc); if out = ⊥ then goto normal branch;
(b) parse out as t′,P′, s′, ρ̃. If t′ = t and prg(s′) = SGenEnc then output P
′ and
halt, else goto normal branch;
2. Normal branch:
(a) if t = t∗ then set pk = pk∗;
(b) else set rNCE ← FMSK{t∗}(t), set pk, sk ← NCE.Gen(rNCE)
(c) set randomness e← FExtGenEnc(t, rGenEnc), sample fEnc,ExtEnc, riO,Enc, sEnc ←
e. Set SEnc ← prg(sEnc).
(d) create PEnc ← iO(Enc[pk,ExtEnc, fEnc, SEnc]; riO,Enc)
(e) output PEnc
Figure 2·24: Program GenEnc:Sim1.
and we can safely puncture the key without changing the functionality.
Generating other executions. The difference is that we use GenDec:Sim1 to generate
t, sk in other executions. In simulated executions t is chosen at random and thus with
overwhelming probability t 6= t∗; this means that other simulated executions are still
generated normally.
Consider the first message in a real execution t = GenDec:Sim(rGenDec). Since
rGenDec is random, with overwhelming probability normal branch is executed and thus
t = FExtGenDec(rGenDec). But random t
∗ is outside the image of FExtGenDec due to sparseness
of this PRF, thus t∗ 6= t, and other real executions are generated normally, as if
original program GenDec:Sim was used.
Hybrid 5cl - choose at random punctured value r
∗
NCE
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) choose random t∗, choose random r∗NCE. Set (pk
∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);




Constants: punctured master key MSK{t∗} , receiver faking key fGenDec, key for
sparse extracting prf ExtGenDec, prg image SGenDec
Inputs: randomness rGenDec
1. Trapdoor branch:
(a) decode out← PDE.DecfGenDec(rGenDec); if out = ⊥ then goto normal branch;
(b) parse out as (t′, sk′, s′, ρ̃). If prg(s′) = SGenDec then output (t
′, sk′) and halt;
else goto normal branch.
2. Normal branch:
(a) generate token t← FExtGenDec(rGenDec)
(b) set randomness rNCE ← FMSK{t∗}(t), run pk, sk ← NCE.Gen(rNCE)
(c) output (t, sk)
Figure 2·25: Program GenDec:Sim1.
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc,
t∗, pk∗]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) choose random r∗Enc and generate c
∗ ← P∗Enc(m∗; r∗Enc):
(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(d) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we choose r∗NCE at random instead of FMSK(t
∗).
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Indistinguishability holds by selective security of puncturable PRF FMSK: we first
choose random t∗ and give it to puncturable PRF challenger as a point to puncture at.
We get back MSK{t∗} and either r∗NCE = FMSK(t∗) or random r∗NCE. We use a given key
to generate programs, and use given r∗NCE to generate (pk
∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE).
Depending on whether we got random r∗NCE or not, we are either in this hybrid or in
the previous hybrid.
Generating other executions. Similar to previous two hybrids, we can assume that for
real and simulated t it holds that t 6= t∗, and changing r∗NCE = FMSK(t∗) to a random
value doesn’t affect other executions.
Hybrid 5dl - encrypt m
∗ using fresh randomness u
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) choose random t∗, choose random r∗NCE. Set (pk
∗, sk∗)← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc,
t∗, pk∗]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish a CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) choose random u∗ and generate c∗ ← seNCE.Enc(pk∗;m∗;u∗)
(c) show (t∗, c∗) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(b) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(c) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗; ρ3) for random ρ3;
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(d) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we generate c∗ ← Enc:clean[pk∗](m∗;u∗) for random u∗, instead of
running P ∗Enc.
Indistinuishability holds by indistinguishability of source of the output for algorithm
Alg = Enc:clean. Let us show a reduction.
We start by generating random t∗, r∗NCE and necessary keys for the CRS, obfuscating
programs and showing this CRS to the adversary. We also show t∗.
We set Alg = Enc:clean[pk∗] to be an algorithm and m∗ to be an input for the game.
The challenger runs the compiler and gets programs Alg : r,Alg : td,Explain. Note
that Alg : td = P∗Enc. The challenger chooses r
∗
Enc and u
∗ and generates c∗ either as
Alg : td(m∗; r∗Enc) or Alg(m
∗;u∗). It gives us (Alg : td,Explain, c∗).
We show challenge c∗ to the adversary as ciphertext. Upon request to show internal
state we encode challenge Alg : td into r∗f,GenEnc. r
∗
f,GenDec is generated as described in
the hybrid. r∗f,Enc ← Explain(m∗, c∗; ρ3).
Generating other executions. Other executions are not affected by the changes - we
generate them as in the previous hybrid.
Hybrid 5el - switch pk
∗, sk∗, c∗ to simulated.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;




f , st)← seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc,
t∗, pk∗f ]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:
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iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) show (t∗, c∗f ) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set sk∗f ← Sim(st,m∗)
(b) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(c) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗f ; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(d) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗f ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(e) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗








f , where pk
∗, c∗f , st←
seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE), and sk
∗
f ← seNCE.Sim(st,m∗) (st is the state of a simulator).
Indistinguishability holds by security of underlying seNCE. Let us show the reduction.
First we generate CRS keys, random t∗ and get pk∗ or pk∗f from NCE challenger. We
obfuscate CRS programs (in particular, we hardwire given pk∗ or pk∗f into GenEnc)
and publish the CRS.
We show t∗ to the adversary as the first message in our protocol. The adversary fixes
input m∗. We get either c∗ (encrypting m∗) or c∗f (dummy) from seNCE challenger
and output it as the second message in the protocol.
When the adversary asks us to show internal state for message m∗, we first ask the
challenger to provide us with a secret key for m∗ and get back either sk∗ or sk∗f . Then







generate P∗Enc with pk




∗ and challenge secret key (sk∗ or sk∗f) into r
∗
f,GenDec; and
challenge ciphertext (c∗ or c∗f) into r
∗
f,Enc. We show these three random values as
internal state of the parties.
Generating other executions. We can assume that rNCE 6= r∗NCE for all other executions
and therefore switching seNCE values, obtained from r∗NCE, to simulated doesn’t affect
other executions.
Hybrid 5fl - switch r
∗
NCE back to the result of the PRF.
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1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) choose random t∗, set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗). Set (pk∗f , c∗f , st)← seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc,
t∗, pk∗f ]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) show (t∗, c∗f ) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set sk∗f ← Sim(st,m∗)
(b) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(c) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗f ; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(d) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗f ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(e) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗) instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds because of selective security of a puncturable PRF FMSK{t∗}.
Let us show a reduction. We first choose random t∗ and give it to PRF challenger as a
point to puncture at. The challenger gives back MSK{t∗} and value r∗NCE which is either
random or FMSK(t
∗). We proceed with using this punctured key and (pk∗f , c
∗
f , st)←
seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE) in generating the rest of the hybrid.
Generating other executions. We can assume that real and simulated t 6= t∗ and
changing random r∗NCE to FMSK(t
∗) doesn’t affect other executions.
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Hybrid 5gl - Unpuncture MSK{t∗} in GenDec:Sim.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) choose random t∗, set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗). Set (pk∗f , c∗f , st)← seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim1[MSK{t∗}, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc,
t∗, pk∗f ]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish the CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) show (t∗, c∗f ) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set sk∗f ← Sim(st,m∗)
(b) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(c) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗f ; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(d) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗f ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(e) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we show original program GenDec:Sim instead of GenDec:Sim1, i.e.
we unpuncture MSK{t∗} in GenDec.
Indistinguishability holds because of iO. Indeed, since t∗ is random, with overwhelming
probability it is outside the image of sparse PRF FExtGenDec , thus, no input r result in
evaluating this PRF on t∗, and we can bring the punctured value back.
Generating other executions. Since in other executions with overwhelming probability
t 6= t∗, this doesn’t affect other executions.
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Hybrid 5hl - Unpuncture MSK{t∗} in GenEnc:Sim.
1. Generate a CRS:
(a) Sample MSK;
(b) choose random t∗, set r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗). Set (pk∗f , c∗f , st)← seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE);
(c) Sample keys ExtGenDec, fGenDec, sGenDec, set SGenDec ← prg(sGenDec);
obfuscate PGenDec ← iO(GenDec:Sim[MSK, fGenDec,ExtGenDec, SGenDec]);
obfuscate PExplainGenDec ← iO(Explain[fGenDec, sGenDec]);
(d) Sample keys ExtGenEnc fGenEnc, sGenEnc, set SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc);
obfuscate PGenEnc ← iO(GenEnc:Sim[MSK, fGenEnc,ExtGenEnc, SGenEnc]),
obfuscate PExplainGenEnc ← iO(Explain[fGenEnc, sGenEnc]).
(e) Set CRS = (PGenEnc,PGenDec). Publish a CRS.
2. Generate communications in the protocol:
(a) generate P∗Enc as an obfuscation of Enc:Sim:






iO,Enc ← e∗. Set S∗Enc ←
prg(s∗Enc).







(b) show (t∗, c∗f ) as communications in the protocol
3. Show parties’ internal state consistent with message m∗ and commu-
nications:
(a) set sk∗f ← Sim(st,m∗)
(b) set r∗f,GenEnc ← PExplainGenEnc(t∗, P ∗Enc; ρ1) for some random ρ1
(c) set r∗f,GenDec ← PExplainGenDec(t∗, sk∗f ; ρ2) for some random ρ2
(d) set r∗f,Enc ← PExplainEnc(m∗, c∗f ; ρ3) for random ρ3;
(e) show (r∗f,GenEnc, r
∗




In this hybrid we show original program GenEnc:Sim instead of GenEnc:Sim1, i.e.
we remove the line “if t = t∗ then set pk = pk∗f” and unpuncture MSK{t∗}.
Indistinguishability holds because of iO. Note that we didn’t change the trapdoor
branch, thus the set of inputs on which the trapdoor branch is executed (and therefore
also the set on which the normal branch is executed) is the same for both programs.
Consider three cases:
1. If input (t, r) results in executing the trapdoor branch, then both programs
output the same answer, since their trapdoor branch code is the same.
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2. If input (t, r) results in executing the normal branch, and t 6= t∗, then both
programs execute the same steps to compute PEnc, with the only difference that
GenEnc:Sim uses full key MSK and GenEnc : 1 uses punctured MSK{t∗}. Since
we assumed that t 6= t∗, the output is the same in both programs.
3. If input (t, r) results in executing the normal branch, and t = t∗, then GenEnc:Sim
computes r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗), sets pk∗, sk∗ ← seNCE.Gen(r∗NCE), and uses pk∗ to
generate PEnc. GenEnc:Sim1 on input t = t
∗ directly sets pk∗f to be used in




f , st) ← seNCE.Sim(r∗NCE), r∗NCE ← FMSK(t∗). Im-
portantly, pk∗ obtained by running NCE.Gen on r∗NCE is exactly the same as pk
∗
f
obtained by running NCE.Sim on r∗NCE by the “fixed-public-key” property of
underlying seNCE. Therefore they are using the same public key pk∗ = pk∗f , and
other variables needed to generate PEnc (keys fEnc,ExtEnc, obfuscation random-
ness riO,Enc) are all sampled from the same e = FExtGenEnc(t
∗, r); thus they generate
exactly the same obfuscated program PEnc = iO(Enc[pk∗, fEnc,ExtEnc]; riO,Enc]).
Generating other executions. Since for other executions t 6= t∗, this change doesn’t
affect other executions.
This is hybrid is equivalent to simulation.
Sizes in our construction
Our construction has a lot of size dependencies. We present a size diagram on
Figure 2·26, assuming our implementation of explainability compiler based on iO
and puncturable deterministic encryption (PDE). There all sizes are grouped in
“complexity classes”. Here we outline several main dependencies:
• if a fake randomness has values encoded, it should be longer than these values,
but not much longer. Namely, if underlying encoded message has size l, then
the size of the plaintext for PDE (which consists of encoded message, secret s
and prg(ρ)) is l + 3λ, and the size of PDE ciphertext should be at least 4 times
bigger (the latter is because explainability compiler uses statistically injective
PRF). Therefore randomness and encoded value are in the same “complexity
class”.
• if a key is punctured on some input, its size is at least λ|input|.
• if randomness is used as input for sparse extracting PRF, its length should be
at least O(λ) (since in this case we can construct such a PRF by theorem ??).
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Figure 2·26: Size dependency graph between different variables, when
underlying seNCE is instantiated with our construction from section 2.4.4.
Notation: iO(s) for size s means the resulting size of an obfuscated program
of the initial approximate size s. Dependencies due to obfuscation are drawn
as fat blue arrows. Green boxes mark CRS, yellow boxes mark randomness
used for extracting PRF, and blue denotes variables which are sent in the
protocol.
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• size of an obfuscated program is significantly larger than the size of the original
program (polynomial in original size s and security parameter λ).
Note that all dependencies in the graph are due to the “hardwired values”, i.e. due to
the fact that some values should be hardcoded into programs, or messages should be
encrypted into ciphertexts. In particular, the same length restrictions remain even
when succinct iO for TM or RAM ((CHJV15, CH16, KLW15)) is used.
Note that the dependency graph is acyclic, and variables which we actually send over
the channel - t and c - are in the very top of the graph. This means that we can set
length of t and m to be a security parameter, and then set lengths of other variables
as large as needed by following edges in dependency graph.
2.4.6 Constant-rate Non-committing Encryption in the CRS Model
In this section we give our first construction of a constant-rate non-committing
encryption. For a construction of NCE with rate 1, see sections 2.4.4 and 2.4.3.
More precisely, we describe the transformation from any non-committing encryption
with erasures (eNCE) in the plain model to a full non-committing encryption in a CRS
model, such that this transformation preserves the length of communication. Thus
by using any constant-rate NCE with erasures (for instance, (JL00) or (CHK05)) we
achieve a full constant-rate NCE.
The scheme is given on Fig. 2·27. The CRS contains a description of two pro-
grams, GenEnc and Gen. Gen(rGen) simply runs a generation algorithm of eNCE
and outputs pk, sk. GenEnc(rGenEnc) outputs an obfuscated program Encrypt(pk,m, r).
Encrypt(pk,m, r) just computes a normal encryption of m under pk. All three al-
gorithms are “rerandomized”, i.e. randomness they use is obtained by applying an
extracting PRF on their input. The protocols goes as follows: the receiver runs Gen
to produce (pk, sk) and sends pk to the sender. Then the sender first runs GenEnc to
produce a program E, and then runs E on pk, m, and obtains the ciphertext c, which
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it sends to the receiver.
Theorem 22. Assume indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits and one way func-
tions. Let (eNCE.Gen, eNCE.Enc, eNCE.Dec) be a non-committing encryption with
erasures in a plain model. Then:
1. The scheme given on Fig. 2·27 is a full non-committing encryption scheme in a
CRS model.
2. The length of communication (i.e. |pk| + |c|) is the same as the length of
communication in underlying eNCE.
Since a constant-rate NCE schemes with erasures do exist ((CHK05), under decisional
composite residuosity assumption), we immediately get the following corollary:
Corollary 23. Assuming one way functions, indistinguishability obfuscation, and
hardness of decisional composite residuosity, there exist a constant-rate non-committing
encryption in the CRS model.
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NCE from eNCE
CRS: obfuscated programs Gen and GenEnc
Inputs: sender’s message m
• Round 1. The receiver chooses randomness rGen and generates keys (pk, sk)←
Gen(rGen). It sends pk to the sender.
• Round 2. The sender chooses randomness rEnc, rGenEnc. It runs E ←
GenEnc(rGenEnc) and then c← E(pk,m, rEnc). It sends c to the receiver.
• The receiver decrypts m′ ← eNCE.Dec(sk, c).
Program Gen(rGen)
Inputs: randomness rGen
// hardcoded values: key for extracting PRF ExtGen
1. Set rNCE ← FExtGen(rGen).
2. Set (pk, sk)← eNCE.Gen(rNCE)
3. Output (pk, sk)
Program GenEnc(rGenEnc)
// hardcoded values: key for extracting PRF ExtGenEnc
Inputs: message m, randomness rEnc
1. Set e← FExtGenEnc(rEnc);
2. Use e to sample a key ExtEncrypt for an extracting PRF and obfuscation random-
ness riO
3. Compute E ← iO(Encrypt[ExtEncrypt]; riO)
4. Output E.
Program Encrypt(pk, m, rEncrypt)
// hardcoded values: key for extracting PRF ExtEncrypt
Inputs: eNCE public key pk, message m, randomness rEncrypt
1. Set u← FExtEncrypt(rEncrypt).;
2. Compute c← Encpk(m;u)
3. Output c.
Figure 2·27: Transformation from a non-committing encryp-
tion with erasures to a full non-committing encryption. Pro-




1. Simulation of the CRS:
(a) Sample keys ExtGen, fGen, ExtGenEnc, fGenEnc, choose random sGen, sGenEnc and
set SGen ← prg(sGen), SGenEnc ← prg(sGenEnc).
(b) Set the CRS to be obfuscated programs Gen:Sim[ExtGen, fGen, SGen] and
GenEnc:Sim[ExtGenEnc, fGenEnc, SGenEnc].
For every execution, generate the following:
2. Simulation of communication: Run eNCE.Sim to generate pk, c, state.
3. Simulation of internal state of the sender for message m:
(a) Sample keys ExtEncrypt, fEncrypt and randomness sEncrypt. Set SEncrypt ←
prg(sEncrypt).
(b) Set E to be an obfuscated program Encrypt : Sim[ExtEncrypt, fEncrypt, SEncrypt].
(c) set rEnc ← PDE.EncfEncrypt(pk,m, c, prg(ρ1)) for random ρ1
(d) set rGenEnc ← PDE.EncfGenEnc(E, prg(ρ2)) for random ρ2
(e) set rEnc, rGenEnc to be the internal state of the sender.
4. Simulation of internal state of the receiver for message m:
(a) run skm ← eNCE.Sim(m, state). Set rGen ← PDE.EncfGen(pk, skm, prg(ρ3))
for random ρ3
(b) set rGen to be the internal state of the receiver.
Figure 2·28: NCE Simulator. Description of programs
Gen:Sim, GenEnc:Sim, and Encrypt:Sim are given in Fig.
2·29.
Proof. It is clear from the description of the scheme that the transformation preserves
the length of communication. We show that it also preserves correctness and security
of the underlying eNCE.
Correctness. By the correctness of the underlying eNCE scheme, when generation
randomness and encryption randomness are chosen uniformly at random, a decryption
error happens with only negligible probability. Since in our scheme both generation
randomness rNCE and encryption randomness u are generated using a PRF, their
distribution is close to uniform (with overwhelming probability over the choice of PRF
keys), and therefore decryption error remains negligible.
Security. We prove in a sequence of hybrids that the real distribution is indistin-
guishable from the simulated one. To keep the proof concise, we only prove it for one
execution.
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Programs generated by NCE Simulator.
Program Gen:Sim(rGen)
Inputs: randomness rGen
// hardcoded values: key for extracting PRF ExtGen, faking key fGen, prg image SGen
1. Trapdoor branch:
(a) Decrypt out← PDE.DecfGen(rGen); if out = ⊥, then execute normal branch.
(b) Else parse out as (pk′, sk′, s′, ρ̃). If prg(s′) = SGen then output (pk
′, sk′) and
halt; otherwise execute the normal branch.
2. Normal branch:
(a) Set rNCE ← FExtGen(rGen).
(b) Set (pk, sk)← eNCE.Gen(rNCE)
(c) Output (pk, sk)
Program GenEnc:Sim(rGenEnc)
// hardcoded values: key for extracting PRF ExtGenEnc, faking key fGenEnc, prg image
SGenEnc
Inputs: message m, randomness rEnc
1. Trapdoor branch:
(a) Decrypt out ← PDE.DecfGenEnc(rGenEnc); if out = ⊥, then execute normal
branch.
(b) Else parse out as (E ′, s′, ρ̃). If prg(s′) = SGenEnc then output (E
′) and halt;
otherwise execute the normal branch.
2. Normal branch:
(a) Set e← FExtGenEnc(rEnc);
(b) Use e to sample a key ExtEncrypt for an extracting PRF and obfuscation
randomness riO
(c) Compute E ← iO(Encrypt[ExtEncrypt]; riO)
(d) Output E.
Program Encrypt:Sim(pk, m, rEncrypt)
// hardcoded values: key for extracting PRF ExtEncrypt , faking key fEncrypt, prg image
SEncrypt
Inputs: eNCE public key pk, message m, randomness rEncrypt
1. Trapdoor branch:
(a) Decrypt out ← PDE.DecfEncrypt(rEncrypt); if out = ⊥, then execute normal
branch.
(b) Else parse out as (c′, s′, ρ̃). If prg(s′) = SEncrypt then output (c
′) and halt;
otherwise execute the normal branch.
2. Normal branch:
(a) Set u← FExtEncrypt(rEncrypt);
(b) Compute c← Encpk(m;u)
(c) Output c.
Figure 2·29: Programs generated by NCE Simulator.
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The proof consists of a repeated application of the following properties of explainability
compiler 8:
• The program is indistinguishable from its version with a trapdoor branch (for
instance, Gen and Gen:Sim);
• The ciphertext produced by running Encrypt:Sim (which has a trapdoor branch)
is indistinguishable from computing a ciphertext using a truly random encryption
randomness u (the same holds for output of other two programs);
• the true randomness is indistinguishable from fake randomness explaining given
input-output behavior.
These properties allow to make pk, sk,m independent of programs, after which we
can use security of underlying eNCE to switch them to simulated pk, sk, c. Now we
briefly describe hybrids:
1. Real execution. In this distribution the CRS contains obfuscated programs
GenEnc and Gen; rGen, rGenEnc, and rEncrypt are truly random, and pk and c are
generated honestly, as specified in Fig. 2·27.
2. Hybrid 1. In this hybrid the CRS contains obfuscated programs GenEnc:Sim
and Gen:Sim (Fig. 2·29).
Indistinguishability holds by indistinguishability of programs with and without
a trapdoor (def. 8 and theorem 19).
3. Hybrid 2. In this hybrid upon corruption of parties the adversary is given fake
randomness rf,Gen and rf,GenEnc (instead of real rGen and rGenEnc), generated as
rf,Gen ← PDE.EncfGen(pk, sk, prg(ρ3)) and rf,GenEnc ← PDE.EncfGenEnc(E, prg(ρ2)).
Here ρ2, ρ3 are chosen at random, and E is an obfuscated Encrypt generated as
in a real execution.
Indistinguishability holds by selective explainability (def. 8 and theorem 19).
Note that an input to GenEnc (i.e. pk) doesn’t depend on m, and Gen doesn’t
have non-random input at all; thus we can indeed use selective explainability.
4. Hybrid 3. In this hybrid we choose rNCE (generation randomness for eNCE)
and e (used to generate and obfuscate Encrypt) at random, instead of checking
for a trapdoor branch and then computing extracting PRFs FExtGen and FExtGenEnc ,
as in programs Gen:Sim and GenEnc:Sim.
Indistinguishability holds by indistinguishability of the source of the output for
programs Gen:Sim and GenEnc:Sim (def. 8 and theorem 19).
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5. Hybrid 4. In this hybrid we generate E as obfuscation of Encrypt:Sim, instead
of Encrypt.
Indistinguishability holds by indistinguishability of programs with and without
a trapdoor (def. 8 and theorem 19).
6. Hybrid 5. In this hybrid upon corruption of parties the adversary is given
fake randomness rf,Encrypt (instead of real rEncrypt ), generated as rf,Encrypt ←
PDE.EncfEncrypt(pk,m, c, prg(ρ1)). Here ρ1 is chosen at random.
Indistinguishability holds by selective explainability (def. 8 and theorem 19).
Note that the program Encrypt needs to be generated only upon corruption,
when m is already determined; thus we can indeed use selective explainability.
7. Hybrid 6. In this hybrid we choose encryption randomness u at random,
instead of checking for a trapdoor branch and then computing extracting PRFs
FExtEncrypt , as in the program Encrypt:Sim.
Indistinguishability holds by indistinguishability of the source of the output for
the program Encrypt:Sim (def. 8 and theorem 19).
8. Hybrid 7. In this hybrid we switch pk, c, sk from real to simulated, relying on
security of underlying eNCE. This is a simulation distribution.
The proof for many executions can be carried out in the same way, by first switching
the CRS to simulated (hybrid 1) and then switching executions from real to simulated






Standard encryption guarantees that parties can communicate in secrecy even when
an adversary can see their communication transcript. However, this secrecy guarantee
holds only as long as the private keys and randomness used for encryption remain
secret. If an authoritative entity bribes or even coerces the parties to disclose their
secret keys and randomness, secrecy is no longer guaranteed. In fact, with prevalent
encryption schemes the ciphertext is often a “commitment” to the plaintext, in the
sense that there is only a single way to convincingly demonstrate secret keys and
randomness that are consistent with the ciphertext.
To address this issue, Canetti et al. (CDNO97) introduced the notion of deniable
encryption, in which a party may send a ciphertext c which is an encryption of message
m, and later, for any plaintext m′ 6= m, the party can reveal fake keys and randomness
with respect to which c appears to be an encryption of m′.1
When the communicating parties have common secret key, deniable encryption can be
simple: For instance, the one-time pad (OTP) scheme is perfectly deniable. (Indeed,
having sent c = k ⊕ m, the parties can claim that they sent any plaintext m′ by
claiming that k′ = c⊕m′ is their true key.2 However, shared-key deniable schemes
do not address the question of how to deniably agree on this shared key in the first
place. Currently known key exchange protocols are themselves “committing”: for
instance, in a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol there exists only one key consistent
with any given transcript, and therefore equivocating one-time pad key generated
using Diffie-Hellman key exchange would be impossible. In other words, asymmetric
1Deniable encryption should not be confused with deniable authentication, which allows a party
to deny that it participated in the communication. See more discussion in Section 3.1.1.
2Furthermore, observe that the key size in any deniable encryption scheme has to be at least as
large as the size of a plaintext, since there should exist a different key for any possible fake plaintext,
thus OTP is “the best possible” symmetric-key deniable encryption in terms of key and ciphertext
size.
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(possibly interactive) deniable encryption and incoercible key exchange are tightly
related: they both capture the notion of deniable communication.
In the case of two-message ptrotocols, this notion corresponds to deniable public-
key encryption. Such an encryption scheme, in addition to standard algorithms
Gen(r), Enc(pk,m; s), and Dec(sk, c) (for key generation, encryption, and decryp-
tion, respectively), also has “faking algorithms” SFake(s,m,m′, (pk, c); ρS)→ s′ and
RFake(r,m,m′, (pk, c); ρR) → r′. They take as input the true random coins of the
sender or receiver, real and fake messages m,m′, communication transcript (pk, c),
and random coins ρS or ρR, in case these algorithms are randomized. Their outputs
s′ and r′ respectively are “fake sender randomness” and “fake receiver randomness”
which explain (pk, c) as a transcript transmitting m′.
There are three natural notions of deniability, depending on whether the adversary
gets access to (possibly fake) randomness of the sender, receiver, or both. They are
called sender-, receiver-, and sender-and-receiver-deniability, respectively. Sender-and-
receiver deniability, which is the strongest notion among the three, is often called
bideniability. It requires that for any plaintexts m,m′:
(pk, c = Enc(pk,m′; s), s, r) ≈c (pk, c = Enc(pk,m; s), s′, r′), (3.1)
where≈c denotes computational indistinguishability, s, r are uniformly chosen, (pk, sk)←
Gen(r), s′ = SFake(s,m,m′, (pk, c); ρS), r
′ = RFake(r,m,m′, (pk, c); ρR). The proba-
bilities are taken over the random choice of s, r, ρS, ρR. In other words, bideniable
encryption guarantees that an adversary, who sees (possibly fake) encryption and
generation randomness consistent with m′, cannot tell whether the value actually sent
was m′, or possibly a different value m.3 Sender deniability (respectively, receiver
3Note that this definition implies that (pk, c = Enc(pk,m′; s)) ≈c (pk, c = Enc(pk,m; s)), and
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deniability) is a relaxation of the above definition where the the internal randomness
of the receiver (respectively, sender) is removed from both sides of (3.1). We stress
that, while all variants are meaningful, bideniability provides a qualitatively stronger
guarantee than either sender deniability or receiver deniability alone:
Bideniability leaves the coercer no way of figuring out what the plaintext
really was, even if all parties involved are coerced: the plaintext becomes
“virtually erased” from the system.
Sender-deniable encryption was built in (SW14). This result, together with a technique
from (CDNO97), provides a three-message receiver-deniable interactive encryption
protocol. Furthermore, as shown in (BNNO11), any receiver deniable encryption
has to be interactive, with at least three messages. Still, the following question has
remained wide open:
Can parties communicate bideniably without any pre-established shared secrets?
A positive answer to this question may seem somewhat unexpected. For instance,
in key exchange protocols - another setting where secrecy is required without any
pre-shared secrets - security crucially relies on the fact that parties keep their internal
state, e.g. discrete log, hidden from the eavesdropper. Among other things, the
missing variable prevents the eavesdropper from running algorithms of the scheme,
thus making the eavesdropper inherently less powerful than parties and guaranteeing
that the parties can learn the key while the eavesdropper cannot. In contrast, in
bideniable encryption (or, incoercible key exchange) the adversary is as powerful as
parties, since it knows all variables which honest parties would know, and therefore
can compute any function which honest parties could compute. Thus, security of
bideniable encryption (or, incoercible key exchange) hinges on a delicate distinction
therefore any deniable encryption is also semantically secure.
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between knowing to distinguish the right internal state from the wrong one.
Our results in a nutshell: Bideniable interactive encryption. Nevertheless,
we show that interactive bideniable encryption, and therefore incoercible key exchange,
exist, assuming subexponential iO and OWFs. Concretely, we show a 3-message
protocol which, assuming subexponential iO and OWFs, allows to transmit 1-bit
plaintexts bideniably given access to a reusable, global, and non-programmable public
reference string. In addition to standard deniability, it also provides a different
guarantee which we call off-the-record deniability, as we explain next.
Off-the-record deniability. Besides standard deniability as defined by (CDNO97),
we additionally consider a different form of deniability, incomparable to the standard
one, which we call off-the-record deniability. Off-the-record deniability guarantees
that the plaintext remains hidden even when both parties are coerced, and one party
gives randomness consistent with one plaintext and the other party gives randomness
consistent with another plaintext. Further, this should hold no matter whether both
random coins given to the coercer are fake, or one of them is real. That is, with an
off-the-record deniable scheme the coercer cannot tell which party - if any - is telling
the truth.
Such a guarantee may be useful in a number of situations. One example is when
the parties do not have the ability to agree on a fake message, or when they cannot
even coordinate whether they should lie or tell the truth. Another example is when
one party defects against the other party and discloses its own randomness for a sole
purpose of demonstrating that the other party sent, or received, a sensitive plaintext.
Note that off-the-record deniability is incomparable to standard deniability, which
in fact does not give any guarantee in a situation where parties’ claimed plaintexts
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are inconsistent, or even when plaintexts are consistent but one party provides true
randomness and the other provides fake randomness for the same true plaintext. In
other words, the standard definition of deniability provides deniability guarantees
to any one of the parties only in the case where both parties deny consistently. In
contrast, off-the-record deniabilty provides each party with deniability guarantees
regardless of the actions of the other party - the same level of deniability provided by
an ideally private channel in the case of inconsistent claims.
3.1.1 Applicability and Variants
In this section we discuss a number of issues such as applicability of deniable encryption,
possible variations in the definition, and some related notions.
When is deniable encryption useful? Note that, no matter how good deniable
encryption is, the original randomness and plaintexts in most cases remain in the
memory of machines of the parties. If the adversary has the ability to seize these
machines without any prior notice, deniable encryption clearly cannot help. Further,
even if parties expect their machines to be seized, replacing their true randomness
and plaintext with fake ones requires secure erasures.
That is, deniable encryption is useful in a setting when the adversary doesn’t have
direct access to parties’ machines, and instead encourages parties to disclose their
state themselves. Examples include an attempt to learn the content of communication
via bribes or threats, an obligation to disclose the keys as part of the legal process, or
vote buying.
Deniability is guaranteed only assuming the correct execution of the pro-
tocol. We cannot stress enough that deniability protects parties only as long as
parties correctly run the protocol: that is, choose their random coins truly at random
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and generate messages according to instructions of a protocol. This is generally not an
issue when parties want protection against an external coercer who could demand their
keys later, and therefore are themselves interested in following the protocol honestly.
However, in some scenarios the parties themselves should be treated as potentially
malicious: for instance, a government agent who was offered bribes for revealing the
content of sensitive communication, or a voter who is planning to sell its vote, or any
other person who intends to prove its plaintext in a situation where they better don’t.
Clearly, if a party is already malicious during the protocol execution, it can always
set its randomness s to be, e.g., digits of π, and then use it as a proof that it knows
the true plaintext. In some applications this issue can be solved using physical setup
assumptions. For instance, (BT94) argues that a physical booth is required to achieve
receipt-free voting; if such a booth is available, one could use it to generate randomness
for voters and give it to them (rather than letting voters pick it themselves, potentially
in a malicious way), thus making deniable encryption sufficient.
However, even when such a setup is not available, deniable encryption still guarantees
some security - that parties cannot prove their plaintext as long as they followed
the protocol, even if later their intentions become malicious. Indeed, any “proof of
plaintext” computed using their true random coins could be also computed from fake
coins and fake plaintext.
Possible variants of the definition. The definition of deniable encryption can
be parametrized in a number of ways, e.g.:
• Post-execution vs adaptive coercion. In this paper we consider the setting
where coercion happens after the protocol is executed. One can consider a
broader definition of adaptive coercion which can happen at arbitrary moment
during the protocol execution (and with the other party being aware or unaware
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of the coercion).
• Time when the fake plaintext is chosen. In this paper we avoid this issue
by considering bit encryption only. If one considers encrypting longer messages,
there are several possible levels of how adaptive the choice of fake plaintext is:
The weakest notion is to require that the fake plaintext m′ should be chosen
already at the time of encryption and supplied to the encryption algorithm: this is
called plan-ahead deniability in (CDNO97). Another definition (commonly used)
requires encryption process to be independent of fake plaintext; however, note
that both real and fake plaintexts have to be chosen by the adversary at the time
of encryption in order for deniability game to be well-defined. Another option
is to consider a simulation-based definition of deniable encryption (discussed
later), and let the environment choose fake messages for parties as late as at the
time of coercion. Finally, in a CRS model there is one more level of adaptivity,
where both real and fake plaintexts are chosen before the CRS is fixed.
• Indistinguishability-based vs simulation-based definitions. One could
define incoercible encryption as an encryption which implements ideal secure
channels under coercion, similarly to how (CG96) (and its follow-up (CGP15))
define incoercible computation (there are also other definitions, e.g. (UM10,
AOZZ15)). The idea behind the definition is that the simulator should be able
to simulate random coins, given only the plaintext, but not the information
whether this plaintext is real or fake - which implies that in the real world the
adversary doesn’t know this either. (Both real and fake plaintexts are chosen by
the environment, and fake plaintexts of the sender and the receiver do not have
to be consistent).
It is easy to show that in the semi-honest model (i.e. when parties follow the
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protocol throughout, and are being coerced only post-execution, encryption
is incoercible if and only it is both bideniable and off-the-record deniable4.
Intuitively, the simulator can always simulate the communication by generating
an encryption of 0, and simulate random coins by running faking algorithm for
a given plaintext.
• Deterministic vs randomized faking algorithms. We note that faking
algorithms could be deterministic (i.e. the only randomness they take as in-
put is true randomness of the sender s, which we treat as non-random input
since it is picked once and reused across different algorithms of the sender)
or randomized (when they additionally take as input fresh random coins ρ
which are not used anywhere else). For instance, the syntax of SFake could
be both SFake(s,m,m′, tr) and SFake(s,m,m′, tr; ρS), where tr is the transcript
of communication. In our construction SFake is deterministic and RFake is
randomized.
• Private vs public deniability. We say that deniability of the sender (or
receiver, or both) is public ((SW14)), if the corresponding faking algorithm
doesn’t take the true randomness and the true plaintext as input. For in-
stance, our scheme has public deniability of the receiver, i.e. RFake has syntax
RFake(m′, tr; ρR). This means that anyone, not just the receiver, can produce
fake random coins of the receiver. Note that in this case RFake has to be
randomized, otherwise the coercer could easily check if claimed r is fake by
comparing it to RFake(m′, tr).
• “Coordinated” schemes. One can also consider a “coordinated” scheme
((OPW11)) where faking algorithm takes as input true coins of both the sender
4It is important that both properties hold with respect to the same faking algorithms, i.e. that
parties do not have to choose whether they want standard deniability or off-the-record deniability.
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and the receiver at the same time, thus requiring coordination between the sender
and the receiver in order to compute fake randomness. Our scheme doesn’t
require such coordination, but we note that prior to this work even coordinated
fully bideniable schemes were not known.
Related concepts.
• Incoercible key exchange is equivalent to deniable encryption: indeed, given
the former, one can always encrypt messages deniably under one-time pad.
Given deniable encryption, one can always pick a random key and send it to the
receiver deniably.
• Non-committing (adaptively secure) encryption (NCE, (CFGN96))
may sound similar to deniable encryption; it requires that the simulator can
generate dummy ciphertexts that can later be opened to any given plaintext.
The differences are twofold. First, in deniable encryption a ciphertext that
carries a plaintext can be faked, while in NCE ciphertexts either can be faked
(if they are simulated) or carry a plaintext (if they are real). In other words,
parties cannot fake; only the simulator can. Second, fake opening on behalf of
the sender and the receiver in NCE is done by the same entity - the simulator -
while in deniable encryption parties fake on their own.
Bideniable encryption is strictly stronger than NCE, since bideniable encryption
implies NCE ((CDNO97)), and since there exist two-message NCE schemes
((CDMW09)) which provably cannot be bideniable due to the 3-message lower
bound ((BNNO11)).
• Flexible Deniability. In addition to full deniability, (CDNO97) also introduced
a weaker notion of deniability, sometimes called multi-distributional deniability
((OPW11), (BNNO11), (Dac12), (AFL16), (CIO16)), or dual-scheme deniabil-
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ity
(GKW17). We defer discussion of this notion to Section 3.9.
• Deniable authentication. Deniable encryption should not be confused with
deniable authentication. In the latter, the goal is to allow the receiver of a
message to authenticate the source and contents of the message, while providing
the sender with a guarantee that the receiver is unable to convincingly prove
to an external entity, that did not directly witness the communication, that the
message has been indeed received from the sender (see e.g. (DKSW09)). In
contrast, in the setting of deniable encryption the external entity is assumed to
have directly witnessed the communicated ciphertext and concern is for both
parties to maintain secrecy of the plaintext, even when coerced (separately or
jointly) to provide their internal secrets.
3.1.2 Prior Work on Deniable Encryption
The notion of deniable encryption was first introduced in 1996 in the work of (CDNO97).
However, techniques of that time fell short of achieving deniability: indeed, (CDNO97)
present a construction where the distinguishing advantage between real and fake
opening was inversely proportional to the length of the ciphertext, thus requiring
superpolynomially-long ciphertexts in order to achieve deniability. It was not until
2014 when Sahai and Waters presented the first (and, to date, the only) construction of
sender-deniable encryption (SW14), and their construction was based on assumptions
as strong as indistinguishability obfuscation. (In fact, to the best of our knowledge,
their approach gives the only known way of “inverting” generic programs, i.e. coming
up with consistent random coins for a different input-output pair, which is necessary
for deniable encryption).
The construction of (SW14) can be transformed into 3-message receiver-deniable
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protocol using generic transformation of (CDNO97), by letting the receiver send
random bit b to the sender deniably in rounds 1 and 2, and then letting the sender
send b ⊕ m back in round 3. In fact, the sender, instead of sending b ⊕ m in the
clear, can send it encrypted under deniable encryption, and the resulting 3-message
scheme will be sender-or-receiver-deniable - that is, the adversary is allowed to obtain
randomness of any party of its choice, but only one of the two5. However, all these
constructions heavily rely on the fact that internal state of one of the parties remains
hidden, and therefore fail to achieve deniability for both parties at the same time.
Several works focused on proving lower bounds for deniable encryption. (CDNO97)
show that a certain class of schemes cannot achieve better distinguishing advantage
than inverse polynomial. (Dac12) extends this result to a broader class of constructions,
showing that the same holds for any black-box construction of sender-deniable encryp-
tion from simulatable encryption. (Nie02) show that any non-committing encryption,
including bideniable encryption, can only reuse its public key a priori bounded number
of times; and therefore it has to be an interactive protocol, even if it requires two
messages. Using different techniques, (BNNO11) show that receiver-deniable scheme
cannot even be a 2-message protocol: at least 3 messages are required. The same
holds for bideniable encryption.
A significantly weaker notion of deniability, called flexible, or multi-distributional, or
dual-scheme deniability, was explored in several works (CDNO97),
(OPW11), (BNNO11), (Dac12), (AFL16), (CIO16), (GKW17). While this notion is
5In fact, this is an example of the scheme, asked by (OPW11), which is sender-or-receiver-
deniable, but provably not bideniable. Indeed, for this scheme to be bideniable, both parties should
simultaneously lie about either plaintext b of the first encryption, or plaintext b⊕m of the second
encryption - otherwise true values of b and b⊕m reveal true m. This in turn implies that at least one
of the two deniable schemes is receiver-deniable, which is impossible due to lower bound of (BNNO11)
for 2 messages. Similarly, this scheme is not off-the-record deniable. Indeed, the adversary can xor
the plaintext claimed to be received by the sender at round 2 (which is the true value of b) with the
plaintext claimed to be received by the receiver at round 3 (which is the true value of b⊕m) to learn
the true plaintext.
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only loosely related to ours, we give more details about its strengths and weaknesses
in section 3.9.
3.1.3 Our Results: Interactive Deniable Encryption
We show a 3-message deniable encryption scheme from subexponential iO and subex-
ponential one-way functions in a non-programmable CRS model6. The CRS consists
of obfuscated programs which everyone (including parties and adversaries) has access
to. The CRS has to be generated by some trusted entity ahead of time, but this entity
doesn’t need to participate in the protocol. The programs are reusable an arbitrary
polynomial number of times by arbitrarily many pairs of communicating parties (in
particular, the CRS has a fixed size, independent on the number of executions). We
stress again that the adversary has access to the same programs and thus has exactly
the same power as honest parties do: in particular, parties do not receive any help
(in generating fake randomness) from external incoercible authority, and can disclose
their full internal state, including the faking key, to the adversary (unlike in flexible
deniable encryption)7:
Theorem 24. Assuming subexponentially-secure indistinguishability obfuscation and
subexponentially-secure one-way functions, there exists a three-message interactive
encryption for 1-bit plaintexts that is bideniable and off-the-record-deniable in the
common reference string model. In addition, the receiver’s deniability is public, i.e.
true random coins of the receiver are not required to compute fake randomness of the
receiver.
Our scheme instructs parties to run programs in the CRS in order to compute protocol
messages, decrypt, or fake: that is, all the computation happening in the scheme is
6The standard definition of deniable encryption ((CDNO97)) is game-based (there is no notion of
simulation), and for both challenge bits b = 0, 1 the CRS has to be generated in the same way. Thus
the CRS is inherently non-programmable.
7In fact, in our scheme there is no separate faking key: the same randomness r is used by the
receiver to generate its messages, decrypt, and fake. Upon coercion, the adversary gets access to
(possibly fake) r.
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hidden even from the parties themselves, and choosing initial random coins is the only
thing parties do themselves.
The challenges we are facing are two-fold. First, deniable encryption is not easy to
build even when parties have only oracle access to the programs; in fact, throughout
the introduction we mostly explain how to build deniable encryption in this setting.
It turns out that even in this setting deniable encryption is non-trivial; In particulat,
the programs involved should have a special hidden logic which thwarts all potential
adversarial recombinations of pieces of the transcript and claimed randomness of the
parties. Second, in our actual construction parties (and an attacker) have access to
the actual code of programs, protected by indistinguishability obfuscation; thus we
need to argue that security still holds with weaker guarantees of indistinguishability
obfuscation. To achieve this we use techniques commonly used in settings where the
adversary can run programs on outputs of other programs iteratively, like in garbled
TMs and RAM from iO ((KLW15, CHJV14)), as well as the constructions of trapdoor
permutations from iO ((BPR15, BPW16)).
Although we state and prove the theorem for 1-bit encryption, our construction can
be used to encrypt and deny longer messages, say be encrypting each bit separately.
3.1.4 A Very Brief Overview of the Scheme
Our starting point is a special mechanism built by (SW14) which allows to make any
randomized algorithm deniable - that is, it is possible to come up with fake random
coins for this algorithm which are consistent with any given input-output pair, even if
this input doesnt normally result in such output. In particular, this means that we
can take any protocol and equip parties with a way to “explain”, separately, each of
the messages they send to the other party - that is, come up with fake randomness
which makes, say, the first message sent from the sender to the receiver consistent
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with any plaintext of parties’ choice.
A first atempt at a bideniable scheme might then be to have the parties use pre-
obfuscated programs for encryption, decryption, sender-fake and receiver-fake, and then
use the sender-fake and receiver-fake to “explain” each one of the protocol messages
individually, using the (SW14) mechanism. However, the (SW14) mechanism is
guaranteed to work only when applied to independent algorithms, which is definitely
not the case here. (Indeed, otherwise we could just use this mechanism to get a
two-message bideniable encryption, which is impossible (BNNO11).) The problem
here is that the joint behavior of key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithm
by itself reveals too much - no matter how innocently-looking fake randomness we
create for each algorithm. Namely, the adversary can play with the given transcript
and randomness to generate certain “related” transcripts and randomness, and then
try to run the decryption algorithm on different combinations of them. To get some
intuition for why this is a problem, consider the following. Fake r can be viewed as
a string which “remembers”, explicitly or implicitly, a single instruction to decrypt
a certain transcript to a certain fake plaintext. The adversary can try to run RFake
many times on (claimed to be real) r and related transcripts, hoping that each new
application of RFake will add a new instruction into the “memory” of r. Since r is
a bounded-length string which can “remember” only a fixed amount of information,
sooner or later the very first instruction will be erased from the “memory” of r. In
other words, if r is fake, then by running RFake many times it is possible to come up
with some different r̃ which doesn’t have the instruction r has and thus decrypts the
transcript in question honestly. (In fact, this is the high-level idea of the impossibility
argument of (BNNO11); see more details in section 3.2.1).
Thus our plan is to first design a protocol that doesn’t allow the coercer to compute
related transcripts, and then to put (SW14) mechanism on top of it to achieve input-
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output consistency. We first do it in “oracle-access model” - a model where everyone
(both parties and adversaries) has black-box access to specially designed programs
- and then adapt the construction to the setting where everyone gets access to the
actual code of programs, obfuscated under indistinguishability obfuscation.
The first part of our plan - designing a protocol free from related transcripts - itself
consists of two major steps:
Step 1: We design a “base” protocol as follows: we give parties (and the coercer) an
access to specially designed programs for all algorithms of deniable encryption, i.e. for
generating messages, decrypting, and faking; parties are not supposed to do anything
by themselves - they only pick their random coins and run corresponding programs.
We set the programs such that the first message µ1 is a PRF of the sender randomness
s and its plaintext m, the second message µ2 is a PRF of the receiver randomness
r and µ1, and the third message µ3 is an encryption of m,µ1, µ2. (All keys, e.g. for
PRFs and encryption, are hidden inside these programs and not known to anyone,
including parties.) Then the receiver can use its decryption program which decrypts
the ciphertext and outputs m. In addition, we add certain consistency checks to the
programs to make sure that decryption program returns the output only if it gets the
correct r (i.e. consistent with µ2), and the program for the third message only returns
the output if it gets the correct s (i.e. consistent with µ1).
In other words, in the first two messages parties essentially exchange “hashes” of their
internal state so far. Intuitively, this guarantees (or, rather, should guarantee) that
the adversary cannot compute related transcripts - for instance, cannot reuse µ1, µ2
from transcript (µ1, µ2, µ3) and compute some new µ3
′ such that (µ1, µ2, µ3
′) is also a
valid transcript with respect to the same r.
Step 2: We show that the intuition from the step 1 is only partially correct: namely,
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it turns out that, despite all precautions, there always exists a certain, very specific
algorithm to compute related transcripts, in any 3-message bideniable encryption
scheme. This algorithm, given any transcript (µ1, µ2, µ3), and run iteratively, allows
to compute transcripts (µ1, µ2, µ3
(1)), (µ1, µ2, µ3
(2)), and so on, with the same first and
second messages, but different third message. This allows to produce “a chain” of
related transcripts tr1, tr2, and so on. (However, the scheme from step 1 is still useful,
since it protects from all other attempts to compute related transcripts, except for
this algorithm, which is crucial for security).
To make sure that the adversary cannot use this chain of related transcripts to learn
the true plaintext (like in 2-message case), we augment the base scheme with “levels”:
that is, we set up the scheme in such a way that µ3
(i), generated using that algorithm,
“knows” its own index i, i.e. it is an encryption of (m,µ1, µ2, i); we call this index i
a level. (This is possible to do since the algorithm to generate related transcripts
is inherently sequential, and in particular index i of each transcript is well defined.)
Further, we let the fake randomness r′ (generated by running RFake on (µ1, µ2, µ3
(i)))
also “know” index i of the transcript which was used to generate this r′. (We make
sure that this number i is hidden from parties and the adversary, but programs still
have a way to learn it). With this in place, we can set up decryption algorithm
such that any fake r′ associated with some index i can be used to decrypt correctly
transcripts with µ3
(j) where j > i (“correctness forward”), but cannot be used to
decrypt transcripts with µ3
(j) where j < i (“oblivious past”). We refer to this as
“comparison-based decryption behavior”. As we will show later, such a setup allows to
design a scheme and prove its security. In particular, it avoids the attack described
before, where the adversary takes (fake) r and uses it to run RFake multiple times on
related transcripts in an attempt to “erase” an instruction for the challenge transcript.
As mentioned above, we then put (SW14) mechanism on top of this protocol to
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allow to generate consistent fake randomness. Finally, we need to show security of
the protocol while only relying on iO. This comes with its own set of challenges.
First, security argument in “oracle-access” setting relies a lot on the fact that certain
outputs of programs are hard to find, as long as corresponding inputs are hard to
find. In contrast, to make the same reasoning in iO setting we need to show that
such inputs don’t exist (rather than being hard to find). Second, it turns out that
as part of our construction we have to build a special primitive which somewhat
resembles “deterministic order-revealing encryption”: concretely, no one should be
able to tell between Enc(0) and Enc(1), even given programs which homomorphically
increment ciphertexts (producing Enc(2),Enc(3) and so on up to some superpolynomial
bound) and homomorphically compare them. (Intuitively, homomorphic comparison
is required to implement comparison-based decryption behavior; we give more details
in section 3.2).
This concludes the brief overview of our scheme. For a more detailed explanation of
challenges and techniques we refer the reader to section 3.2. An impatient reader can
directly look up the description of programs on fig. 3·2, fig. 3·3 in the introduction,
or read the construction in the body of the paper (section 3.6, fig. 3·84, fig. 3·85).
3.1.5 On the Complexity of the Construction and the Proof
While this work significantly extends the boundary of what is known to be possible in
deniable encryption, it makes strong hardness assumptions and uses the CRS model.
Furthermore, the construction is relatively complex, and the analysis is long and
somewhat tedious. We use this section to comment on these drawbacks and point to
potential avenues for improvement.
A simpler construction? First, we argue that the core idea behind the construc-
tion is relatively simple. Our first observation is that the main attack to be concerned
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about is one where the adversary starts from the challenge transript, generates a chain
of other dependent transcripts, and uses these transripts to test the behavior of the
scheme. To remain secure, the scheme should satisfy “comparison-based decryption
behavior”, which says that if the adversary generates a fake decryption key using one
of the transcripts tr in the chain, then this key must decrypt correctly all transcripts
after tr in the chain (“correctness forward”), and output ⊥ on all transcripts before tr
(“oblivious past”).
However, to implement this idea we needed lengthy proofs, even when such proofs
are simple conceptually. This is in part due to the fact that the syntax of deniable
encryption is already complicated (with 6 programs, taking as input 2 to 6 variables
each, it can take 1-2 pages just to present their code). In part this is also due to the
fact that our current techniques of working with obfuscation are not tailored well to
dealing with multiple interconnected programs which can all be run interactively with
each other, requiring multiple hybrids per single logical step.
That said, it is unlikely that the “core” of bideniable encryption, at least in 3 messages,
can be made significantly simpler. The reason is that bideniability is a very strong
property and it imposes many requirements on the scheme, which do not leave much
freedom for the construction: arguably, any construction in 3 messages would have
to do some comparison-based decryption behavior, very similar to ours. For instance,
the fact that the adversary can generate certain chains of transcripts is true for any
(3-message) scheme: it is implied by sender-deniability. It can also be easily shown
from bideniability that “correctness forward” must hold. Finally, while this is not
a formal statement, it seems that some variant of “oblivious past” should also hold
in any scheme; otherwise the adversary can use some decryption key from the chain
to decrypt the challenge transcript (which is in the very beginning of the chain). In
other words, comparison-based decryption behavior (or its close variant) seems to be
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inherent in the 3 message case.
A simpler construction using secure hardware? Random Oracle? For
a relaxed notion? Both the impossibility result of (BNNO11) for 2-message
receiver-deniable encryption and our observations of how 3-message scheme should
look like are very generic. They only use the fact that the coercer has oracle access to
faking queries and decryption queries, and therefore they hold in any model where
the adversary has the same ability to decrypt and fake as the honest parties do8. For
instance, relaxing the definition such that the receiver only discloses decryption key
and faking key (as opposed to full generation randomness) won’t help (neither for
2-message receiver deniable, nor for 3-message bideniable encryption), since these two
keys still give the adversary access to faking and decryption oracles. However, further
relaxation - where the receiver only discloses decryption key, but not the faking key -
already helps tremendously, since the adversary looses its access to a faking oracle:
this definition is very related to the notion of flexibly deniable encryption, which is
possible to construct in 2 messages, and from much weaker assumptions; we discuss
this notion more in section 3.9.
In short, the scheme still has to follow comparison-based decryption behaviour in any
model where the adversary has the same power to decrypt and fake as the party does.
This covers a lot of natural models, even those which usually greatly simplify the task
of building the target cryptographic primitive, such as secure hardware model. The
same holds for the CRS model, even if the CRS is very structured and has secrets
inside it.
8The model also has to be realistic in a sense that it shouldn’t allow to compress information
past its information-theoretic bound. E.g. programmable random oracle model can sometimes be
used to avoid incompressibility-based impossibility results, and in this sense programmable random
oracle may allow to compress information. It could be that in programmable random oracle model
the construction of bideniable encryption can be much simpler; however, we underline that it would
not be instantiatable.
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In constrast, deniable encryption could be potentially much simpler in any model
where the coercer doesn’t get access to faking key (e.g. if parties fake with the help of
a trusted party, or if the adversary believes that parties do not have the faking key).
We underline however that, while such solutions could be meaningful in practice, from
a theoretical perspective they don’t really capture the nature of deniability, where the
coercer expects to see all coins which the party uses in the execution.
A simpler construction, using more rounds of interaction? Our ideas only
hold for the 3-message case; it could be that a much simpler protocol exists given
many rounds of interaction. However, we were not able to build such a protocol, and
we think this is a great open problem.
Is obfuscation necessary? We use obfuscation for several reasons. The first is to
hide whether each program of deniable encryption is doing real computation or uses
the trapdoor thread to output fake values, similar to the sender-deniable encryption
of (SW14).
Another reason is that, as we explain more in section 3.2, a deniable encryption
scheme with comparison-based decryption logic requires us to build a certain form
of deterministic order-revealing encryption: concretely, the adversary shouldn’t be
able to distinguish between encryption of 0 and 1, even given functions which allow to
increment ciphertexts homomorphically (up to an encryption of a superpolynomial
bound T ) and compare them (with the result of the comparison in the clear). Intuitively,
this is required since we design the scheme such that transcripts in the chain contain an
encryption of their own position in the chain, and decryption procedure uses “compare”
functionality to determine if it should decrypt correctly or output ⊥, according to
comparison-based logic. We build this scheme from iO.
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The last but not the least, obfuscation allows us to make sure that the adversary
can only run programs in a “permitted way” (e.g. cannot combine two transcripts
and decrypt the resulting transcript). As an important special case, the adversary
should not be able to generate chains of transcripts in any way, except for one method
which provably exists in any scheme. Such a guarantee is extremely important for
our construction, since it allows to set up the scheme such that each transcript in
the chain contains its own index, which in turn enables comparison-based decryption
behavior and makes the scheme secure.
To summarize, we use obfuscation for seemingly different reasons. To build bideniable
encryption without obfuscation, one has to be able to implement, at the very least,
the above three mechanisms using different primitives. Note that replacing iO with
a weaker primitive in our construction would most likely also result in a 2-message
sender-deniable encryption without obfuscation. Yet, sender-deniable encryption of
(SW14), from iO and one-way functions, is the only construction of a sender-deniable
encryption we know so far, and we think it would be a great improvement on its
own to build sender-deniable encryption from a weaker primitive - or even to use an
iO-based approach different from the one of (SW14)!
Subexponential security. The need for subexponential security comes from the
fact that switching a ciphertext from an encryption of 0 to an encryption of 1 in the
“order-revealing encryption” mentioned above requires some superpolynomial T steps.
(The latter, in turn, follows from the fact that the adversary can generate chains of
any polynomial length). With our current techniques, it seems inherent to have the
number of hybrids proportional to T and therefore to require subexponential security
of underlying primitives.
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Structured CRS with secrets. Our construction requires a CRS (which consists
of obfuscated programs), where randomness used to generate the CRS (i.e. randomness
of obfuscation and secret keys inside the programs) must remain hidden from everyone
including participants of the protocol.
While removing this setup assumption would be great, it appears to be out of reach of
the current cryptographic techniques. This question is a special case of a very general
question in cryptography: it is possible to generate any structured CRS with secrets
without knowing those secrets? This in turn is a special case of invertible sampling
hypothesis (ISH) (IKOS10) which conjectures that for any distribution (potentially
generated using some secret information), there is a way to generate it without learning
those secrets (e.g., it should be possible to sample N = pq without knowing p, q).
ISH is related to several questions in cryptography, such as adaptive security and the
relationship between PKE and OT. However, (IKOS10) show, albeit under strong
assumptions, that ISH doesn’t hold for some specific distributions. While this doesn’t
imply that our CRS cannot be generated in such a way, or that deniable encryption
is impossible without a CRS, it indicates that this question may be quite hard to
answer.
3.2 Informal Overview of our Scheme
In this section we give informal yet almost complete overview of the scheme. We
start by explaining that the scheme should decrypt related transcripts according to
a certain comparison-based logic in section 3.2.1. Next in section 3.2.2 we design
the scheme such that decryption algorithm has necessary information to follow this
logic on sequentially-generated related transcripts (and at the same time we make
sure that the scheme doesn’t allow to generate related transcripts in any other way).
Finally in section 3.2.3 we describe the changes to the scheme due to the use of
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indistinguishability obfuscation.
3.2.1 Decryption Behavior on Related Transcripts
In order to understand how to set decryption behavior for our 3-message scheme, it is
instructive to recall why receiver-deniable encryption cannot exist in two messages.
Impossibility result of the 2-message case ((BNNO11)), and related tran-
scripts. (BNNO11) show that any 2-message receiver-deniable encryption scheme,
even for a single-bit plaintext, can be used to deniably send any polynomial number
of plaintexts, simply by reusing the first message (pk) and sending multiple second
messages c1, . . . , cN (where N is an arbitrary polynomial); they show that all these
ciphertexts can be faked simultaneously using a single fake decryption key. This in
turn implies that any string can be compressed beyond information-theoretic bound.
This compression is done as follows. The protocol to compress any random string
b1, . . . , bN from N bits (where N is an arbitrary number larger than |sk|) to |sk| bits
is the following: first, ahead of time prepare N encryptions of 0 - let us call them
c1, . . . , cN - under the same pk. (Note that these ciphertexts do not depend on the
string to be compressed and thus can be thought of as public parameters of the
compression protocol.) Then, to compress b1, . . . , bN , compute fake sk
(N) by mapping
each ci to bi, that is, compute sk
(1) ← RFake(sk, c1, b1), sk(2) ← RFake(sk(1), c2, b2),
. . . , sk(N) ← RFake(sk(N−1), cN , bN). The string sk(N) is a compressed description of
b1, . . . , bN , since it is shorter than N and since the original string can be recovered by
decrypting each bi as Dec(sk
(N), ci).
9
An important property of the 2-message scheme which allows this proof to go through
(concretely, to reduce single-bit deniability to multi-bit deniability) is that given some
9Since any bideniable encryption is also receiver-deniable, this impossibility of 2-message receiver-
deniable encryption immediately implies impossibility of 2-message bideniable encryption as well.
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transcript tr1 = (pk, c1), it is easy to compute another transcript which is consistent
with the same receiver randomness r and contains a possibly different plaintext.
Indeed, it is easy to compute another transcript tr2 = (pk, c2) simply by reusing
pk and encrypting any plaintext of one’s choice under fresh encryption randomness.
Further, note that transcripts generated this way are “symmetric” - meaning that
not only it is easy to compute tr2 from tr1, but it is also easy to compute (the right
distribution of) tr1 from tr2. Next, note that it is possible to generate polynomially
many transcripts this way, which encrypt arbitrary plaintexts of one’s choice. Finally
and most importantly, from the point of view of sk all these transcripts could be
transcripts in an honest execution of the protocol, and therefore sk has to “work” on
each of them: that is, it has to decrypt them correctly, it has to produce valid fake
key on them, and so on. We call such transcripts related.
Similarly, in the 3-message case, given some transcript tr(s∗, r∗,m) for randomly
chosen sender and receiver coins s∗, r∗, one can consider a set of related transcripts,
i.e. transcripts on which r∗ also has to “work”. For instance, transcripts of the form
tr(s′, r∗,m′), where m′ is arbitrary and s′ is random, could be themselves the result
of the honest execution of the protocol, and therefore such transcripts are related
transcripts. Similarly, transcripts where s′ is not random but is indistinguishable from
random are also related.
We say that a scheme allows to construct related transcripts, if, given tr(s∗, r∗,m)
but not r∗, it is possible to compute related transcripts in polynomial time.This
property is important because by indistinguishability of real and fake randomness,
fake receiver randomness also has to work on related transcripts - at least on those
which can be computed from a challenge transcript10. Intuitively, this imposes too
10Requirement that r∗ shouldn’t be used when computing related transcripts comes from the fact
that in deniability game the adversary doesn’t necessarily get real randomness r∗ and has to generate
related transcripts without it. Also, note that with r∗ related transcripts would be always easy to
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many requirements on the scheme, leading to impossibility in the 2-message case and
requiring special decryption logic in the 3-message case. Let us first analyze what goes
wrong in the 2-message case, in what is essentially a reformulation of the intuition
behind the proof of (BNNO11):
It is helpful to view fake r′ (produced by running RFake on some transcript tr1, plaintext
m′1 and real r) as having “memory” where RFake records the mapping tr1 → m′111.




already remembers a mapping tr1 → m′1, and RFake now asks it to remember another
mapping tr2 → m′2, it is not clear what should happen. Intuitively, there are 3 possible
ways of how the scheme could handle this: remember both mappings, or only the last
one, or abort:
• Option 1: RFake outputs ⊥ (or any other value which is not a “valid” fake
randomness, i.e. which doesn’t remember the last mapping tr2 → m′2 and
therefore doesn’t decrypt tr2 to m
′
2). In other words, the scheme only allows
to run RFake once. Such behavior immediately leads to an attack: assume the
adversary is given tr1 and fake receiver randomness r
′ as a challenge. It can
compute tr2 and run RFake on it. If r
′ randomness was real, then RFake would
work and output randomness which decrypts tr2 to m
′
2; if this doesn’t happen
when r′ is already fake, then this can be used to distinguish between real and
fake r′.
Note that for this argument it is crucial that given tr1, it is easy to compute tr2.
• Option 2: RFake “forgets” the previous mapping, i.e. outputs fake randomness
which only memorizes the new mapping tr2 → m′2 (but not the old mapping
find simply by computing tr(s′, r∗,m′) for random s′ and any m′; for this reason, when we talk about
finding related transcripts, we always implicitly assume that r∗ shouldn’t be used.
11The proof of (BNNO11) essentially shows that in any 2-message scheme r′ has to memorize this
mapping, explicitly or implicitly.
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tr1 → m′1)12. Such behavior leads to an attack: assume the adversary is given
tr1 and fake receiver randomness r
′ (which maps tr1 to m
′
1) as a challenge. It
can compute tr2 and run RFake on r
′ and tr2, and use the resulting randomness
(which doesn’t remember the mapping tr1 → m′1 anymore) to decrypt tr1 honestly
and learn the true plaintext of tr1.
Note that decrypting tr1 should indeed result in the true plaintext (as opposed
to aborting, for example). Indeed, if r′ was real randomness of tr1, then the
adversary could compute fake randomness with respect to tr2, which should still
decrypt tr1 correctly (otherwise, if randomness fake with respect to tr2 decrypts
tr1 incorrectly, then it is possible to win deniability game when tr2 is a challenge
transcript - as long as tr1 can be computed from tr2). Therefore the same should
hold if r′ is already fake with respect to tr1.
Note that for this argument it is crucial that tr1 can be computed from tr2, and
tr2 can be computed from tr1.
• Option 3: RFake “appends” the new mapping to all previous ones, i.e. outputs
fake randomness which memorizes both mappings tr2 → m′2, tr1 → m′1. Then
by repeating the process more than |r| times we can force r to remember more
than |r| mappings, which is information-theoretically impossible.
Summarizing this discussion, the following properties make a scheme insecure:
1. Assume a scheme allows to construct multiple (more than |r|) related transcripts
tr1, tr2, . . ., for possibly different plaintexts m1,m2, . . .;
2. further, assume that the procedure to construct them is “symmetric” - that is,
if trj can be constructed using tri, then (the correct distribution of) tri can also
12Note that we consider remembering only 1 mapping for simplicity. This argument can be easily
extended to the case when randomness can remember some fixed polynomial number of mappings.
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be constructed using trj;
then this scheme - even if it is interactive - is subject to the same impossibility result
as in (BNNO11).
Comparison-Based Decryption Behavior. As we explain in more detail in
section 3.2.2, any 3-message bideniable scheme allows to construct related transcripts;
however, the algorithm to generate them is not “symmetric”. That is, this algorithm
allows to generate tr1 → tr2 → tr3 → . . . but only in a sequential way: it is easy to
compute them “forward”, but in general it could be hard, given trj, to generate (the
correct distribution of) tri where i < j - i.e. hard to compute them “backward”.
To understand how the scheme should behave on related transcripts in the 3-message
case, let’s reconsider options 1 - 3 mentioned above, keeping in mind that related
transcripts are easy to compute forward but hard to compute backward, i.e. that trj
is easy to build from tri if and only i < j.
Let r′ be fake with respect to tri, and assume RFake is run on already-fake r
′ and a
different transcript trj. Then:
• Option 1 (RFake gives invalid output, e.g. ⊥) is still insecure for j > i, but
possible for j < i.
• Option 2 (new fake randomness only remembers the last mapping and forgets
the previous one) is now possible, but only as long as decrypting “backwards”,
i.e. using r′ to decrypt transcripts trj for j < i, outputs ⊥; otherwise this option
has the same issue as in 2-round case. (In contrast, note that r′ should decrypt
“forward”, i.e. trj for j > i, correctly, since this is what r
′ would do if it was
real).
• Option 3 (new fake randomness remembers all previous mappings and the new
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one) is still information-theoretically impossible.
These options tell us that the scheme should exhibit a different behavior depending
on whether r′ is used “forward” or “backward” (i.e. if it is used to decrypt/fake trj
for j > i or j < i). Perhaps the most natural logic consistent with options described
above is to do everything correctly “forward”, but output ⊥ “backward”, that is:




new fake randomness which only remembers trj → m′j (but not the previous
mapping with tri);
2. When j < i, both Dec and RFake on inputs r′, trj should output ⊥;
However, we elect to change this logic slightly in order to make deniability of the
receiver public, meaning that RFake(tr,m) doesn’t take receiver randomness as input.
Indeed, note that the previous mapping is discarded by RFake anyway and thus RFake
can work without knowledge of receiver randomness. Thus in our scheme we adopt
the following comparison-based decryption behavior, slightly different from the one
described above:
1. When j > i, Dec on inputs r′, trj should decrypt trj correctly;
2. When j < i, Dec on inputs r′, trj should output ⊥;
3. For all j RFake(trj,m
′
j) outputs fake randomness which remembers trj → m′j.
It remains to mention that by definition of related transcripts, the original, truly
random r∗ should decrypt each one of them correctly. This concludes the description
of the logic which we incorporate into programs Dec and RFake.
In the next section we design a scheme which only allows to compute related transcripts
sequentially, and where Dec has all necessary information in order to decide if it should
decrypt honestly or output ⊥, according to the rule above.
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3.2.2 Description of the Scheme for the Case When Programs are Given
as Oracles
Notation. Before proceeding further, we fix some notation. We denote by s and r
variables corresponding to randomness of the sender and the receiver, respectively,
and µ1, µ2, µ3 denote the three messages of the protocol. P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake
are the programs of the deniable encryption. More specifically:
P1(s,m) takes as input sender randomness s and plaintext m and outputs the first
message µ1. P2(r, µ1) takes as input receiver randomness r and first message µ1
and outputs the second message µ2. P3(s,m, µ1, µ2) takes as input sender random-
ness s, plaintext m, and protocol messages µ1, µ2 and outputs the last message
µ3. Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3) takes as input receiver randomness r and protocol messages
µ1, µ2, µ3 and outputs the plaintext m. SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3) takes as input sender
randomness s, true plaintext m, new (fake) plaintext m̂, and protocol messages
µ1, µ2, µ3 and outputs fake randomness s
′ which makes µ1, µ2, µ3 look consistent with
m̂. RFake(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3) takes as input new (fake) plaintext m̂ and protocol messages
µ1, µ2, µ3 and outputs fake randomness r
′ which makes µ1, µ2, µ3 look consistent with
m̂ (note that receiver-deniability is public, that is, anyone can create fake r′ since the
knowledge of true r is not required to run RFake).
The base scheme. We start with the base scheme where the goal is to make sure
that related transcripts are hard to compute, unless a certain algorithm is used.
Programs of the scheme are presented on fig. 3·1. Programs P1,P2,P3 normally
output messages µ1, µ2, µ3 computed as µ1 = PRF(s,m), µ2 = PRF(r, µ1), µ3 =
EncK(m,µ1, µ2)
13. Here Enc is a deterministic encryption scheme, and its key K is
hardwired inside programs P3 and Dec. (All keys involved in the construction are
13Note that s,m (and r, µ1) are both inputs to the PRF, not keys; we omit PRF keys in order to
not overload the notation.
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only known to the programs, but not known to parties.) Program Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
can verify that PRF(r, µ1) = µ2 and then decrypt µ3 and output m.
In addition, programs P1,P2,P3,Dec have a “hidden trigger” mechanism
((SW14)) which allows to create fake, but random-looking s and r with a certain
value encrypted inside (which can be read by the programs). Such fake s and r are
encryptions under keys KS, KR of an instruction for the program - e.g. s which is an
encryption of (µ1,m) tells program P1 to output µ1 on input m. The encryption scheme
used should have pseudorandom ciphertexts; since its keys KS, KR are hidden inside
the programs, to an external observer such fake randomness looks like a uniformly
chosen string. The sender and the receiver can compute such fake randomness by
running SFake and RFake.
In addition, program P3, before producing the output, performs a validity check which
aims to make sure that µ3 which it will output corresponds to the same plaintext as
µ1. It does so by verifying that input s is a correct preimage of µ1 with respect to m
under program P1 (possibly fake). Similarly the decryption program Dec only gives
the output if randomness r is a consistent (possibly fake) preimage for the second
message µ2 under P2.
Communication in this protocol consists of µ1 = PRF(s,m), µ2 = PRF(r, µ1), and
µ3 = EncK(m,µ1, µ2). If the sender and receiver want to claim they transmitted m̂
instead, they can use SFake, RFake to compute fake s′ and r′, which are random-
looking strings with (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, ρ) hardwired inside (ρ is just for randomizing, and
is ignored by the programs). In particular, if the adversary tries to decrypt the
transcript µ1, µ2, µ3 with fake r
′ = EncKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, ρR), it will get m̂ as a result
(via trapdoor step of the decryption program). Similarly, other programs, given fake
s′ or r′ as input, use trapdoor step as well, making the transcript look consistent with
m̂.
265
Programs of the base scheme.
Program P1(s,m)




′) and m′ = m, then return µ1
′
//if s is fake and encodes m, output encoded µ1
′
2. Main step: Return µ1 ← PRF(s,m). //otherwise output PRF(s,m)
Program P2(r, µ1)





′ = µ1, then return µ2
′.
//if r is fake and encodes µ1, output encoded µ2
′
2. Normal step: else return PRF(r, µ1). //otherwise output PRF(r, µ1)
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1, then abort;




′) and (m′, µ1
′, µ2
′) = (m,µ1, µ2),
then return µ3
′. //if s is fake and encodes correct (m,µ1, µ2), output encoded
µ3
′
3. Normal step: else return EncK(m,µ1, µ2).//otherwise encrypt m
Program Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
1. Validity check: if P2(r, µ1) 6= µ2, then abort;







′) = (µ1, µ2, µ3),
then return m′. //if r is fake and encodes correct (µ1, µ2, µ3), output encoded
m′
3. Normal step: else decrypt (m′′, µ1
′′, µ2
′′) ← DecK(µ3). If (µ1′′, µ2′′ = µ1, µ2)
then output m′′, else abort. //otherwise decrypt honestly
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρS)
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1, then abort;
2. Normal step: else return EncKS(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, ρS) // output fake s with fake
plaintext and the transcript inside.
Program RFake(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρR)
1. Normal step: return EncKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, ρR) // output fake r with fake plain-
text and the transcript inside
Figure 3·1: Programs of the base scheme (note that this scheme is not
secure yet and will be augmented later). Programs P1,P2,P3,Dec are
deterministic (we treat s, r as part of the normal input, even though they
are randomly chosen, since they are reused across different programs).
Programs SFake, RFake are randomized.
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Note that the current scheme at the very least guarantees consistent input-output
behavior of programs on fake randomness s′, r′.
How the base scheme protects from related transcripts. Recall that in




∗) = tr(s∗, r∗,m), it should be hard to come up with another
transcript tr = (µ1, µ2, µ3) = tr(s, r
∗,m′) for the same r∗.
The base scheme partially prohibits computing related transcripts. Indeed, let’s divide
all related transcripts into two groups: transcripts with with µ1 = µ1
∗ (and therefore
µ2 = µ2
∗, since µ2 only depends on µ1 and r
∗), and transcripts with µ1 6= µ1∗ (and
therefore, in general, µ2 6= µ2∗). We describe how the above construction deals with
each case:
Case µ1 6= µ1∗: Finding such a transcript (in particular, µ2) requires coming up with
µ2 = P2(r
∗, µ1) without knowing r
∗, which is hard due to the fact that P2 computes
a PRF.
Case µ1 = µ1
∗: Unlike the previous case, related transcripts with µ1 = µ1
∗ also
have µ2 = µ2
∗, and thus one can always reuse µ2 = µ2
∗ in such a transcript. However,
to compute the transcript of this form, it still remains to compute µ3, such that
µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3 is a valid transcript with respect to r
∗.
Recall that µ3 is an encryption under a hidden key K and therefore can be only
computed by running the corresponding program, P3. Further, recall that there is a
validity check in P3 which guarantees that the program produces the output only if
we give it a consistent s for µ1 (by checking that P1(s,m) = µ1). Finally, note that
P1(s,m) = µ1 can be satisfied in one of the two ways: either s is indeed a correct PRF
preimage of µ1, or s is fake and contains µ1. Thus, if we wish to compute a different
µ3 6= µ3∗ (potentially for a different plaintext m′) for the same µ1∗, µ2∗, we need to
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give P3 as input some string s′ such that:
• either s′ is a valid PRF preimage (that is, PRF(s′,m′) = µ1∗);
• or s′ is fake randomness containing m′, µ1∗.
Intuitively, finding a valid PRF preimage is hard since the key of the PRF is hidden
inside the program. Note however that finding fake s′ with m′, µ1
∗ inside is very easy -
in fact, SFake will readily output such s′! However, note that finding such s′ cannot be
done without running SFake (again, since the key KS is hidden inside the programs).
To summarize this part, we now have a scheme which doesn’t allow to compute related
transcripts but only as long as SFake is not used to find them. Needless to say, SFake
is readily available to the adversary, and therefore the current scheme does allow
to construct related transcripts (and is not secure yet). However, as we see next,
executing SFake only allows to compute related transcripts in inherently sequential
way, and therefore we can make the scheme secure by implement the comparison-based
decryption logic which we discussed in the previous subsection.
Computing related transcripts using SFake. Assume the adversary is given
the challenge transcript tr∗ = (µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗), randomness s∗, r∗ which can be real or
fake, and plaintext m∗ (which this transcript is claimed to encrypt). We now explain
how to compute related transcripts tr1, tr2, and so on, using tr
∗ and s∗14. Each related




The idea is to force P3 to output a different µ3
(1) by giving it randomness s1 which
passes validity check with respect to µ1
∗,m1 (where m1 is an arbitrary plaintext,
possibly different from the plaintext m∗ of tr∗). This can be done by using SFake to
14Recall that previously we required that related transcripts are hard to find given only the
transcript tr∗, and now we additionally allow to use (real or fake) s∗ in order to generate them. The
reason is that in many cases everything we said above about impossibility of all three options can be
extended to the case where related transcripts are generated using s∗ and tr∗ (as opposed to just tr∗).
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generate fake s1 which contains m1, µ1
∗. However, if we just compute s1 by running
SFake on s∗, tr∗, and m1, it won’t do us any good: while s1 generated this way passes
validity check, it will make P3 simply output hardwired µ3
∗ and thus we won’t get a
new third message. The idea is to get fake s1 which contains m1, µ1
∗, but different
µ̃2 6= µ2∗, which can be done as follows:
1. Compute an auxiliary transcript t̃r = (µ1
∗, µ̃2, µ̃3) with the same first message
µ1
∗, but different second message µ̃2 by choosing fresh randomness r̃ of the
receiver and setting t̃r ← tr(s∗, r̃,m∗). Note that the first message of this
transcript is P1(s∗,m∗) = µ1
∗.
2. Compute s1 ← SFake(s∗,m∗,m1, µ1∗, µ̃2, µ̃3). Note that s1 is fake randomness
which remembers m1, µ1
∗ but different µ̃2 6= µ2∗.
3. Compute µ3
(1) ← P3(s1,m1, µ1∗, µ2∗). Set tr1 = (µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3(1)). Note that
µ1
∗ = P1(s1,m1) and therefore tr1 = tr(s1, r
∗,m1); it follows from sender-
deniability that s1 is indistinguishable from random, and therefore tr1 is a
related transcript.
An important thing to note is that program P3 can detect when it is being used to
produce related transcripts the way described above. Indeed, in this case the input to
program P3, (s,m, µ1, µ2), is such that s is fake and contains m,µ1, but some different
µ̃2 6= µ2; we will refer to this case as mixed case. Further, we claim that the procedure
above (or its variations, e.g. repeating SFake several times) is the only way to compute
related transcripts in our scheme - which means that P3 can always detect when it is
computing related transcript. Intuitively, this is because the only way to compute valid
third message is to run P3, which in turn requires some s which passes validity check,
which in turn requires fake s with m1 and µ1
∗ inside (recall that it is hard to find a
PRF preimage of µ1
∗), which in turn requires to run RFake on some (not necessarily
valid) transcript with the same µ1
∗ but different µ̃2 6= µ2∗ - which can be detected by
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P3.
Note that this procedure can then be repeated (this time starting from s1 instead of
s∗) to generate s2 and corresponding tr2, s3 and tr3 and so on
15.
For our scheme this means that the adversary can generate many third messages of the
form EncK(mi, µ1
∗, µ2
∗). Note that, just like with ciphertexts in the 2-message scheme,
these third messages are “symmetric” and therefore our base scheme is insecure
because of the same reasons as 2-message schemes. (In fact, the base scheme is badly
broken because of a simpler reason: the adversary can test whether tr∗ encrypts m1
or not simply by checking whether µ3
∗ = µ3
(1) or not. However, the latter issue could
be easily fixed, while the former is substantial.)
Next we are going to change the scheme so that the procedure above indeed generates
transcripts in “one-way” manner - such that they are hard to compute backwards
- and allows program Dec to decrypt according to comparison-based rule discussed
before.
Augmenting the scheme with levels. First we briefly describe the idea. Recall
that according to comparison-based logic program Dec should correctly decrypt forward,
i.e. for j > i it should correctly decrypt trj using ri (which is fake with respect to tri),
but if i < j it should output bot. To let program Dec decide whether i < j or not
(and therefore whether it should decrypt correctly or output ⊥), we modify the base
scheme such that both the transcript and fake randomness know their index, which
we call a level: that is, we change the third message µ3 of the transcript trj to be
an encryption of (m,µ1, µ2, j), and we let fake r
′ = RFake(tri,m
′
i) remember not only
the mapping tri → m′i, but also i (this can be achieved by making RFake decrypt the
15One can show, by a reduction to sender-deniability, that this procedure generates related
transcripts in any 3-message scheme.
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third message of tri and write its level into memory of r
′). Then program Dec can
decrypt both µ3 and r
′, compare their levels i and j and make a decision whether to
decrypt honestly or output ⊥.
It remains to describe how to make sure that µ3 encrypts the correct level i (i.e. which
indeed corresponds to the index of its transcript in the chain of related transcripts).
In other words, why does program P3 know that now it is producing the message
belonging to the transcript number i? Indeed, this program needs to somehow learn i
from its inputs s,m, µ1, µ2. Recall that the algorithm to compute related transcript
trj in fact does so by running this program on fake s which was faked j times. If we
change the format of fake s to additionally encrypt a number representing how may
times SFake was executed to produce this s, then the program for the third message
can learn this number from s and copy it into µ3.
More concretely, we are going to do the following changes to the base scheme: first, we
change the format of fake randomness. Recall that in the base scheme fake randomness
was an encryption of (m,µ1, µ2, µ3, ρ) under the corresponding key (KS or KR). In
the augmented scheme we set fake randomness to be an encryption of (m,µ1, µ2, µ3, `)
for sender randomness and (m,µ1, µ2, µ3, `, ρ) for receiver randomness, where ` is a
number between 0 and some superpolynomial upper bound T , which we call a level.
Further, we let the third message also contain a level, i.e. be EncK(m,µ1, µ2, `); in
the honest execution the level of the transcript is always set to 0.
Below we outline required modifications to the programs. The programs themselves
can be found in fig. 3·2 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·3 (programs of the
receiver).
• Program SFake now additionally increments the level. That is, if it is given real










(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′; //if s is fake and encodes m, output encoded µ1
′
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← PRFkS(s,m). //otherwise output PRF(s,m)
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′; //if s is fake and encodes correct
(m,µ1, µ2), output encoded µ3
′
3. Mixed input step: If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ but µ2 6= µ2′ then return µ3 ←
EncK(m,µ1, µ2, `
′); //if s is fake and encodes correct (m,µ1) but incorrect
µ2
′, encrypt m with level copied from s
4. Main step:
(a) Return µ3 ← EncK(m,µ1, µ2, 0). //otherwise encrypt m with level 0
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. If ` ≥ T then abort;
ii. Return EncKS(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, ` + 1). //if input s is already fake then
output new fake s with fake plaintext, the transcript, and incremented
level
3. Main step:
(a) Return EncKS(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, 1). //otherwise output fake s with fake plain-
text, the transcript, and level 1










(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2




(a) Return µ2 ← PRFkR(r, µ1). //otherwise output PRF(r, µ1)
Program Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
1. Validity check: if P2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′; //if r is fake and encodes correct
(µ1, µ2, µ3), output encoded m
′




3. Mixed input step: If µ1, µ2 = µ1
′, µ2





′′) and `′ < `′′ then return m′′; //if r is fake and
encodes correct (µ1, µ2) but incorrect µ3
′, decrypt honestly or abort, de-
pending on whether the level in r is smaller than in µ3 or not
(b) Else abort.
4. Main step:
(a) out← DecK(µ3); if out = ′fail′ then abort, else parse out as (m′′, µ1′′, µ2′′, `′′);
(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) then return m′′; //otherwise decrypt honestly
(c) Else abort.
Program RFake(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
1. out← DecK(µ3); if out = ′fail′ then abort, else parse out as (m′′, µ1′′, µ2′′, `′′);
2. Return r′ ← EncKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `′′, prg(ρ)). // output fake r with fake plaintext,
the transcript, and the level copied from µ3
Figure 3·3: Programs P2,Dec,RFake.
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If it gets already fake randomness with some level `, it outputs fake randomness
with level `+ 1 (unless the upper bound T is reached, in which case it aborts).
Note that this modification makes SFake “one-way”, since it is hard, given fake
s with level `, to compute fake s with level smaller than `.
Recall that SFake in the base scheme was randomized; in the final scheme we
make it deterministic: since incremented level guarantees that fake s changes
with each application of SFake, there is no need for randomization anymore.
• Program P3 now additionally encrypts a level, i.e. it outputs EncK(m,µ1, µ2, 0)
in the main step (where 0 is a level). Further, program P3 now has a “mixed
input” step where it checks that s is fake and contains the same m,µ1 as the
input, but some other µ2 (recall that this condition was a warning that P3 is being
used to compute a related transcript). In this case it outputs EncK(m,µ1, µ2, i),
where i is a level in fake s. This guarantees that related transcript tri, computed
using the procedure described above, will have its index i encrypted in its third
message µ3
(i).
• Program RFake now also copies the level from µ3 into the fake randomness.
• Program Dec now also has “mixed input” step, which happens when fake r
contains the same µ1, µ2 as in its input, but some different µ3. This condition
indicates that Dec is being used to test the behavior of the scheme on related
transcripts - i.e. that some fake ri (fake with respect to transcript tri) is used to
decrypt trj. In this case Dec follows the comparison-based decryption logic we
described above: that is, it learns the level i of receiver randomness and the level
j of the transcript, and decrypts honestly when i < j or outputs ⊥ otherwise.
This concludes the description of our scheme in the model where parties only have
oracle access to the programs. It remains to explain why the resulting scheme indeed
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doesn’t allow to compute related transcripts backwards. Roughly, this is because
computing the third message can only be done by running P3 on fake s, but computing
fake s is possible only in one direction: that is, one can repeatedly apply SFake to
generate fake s with higher and higher levels, but given some fake s with level i, it is
hard to find any fake s with levels below i16.
Summary. To summarize, we designed the scheme in such a way that related
transcripts are hard to compute unless SFake-based procedure is used. Further, we
added a counter called “level” into fake s and transcripts in such a way that related
transcripts tr1, tr2, . . . carry their index 1, 2, . . . inside them. Finally, we let fake r
remember the index of the transcript which was used to generate that r. If the
adversary decides to play with related transcripts - e.g. take randomness r′ (fake with
respect to tri) and decrypt trj using r
′ - the decryption algorithm can compare i and
j and make the decision whether to decrypt or abort.
Finally, recall that the comparison-based logic of the decryption program was designed
in such a way that fake r, on one hand, doesn’t remember too much to violate the
information-theoretic bound, and on the other hand, doesn’t decrypt too much to
reveal the true plaintext of the challenge transcript. Such logic is possible in the
3-message case as long as related transcripts cannot be computed “backward” (e.g.
tr1 cannot be computed from tr2). Our scheme forces this property by making sure
that tri can only be computed using i-times-fake s, and that given i-times-fake s it is
hard to compute the right distribution of i− 1-times-fake s. The latter is due to the
16Formally speaking, the procedure to generate related transcripts actually allows to generate a
tree of transcripts, not just a chain. This is because the procedure can be repeated several times
(with different r̃), starting with the same level-0 transcript, to obtain several level-1 transcripts, and
then each level-1 transcript can produce several level-2 transcripts, and so on. However, randomness
and transcripts from different branches don’t have to “work” together (e.g. Dec can output ⊥),
and the comparison-based decryption should hold only on each separate branch of the tree of any
polynomial length.
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fact that SFake increments the counter of how many times s was faked, all the way to
some unreachable in polynomial time bound T .
Finally, let us describe how the programs behave in the normal execution, on fake
randomness, and when the adversary generates related transcripts:
• Normal execution of the protocol: executing programs on randomly chosen
s∗, r∗ and plaintext m∗0 makes programs execute the main step and output
µ1
∗ = PRF(s∗,m∗0), µ2







given the resulting transcript as input, outputs m∗0 via main step.




∗, 1)), fake r′ (which encodes (m∗1, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗, 0)), and m∗1 makes
programs execute trapdoor step, which tells them to output a hardwired value
and abort. Thus, P1 will output µ1
∗, P2 will output µ2
∗, P3 will output µ3
∗,
and Dec will output m∗1 via trapdoor step, making the transcript for plaintext
m∗0 look consistent with m
∗
1.
• Efficiently computable related transcripts: it is only possible to compute
related transcripts of the form (µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3), where µ3 = EncK(m,µ1
∗, µ2
∗, `), ` ≥
1; moreover, the only way of doing so is to follow the procedure described above
(which includes running SFake). Trying to compute µ3 for such transcript will
make program P3 execute “mixed input step”, making sure that such µ3 indeed
receives level ` ≥ 1; for this mechanics it is important that SFake increments
the level inside s. Trying to decrypt such related transcript (µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3) will
make program Dec execute “mixed input step”, making sure that the correct
decryption behavior is observed (that fake r decrypts correctly transcripts with
larger level, but refuses to decrypt transcripts with smaller level); for this
mechanics it is important that RFake copies the level from the transcript to r.
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Security proof when programs are given as oracles. Since the proof even
in this simpler model is somewhat lengthy, we only outline main steps and give the
intuition for why each step holds. The proof proceeds in 4 main steps. We start
with a real execution corresponding to plaintext m∗0, where the adversary receives real
randomness s∗, r∗. The proof proceeds as follows:
• Step 1. Instead of giving the adversary real s∗, we give it s′ = EncKS(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗,
µ3
∗, ` = 0) (note that this s′ contains level 0, unlike fake randomness produced
by SFake which contains level at least 1).
Intuitively, the reason why we can switch from s∗ to s′ indistinguishably is
because all programs treat them in the same way. That is:
– either the programs output the same value, possibly using different parts
of the program (e.g. P1 on input (s∗,m∗0) outputs µ1
∗ via main step and
on input (s′,m∗0) it outputs µ1
∗ via trapdoor step),
– or the programs execute the same code, possibly outputting different result
(e.g. P1 on input (s∗,m∗1) and (s
′,m∗1) outputs a PRF of its input).
This observation, together with the fact that the ciphertext s′ is pseudorandom,
allows us to change s∗ to s′, in a manner similar to the proof of deniable
encryption of (SW14).






∗, ` = 0, ρR). The proof is analogous to the previous case -
with the difference that there exist an input on which r∗ and r′ behave differently.
Indeed, recall that r∗ decrypts honestly all related transcripts, while r′ decrypts
honestly only “forward”, i.e. related transcripts with level ` ≥ 1. Thus, tran-








∗, ` = 0) is like µ3
∗
except that it encrypts the wrong plaintext m∗1. Such transcript is decrypted
correctly to m∗1 by r
∗, but decrypting it with r′ returns ⊥ since comparison of
levels fails.
This single transcript makes r∗ and r′ look different enough so that we cannot
do the proof like in step 1. Therefore, we first move to a hybrid where this
“differing” transcript doesn’t exist. This is done as follows. First, since s∗ - the
preimage of a PRF value µ1
∗ - is not part of the distribution anymore, we can
move µ1
∗ outside of the PRF image. Then we can argue that P3 never outputs
µ3∗:
– The main step cannot output µ3∗, since the main step is executed only if
validity check is passed via a correct PRF preimage, which now doesn’t
exist.
– The mixed step cannot output µ3∗. To make the mixed step output a
ciphertext with level 0 (like µ3∗), one has to give P3 as input randomness
with level 0. However, it is hard to find such randomness since SFake never
outputs randomness with level 0.
– The trapdoor step can only output µ3∗ if we give P3 fake randomness with
µ3∗ inside to begin with. Since there are no other means of computing µ3∗,
such randomness is also hard to find and therefore this step also doesn’t
output µ3∗.
Once the differing transcript (µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3∗) is eliminated, we can switch r
∗ to r′
similar to the previous step.
• Step 3. The next step is to switch µ3∗ from encrypting m∗0 to m∗1. This is done
by “detaching” µ3
∗ from its key K in programs P3 and Dec. Concretely, note
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that:
– P3 can only output µ3
∗ via the trapdoor thread (which doesn’t use the key
K). The reason is very similar to the case-by-case analysis of P3 above:
the main step requires the preimage of the PRF, which doesn’t exist, and
the mixed step requires sender randomness with level 0, which is hard to
find.
– Dec can only “decrypt” µ3
∗ via the trapdoor thread (which, again, doesn’t
use K). To guarantee this, we first move µ2
∗ outside of the image of the
PRF (this is possible since r∗ is not part of the distribution anymore). As
a result, µ3
∗ is never decrypted via the main step because the preimage for
µ2
∗ doesn’t exist. Further, µ3
∗ cannot be decrypted in the mixed step either,
because, due to “forward decryption” rule, it requires receiver randomness
with level smaller than level in µ3
∗ - which doesn’t exist since µ3
∗ has the
smallest possible level, 0.
In other words, neither P3 nor Dec need to use K to encrypt or decrypt µ3
∗.
Therefore we can “detach” K and µ3
∗ and change the plaintext to m∗1.
Note that the transcript now contains m∗1, and both randomness s
′, r′ are
consistent with m∗0. However, the proof is not finished yet since parties cannot
produce such s′ themselves (since it contains level 0 instead of 1).






∗, ` = 1). To understand the challenge of this step,
it is instructive to take a “level-centric” point of view: let’s forget that the
scheme is about transmitting the plaintext, and instead think about fake s
as an encryption of level (0 or 1), think about µ3
∗ as an encryption of level
0, and think about programs of deniable encryption as programs which allow
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homomorphic operations on encrypted levels. For example, program SFake
outputs fake randomness which is an encryption of incremented level, thus
providing homomorphic Increment operation. Program Dec compares levels
inside µ3 and r and based on that decides whether to decrypt or not, thus
providing access to homomorphic isLess function which tells (in the clear) if one
level is smaller than the other.
In other words, step 4 essentially requires to switch s′ from encryption of
0 to encryption of 1, while giving the adversary an access to homomorphic
functions Increment and isLess17. In the oracle model it can be easily shown that
polynomially-bounded adversary cannot distinguish between Enc(0) and Enc(1),
even given access to isLess and Increment oracles, as long as the largest allowed
level is superpolynomial. Indeed, the adversary can only generate polynomially-
many subsequent encryptions Enc(1),Enc(2), . . . or Enc(2),Enc(3), . . . (depending
on whether the challenge ciphertext was Enc(0) or Enc(1)) and compare them,
but the result of comparison will be exactly the same in both cases.
This concludes the proof in the model where programs are given as oracles.
3.2.3 Changes to the Construction and the Proof when Obfuscated Code
of Programs is Given.
There are two major changes:
ACE. First, instead of using symmetric-key encryption scheme for generating
fake randomness of the sender and the receiver (keys KS, KR), as well as the main
encryption scheme which is used to compute µ3 (key K), we are using special public key
encryption scheme called asymmetric constrained encryption (ACE) from of (CHJV14)
17Recall that the adversary also has µ3
∗ which is an encryption of level 0. For simplicity, we ignore
this fact in this high-level overview.
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(with keys EKS,DKS; EKR,DKR; EK,DK, respectively).
To understand why ACE is required, note that in many places of the security proof
we used the fact that the only way to obtain some value is to run a corresponding
program on some inputs. If those inputs are themselves provably hard to find, in
the oracle setting it is usually easy to argue that outputs are hard to find as well.
Everything changes when parties have access to obfuscated programs, as opposed to
just oracles. First, such reasoning becomes more difficult because the keys are now
fixed inside programs and therefore are part of the distribution. Second, iO guarantees
security only when two programs are identical, and therefore in most cases it is not
enough to show that some inputs are hard to find: we need to show they don’t exist.
ACE proved to be an indispensable tool in adapting our proof from the oracle-based
setting to the iO-based setting. At a high level, ACE is a deterministic, public-key
encryption scheme with special security requirements, which essentially allows to
switch any ciphertext from “hard to find” to “doesn’t exist”. More concretely, its
security requirement says that, given punctured encryption key EK{m} (which outputs
⊥ on attempt to encrypt m), nobody can distinguish between DK and DK{m} (which
outputs ⊥ on attempt to decrypt Enc(m), and besides that, doesn’t reveal Enc(m)
itself). As an example, recall that program SFake never encrypts level 0. Thus, we can
puncture EKS at all strings ending with level 0, relying on iO. Next we can puncture
DKS at all such strings, relying on security of ACE. Now we are in a hybrid where
fake sender randomness with level 0 is non-existent, since punctured decryption key
DK never decrypts to level 0. Next in a similar manner we can puncture EK and then
DK to argue that µ3∗ is non-existent, like we did in step 2 in the proof in the oracle
setting.
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The level system. The second change is that instead of using plain numbers
0, . . . , T as levels, we use what we call a level system. That is, we use encrypted
numbers Enc(0), . . . ,Enc(T ) as levels, and, since programs of deniable encryption
should be able to increment and compare levels, we also provide obfuscated programs
which homomorphically increment and compare them. Security requirement of the
level system says that Enc(0) is indistinguishable from Enc(1) even given programs for
homomorphic increment and compare functions.18
However, the proof of step 4 - that is, the proof of security of the level system - turns
out to be quite involved when programs for homomorphic increment and comparison
are given. Roughly, our proof proceeds as follows:
1. First we change Enc(0) to Enc(1) by changing the whole chain from Enc(0),Enc(1),
. . . ,Enc(T ) to Enc(1),Enc(2), . . . ,Enc(T + 1). This is done in T big steps and
therefore incurs security loss proportional to T (recall that T has to be super-
polynomial to make sure that the adversary cannot reach the end).
2. The inadvertent result of the previous step is that in program Increment the
upper bound is changed from T to T + 1 (that is, if previously Increment
returned ⊥ on inputs Enc(T ),Enc(T + 1) and so on, now it returns ⊥ on inputs
Enc(T + 1),Enc(T + 2) and so on). Recall that program Increment is part of the
code of SFake, and recall that in the proof of security of deniable encryption
we need to start and finish with exactly the same CRS, and therefore the same
program Increment. Therefore we need to change the upper bound in Increment
back to T . This is done by arguing that it is hard for the adversary to reach
18In our actual construction, to account for the fact that the adversary also has an encryption
of level 0 (µ3
∗), we use two different types of levels. Also, each level, in addition to encryption of
a number, contains some auxiliary information which “ties” this level to a particular transcript of
the protocol. We also provide programs to sample level 0 and transform between different types of
levels. Actual security requirement is slightly more complicated that what we have stated in this
introduction. However, those modifications are mostly technical: the main ideas are as described.
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the end (i.e. find Enc(T )) - similar to how (BPR15) argue that the adversary
cannot reach the end of the line - and then using the properties of ACE and iO
to change the upper bound back to T .
3.3 Preliminaries
3.3.1 Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Circuits
Definition 9 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO)). A uniform PPT machine iO is
called an indistinguishability obfuscator if the following conditions are satisfied:
• For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for all C ∈ Cλ, for all inputs x, we have that
Pr[C ′(x) = C(x) : C ′ ← iO(1λ, C)] = 1
• There is a polynomial p such that for every circuit C ∈ Cλ, it holds that |iO(c)| ≤
p(|C|).
• For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT distinguisher D, there exists a negligible
function α such that the following holds: For all security parameters λ ∈ N, for
all circuit families C0 = {C0λ}λ∈N, C1 = {C1λ}λ∈N of size |C0λ| = |C1λ|, we have
that if C0λ(x) = C
1
λ(x) for all inputs x, then
∣∣∣Pr[D(iO(1λ, C0λ)) = 1]− Pr[D(iO(1λ, C1λ)) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(λ).
We say that indistinguishability obfuscation is (t(λ), ε(λ))-secure if the distinguishing
advantage of all distinguishers of size t(λ) is at most ε(λ).
3.3.2 Equivalence of iO and diO for programs differing on one point
In the proof of security of the level system we use the following lemma from
(BPR15) (which is a special case of theorem 6.2 from (BCP15), with exact parameters):
Lemma 4. ((BPR15, BCP14)) Let iO be a (t, δ)-secure indistinguishability obfuscator
for P/poly. There exists a PPT oracle-aided extractor E, such that for any tO(1)-size
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distinguisher D, and two equal-size circuits C0, C1 differing on exactly one input
x∗, the following holds. Let C ′0, C
′
1 be padded versions of C0, C1 of size s ≥ 3 ·
|C0|. If |Pr[D(iO(C ′0)) = 1] − Pr[D(iO(C ′1)) = 1]| = η ≥ δ(s)o(1), then Pr[x∗ ←
ED(·)(11/η, C0, C1)] ≥ 1− 2−Ω(s).
3.3.3 Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions and their variants
Puncturable PRFs. In puncrurable PRFs it is possible to create a key that is
punctured at a set S of polynomial size. A key k punctured at S (denoted k{S})
allows evaluating the PRF at all points not in S. Furthermore, the function values at
points in S remain pseudorandom even given k{S}.
Definition 10. A puncturable pseudorandom function family for input size n(λ)
and output size m(λ) is a tuple of algorithms {Sample,Puncture,Eval} such that the
following properties hold:
• Functionality preserved under puncturing: For any PPT adversary A
which outputs a set S ⊂ {0, 1}n, for any x 6∈ S,
Pr[Fk(x) = Fk{S}(x) : k ← Sample(1λ), k{S} ← Puncture(k, S)] = 1.
• Pseudorandomness at punctured points: For any PPT adversaries
A1, A2, define a set S and state state as (S, state)← A1(1λ). Then
Pr[A2(state, S, k{S}, Fk(S))]− Pr[A2(state, S, k{S}, U|S|·m(λ))] < negl(λ),
where Fk(S) denotes concatenated PRF values on inputs from S, i.e. Fk(S) =
{Fk(xi) : xi ∈ S}.
The GGM PRF (GGM85) satisfies this definition.
Statistically injective puncturable PRFs. Such PRFs are injective with over-
whelming probability over the choice of a key. Sahai and Waters (SW14) show that if
F is a puncturable PRF with arbitrary input length n and output length m ≥ 2n+ λ,
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and h is 2-universal hash function, then F′k,h = Fk(x)⊕ h(x) is a statistically injective
puncturable PRF with probability 1− 2−λ over the choice of a key.
Extracting puncturable PRFs. Such PRFs have a property of a strong extractor:
even when a full key is known, the output of the PRF is statistically close to uniform,
as long as there is enough min-entropy in the input. Sahai and Waters (SW14) show
that if the input has min-entropy at least m+ 2λ+ 2 (where m is the output size),
then such PRF can be constructed from any puncturable PRF F as F′k,h = h(Fk(x)),
where h is 2-universal hash function; it can be shown that the output of this PRF
together with the key is 2−λ-close to the uniform distribution.
Sparse computationally extracting puncturable PRFs. We need a slightly
modified version of extracting PRFs: we relax the extracting requirement from
statistical to computational, but require our PRF to have a sparse image. Such a
PRF can be built from computationally extracting PRF by applying a prf on top of it
(CPR17).
Definition 11. A PRF family with a key k mapping {0, 1}n(λ) to {0, 1}l(λ) is a sparse
computationally extracting family for min-entropy t(λ), if, in addition to the standard
definition of a puncturable PRF, the following two conditions hold:
• Sparseness: Pr[r ∈ Im(Fk) : k ← Sample(1λ), r ← Ul] < ν(λ) for some
negligible function ν;
• Computational extractor: If distribution X has min-entropy at least t(λ),
then with overwhelming probability over the choice of key k for any PPT adversary
A
| Pr [ A(k,Fk(x)) = 1 | x← X ]− Pr [ A(k, r) = 1 | r ← UI ] | < negl(λ).
We say that such a PRF is (t(λ), ε(λ))-secure, if for any t-sized distinguishers the
distinguishing advantage in the puncturable PRF game and in the computational
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extractor game is at most ε, and sparsness ν(λ) < ε(λ).
(CPR17) show that, assuming one-way functions, such PRFs exists if t(λ), the entropy
of the input, is at least m/2 + 2λ+ 2, and m is superlogarithmic. We note that their
construction uses a PRF with security parameter λ and a prg with security parameter
m/2 and therefore the construction can be made exponentially secure, by requiring
(possibly stronger) subexponential security of the underlying PRF and prg.
3.3.4 Asymmetrically Constrained Encryption (ACE) and its Relaxed
Variant
ACE at a high level. Asymmetrically constrained encryption ((CHJV14), see
also the journal version (BCG+18)), or ACE for short, is a public-key, deterministic
encryption scheme with special security properties. Intuitively, it allows to puncture
both the public key and the secret key, at possibly different sets, such that EK{m}
doesn’t allow to compute the encryption of m, and DK{m} doesn’t allow to decrypt
the encryption of m. The scheme has to satisfy the following security properties,
which we only roughly outline in this paragraph (see the formal definition below for
precise correctness and security requirements):
• Indistinguishability of ciphertexts: EncEK(m0) and EncEK(m1) are indis-
tinguishable even given punctured EK{m0,m1}, DK{m0,m1} (or given EK,DK
punctured at bigger sets including m0,m1). Intuitively, the adversary can nei-
ther encrypt m0,m1 nor decrypt EncEK(m0) and EncEK(m1), and thus cannot
distinguish between encryptions of m0,m1.
• Security of constrained decryption: Given EK{U}, it is hard to distinguish
between DK{S0} and DK{S1}, where S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ U . Intuitively, the adversary
cannot distinguish between these two cases since it is hard to find a “differing
ciphertext” EncEK(m), m ∈ S1 \ S0, which DK{S0} and DK{S1} decrypt differ-
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ently (to m and ⊥). Such ciphertexts are hard to find since such m ∈ U , and
EK is punctured at U .
Relaxed ACE at a high level. In addition to ACE, we require a slightly different
version of it, which we call a relaxed ACE. In relaxed ACE indistinguishability of
ciphertexts doesn’t necessarily hold. Instead, we require a different property called
symmetry, and we show how to modify the construction of (CHJV14) to build relaxed
ACE with small security loss in constrained decryption game for certain sets. More
concretely, we have the following differences:
• In (CHJV14), security of constrained decryption allows for security loss propor-
tional to the size of S1 \ S0, since they change DK{S0} to DK{S1}, one point at
a time. This is too much in our case, since our sets have size 2O(λ). However,
our sets have nice structure (e.g. all strings ending with the same suffix, or all
such strings except one), and we can slightly modify the construction such that
security loss is only polynomial on such sets. Essentially, our ciphertexts, instead
of having a single signature of a plaintext like in (CHJV14), have signatures of
each prefix of the plaintext, which allows to puncture DK at a lot of points at
once (this technique is similar to (GPS16)).
• We require additional property which we call symmetry. To define it, we first
need a syntactically different way of puncturing the decryption key. In (CHJV14)
puncturing is plaintext-based (i.e. the punctured key DK{m} has the description
of the plaintext but not the ciphertext). We need, in addition to that, a
ciphertext-based way to puncture (we denote it as DK{c}). Symmetry then says
that distributions (c∗, c′,EK{m},DK{c∗, c′}) and (c′, c∗,EK{m},DK{c∗, c′}) are
indistinguishable, where m is an arbitrary plaintext, c′ is its ciphertext, and c∗
is randomly chosen. We note that for ciphertext-based punctured key symmetry
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is the only required security property, although we still require all applicable
correctness properties.
Definition of ACE. Now we present a formal definition:
Definition 12. (CHJV14), (BCG+18) An asymmetrically constrained encryption
(ACE) scheme is a 5-tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup,GenEK,GenDK,
Enc,Dec) satisfying syntax, correctness, security of constrained decryption, and selec-
tive indistinguishability of ciphertexts as described below.
Syntax. The algorithms (Setup,GenEK,GenDK,Enc,Dec) have the following syn-
tax.
• Setup: Setup(1λ, 1n, 1s) is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the secu-
rity parameter λ, the message length n, and a “circuit succinctness” parameter
s, all in unary. Setup then outputs a secret key SK. We think of secret keys as
consisting of two parts: an encryption key EK and a decryption key DK.
Let M = {0, 1}n denote the message space.
• (Constrained) Key Generation: Let S ⊂M be any set whose membership
is decidable by a circuit CS. We say that S is admissible if |CS| ≤ s. Intuitively,
the set size parameter s denotes the upper bound on the size of circuit description
of sets to which encryption and decryption keys can be constrained.
– GenEK(SK,CS) takes as input the secret key SK of the scheme and the
description of circuit CS for an admissible set S. It outputs an encryption
key EK{S}. We write EK to denote EK{∅}.
– GenDK(SK,CS) also takes as input the secret key SK of the scheme and
the description of circuit CS for an admissible set S. It outputs a decryption
key DK{S}. We write DK to denote DK{∅}.
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Unless mentioned otherwise, we will only consider admissible sets S ⊂M.
• Encryption: Enc(EK ′,m) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an
encryption key EK ′ (that may be constrained) and a message m ∈ M and
outputs a ciphertext c or the reject symbol ⊥.
• Decryption: Dec(DK ′, c) is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a
decryption key DK ′ (that may be constrained) and a ciphertext c and outputs
a message m ∈M or the reject symbol ⊥.
Correctness. An ACE scheme is correct if the following properties hold:
1. Correctness of Decryption: For all n, all m ∈ M, all sets S, S ′ ⊂ M s.t.








Informally, this says that Dec ◦ Enc is the identity on messages which are in
neither of the punctured sets.
2. Equivalence of Constrained Encryption: Let SK ← Setup(1λ). For any message
m ∈M and any sets S, S ′ ⊂M with m not in the symmetric difference S∆S ′
(i.e., we are requiring that m is in both S and S ′ or m is in neither S nor S ′).
Pr




EK ′ ← GenEK(SK,CS′)
 = 1.
3. Unique Ciphertexts: With high probability over SK ← Setup(1λ), it holds for
any c and c′ that if Dec(DK, c) = Dec(DK, c′) 6= ⊥, then c = c′.
4. Safety of Constrained Decryption: For all strings c, all S ⊂M,
Pr
[
Dec(DK, c) ∈ S
∣∣ SK ← Setup(1λ), DK ← GenDK(SK,CS) ] = 0
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This says that a punctured key DK{S} will never decrypt a string c to a message
in S.
5. Equivalence of Constrained Decryption: If Dec(DK{S}, c) = m 6= ⊥ and m /∈ S ′,
then Dec(DK{S ′}, c) = m.
Security of Constrained Decryption. Intuitively, this property says that for
any two sets S0, S1, no adversary can distinguish between the constrained key DK{S0}
and DK{S1}, even given additional auxiliary information in the form of a constrained
encryption key EK ′ and ciphertexts c1, . . . , ct. To rule out trivial attacks, EK
′ is
constrained at least on S0∆S1. Similarly, each ci is an encryption of a message
m /∈ S0∆S1.
Formally, we describe security of constrained decryption as a multi-stage game between
an adversary adv and a challenger.
• Setup: A chooses sets S0, S1, U s.t. S0∆S1 ⊆ U ⊆ M and sends their
circuit descriptions (CS0 , CS1 , CU) to the challenger. adv also sends arbitrary
polynomially many messages m1, . . . ,mt such that mi /∈ S0∆S1.
The challenger chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the following:
1. SK ← Setup(1λ),
2. DK{Sb} ← GenDK(SK,CSb),
3. EK ← GenEK(SK, ∅),
4. ci ← Enc(EK,mi) for every i ∈ [t], and
5. EK{U} ← GenEK(SK,CU).
Finally, it sends the tuple (EK{U}, DK{Sb}, {ci}) to adv.
• Guess: A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of A in this game (on security parameter λ) is defined as advA =
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∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 1
2
∣∣. We require that for all PPT A, advA(λ) is negl(λ)|S1 \ S0| .
Selective Indistinguishability of Ciphertexts. Intuitively, this property says
that no adversary can distinguish encryptions of m0 from encryptions of m1, even given
certain auxiliary information. The auxiliary information corresponds to constrained
encryption and decryption keys EK ′, DK ′, as well as some ciphertexts c1, . . . , ct. In
order to rule out trivial attacks, EK ′ and DK ′ should both be punctured on at least
{m0,m1}, and none of c1, . . . , ct should be an encryption of m0 or m1. Let both F1
and F2 be sub-exponentially secure.
Formally, we require that for all sets S, U ⊂ M, for all m∗0,m∗1 ∈ S ∩ U , and all
m1, . . . ,mt ∈M \ {m∗0,m∗1}, the distribution
EK{S}, DK{U}, c∗0, c∗1, c1, . . . , ct
is computationally indistinguishable from
EK{S}, DK{U}, c∗1, c∗0, c1, . . . , ct
in the probability space defined by sampling SK ← Setup(1λ), EK ← GenEK(SK, ∅),
EK{S} ← GenEK(SK,CS), DK{U} ← GenDK(SK,CU), c∗b ← Enc(EK,m∗b), and
ci ← Enc(EK,mi).
As shown in (CHJV14), there exists subexponentially secure ACE assuming subex-
ponentially secure injective PRGs and iO. We note that their construction and the
proof can be based on injective OWFs instead of injective PRGs, similar to the proof
of our relaxed ACE (section 3.11).
Definition of relaxed ACE. As noted earlier, we also consider a relaxed ACE
where indistinguishability of ciphertexts doesn’t necessarily hold. Instead, we require
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a different property called symmetry, and we show how to modify the construction of
(CHJV14) to build relaxed ACE with small secuirty loss in constrained decryption
game for certain sets.
Definition 13. A relaxed asymmetrically constrained encryption (relaxed ACE)
scheme for message space {0, 1}n and suffix parameter t is a 6-tuple of PPT algorithms
(Setup,GenEK,GenDK,Enc,Dec,Puncture) satisfying the the following:
1. Syntax: Setup,GenEK,GenDK,Enc,Dec) have syntax as in the definition of ACE.
Ciphertext-based puncturing algorithm Puncture(SK, c1, c2) is an algorithm
which takes as input the secret key SK, a ciphertext c2 and a random string c1
of the same length and outputs a ciphertext-based punctured key DK{c1, c2}.
(We use this notation to distinguish ciphertext-based puncturing DK{c1, c2}
from plaintext-based puncturing DK{S}, where S is a set of plaintexts).
2. Correctness: We require all correctness properties as in ACE definition. In
addition, we require correctness of decryption and equivalence of con-
strained decryption to hold even for ciphertext-based punctured decryption
keys. Namely, if DK{c1, c2} = Puncture(SK, c1, c2)) where c1 is random and
c2 is Enc(EK,m), then we require that the mentioned properties hold for the
constrained set S = {m}.
3. Security: We require security of constrained decryption (from the defi-
nition of ACE) to hold for the case when there are no plaintext queries, and only
for the case when S1 \ S0 is either of the form Ssuf (that is, a set of all strings
ending with arbitrary, but the same for all strings, suffix suf of length t), or of
the form Ssuf \ {m∗} (where again suf has the size t, and m∗ also ends with suf).
Further, we require that distinguishing advantage depends on |S1 \ S0| at most
logarithmically; in particular, it should be negligible even when |S1 \S0| = O(2λ)
(alternatively, we can require that the advantage is smaller than a concrete
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negligible function).
In addition, for ciphertext-based punctured key we require a property called
symmetry, which is defined as follows:
1. A chooses plaintext m and sends it to the challenger. Let U = Ssuffixt(m) be the
set of all strings ending with the same t bits as m. the challenger computes the
following:
2. SK ← Setup(1λ),
3. c1 is chosen at random from {0, 1}|c|;
4. EK ← GenEK(SK, ∅),
5. EK{U} ← GenEK(SK,U),
6. c2 ← Enc(EK,m)
7. DK{c1, c2} ← Puncture(SK, c1, c2),
8. Finally the challenger chooses random b and gives the adversary
(c1, c2, EK{U}, DK{c1, c2}) if b = 0 and (c2, c1, EK{U}, DK{c1, c2}) if b = 1;
9. A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The advantage of A in this game (on security parameter λ) is defined as advA =∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 1
2
∣∣. We require that for all PPT A, advA(λ) is negligible in λ (alternatively,
we can require that it is smaller than a concrete negligible function).
In section 3.11 we show that there exists subexponentially secure relaxed ACE assuming
subexponentially secure OWFs and iO.
Sparse relaxed ACE. We remark that our relaxed ACE from section 3.11 has
sparse image, that is, the probability that a randomly chosen string of a proper length
is a valid ACE ciphertext is at most 2−λ.
293
3.4 Defining Bideniable and Off-the-record-Deniable Encryp-
tion
In this section we present the definition of interactive deniable encryption, or, more
formally, interactive bideniable message transmission.
Syntax. An interactive deniable encryption scheme π consists of seven algorithms
π = (Setup,P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake), where Setup is used to generate the public
programs (i.e. the CRS), programs P1, P3 and SFake are programs of the sender,
and programs P2, Dec and RFake are programs of the receiver. We let the transcript
tr = π(s, r,m) of an execution of the scheme on inputs m and random input s of the
sender, and random input r of the receiver denote the sequence of three messages
sent in this execution. That is, π(s, r,m) = tr = (µ1, µ2, µ3), where µ1 = P1(s,m),
µ2 = P2(r, µ1), and µ3 = P3(s,m, µ1, µ2).
The faking algorithms have the following syntax: SFake(s,m,m′, tr; ρ) expects to take
a transcript tr along with the true random coins s and true plaintext m, which were
used to compute tr. It also needs the desired fake plaintext m′, and its own randomness
ρ. RFake follows the same syntax except that it expects the receiver randomness r
instead of sender randomness s.
Bideniable and off-the-record-deniable encryption in the CRS model.
Below we define standard and off-the-record deniability for interactive deniable en-
cryption in the CRS model. For simplicity, we concentrate on bit encryption. The
definitions can be naturally extended to multi-bit plaintexts.
Note that formally algorithms of deniable encryption should take the CRS as input,
but we omit this to keep the syntax close to the syntax in our construction (where
the CRS contains the programs, and those programs do not take the CRS as input).
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Definition 14. Bideniable bit encryption in the CRS model. π = (Setup,P1,
P2,P3, Dec, SFake,RFake) is a 3-message bideniable interactive encryption scheme for
message space M = {0, 1}, if it satisfies the following correctness and bideniability
properties:
• Correctness: There exists negligible function ν(λ) such that for at least (1−ν)-
fraction of randomness rSetup, drawn at random from {0, 1}|rSetup|, the following
holds: let CRS ← Setup(rSetup). Then for any m ∈ M Pr[m′ 6= m : s ←
{0, 1}|s| , r ← {0, 1}|r| , tr← π(s, r,m),m′ ← Dec(r, tr)] ≤ ν(λ), where the proba-
bility is taken over the choices of s and r.
• Bideniability: No PPT adversary Adv wins with more than negligible advan-
tage in the following game, for any m0,m1 ∈M:
1. The challenger chooses random rSetup and generates CRS← Setup(rSetup).
It also chooses a bit b at random.
2. If b = 0, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) It chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ = π(s∗, r∗,m0).
(b) It gives the adversary (CRS,m0,m1, s
∗, r∗, tr∗).
3. If b = 1, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) It chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ ← π(s∗, r∗,m1);
(b) It sets s′ ← SFake(s∗,m1,m0, tr∗; ρS) and r′ ← RFake(r∗,m1,m0, tr∗;
ρR), for randomly chosen ρS, ρR.
(c) It gives the adversary (CRS,m0,m1, s
′, r′, tr∗).
4. Adv outputs b′ and wins if b = b′.
Next we define off-the-record deniability. We define it for an arbitrary message space,
since having |M| > 2 allows for an extra case when plaintexts claimed by the sender,
by the receiver, and the real plaintext are three different strings (case b = 2 in the
definition below).
Definition 15. Off-the-record deniable encryption in the CRS model. We
say that a scheme is off-the-record-deniable, if it satisfies correctness as above and has
the following property:
Off-the-record deniability: No PPT adversary Adv wins with more than negligible
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advantage in the following game, for any m0,m1,m2 ∈M:
1. The challenger chooses random rSetup and generates CRS← Setup(rSetup). It also
chooses random b ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
2. If b = 0, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) The challenger chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ ← π(s∗, r∗,m0);
(b) It sets r′ ← RFake(r∗,m0,m1, tr∗; ρR) for randomly chosen ρR.
(c) It gives the adversary (CRS,m0,m1,m2, s
∗, r′, tr∗).
3. If b = 1, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) The challenger chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ ← π(s∗, r∗,m1);
(b) It sets s′ ← SFake(s∗,m1,m0, tr∗; ρS) for randomly chosen ρS.
(c) It gives the adversary (CRS,m0,m1,m2, s
′, r∗, tr∗).
4. If b = 2, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) The challenger chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ ← π(s∗, r∗,m2);
(b) It sets s′ ← SFake(s∗,m2,m0, tr∗; ρS) for randomly chosen ρS.
(c) It sets r′ ← RFake(r∗,m2,m1, tr∗; ρR) for randomly chosen ρR.
(d) It gives the adversary (CRS,m0,m1,m2, s
′, r′, tr∗).
5. Adv outputs b′ and wins if b = b′.
We say that an encryption scheme is bideniable (resp, off-the-record deniable) with
(t, ε)-security, if for any size-t adversary distinguishing advantage in bideniability
(resp., off-the-record deniability) game is at most ε.
Single-execution security implies multi-execution security. We observe
that in the case of definitions 18 and 15 the CRS is global (i.e., non-programamble).
Indeed, these definitions do not involve simulation and the same set of programs is
used throughout. Furthermore, even though definitions 18 and 15 only talk about one
execution of the protocol, it can be shown via a simple hybrid argument that security
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of a single execution of the protocol implies security of any (unbounded) polynomially
many executions with the same set of programs.19
Definition 16. Public receiver-deniability. We say that a bideniable scheme has
public receiver-deniability, if the receiver faking algorithm RFake takes as input only
the transcript tr and fake plaintext m′ (but not true random coins of the receiver r∗
and true plaintext m).
3.5 Level System
Motivation and overview. The idea of a level system is to have an encryption
scheme which allows to increment ciphertexts and compare them homomorphically.
However, in order for this encryption to be useful in our construction of deniable
protocol, we require the following properties of this ”encryption scheme”:20
• There should be two types of ciphertexts, which we call single-tag levels and
double-tag levels;
• A single-tag level is an encryption of number i between 0 and upper bound T ,
together with some string m1 ∈M1, which we call a tag. (In our construction of
deniable encryption, we use the first message of the deniable protocol as a tag.
This is done to “tie” the level to the instance of the protocol).
• A double-tag level is an encryption of number i between 0 and upper bound
T , together with two tags m1 ∈M1,m2 ∈M2. (In our construction of deniable
encryption, we use the first and the second messages of the deniable protocol as
tags. This, again, is done to “tie” the level to the instance of the protocol).
• It should be possible to perform the following operations:
19Indeed, we can change all executions from real to fake one by one, where the reduction from a
single-execution security will generate other executions on its own, using the fact that knowing the
CRS (but not its generation randomness) is enough to run all programs.
20Note that even though we call it encryption, we don’t require this primitive to have decryption.
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1. Sample a single-tag level 0 for any tag m1;
2. Homomorphically increment the value inside any single-tag level (keeping
its tag the same);
3. Transform any single-tag level into a double-tag level, for any second tag
m2 (the value and the first tag remain the same);
4. Compare two double-tag levels, as long as their both tags are the same;
5. Given any level, retrieve its tag(s).
Notation. We use notation [i,m1] to denote a single-tag level with value i and tag
m1. We also use `i to denote a single-tag level with value i, when the tag is clear from
the context.
We use notation [i,m1,m2] to denote a double-tag level with value i and tags m1,m2.
We also use Li to denote a double-tag level with value i, when its tags are clear from
the context.
Security property. Security requirement says that it should be hard to distinguish



















(limited) ability to perform homomorphic operations described above.
This will be used in the proof of security of deniable encryption scheme as follows.
Recall that in that proof we need to start with the real transcript and real randomness




0, respectively) and eventually switch to the (same) real




0). We can use security of
the level system in the proof of deniable encryption as follows: given challenge `∗b , L
∗
0
(where `∗b = [b,m
∗
1], b ∈ {0, 1}, L∗0 = [0,m∗1,m∗2]), we use `∗b inside fake s and we use
L∗0 inside the transcript and fake r. Since security of levels only holds when programs
are punctured, in the proof of deniable encryption we first move to a hybrid where we
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use only punctured level programs, and then use security of the level system.
3.5.1 Definition
We start with describing a syntax of the level system for tag space M and upper
bound T :
• Setup(1λ;T ; GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags;
rSetup) → PP = (PGenZero,PIncrement,PTransform,PisLess,PRetrieveTag,PRetrieveTags) is a
randomized algorithm which takes as input security parameter, the largest
allowed level T , description of programs, and randomnes. It uses random coins
to sample all necessary keys for each program21, and outputs those programs
obfuscated under iO.
• GenZero(m1) → ` is a deterministic algorithm which takes message m1 ∈ M
as input and outputs a string ` = [0,m1], which is a single-tag level with tag
m1 and value 0. We also require that there exists a punctured version of this
algorithm denoted GenZero[m∗1](m1) which outputs
′fail′ on input m∗1.
• Increment(`) → `′ is a deterministic algorithm which takes a single-tag level
` = [i,m1] for some 0 ≤ i ≤ T − 1,m1 ∈M , and outputs a single-tag level with
the same tag and incremented value, i.e. `′ = [i + 1,m1]. If i ≥ T , it instead
outputs ′fail′.
• Transform(`,m2)→ ` is a deterministic algorithm which takes a single-tag level
` = [i,m1] for some 0 ≤ i ≤ T,m1 ∈ M , and some message m2 ∈ M , and
outputs L = [i,m1,m2], which is a double-tag level with tags m1,m2, and value
i. We also require that there exists a punctured version of this algorithm denoted
Transform[(`∗,m∗2)](`,m2) which outputs
′fail′ on input (`∗,m∗2).
21We assume that Setup is implicitly given generation algorithms for all underlying primitives of
the programs.
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• isLess(L′, L′′) → out ∈ {true, false} is a deterministic algorithm which takes as









2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2), then it outputs ′fail′. Otherwise it
outputs true if i′ < i′′ and false if i′ ≥ i′′.
• RetrieveTag(`)→ m is a deterministic algorithm which takes a single-tag level `
and outputs its tag.
• RetrieveTags(L)→ m is a deterministic algorithm which takes a double-tag level
L and outputs boths tags.
We underline that all programs except Setup are deterministic.
Definition 17. A tuple of parametrized, deterministic22 algorithms (GenZero, Increment,
Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags, GenZero[m∗1],Transform[l
∗,m∗2]) is a level
system for tag space M , if algorithms have syntax described above, and the correctness
and security properties described below hold.
Notation: Let T be superpolynomial in λ, and PP = (PGenZero, PIncrement, PTransform,
PisLess,PRetrieveTag, PRetrieveTags) ← Setup(1λ; T ; GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess,
RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
Next, let m∗1 ∈M , m∗2 ∈M , and let `∗ be an arbitrary string (not necessarily a level).












∗,m∗2)], isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags; rSetup)
with the same randomness rSetup as above.
For any fixed rSetup consider the following notation:
• For every m1 ∈M denote [0,m1] = PGenZero(m1);
• For every m1 ∈M , 1 ≤ i ≤ T denote [i,m] = PIncrement([i− 1,m]);
22We prefer to use the notion of parametrized, deterministic algorithms to keep the definition
simple. To formally define this notion, consider a randomized Turing machine with the restriction
that the number of random bits written on its random tape is fixed and independent of input (only
dependent on security parameter λ). Such a Turing machine can first use these random coins to
generate all necessary parameters (e.g. keys) and then run the actual code of the algorithm using
generated parameters. In particular, we assume that this TM has the code of all necessary generation
algorithms.
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• For every m2 ∈ M and every [i,m1], where 0 ≤ i ≤ T,m1 ∈ M , denote
[i,m1,m2] = PTransform([i,m1],m2).
Correctness: The following properties should hold, except with negligible probability
over the choice of rSetup:
• Uniqueness of leves:
– For all ` /∈ {[i,m1] : 0 ≤ i ≤ T,m1 ∈M}:
∗ PIncrement(`) = ′fail′;
∗ PTransform(`,m2) = ′fail′ for any m2 ∈M ;
∗ PRetrieveTag(`) = ′fail′.
– For all L /∈ {[i,m1,m2] : 0 ≤ i ≤ T,m1 ∈M,m2 ∈M}:
∗ PisLess(L,L′) = ′fail′, PisLess(L′, L) = ′fail′ for any string L′;
∗ PRetrieveTags(L) = ′fail′.
• Upper bound is respected: For every m1 ∈M PIncrement([T,m1]) = ′fail′.
• Correctness of comparison: For every m1,m2 ∈M and for every 0 ≤ i, j ≤
T :
– PisLess([i,m1,m2], [j,m1,m2]) = true for i < j,
– PisLess([i,m1,m2], [j,m1,m2]) = false for i ≥ j.











• Correctness of tags retrieval: For every m1,m2 ∈ M and for every 0 ≤
i ≤ T :
– PRetrieveTag([i,m1]) = m1,
– PRetrieveTags([i,m1,m2]) = (m1,m2).
• Functionality is preserved under puncturing:
– PGenZero(m) = P
′
GenZero(m) for all m ∈M , m 6= m∗1;
– PIncrement(`) = P
′
Increment(`) for all strings `;
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– PTransform(`,m2) = P
′
Transform(`,m2) for all strings l and for all m2 ∈ M ,
except (`∗,m∗2);
– PisLess(L
′, L′′) = P′isLess(L
′′, L′′) for all strings L′, L′′;
– PRetrieveTag(`) = P
′
RetrieveTag(`) for all strings `;
– PRetrieveTags(L) = P
′
RetrieveTags(L) for all strings L.
Note that it follows from the correctness properties that [i,m1] = [i
′,m′1] if and only
(i,m1) = (i
′,m′1), and [i,m1,m2] = [i
′,m′1,m
′








0,PP0) ≈ (`∗1, L∗0,PP1),
where rSetup is randomly chosen, PP = (PGenZero,PIncrement,PTransform,PisLess,
PRetrieveTag, PRetrieveTags) ← Setup(GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,
RetrieveTags; rSetup),
`∗0 ← PGenZero(m∗1), `∗1 ← PIncrement(`∗0), L∗0 ← PTransform(`∗0,m∗2),
PPb ← Setup(GenZero[m∗1], Increment,Transform[(`∗b ,m∗2)], isLess,RetrieveTag,
RetrieveTags; rSetup).
3.5.2 Construction
We implement a level system in a natural way: we let levels to be ciphertexts
(encrypting the value and the tag in a single-tag level, and the value and both tags in
a double-tag level) under special encryption scheme called asymmetric constrained
encryption, or ACE (12). For single-tag and double-tag levels we use two different
instances of ACE, with keys EK1,DK1 for single-tag levels and EK2,DK2 for double-tag
levels. We let programs of the level system (fig. 3·4) perform required “homomorphic”
operations in a natural way, by decrypting the ciphertext and learning its value and




• λ be a security parameter;
• iO be (poly(λ), 2−Ω(νiO(λ)))-secure indistinguishability obfuscation;
• ACE be an asymmetric constrained encryption scheme with (poly(λ), 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)))-
secure indistinguishability of ciphertexts and (poly(λ), 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ))) security
of decryption;
• g be a (2O(νOWF(λ′)), 2−Ω(νOWF(λ′)))-secure injective one-way function mapping λ′ =
log T (λ)-bit inputs to poly(λ′)-bit outputs;
• γ(λ) be a function satisfying the following conditions:
– γ(λ) = O(νiO(λ));
– 2γ(λ)poly(λ) log T = O(2νOWF(log T ));
Then the scheme described on fig. 3·4 is a level system for upper bound T (λ), tags
of length τ(λ), which is (poly(λ), 2−νlevels(λ))-secure, where 2−νlevels(λ) is equal to the
following:
2−Ω(γ(λ))+T−1(λ)+T (λ)2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ))+2τ(λ)(T (λ)·2−Ω(νiO(λ))+T (λ)·2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ))+
+2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)))).
Note: Here γ(λ) represents distinguishing advantage between two obfuscated programs
differing on one input (which is a preimage of the OWF g). The two conditions on
γ are set to satisfy the requirements of theorem 4, and say that the inverter’s size
is small enough, and that distinguishing advantage is big enough compared to the
indistinguishability guarantee of iO.
By using subexponentially-secure primitives, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Let:
• λ be a security parameter;
• iO be (poly(λ), 2−Ω(λε))-secure indistinguishability obfuscation;
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Program GenZero(m1)
Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE.
1. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program Increment(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. output l+1 ← ACE.EncEK1(i+ 1,m1).
Program Transform(l,m2)
Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, upper
bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Figure 3·4: Programs in our level system
• ACE be an asymmetric constrained encryption scheme with (poly(λ), 2−Ω(λε))-
secure indistinguishability of ciphertexts and (poly(λ), 2−Ω(λ
ε)) security of decryp-
tion;
• g be a (2Ω(λ′ε), 2−Ω(λ′ε))-secure injective one-way function mapping λ′ = λε/2-bit
inputs to poly(λ′)-bit outputs;
• γ(λ) = λε2/2;
Then the scheme described on fig. 3·4 is a level system for upper bound T (λ) = 2λε/2,
tags of length τ(λ) = λε/2, which is (poly(λ), 2−Ω(λ
ε2/2))-secure.
3.5.3 Overview of the Proof
Correctness. Correctness properties of our level scheme immediately follow from
statistical correctness of iO and correctness and uniqueness properties of ACE.
For security, we first informally describe the structure of the proof, and then give the
sequence of hybrids in section 3.5.4 and security reductions in section 3.5.5. Recall that
304
Program isLess(L′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTag(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTags(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·5: Programs in our level system
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security definition requires that (`∗0, L
∗
0,PP0) ≈ (`∗1, L∗0,PP1), where PPb are punctured,
obfuscated programs. Starting from the distribution (`∗0, L
∗
0,PP0), our proof proceeds
in 3 main steps:






1]. Programs GenZero and
Increment define a chain [0,m1] → [1,m1] → . . . → [T,m1] → ⊥ for each tag




1] by switching the
whole chain from [0,m∗1]→ [1,m∗1]→ . . .→ [T,m∗1]→ ⊥ to [1,m∗1]→ [2,m∗1]→
. . .→ [T + 1,m∗1]→ ⊥.
As a result of this change, `∗0 is switched to `
∗
1 as desired (and in particular, the
punctured point in Transform is switched from `∗0 to `
∗
1 as well). However, this
change also affects the programs in the following two ways (resulting programs
are in fig. 3·8) :
• Wrong upper bound: programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag
now have an upper bound T + 1 (instead of T ) for the case m1 = m
∗
1,
• Incorrect reencryption: program Transform, given [i,m∗1] for 0 ≤ i ≤
T + 1, outputs [i− 1,m∗1,m2] instead of [i,m∗1,m2].
2. Restoring correct upper bound in Increment,Transform, and RetrieveTag.
In a sequence of hybrids we change the wrong upper bound T + 1 to the correct
upper bound T in relevant programs.
Resulting programs are in fig. 3·10. This part of the proof uses ideas from
(BPR15) to argue that the adversary can never reach the upper bound and thus
the upper bound can be decreased by 1 indistinguishably.
3. Restoring correct reencryption in Transform. In a sequence of hybrids we
make program Transform output the correct value [i,m∗1,m2], for all 0 ≤ i ≤ T
and for all m2.
The proof of this step follows a by-now-standard puncturing technique (which
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allows to change the ciphertext in a PRF-based encryption from one plaintext
to another), except that we also have to deal with program isLess which has
decryption inside it.
At the end of this step, we obtain original punctured programs, thus proving
security of our level system.
Security loss. Steps 1 and 2 require number of hybrids proportional to the upper
bound T , and step 3 requires number of hybrids proportional to 2|m2|T . In addition, in
the proof of step 2 we also lose 1/T , thus requiring T and 2|m2| to be superpolynomial.
Now we describe the proof in each step in more detail (recall that complete list of
hybrids can be found in section 3.5.4):
Step 1: Switching `∗ from [0,m∗1] to [1,m
∗
1].
1. We first change the chain to [0,m∗1] → [1,m∗1] → . . . → [T − 1,m∗1] → [T +
1,m∗1] → ⊥, creating a gap between T − 1 and T + 1. This is done by first
hardwiring the ciphertext l∗T = [T,m
∗
1] into relevant programs, then puncturing
keys corresponding to both [T,m∗1] and [T + 1,m
∗
1] (the latter can be punctured
since they are never used due to upper bound T ), and finally switching hardwired
ciphertext to l∗T+1 = [T + 1,m
∗




Note that the keys remain punctured at the point [T,m∗1], which essentially
means that from the point of view of programs there doesn’t exist a valid
encryption of (T,m∗1).
Finally, note that switching the hardwired ciphertext from [T,m∗1] to [T + 1,m
∗
1]
changes the upper bound from T to T+1 in programs Transform and RetrieveTag.
2. Then in a sequence of hybrids we move the gap from T down to 0 a follows. Let
23Note that it is crucial for switching the ciphertext that keys are punctured at both points, and
only one of the two ciphertexts is present in the distribution.
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j-th hybrid be a hybrid where the gap is at j + 1, i.e. Increment defines a chain
[0,m∗1]→ [1,m∗1]→ . . .→ [j,m∗1]→ [j + 2,m∗1]→ . . .→ [T,m∗1]→ [T + 1,m∗1],
and keys are punctured at [j + 1,m∗1], meaning that there doesn’t exist a valid
encryption of (j+1,m∗1). We move the gap to j by first hardwiring the ciphertext
l∗j = [j,m
∗
1] into relevant programs, then puncturing keys corresponding to [j,m
∗
1]
(recall that keys are already punctured at [j + 1,m∗1]), and finally switching
hardwired ciphertext to l∗j+1 = [j + 1,m
∗
1] and unpuncturing keys at [j + 1,m
∗
1].
Note that the keys remain punctured at the point [j,m∗1], enabling the next step.
In addition, note that in the first step the upper bound in Increment is switched
from T to T + 1. This is due to the fact that this step switches the hardwired
ciphertext from [T − 1,m∗1] to [T,m∗1], and due to the fact that there is a
hardwired instruction to output [T + 1,m∗1], given hardwired ciphertext as input
(indeed, while in the original Increment input [T,m∗1] results in ⊥, after the
change input [T,m∗1] results in [T + 1,m
∗
1]).







3. As a result, we obtain Increment which defines a chain 1 → 2 → . . . → T →
T + 1→ ⊥ for the tag m∗1, and keys are punctured at [0,m∗1]. We remove the
puncturing using the fact that keys for [0,m∗1] are never used, since GenZero
doesn’t have to work on input m∗1.
Resulting programs are in fig. 3·8).
Step 2: Restoring the correct upper bound of Increment, Transform, and
RetrieveTag on m∗1. Intuitively, nobody can tell whether these programs have an
upper bound T or T +1, since the only way to test this is to check if, starting with level
[1,m∗1], Increment fails after T − 1 or T executions, which requires superpolynomial
time to compute. To turn this intuition into a formal argument, we follow the proof
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of (BPR15):
1. We cut the chain 1 → 2 → . . . → T → T + 1 → ⊥ (we omit the tag m∗1 for
simplicity and compactness) at a random point as follows. We add a check “if
prg(i) = S then abort” to Increment, where S is randomly chosen. If the prg is
expanding enough, then with overwhelming probability S is outside of the prg
image, and adding this line doesn’t change the functionality. However, next we
change S to be prg(s) for some random s, which cuts the line at point s: that is,
Increment now defines the chain 1→ . . . s→ ⊥, s+ 1→ . . .→ T + 1→ ⊥.
2. In a sequence of hybrids we cut the line in all points after s, obtaining the
following chain: 1 → . . . → s → ⊥, s + 1 → ⊥, s + 2 → ⊥, . . ., T → ⊥,
T + 1 → ⊥. Intuitively, once Increment outputs ⊥ given [s,m∗1], it becomes
impossible for an adversary to obtain [s + 1,m∗1], and therefore behavior of
Increment at [s + 1,m∗1] can be changed to ⊥ as well. The process can be
continued. This intuition is captured by the security of constrained decryption
of ACE.
As the result, we move to a hybrid where valid encryptions of (s+ 1,m∗1), . . . ,
(T + 1,m∗1) do not exist.
3. Then we can move the upper bound from T + 1 back to T for the case m1 = m
∗
1,
since programs output ⊥ on input [T + 1,m∗1] anyway. Thus, changing T + 1 to
T doesn’t affect the functionality of the programs.
4. Then we can reverse all previous steps, restore the chain and eventually get
original programs with correct upper bound T (except Transform, which now
has the correct upper bound T , but still has incorrect behavior on inputs of the
form ([i,m∗1],m2)).
Resulting programs are in fig. 3·10).
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Step 3: Restoring the correct reencryption behaviour in Transform. Note
that TransformB (fig. 3·10) defines the set of outputs [0,m1,m2], . . . , [T,m1,m2] (cor-
responding to inputs ([0,m1],m2), . . . , ([T,m1],m2)) for the case m1 6= m∗1, and the set
of outputs [−1,m∗1,m2], . . . , [T − 1,m∗1,m2] (corresponding to inputs ([0,m∗1],m2),
. . . , ([T,m∗1],m2)) for the case m1 6= m∗1. We change the set of outputs from
[−1,m∗1,m2], . . . , [T−1,m∗1,m2] to [0,m∗1,m2], . . . , [T,m∗1,m2] by running the following
sequence of steps for each possible second tag m2:
1. We first change the set of outputs from [−1,m∗1,m2], . . . , [T − 1,m∗1,m2] to
[−1,m∗1,m2], . . . , [T − 2,m∗1,m2], [T,m∗1,m2], creating a gap between T − 2 and
T . This is done by first hardwiring the ciphertext L∗T−1 = [T − 1,m∗1,m2]
into relevant programs (Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags), then puncturing
keys corresponding to both [T − 1,m∗1,m2] and [T,m∗1,m2] (the latter can be
punctured since they are never used due to the upper bound T ), and finally
switching hardwired ciphertext to L∗T = [T,m
∗
1,m2] and unpuncturing keys at
[T,m∗1,m2]
24.
Note that the keys remain punctured at the point [T−1,m∗1,m2], which essentially
means that from the point of view of programs there doesn’t exist a valid
encryption of (T − 1,m∗1,m2).
2. Then in a sequence of hybrids we move the gap from T − 1 down to −1 a
follows. Let j-th hybrid be a hybrid where the gap is at j + 1, i.e. Transform
outputs [−1,m∗1,m2], . . . , [j,m∗1,m2], [j+2,m∗1,m2], . . . , [T,m∗1,m2], and keys are
punctured at [j + 1,m∗1,m2], meaning that there doesn’t exist a valid encryption
of (j + 1,m∗1,m2). We move the gap to j by first hardwiring the ciphertext
L∗j = [j,m
∗
1,m2] into relevant programs, then puncturing keys corresponding to
[j,m∗1,m2] (recall that keys are already punctured at [j + 1,m
∗
1,m2]), and finally
24Note that it is crucial for switching the ciphertext that keys are punctured at both points, and
only one of the two ciphertexts is present in the distribution.
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switching hardwired ciphertext to L∗j+1 = [j + 1,m
∗
1,m2] and unpuncturing keys
at [j + 1,m∗1,m2].
Note that the keys remain punctured at the point [j,m∗1,m2], enabling the next
step.
An important property of program isLess which enables switching [j,m∗1,m2]
to [j + 1,m∗1,m2] at each step is that isLess treats both [j,m
∗
1,m2] and [j +
1,m∗1,m2] in the same way. That is, both [j,m
∗
1,m2] and [j + 1,m
∗
1,m2] are
larger than [0,m∗1,m2], . . . , [j − 1,m∗1,m2], and both are smaller than [j +
2,m∗1,m2], . . . , [T,m
∗
1,m2]. Finally, both are equal when compared to themselves.
These inputs are the only valid inputs, since the other point (i.e. [j + 1,m∗1,m2]
or [j,m∗1,m2], respectively) is punctured out.
Finally, note that we don’t perform two last steps, i.e. switching from 0 to
1 and from −1 to 0, for the case m2 = m∗2 (indeed, that would switch the















2] in both experiments). In fact, we don’t have to switch from
0 to 1 since Transform is punctured at [l∗1,m
∗
2] and outputs
′fail′ on this input
anyway. Further, since [0,m∗1] is hard to obtain for the adversary, we argue that
Transform may be indistinguishably changed from outputting [−1,m∗1,m∗2] to
[0,m∗1,m
∗








Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program Increment(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;




Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Figure 3·6: Programs in HybA. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary











Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTag(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTags(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·7: Programs in HybA. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementB(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l




1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Figure 3·8: Programs in HybB. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary












Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagB(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsB(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·9: Programs in HybB. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementC(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Figure 3·10: Programs in HybC . In addition, in this hybrid the adver-












Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·11: Programs in HybC . In addition, in this hybrid the adver-












Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program Increment(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;




Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Figure 3·12: Programs in HybD. In addition, in this hybrid the adver-











Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTag(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTags(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·13: Programs in HybD. In addition, in this hybrid the adver-










3.5.4 List of Hybrids
For any messages m∗1,m
∗
2, consider the following distributions for randomly chosen
rSetup:
• HybA = (PP, `∗0, L∗0,m∗1,m∗2), where PP = Setup(1λ; GenZero[m∗1], Increment,
Transform[`∗0,m
∗












































• HybD = (PP, `∗1, L∗0,m∗1,m∗2), where PP = Setup(1λ; GenZero[m∗1], Increment,
Transform[`∗1,m
∗














Note that HybA is the distribution from security game for b = 0 and HybD is the
distribution from security game for b = 1. To prove security of the level system, we
need to show that HybA ≈ HybD, which we do in the following lemmas:
Lemma 5. (Switching from `∗0 to `
∗
1) For any PPT adversary A,
advHybA,HybB(λ) ≤ T · 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)) + T · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Lemma 6. (Changing the upper bound from T + 1 to T ) For any PPT
adversary A,




+ T · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + T · 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
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Lemma 7. (Restoring behavior of Transform) For any PPT adversary A,
advHybC ,HybD(λ) ≤ 2
τ(λ)(T · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + T · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ))).
Proof of lemma 5 (Switching from `∗0 to `
∗
1).
As described earlier, we are going to shift levels [i,m∗1] to [i + 1,m
∗
1] one by one,
starting from i = T . We start from HybA.



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·14.
That is, we puncture ACE key EK1 at point pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1) in programs
Increment and GenZero, since these programs never run encryption on pT+1.
Indistinguishability holds by iO.



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·15.
That is, we puncture ACE key DK1 at the same point pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1) in
programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by
security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key
is already punctured at pT+1.
Next we consider the following sequence of hybrids for j = T, . . . , 1. Programs for
the case j = T and j = T − 1 are written separately in order to track how the upper
bound in programs is changed from T to T + 1.
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2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·15 (for the case j = T ), fig. 3·18 (for j = T − 1),
fig. 3·22 (for j = T − 2, . . . , 1).
That is, in this hybrid EK1 and DK1 are punctured at pj+1 = (j + 1,m
∗
1).
In addition, program Increment, given [j,m∗1], outputs [j + 2,m
∗
1]. Program
Transform, given ([i,m∗1],m2) for i > j, outputs [i− 1,m∗1,m2].
Note that HybA,2,j,1 = HybA,1,2 for j = T .

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·16 (for the case j = T ), fig. 3·19 (for j = T − 1),
fig. 3·23 (for j = T − 2, . . . , 1).
That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK1,DK1 at the point pj = (j,m
∗
1)
and hardwire l∗j = ACE.EncEK1(j,m
∗
1) to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt
pj in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguisha-
bility holds by iO.

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·17 (for the case j = T ), fig. 3·20 (for j = T − 1),
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fig. 3·24 (for j = T − 2, . . . , 1).




j+1 = ACE.EncEK1(j + 1,m
∗
1)
in programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds
by security of ACE for punctured points pj, pj+1.

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·18 (for the case j = T ), fig. 3·21 (for j = T − 1),
fig. 3·25 (for j = T − 2, . . . , 1).
That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK1,DK1 at the point pj+1 = (j + 1,m
∗
1) and
remove hardwired l∗j+1 = ACE.EncEK1(j+ 1,m
∗
1) in programs GenZero, Increment,
Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by iO.
Note that HybA,2,j,4 = HybA,2,j−1,1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ T .
Next we change l∗0 to l
∗
1 as follows:

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·26.
That is, in this hybrid EK1 and DK1 are punctured at p1 = (1,m
∗
1). In addition,
program Increment, given [0,m∗1], outputs [2,m
∗
1]. Program Transform, given
([i,m∗1],m2) for i > 0, outputs [i− 1,m∗1,m2].
Note that HybA,2,0,1 = HybA,2,j,4 for j = 1.
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2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·27.
That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK1,DK1 at the point p0 = (0,m
∗
1)
and hardwire l∗0 = ACE.EncEK1(0,m
∗
1) to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt
p0 in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguisha-
bility holds by iO.



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·28.







programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag, and give l∗1 instead of l
∗
0 to the
adversary. Indistinguishability holds by security of ACE for punctured points
p0, p1.



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·29.
That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK1,DK1 at the point p1 = (1,m
∗
1) and remove
hardwired l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗
1) in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform,
and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by iO.




















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·30.
That is, we unpuncture ACE decryption key DK1 at the point p0 = (0,m
∗
1) in
programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by
security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key
is punctured at p0.



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·31.
That is, we unpuncture ACE encryption key EK1 at the point p0 = (0,m
∗
1)
in programs GenZero, Increment. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since these
programs never encrypt p0.
Note that HybA,3,3 is the same as HybB.
Thus, the the advantage of the PPT adversary in distinguishing between HybA and
HybB is at most
(2T + 4) · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + (T + 1) · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 2 · 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) =






Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT+1} of ACE punctured at the point









2. Return l← ACE.EncEK1{pT+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,1,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT+1},DK1 of ACE punc-
tured at pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,1,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return m1.
Figure 3·14: Programs in HybA,1,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT+1} of ACE punctured at the point









2. Return l← ACE.EncEK1{pT+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,T,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT+1},DK1{pT+1} of ACE
punctured at pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK1{pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT+1} of ACE punctured at the point
pT+1 = (T+1,m
∗





tag m∗2, upper bound T .






2. out ← ACE.DecDK1{pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,T,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT+1} of ACE punctured at the point
pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK1{pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
3. Return m1.
Figure 3·15: Programs in HybA,1,2 (same as HybA,2,T,1). In addi-
tion, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated pro-













Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punctured at points pT =









2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pT ,pT+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,T,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT , pT+1},DK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punc-
tured at pT = (T,m
∗
1), pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗






1. If l = l∗T then output
′fail′;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT ,pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. If i = T − 1 and m1 = m∗1 then output l∗T ;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punctured at points pT =
(T,m∗1), pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗









1), upper bound T .






2. If l = l∗T then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT ,pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
5. output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,T,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punctured at points pT =
(T,m∗1), pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗




1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗T then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT ,pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·16: Programs in HybA,2,T,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punctured at points pT =









2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pT ,pT+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,T,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT , pT+1},DK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punc-
tured at pT = (T,m
∗
1), pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1), single-tag level l
∗




1. If l = l∗T+1 then output
′fail′;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT ,pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. If i = T − 1 and m1 = m∗1 then output l∗T+1;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punctured at points pT =
(T,m∗1), pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗





tag m∗2, single-tag level l
∗
T+1 = ACE.EncEK1(T + 1,m
∗
1), upper bound T .






2. If l = l∗T+1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT ,pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
5. output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,T,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT , pT+1} of ACE punctured at points pT =
(T,m∗1), pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1), single-tag level l
∗
T+1 = ACE.EncEK1(T + 1,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗T+1 then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT ,pT+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·17: Programs in HybA,2,T,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT } of ACE punctured at the point pT = (T,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pT }(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,T−1,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT },DK1{pT } of ACE punctured at
pT = (T,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If i = T − 1 and m1 = m∗1 then output ACE.EncEK1{pT }(i+ 2,m1);






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT } of ACE punctured at the point pT = (T,m∗1),






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1 and i = T + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T,m∗1,m2);
4. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
5. output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,T−1,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT } of ACE punctured at the point pT = (T,m∗1), upper
bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·18: Programs in HybA,2,T,4 (same as HybA,2,T−1,1). In ad-
dition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated pro-













Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punctured at points pT−1 = (T −









2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pT−1,pT }(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,T−1,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT−1, pT },DK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punc-
tured at points pT−1 = (T − 1,m∗1), pT = (T,m∗1), single-tag level l∗T−1 = ACE.EncEK1(T − 1,m∗1),
upper bound T ,
1. If l = l∗T−1 then output ACE.EncEK1{pT−1,pT }(T + 1,m
∗
1);
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1,pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. If i = T − 2 and m1 = m∗1 then output l∗T−1;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punctured at points pT−1 = (T −
1,m∗1), pT = (T,m
∗







single-tag level l∗T−1 = ACE.EncEK1(T − 1,m∗1), upper bound T .






2. If l = l∗T−1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T − 1,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1,pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and i = T + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T,m∗1,m2);
5. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
6. output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,T−1,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punctured at points pT−1 = (T −
1,m∗1), pT = (T,m
∗
1), single-tag level l
∗
T−1 = ACE.EncEK1(T − 1,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗T−1 then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1,pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
4. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·19: Programs in HybA,2,T−1,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punctured at points pT−1 = (T −









2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pT−1,pT }(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,T−1,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT−1, pT },DK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punc-
tured at points pT−1 = (T − 1,m∗1), pT = (T,m∗1), single-tag level l∗T = ACE.EncEK1(T,m∗1) , upper
bound T .
1. If l = l∗T then output ACE.EncEK1{pT−1,pT }(T + 1,m
∗
1);
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1,pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. If i = T − 2 and m1 = m∗1 then output l∗T ;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punctured at points pT−1 = (T −
1,m∗1), pT = (T,m
∗







single-tag level l∗T = ACE.EncEK1(T,m
∗
1), upper bound T .






2. If l = l∗T then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T − 1,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1,pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and i = T + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T,m∗1,m2);
5. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
6. output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,T−1,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT−1, pT } of ACE punctured at points pT−1 = (T −
1,m∗1), pT = (T,m
∗




1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗T then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1,pT }(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
4. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·20: Programs in HybA,2,T−1,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pT−1} of ACE punctured at the point pT−1 = (T − 1,m∗1),
tag m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pT−1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,T−1,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pT−1},DK1{pT−1} of ACE punctured at
the point pT−1 = (T − 1,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If i = T − 2 and m1 = m∗1 then output ACE.EncEK1{pT−1}(i+ 2,m1);






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT−1} of ACE punctured at the point pT−1 = (T − 1,m∗1),






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1 and i = T + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T,m∗1,m2);
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and i = T then output L← ACE.EncEK2(T − 1,m∗1,m2);
5. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
6. output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,T−1,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pT−1} of ACE punctured at the point pT−1 = (T − 1,m∗1),
upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pT−1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·21: Programs in HybA,2,T−1,4. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pj+1} of ACE punctured at the point pj+1 = (j + 1,m∗1),
tag m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pj+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,j,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pj+1},DK1{pj+1} of ACE punctured at
pj+1 = (j + 1,m
∗
1), index j, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If i = j and m1 = m
∗
1 then output ACE.EncEK1{pj+1}(i+ 2,m
∗
1);






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj+1} of ACE punctured at the point pj+1 = (j + 1,m∗1),






2, index j, upper bound
T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) If i > j + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
(c) If i = j + 1 then output ′fail′;
(d) If i < j + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,j,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj+1} of ACE punctured at the point pj+1 = (j + 1,m∗1),
upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·22: Programs in HybA,2,j,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points pj = (j,m∗1), pj+1 = (j+ 1,m∗1), tag
m∗1.
1. If m1 = m∗1 then output
′fail′;
2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pj ,pj+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,j,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pj , pj+1},DK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points
pj = (j,m
∗
1), pj+1 = (j + 1,m
∗
1), single-tag level l
∗
j = ACE.EncEK1 (j,m
∗
1), index j, upper bound T ,
1. If l = l∗j then output ACE.EncEK1{pj ,pj+1}(j + 2,m
∗
1);
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj ,pj+1}(l); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m∗1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
5. If i = j − 1 and m1 = m∗1 then output l∗j ;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points pj = (j,m∗1), pj+1 = (j + 1,m∗1),




2, single-tag level l
∗
j = ACE.EncEK1 (j,m
∗
1),
index j, upper bound T .




2. If l = l∗j then output L← ACE.EncEK2 (j,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj ,pj+1}(l); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If m1 = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) If i > j + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2 (i− 1,m1,m2);
(c) If i = j + 1 then output ′fail′;
(d) If i = j then output ′fail′;
(e) If i < j then output L← ACE.EncEK2 (i,m1,m2).
5. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2 (i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,j,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points pj = (j,m∗1), pj+1 = (j + 1,m∗1),
single-tag level l∗j = ACE.EncEK1 (j,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗j then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj ,pj+1}(l); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
4. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·23: Programs in HybA,2,j,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points pj = (j,m∗1), pj+1 = (j+ 1,m∗1), tag
m∗1.
1. If m1 = m∗1 then output
′fail′;
2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pj ,pj+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,j,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pj , pj+1},DK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points
pj = (j,m
∗
1), pj+1 = (j + 1,m
∗
1), single-tag level l
∗
j+1 = ACE.EncEK1 (j + 1,m
∗
1) , index j, upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗j+1 then output ACE.EncEK1{pj ,pj+1}(j + 2,m
∗
1);
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj ,pj+1}(l); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m∗1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
5. If i = j − 1 and m1 = m∗1 then output l∗j+1;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points pj = (j,m∗1), pj+1 = (j + 1,m∗1),




2, single-tag level l
∗
j+1 = ACE.EncEK1 (j +
1,m∗1), index j, upper bound T .




2. If l = l∗j+1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2 (j,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj ,pj+1}(l); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If m1 = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) If i > j + 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2 (i− 1,m1,m2);
(c) If i = j + 1 then output ′fail′;
(d) If i = j then output ′fail′;
(e) If i < j then output L← ACE.EncEK2 (i,m1,m2).
5. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2 (i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,j,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj , pj+1} of ACE punctured at points pj = (j,m∗1), pj+1 = (j + 1,m∗1),
single-tag level l∗j+1 = ACE.EncEK1 (j + 1,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗j+1 then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj ,pj+1}(l); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
4. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·24: Programs in HybA,2,j,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{pj} of ACE punctured at the point pj = (j,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pj}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,j,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pj},DK1{pj} of ACE punctured at
pj = (j,m
∗
1), index j, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If i = j − 1 and m1 = m∗1 then output ACE.EncEK1{pj}(i+ 2,m∗1);






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj} of ACE punctured at the point pj = (j,m∗1), encryption






2, index j, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) If i > j then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
(c) If i = j then output ′fail′;
(d) If i < j then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,j,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{pj} of ACE punctured at the point pj = (j,m∗1), upper
bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{pj}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·25: Programs in HybA,2,j,4. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p1} of ACE punctured at the point p1 = (1,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,0,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p1},DK1{p1} of ACE punctured at
p1 = (1,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If i = 0 and m1 = m
∗
1 then output ACE.EncEK1{p1}(i+ 2,m
∗
1);






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p1} of ACE punctured at the point p1 = (1,m∗1), encryption






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) If i > 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
(c) If i = 1 then output ′fail′;
(d) If i < 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,0,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p1} of ACE punctured at the point p1 = (1,m∗1), upper
bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·26: Programs in HybA,2,0,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .








2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0,p1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,0,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0, p1},DK1{p0, p1} of ACE punctured at
points p0 = (0,m
∗
1), p1 = (1,m
∗




1), upper bound T ,
1. If l = l∗0 then output ACE.EncEK1{p0,p1}(2,m
∗
1);
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0,p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0, p1} of ACE punctured at points p0 = (0,m∗1), p1 =














2. If l = l∗0 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(0,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0,p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) If i > 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
(c) If i = 1 then output ′fail′;
(d) If i = 0 then output ′fail′;
5. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,0,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0, p1} of ACE punctured at points p0 = (0,m∗1), p1 =




1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗0 then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0,p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
4. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·27: Programs in HybA,2,0,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .








2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0,p1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,2,0,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0, p1},DK1{p0, p1} of ACE punctured at
points p0 = (0,m
∗
1), p1 = (1,m
∗




1), upper bound T ,
1. If l = l∗1 then output ACE.EncEK1{p0,p1}(2,m
∗
1);
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0,p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0, p1} of ACE punctured at points p0 = (0,m∗1), p1 =














2. If l = l∗1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(0,m∗1,m2);
3. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0,p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
4. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) If i > 1 then output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
(c) If i = 1 then output ′fail′;
(d) If i = 0 then output ′fail′;
5. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,2,0,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0, p1} of ACE punctured at points p0 = (0,m∗1), p1 =




1), upper bound T .
1. If l = l∗1 then output m
∗
1;
2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0,p1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
4. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·28: Programs in HybA,2,0,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .








2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,3,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punc-
tured at p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at the point p0 =







upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,3,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at the point p0 =
(0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·29: Programs in HybA,3,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .








2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,3,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1 of ACE punctured
at p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,3,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·30: Programs in HybA,3,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementA,3,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) output L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagA,3,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m = m∗1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m∗1.
3. If m 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
(b) Output m1.
Figure 3·31: Programs in HybA,3,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,










Proof of lemma 6 (Changing the upper bound from T + 1 to T ).
As described earlier, we will fix upper bounds in programs by cutting the sequence
of encryptions [1,m∗1] → . . . → [T + 1,m∗1] at a random place and then cutting the
sequence in all subsequent positions, then changing the upper bound, and finally
restoring the line. We cut the line at a random place in the following sequence of
hybrids, starting from HybB:



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·33.
That is, in program Increment we add an instruction to abort if m1 = m
∗
1
and g(i) = I∗, where g is an injective OWF and I∗ is a random image of g.
Indistinguishability holds by security of iO and OWF: since OWF is injective, the
two programs differ only at a single point; as shown in (BCP15), any adversary
which can distinguish between the two programs, can be also used to find the
differing point, which can be used to break one-wayness of g (see lemma 4).



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·34.
That is, in programs Increment and GenZero we puncture ACE encryption key
EK1 at the point (i
∗ + 1,m∗1). Indistinguishability holds by iO, since Increment
never needs to encrypt this point, because it aborts earlier on input [i∗,m∗1].
GenZero never needs to encrypt (i∗,m∗1) as well, since it only encrypts value 0,
and i∗ = 0 only with negligible probability.
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Next we run the following sequence of hybrids for j = i∗, . . . , T in order to cut the
chain at all points after i∗:

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·35.
That is, in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag ACE en-
cryption key EK1 is punctured at the set {(i∗ + 1,m∗1), . . . , (j + 1,m∗1)}, and its
decryption key DK1 is punctured at the set {(i∗ + 1,m∗1), . . . , (j,m∗1)}.
Note that HybB,2,j,1 = HybB,1,2 for j = i
∗.

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·36.
That is, in programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag we additionally punc-
ture ACE decryption key DK1 at the point (j+ 1,m
∗
1). Indistinguishability holds
by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since EK1 is already punctured at
the set which includes (j + 1,m∗1).

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·37.
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That is, we additionally puncture ACE encryption key EK1 at the point (j+2,m
∗
1)
in programs GenZero and Increment. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since DK1
is punctured at the set which includes (j + 1,m∗1), and thus program Increment
never tries to encrypt (j + 2,m∗1), aborting earlier; GenZero never needs to
encrypt (j + 2,m∗1) either since j + 2 6= 0.
Note that HybB,2,j,3 = HybB,2,j+1,1 for j = i
∗, . . . , T .
Next we change the upper bound as follows:



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·38.
That is, in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag EK1,DK1
are punctured at the set {[i∗ + 1,m∗1], . . . , [T + 1,m∗1]}.
Note that HybB,3,1 = HybB,2,T,2.



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·39.
That is, in program Increment and Transform we change the upper bound from
T + 1 to T . Indistinguishability holds by iO, since DK1 is punctured at the set
which includes (T,m∗1), (T + 1,m
∗
1), and thus Increment anyways outputs
′fail′
on input [T,m∗1], and Transform anyway outputs
′fail′ on input [T + 1,m∗1].
Next we run the following sequence of hybrids for j = T, . . . , i∗ in order to restore the
chain:
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2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·40.
That is, in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag ACE key
EK1,DK1 are punctured at the set {(i∗ + 1,m∗1), . . . , (j + 1,m∗1)}.
Note that HybB,4,j,1 = HybB,3,2 for j = T .

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·41.
That is, we unpuncture DK1 in Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag at the
point (j+1,m∗1). Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption
of ACE, since EK1 is punctured at the set which includes (j + 1,m
∗
1).

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·42.
That is, we unpuncture EK1 in GenZero and Increment at the point (j + 1,m
∗
1).
Indistinguishability holds by iO, since GenZero never encrypts (j + 1,m∗1) where
j + 1 6= 0, and since Increment never encrypts (j + 1,m∗1), since it aborts on
input [j,m∗1] due to punctured DK1.
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Note that HybB,4,j,3 = HybB,4,j−1,1 for j = T, . . . , i
∗ + 1.
Finally we remove the last remaining cut in the chain as follows:



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·43.
That is, in programs Increment and GenZero ACE encryption key EK1 is punc-
tured at the point (i∗ + 1,m∗1).
Note that HybB,5,1 = HybB,4,j,2 for j = i
∗.



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·44.
That is, in program Increment we add an instruction to abort if m1 = m
∗
1 and
g(i) = I∗, where I∗ = g(i∗) for randomly chosen i∗. In addition, we remove the
puncturing from EK1 in all programs. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since
Increment outputs ′fail′ on [i∗,m∗1] in both cases, and since GenZero never needs
to encrypt (i∗ + 1,m∗1).



















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig. 3·45.
That is, in program Increment we remove an instruction to abort if m1 = m
∗
1
and g(i) = I∗. Indistinguishability holds by security of iO and OWF: since OWF
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is injective, the two programs differ only at a single point; as shown in (BCP15),
any adversary which can distinguish between the two programs, can be also
used to find the differing point, which can be used to break one-wayness of g
(see lemma 4).
Note that HybB,5,3 = HybC .
Note that this reduction works only as long as i∗ 6= 0, which happens with probability
1
T
. Thus, the the advantage of the PPT adversary in distinguishing between HybB
and HybC is at most
1
T
+ 2 · 2−Ω(γ(λ)) + (2(T − i∗ + 1) + 3) · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + 2(T − i∗ + 1) · 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) ≤
1
T






Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementB(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M







2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessB(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagB(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsB(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·32: Programs in HybB. In addition, in this hybrid the adver-














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,1,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1, OWF
g, I∗ = g(i∗) for random i∗, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 = m
∗
1 and g(i) = I
∗) then output ′fail′;
4. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,1,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·33: Programs in HybB,1,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values:punctured encryption key EK1{pi∗+1} of ACE, punctured at the
point pi∗+1 = (i
∗ + 1,m∗1), tag m
∗
1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pi∗+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,1,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pi∗+1},DK1 of ACE, punc-
tured at pi∗+1 = (i
∗ + 1,m∗1), tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,1,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·34: Programs in HybB,1,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,2,j,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,j+1}, DK1{Si∗+1,j} of
ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,j , upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and
{∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE,






2, upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,2,j,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, punctured at the set Si∗+1,j , tag m∗1,
upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·35: Programs in HybB,2,j,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,2,j,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,j+1}, DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of
ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,j , upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and
{∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE,






2, upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,2,j,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, punctured at the set Si∗+1,j+1, tag
m∗1, upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·36: Programs in HybB,2,j,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j+2} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,j+2}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,2,j,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,j+2}, DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of
ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,j , upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and
{∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE,






2, upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,2,j,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, punctured at the set Si∗+1,j+1, tag
m∗1, upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·37: Programs in HybB,2,j,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,T+1} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,3,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,T+1}, DK1{Si∗+1,T+1}
of ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,T , upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a
and {∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i ≥ T + 1 or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i ≥ T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,T+1} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE,






2, upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If m1 = m
∗
1:
(a) If i > T + 1 or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
4. If m1 6= m∗1:
(a) If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
(b) return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,3,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,T+1} of ACE, punctured at the set Si∗+1,T+1, tag
m∗1, upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If m1 = m
∗
1 and (i > T + 1 or i < 0) then output
′fail′;
3. If m1 6= m∗1 and (i > T or i < 0) then output ′fail′;
4. Output m1.
Figure 3·38: Programs in HybB,3,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,T+1} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,3,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,T+1},
DK1{Si∗+1,T+1} of ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,T , upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,T+1} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of






2, upper bound T . Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 6= m∗1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,3,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,T+1} of ACE, punctured at the set
Si∗+1,T+1, upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and
{∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,T+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·39: Programs in HybB,3,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,4,j,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,j+1},
DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,j, upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of






2, upper bound T . Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 6= m∗1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,4,j,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, punctured at the set
Si∗+1,j+1, upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and
{∅} otherwise.
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·40: Programs in HybB,4,j,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j+1} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,j+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,4,j,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,j+1},
DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,j, upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out ← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of






2, upper bound T . Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out ← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 6= m∗1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,4,j,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, punctured at the set
Si∗+1,j, upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and
{∅} otherwise.
1. out ← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·41: Programs in HybB,4,j,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, tag m∗1. Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{Si∗+1,j}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,4,j,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys EK1{Si∗+1,j},
DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, tag m∗1, set Si∗,j, upper bound T . Here Sa,b =
{(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.
1. out ← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, encryption key EK2 of






2, upper bound T . Here
Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and {∅} otherwise.






2. out ← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 6= m∗1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,4,j,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{Si∗+1,j} of ACE, punctured at the set
Si∗+1,j, upper bound T . Here Sa,b = {(a,m∗1), (a+ 1,m∗1), . . . , (b,m∗1)} if b ≥ a and
{∅} otherwise.
1. out ← ACE.DecDK1{Si∗+1,j}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·42: Programs in HybB,4,j,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EK1{pi∗+1} of ACE, punctured at the
point pi∗+1 = (i
∗ + 1,m∗1), tag m
∗
1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{pi∗+1}(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,5,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{pi∗+1}, DK1 of ACE, punc-
tured at the point pi∗+1 = (i
∗ + 1,m∗1), tag m
∗
1, , upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 6= m∗1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,5,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·43: Programs in HybB,5,1. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,5,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1, DK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1, OWF
g, I∗ = g(i∗) for random i∗, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If m1 = m
∗
1 and g(i) = I
∗ then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 6= m∗1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,5,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·44: Programs in HybB,5,2. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementB,5,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 6= m∗1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program RetrieveTagB,5,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·45: Programs in HybB,5,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,










Proof of lemma 7 (Restoring behavior of Transform).
Starting from HybC , we first change outputs of Transform from [i − 1,m∗1,m2] to
[i,m∗1,m2] for different m2 6= m∗2 one by one, by considering the following sequence of
hybrids for q = 0, . . . , ν2, q 6= m∗2, where ν2 = 2|m2|:

















tion of the programs can be found on fig. 3·47.
That is, program Transform on input ([i,m∗1],m2) outputs [i − 1,m∗1,m2] for
m2 ≥ q or m2 = m∗2 and [i,m∗1,m2] otherwise.
Note that HybC = HybC,1,q for q = 0.
In the following sequence of hybrids we change the output at m2 = q from [i−1,m∗1, q]
to [i,m∗1, q]:

















scription of the programs can be found on fig. 3·48.
That is, in program Transform we puncture ACE encryption key EK2 at the
point pT,q = (T,m
∗
1, q). Indistinguishability holds by iO, since Transform never
encrypts this plaintext.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
364
3·49.
That is, in programs isLess and RetrieveTags we puncture ACE decryption key
DK2 at the point pT,q = (T,m
∗
1, q). Indistinguishability holds by security of
constrained ACE key, since EK2 is already punctured at the same point.
We consider the following hybrids for j = T − 1, . . . , 0, switching the output from
[j,m∗1, q] to [j + 1,m
∗
1, q]:















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·50.
That is, in this hybrid EK2,DK2 are punctured at the point pj+1,q = (j+1,m
∗
1, q).
Note that HybC,1,q,1,2 = HybC,1,q,2,j,1 for j = T − 1.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·51.
That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q)
and hardwire L∗j,q = ACE.EncEK2(j,m
∗
1, q) to eliminate the need to encrypt or
decrypt pj,q in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability
holds by iO.
Note that in program isLess we instruct the program to use the value pj+1,q =
(j + 1,m∗1, q) on input L
∗




this doesn’t change the overall functionality of the program: using pj+1,q instead
of pj,q could change the result of comparison only if the other input was an
encryption of pj+1,q (since comparison will result in true when pj,q is used and
false when pj+1,q is used). However, DK2 is punctured at a set which includes
pj+1,q, and thus no ciphertext is decrypted to pj+1,q. Thus programs isLess12,q,2,j,1
and isLess12,q,2,j,0 have the same functionality.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·52.
That is, we replace L∗j,q = ACE.EncEK2(j,m
∗
1, q) with L
∗
j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j +
1,m∗1, q) in programs Transform, isLess and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability
holds by security of ACE for punctured points pj,q, pj+1,q.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·53.
That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q)
and remove hardwired L∗j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j + 1,m
∗
1, q) in programs Transform,
isLess, and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by iO.
Note that HybC,1,q,2,j,4 = HybC,1,q,2,j−1,1 for j = T − 1, . . . , 1.
Next we separately consider the case j = −1, switching the output from [−1,m∗1, q] to
[0,m∗1, q]:
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2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·54.
That is, in this hybrid EK2,DK2 are punctured at the point p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q).
Note that HybC,1,q,2,−1,1 = HybC,1,q,2,j,4 for j = 0.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·55.
That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point p−1,q =
(−1,m∗1, q) and hardwire L∗−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q) to eliminate the need
to encrypt or decrypt p−1,q in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags.
Indistinguishability holds by iO.
Note that in programs isLess and RetrieveTags we instruct the program to output
fail, given L∗−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q) as input, since both programs treat
levels with i < 0 as invalid.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·56.
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That is, we replace L∗−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q) with L∗0,q = ACE.EncEK2(0,m∗1, q)
in programs Transform, isLess and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by
security of ACE for punctured points p−1,q, p0,q.
Next we clean up punctured keys:















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·57.
That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q) and
remove hardwired L∗0,q = ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1, q) in programs Transform, isLess,
and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by iO.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·58.
That is, we unpuncture ACE key DK2 at the point p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q) in programs
Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by security of a
constrained ACE key, since EK2 is punctured at p−1,q.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·59.
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That is, we unpuncture ACE key EK2 at the point p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q) in program
Transform. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since Transform never encrypts this
value.
Note that programs isLess and RetrieveTags now output ′fail′ on input [0,m∗1, q]. We
fix this in the following hybrids:



















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·60.
That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE encryption key EK1 at p0 = (0,m
∗
1) in
programs GenZero and Increment. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since these
programs never encrypt p0.



















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·61.
That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE decryption key DK1 at the same point
p0 = (0,m
∗
1) in programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguisha-
bility holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding
encryption key EK1 is already punctured at p0.




















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·62.
That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE encryption key EK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q)
in program Transform. Indistinguishability holds by security of iO, since, due to
punctured DK1{p0}, this program always outputs ′fail′ on input ([0,m∗1], q) and
thus never needs to encrypt p0,q.



















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·63.
That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE decryption key DK2 at the same point
p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q) in programs isLess and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds
by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption
key EK2 is already punctured at p0,q.



















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·64.
That is, we remove instructions to output ′fail′ in programs isLess and RetrieveTags
on input [0,m∗1, q]. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since these instructions are
never executed due to the fact that DK2 is punctured at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q) and
thus the programs output ′fail′ during decryption.




















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·65.
That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE decryption key DK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q)
in programs isLess and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by security
of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key EK2 is
punctured at p0,q.



















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·66.
That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE encryption key EK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q)
in program Transform. Indistinguishability holds by security of iO, since, due to
punctured DK1{p0}, this program always outputs ′fail′ on input ([0,m∗1], q) and
thus never needs to encrypt p0,q.



















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·67.
That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE decryption key DK1 at p0 = (0,m
∗
1)
in programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds
by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption
371
key EK1 is punctured at p0.



















2). Description of the programs
can be found on fig. 3·68.
That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE encryption key EK1 at p0 = (0,m
∗
1)
in programs GenZero and Increment. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since these
programs never encrypt p0.
This concludes fixing behavior of Transform for the case m2 6= m∗2. Next we fix the
case m2 = m
∗
2 in a similar manner, except that we need different hybrids for the case
j = −1, 0 (to prevent switching L∗0 to L∗1):

















scription of the programs can be found on fig. 3·69.
Note that HybC,1,q,4,9 = HybC,2,1,1 for q = 2
|m2|.

















scription of the programs can be found on fig. 3·70.
That is, in program Transform we puncture ACE encryption key EK2 at the




2). Indistinguishability holds by iO, since Transform
never encrypts this plaintext.
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2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·71.
That is, in programs isLess and RetrieveTags we puncture ACE decryption key




2). Indistinguishability holds by security of
constrained ACE key, since EK2 is already punctured at the same point.
We consider the following hybrids for j = T − 1, . . . , 1, switching the output from
[j,m∗1,m
∗




















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·72.




Note that HybC,2,1,3 = HybC,2,2,j,1 for j = T − 1.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·73.











2) to eliminate the need
to encrypt or decrypt pj,m∗2 in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags.
Indistinguishability holds by iO.
Note that in program isLess we instruct the program to use the value pj+1,m∗2 =
(j + 1,m∗1,m
∗
2) on input L
∗
j,m∗2





However, this doesn’t change the overall functionality of the program: using
pj+1,m∗2 instead of pj,m∗2 could change the result of comparison only if the other
input was an encryption of pj+1,m∗2 (since comparison will result in true when
pj,m∗2 is used and false when pj+1,m∗2 is used). However, DK2 is punctured at a
set which includes pj+1,m∗2 , and thus no ciphertext is decrypted to pj+1,m∗2 . Thus
programs isLessC,2,2,j,1 and isLessC,2,2,j,2 have the same functionality.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·74.










2) in programs Transform, isLess and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability
holds by security of ACE for punctured points pj,m∗2 , pj+1,m∗2 .















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·75.




2) and remove hardwired L
∗
j+1,m∗2





grams Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by iO.
Note that HybC,2,2,j,4 = HybC,2,2,j−1,1 for j = T − 1, . . . , 2.
Finally we consider the case j = −1, switching the output from [−1,m∗1,m∗2] to
[0,m∗1,m
∗
2] and cleaning up any left puncturing:















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·76.





Note that HybC,2,3,1 = HybC,2,2,j,4 for j = 1.















2). Description of the programs can be found on fig.
3·77.





programs isLess and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by security of a
constrained ACE key, since EK2 is punctured at p1,m∗2 .

















2). Description of the pro-
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grams can be found on fig. 3·78.
That is, we change the following: first, we puncture ACE key EK1 at the point
p0 = (0,m
∗
1) in programs GenZero and Increment: this is without changing the
functionality of those programs, since then never need to encrypt p0. Second,




2) in program Transform,
since this program never needs to encrypt p1,m∗2 due to the first instruction
(which tells the program to output ′fail′ if it gets ([1,m∗1],m
∗
2) as input)). Indis-
tinguishability holds by iO.

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·79.
That is, in programs Increment and RetrieveTag we puncture ACE decryption
key DK1 at the point p0 = (0,m
∗
1). Indistinguishability holds by security of
constrained ACE key, since EK1 is already punctured at the same point.

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·80.
That is, we let program Transform output [0,m∗1,m
∗
2] (instead of [−1,m∗1,m∗2]) on
input ([0,m∗1],m
∗
2). This doesn’t change the functionality of the program, since
DK1 is punctured the point p0 = (0,m
∗
1), thus no valid encryption of (0,m
∗
1)
exists, and Transform aborts on input [0,m∗1],m
∗
2. Indistinguishability holds by
376
iO.

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·81.
That is, in programs Increment and RetrieveTag we unpuncture ACE decryption
key DK1 at the point p0 = (0,m
∗
1). Indistinguishability holds by security of
constrained ACE key, since EK1 is already punctured at the same point.

















2). Description of the pro-
grams can be found on fig. 3·82.
That is, we unpuncture ACE key EK1 at the point p0 = (0,m
∗
1) in programs
GenZero and Increment. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since neither program
encrypts this value.
Note that HybC,2,3,7 = HybD.
Thus, the the advantage of the PPT adversary in distinguishing between HybC and
HybD is at most
(2τ(λ) − 1)((2T + 9) · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + (T + 1) · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 6 · 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)))+
(2(T − 1) + 4) · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + (T − 1) · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 4 · 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) =
377
2τ(λ)(T · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + T · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ))).
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Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementC(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M







2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·46: Programs in HybC . In addition, in this hybrid the adver-
















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-
tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2);
Program isLessC,1,q(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·47: Programs in HybC,1,q. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pT,q} of ACE
punctured at pT,q = (T,m
∗




1), message q, tag
m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,q}(i,m1,m2);
Program isLessC,1,q,1,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,1,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·48: Programs in HybC,1,q,1,1. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pT,q} of ACE
punctured at pT,q = (T,m
∗




1), message q, tag
m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,q}(i,m1,m2);
Program isLessC,1,q,1,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pT,q} of ACE punctured at pT,q = (T,m∗1, q),
upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,1,2(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pT,q} of ACE punctured at pT,q = (T,m∗1, q),
upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{pT,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·49: Programs in HybC,1,q,1,2. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj+1,q} of ACE
punctured at pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗





q, tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 > q return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i ≤ j + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
7. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj+1,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,2,j,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj+1,q} of ACE punctured at pj+1,q =
(j + 1,m∗1, q), upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,2,j,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj+1,q} of ACE punctured at pj+1,q =
(j + 1,m∗1, q), upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{pj+1,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·50: Programs in HybC,1,q,2,j,1. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj,q, pj+1,q} of ACE punctured
at pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q), pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗





level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 > q return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i = j + 1 return L
∗
j,q;
7. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i < j + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
8. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,2,j,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,q, pj+1,q} of ACE punctured at pj,q = (j,m∗1, q), pj+1,q =




1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L′ = L∗j,q then set (i
′,m′1,m
′
2) = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q),




2. If L′′ = L∗j,q then set (i
′′,m′′1 ,m
′′
2) = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q),




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,2,j,2(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,q, pj+1,q} of ACE punctured at pj,q = (j,m∗1, q), pj+1,q =




1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L = L∗j,q then return (m
∗
1, q);
2. out← ACE.DecDK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·51: Programs in HybC,1,q,2,j,2. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj,q, pj+1,q} of ACE punctured
at pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q), pj+1,q = (j+ 1,m
∗
1, q), double-tag level L
∗
j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j+ 1,m
∗
1, q), single-
tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 > q return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i = j + 1 return L
∗
j+1,q;
7. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i < j + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
8. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,2,j,3(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,q, pj+1,q} of ACE punctured at pj,q = (j,m∗1, q), pj+1,q =
(j + 1,m∗1, q), double-tag level L
∗
j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j + 1,m
∗
1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L′ = L∗j+1,q then set (i
′,m′1,m
′
2) = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q),




2. If L′′ = L∗j+1,q then set (i
′′,m′′1 ,m
′′
2) = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q),




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,2,j,3(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,q, pj+1,q} of ACE punctured at pj,q = (j,m∗1, q), pj+1,q =
(j + 1,m∗1, q), double-tag level L
∗
j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j + 1,m
∗
1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L = L∗j+1,q then return (m
∗
1, q);
2. out← ACE.DecDK2{pj,q,pj+1,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·52: Programs in HybC,1,q,2,j,3. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj,q} of ACE
punctured at pj,q = (j,m
∗




1), message q, tag
m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 > q return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i ≤ j return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
7. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,2,j,4(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,q} of ACE punctured at pj,q = (j,m∗1, q),
upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,2,j,4(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,q} of ACE punctured at pj,q = (j,m∗1, q),
upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·53: Programs in HybC,1,q,2,j,4. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{p0,q} of ACE
punctured at p0,q = (0,m
∗




1), message q, tag
m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 > q return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i ≤ 0 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
7. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,2,−1,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q),
upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,2,−1,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q),
upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{p0,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·54: Programs in HybC,1,q,2,−1,1. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{p−1,q, p0,q} of ACE punctured
at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q), p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), double-tag level L∗−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q), single-tag
level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 > q return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i = 0 return L
∗
−1,q;
7. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i < 0 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
8. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,2,−1,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p−1,q, p0,q} of ACE punctured at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q),
p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q), double-tag level L
∗
−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L′ = L∗−1,q then output
′fail′;




2. If L′′ = L∗−1,q then output
′fail′;




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,2,−1,2(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p−1,q, p0,q} of ACE punctured at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q),
p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q), double-tag level L
∗
−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L = L∗−1,q then output
′fail′;
2. out← ACE.DecDK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·55: Programs in HybC,1,q,2,−1,2. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{p−1,q, p0,q} of ACE punctured
at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q), p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), double-tag level L∗0,q = ACE.EncEK2(0,m∗1, q), single-tag
level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 > q return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i = 0 return L
∗
0,q;
7. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = q, and i < 0 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
8. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,2,−1,3(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p−1,q, p0,q} of ACE punctured at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q),
p0,q = (0,m
∗




1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L′ = L∗0,q then output
′fail′;




2. If L′′ = L∗0,q then output
′fail′;




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,2,−1,3(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p−1,q, p0,q} of ACE punctured at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q),
p0,q = (0,m
∗




1, q), upper bound T .
1. If L = L∗0,q then output
′fail′;
2. out← ACE.DecDK2{p−1,q,p0,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·56: Programs in HybC,1,q,2,−1,3. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{p−1,q} of ACE
punctured at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q), single-tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m∗1), message q,
tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,3,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p−1,q} of ACE punctured at p−1,q =
(−1,m∗1, q), message q, tag m∗1, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′











1, q) then output
′fail′;
6. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,3,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p−1,q} of ACE punctured at p−1,q =
(−1,m∗1, q), message q, tag m∗1, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{p−1,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q) then output
′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·57: Programs in HybC,1,q,3,1. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{p−1,q} of ACE
punctured at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q), single-tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m∗1), message q,
tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p−1,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,3,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′












3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′











1, q) then output
′fail′;
6. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,3,2(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L




1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q) then output
′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·58: Programs in HybC,1,q,3,2. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-
tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,3,3(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′












3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′











1, q) then output
′fail′;
6. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,3,3(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L




1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q) then output
′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·59: Programs in HybC,1,q,3,3. In addition, in this hy-
brid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],













Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1 of ACE punctured at p0 =
(0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-tag level
l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, message q, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′





1, q) then output
′fail′;




1, q) then output
′fail′;
6. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,1(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, message q, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q) then output
′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·60: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,1. In addition, in this hybrid the














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,2(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), encryption key








2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, message q, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′





1, q) then output
′fail′;




1, q) then output
′fail′;
6. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTag(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTags(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, message q, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q) then output
′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·61: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,2. In addition, in this hybrid the














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), encryption key
EK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), single-tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m∗1), message q,
tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,3(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, message q, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′





1, q) then output
′fail′;




1, q) then output
′fail′;
6. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,3(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, message q, tag m
∗
1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q) then output
′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·62: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,3. In addition, in this hybrid the














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), encryption key
EK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), single-tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m∗1), message q,
tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,4(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), message q,
tag m∗1, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{p0,q}(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{p0,q}(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′





1, q) then output
′fail′;




1, q) then output
′fail′;
6. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,4(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), message q,
tag m∗1, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2{p0,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. If (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q) then output
′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).






Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,5(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), encryption key
EK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), single-tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m∗1), message q,
tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,5(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), upper bound
T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{p0,q}(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{p0,q}(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,5(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,5(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2{p0,q}(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·64: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,5. In addition, in this hybrid the














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,6(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), encryption key
EK2{p0,q} of ACE punctured at p0,q = (0,m∗1, q), single-tag level l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m∗1), message q,
tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p0,q}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,6(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,6(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,6(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·65: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,6. In addition, in this hybrid the














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,7(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), encryption key








2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,7(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,7(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,7(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·66: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,7. In addition, in this hybrid the














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag m∗1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,8(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1 of ACE punctured at p0 =
(0,m∗1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-tag level
l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,8(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,8(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,8(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·67: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,8. In addition, in this hybrid the














Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,1,q,4,9(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;






Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-tag level
l∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 ≥ q + 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,1,q,4,9(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m′2).
2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2(L′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1 ,m′′2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1 ,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagC,1,q,4,9(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Program RetrieveTagsC,1,q,4,9(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·68: Programs in HybC,1,q,4,9. In addition, in this hybrid the
















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2);
Program isLessC,2,1,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,1,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·69: Programs in HybC,2,1,1. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pT,m∗2} of ACE











tag m∗2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,m∗2}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,m∗2}(i,m1,m2);
Program isLessC,2,1,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,1,2(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·70: Programs in HybC,2,1,2. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pT,m∗2} of ACE











tag m∗2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1 and m2 = m
∗
2 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,m∗2}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pT,m∗2}(i,m1,m2);
Program isLessC,2,1,3(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pT,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pT,m∗2 =
(T,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pT,m∗2}(L




2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pT,m∗2}(L




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,1,3(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pT,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pT,m∗2 =
(T,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{pT,m∗2}(L); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·71: Programs in HybC,2,1,3. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj+1,m∗2} of









tag m∗1, tag m
∗
2, index j, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




2 and i ≤ j + 1 return L ← ACE.EncEK2{pj+1,m∗2}(i −
1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj+1,m∗2}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,2,2,j,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj+1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj+1,m∗2 =
(j + 1,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj+1,m∗2}(L




2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj+1,m∗2}(L




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,2,j,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj+1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj+1,m∗2 =
(j + 1,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK2{pj+1,m∗2}(L); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1,m2.
Figure 3·72: Programs in HybC,2,2,j,1. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj,m∗2 , pj+1,m∗2}




















m∗2, index j, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




2 and i < j + 1 return L ← ACE.EncEK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(i −
1,m1,m2);








6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,2,2,j,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,m∗2 , pj+1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj,m∗2 =
(j,m∗1,m
∗












upper bound T .
1. If L′ = L∗j,m∗2 then set (i
′,m′1,m
′





else out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(L
′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else
parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m
′
2).
2. If L′′ = L∗j,m∗2 then set (i
′′,m′′1,m
′′





else out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(L
′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else
parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1,m
′′
2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,2,j,2(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,m∗2 , pj+1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj,m∗2 =
(j,m∗1,m
∗












upper bound T .





2. out ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(L); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse
out as (i,m1,m2).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·73: Programs in HybC,2,2,j,2. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj,m∗2 , pj+1,m∗2}




















tag m∗2, index j, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




2 and i < j+1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj+1,m∗2}(i−1,m1,m2);








6. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,2,2,j,3(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,m∗2 , pj+1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj,m∗2 =
(j,m∗1,m
∗










2), upper bound T .
1. If L′ = L∗j+1,m∗2 then set (i
′,m′1,m
′





else out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(L
′); if out′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else
parse out′ as (i′,m′1,m
′
2).
2. If L′′ = L∗j+1,m∗2 then set (i
′′,m′′1,m
′′





else out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(L
′′); if out′′ = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else
parse out′′ as (i′′,m′′1,m
′′
2).
3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,2,j,3(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,m∗2 , pj+1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj,m∗2 =
(j,m∗1,m
∗










2), upper bound T .





2. out ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2 ,pj+1,m∗2}(L); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse
out as (i,m1,m2).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
4. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·74: Programs in HybC,2,2,j,3. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{pj,m∗2} of ACE











m∗2, index j, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




2 and i ≤ j return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,m∗2}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{pj,m∗2}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,2,2,j,4(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj,m∗2 =
(j,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2}(L




2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2}(L




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,2,j,4(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{pj,m∗2} of ACE punctured at pj,m∗2 =
(j,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{pj,m∗2}(L); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·75: Programs in HybC,2,2,j,4. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{p1,m∗2} of ACE











m∗2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




2 and i ≤ 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p1,m∗2}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p1,m∗2}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,2,3,1(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at p1,m∗2 =
(1,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out′ ← ACE.DecDK2{p1,m∗2}(L




2. out′′ ← ACE.DecDK2{p1,m∗2}(L




3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,3,1(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2{p1,m∗2} of ACE punctured at p1,m∗2 =
(1,m∗1,m
∗
2), upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2{p1,m∗2}(L); if out =
′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·76: Programs in HybC,2,3,1. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2{p1,m∗2} of ACE











m∗2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




2 and i ≤ 1 return L← ACE.EncEK2{p1,m∗2}(i− 1,m1,m2);
5. Return L← ACE.EncEK2{p1,m∗2}(i,m1,m2).
Program isLessC,2,3,2(L
′, L′′)
Inputs: double-tag levels L′, L′′
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .








3. If i′ > T or i′′ > T or i′ < 0 or i′′ < 0 or (m′1,m
′
2) 6= (m′′1,m′′2) then output ′fail′;
4. If i′ < i′′ then output true, else output false.
Program RetrieveTagsC,2,3,2(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out ← ACE.DecDK2(L); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as
(i,m1,m2).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Return (m1,m2).
Figure 3·77: Programs in HybC,2,3,2. In addition, in this hybrid
the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs GenZero[m∗1],















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-






2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = m
∗
2, and i ≤ 0, return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);




Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag
m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,2,3,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1 of ACE punctured
at p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. output l+1 ← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(i+ 1,m1).
Program RetrieveTagC,2,3,3(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·78: Programs in HybC,2,3,3. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,
















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1),









upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;
4. If m1 = m
∗
1, m2 = m
∗
2, and i ≤ 0, return L← ACE.EncEK2(i− 1,m1,m2);




Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag
m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,2,3,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punc-
tured at p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. output l+1 ← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(i+ 1,m1).
Program RetrieveTagC,2,3,4(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1),
upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·79: Programs in HybC,2,3,4. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,
















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1),














2. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag
m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,2,3,5(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1{p0} of ACE punc-
tured at p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. output l+1 ← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(i+ 1,m1).
Program RetrieveTagC,2,3,5(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1),
upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1{p0}(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·80: Programs in HybC,2,3,5. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,
















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1{p0} of ACE punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1), tag
m∗1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,2,3,6(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1{p0},DK1 of ACE punctured
at p0 = (0,m
∗
1), upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. output l+1 ← ACE.EncEK1{p0}(i+ 1,m1).
Program RetrieveTagC,2,3,6(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·81: Programs in HybC,2,3,6. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,
















Inputs: single-tag level l, tag m2 ∈M
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, encryption key EK2 of ACE, single-




2, upper bound T .






2. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then return ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
3. If i > T or i < 0 then return ′fail′;




Inputs: tag m1 ∈M .
Hardwired values: encryption key EK1 of ACE, tag m
∗
1.




2. Output l← ACE.EncEK1(0,m1).
Program IncrementC,2,3,7(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK1,DK1 of ACE, upper bound
T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i ≥ T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. output l+1 ← ACE.EncEK1(i+ 1,m1).
Program RetrieveTagC,2,3,7(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. out← ACE.DecDK1(l); if out = ′fail′ then output ′fail′; else parse out as (i,m1).
2. If i > T or i < 0 then output ′fail′;
3. Output m1.
Figure 3·82: Programs in HybC,2,3,7. In addition, in this hybrid the
adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags,










3.5.5 Detailed Proof of Security
Reductions in the proof of lemma 5 (Switching from `∗0 to `
∗
1)
We show that for any PPT adversary,
advHybA,HybB(λ) ≤ T · 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)) + T · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Lemma 8. advHybA,HybA,1,1(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In programs GenZeroA,1,1 and IncrementA,1,1 encryption key EK1 is punctured
at pT+1 = (T + 1,m
∗
1). This is without changing the functionality, since GenZero only
encrypts plaintexts of the form (0,m1), and Increment outputs
′fail′ when i = T and
thus never encrypts (T + 1,m∗1).
Lemma 9. advHybA,1,1,HybA,1,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {pT+1} = {(T + 1,m∗1)} to puncture encryption key
EK1 and challenge sets {pT+1} ,∅ to puncture decryption key DK1. Indeed, given
EK1{pT+1} and key which is either DK1 or DK1{pT+1}, it is easy to reconstruct the
rest of the distribution.
Lemma 10. advHybA,2,j,1,HybA,2,j,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)) for 1 ≤ j ≤ T .
Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, RetrieveTag we puncture EK1, DK1
at pj = (j,m
∗




1) when required, in order to
preserve functionality.
In program GenZeroA,2,j,2 we can puncture EK1 at pj without changing the functionality,
since GenZeroA,2,j,2 only encrypts plaintexts of the form (0,m1) (note that j ≥ 1).
In program IncrementA,2,j,2 we puncture DK1 at pj and, in order to preserve the
functionality, instruct the program to output ACE.EncEK1(j + 2,m
∗
1) on input `
∗
j (note
that this is what IncrementA,2,j,1 outputs on input `
∗
j)
25. Further, we puncture EK1 at
pj and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output `
∗
j on
input ACE.EncEK1(j − 1,m∗1) (note that this is what IncrementA,2,j,1 does).
25Except for the case j = T , when we instead instruct the program to output ′fail′.
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In program TransformA,2,j,2 we puncture DK1 at pj and, in order to preserve the
functionality, instruct the program to output ACE.EncEK2(j,m
∗
1,m2) on input (`
∗
j ,m2)
for any m2 (note that this is what TransformA,2,j,1 does). Because of this instruction,
we can also instruct TransformA,2,j,2 to output
′fail′ when (i,m1) = (j,m
∗
1), since this
line will never be reached.
In program RetrieveTagA,2,j,2 we puncture DK1 at pj and, in order to preserve the
functionality, instruct the program to output m∗1 on input `
∗
j (note that this is what
RetrieveTagA,2,j,1 does).
Lemma 11. advHybA,2,j,2,HybA,2,j,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) for 1 ≤ j ≤ T .
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ci-
phertexts for the challenge plaintexts pj = (j,m
∗
1) and pj+1 = (j + 1,m
∗
1). In-
deed, given EK1{pj, pj+1}, DK1{pj, pj+1}, and either `∗j = ACE.EncEK1(j,m∗1) or
`∗j+1 = ACE.EncEK1(j + 1,m
∗
1), it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution.
Note that indeed only one of the two ciphertexts is used in both hybrids (in particular,
since j ≥ 1, the key is never punctured at p0 = (0,m∗1) and therefore we can always
compute `∗0 for the distribution).
Lemma 12. advHybA,2,j,3,HybA,2,j,4(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)) for 1 ≤ j ≤ T .
Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, RetrieveTag we unpuncture EK1,
DK1 at pj+1 = (j + 1,m
∗
1) and remove hardwired `
∗
j+1 = ACE.EncEK1(j + 1,m
∗
1):
In program GenZeroA,2,j,4 we can unpuncture EK1 at pj+1 without changing the func-
tionality, since GenZeroA,2,j,3 only encrypts plaintexts of the form (0,m1) (note that
j ≥ 1).
In program IncrementA,2,j,4 we unpuncture DK1 at pj+1, remove the instruction to
output ACE.EncEK1(j+ 2,m
∗
1) on input `
∗
j+1 and, in order to preserve the functionality,
instruct the program to output ACE.EncEK1(j + 2,m
∗
1) when (i,m1) = (j + 1,m
∗
1)
(we don’t put any separate instruction since this is normal behavior of Increment);
26. Further, we unpuncture EK1 at pj+1, remove the instruction to output `
∗
j+1 on
26Except for the case j = T , when we instead remove the instruction to output ′fail′. Note that
Increment outputs ′fail′ when i = T + 1 so no additional modification is required. The other exception
is the case j = T −1, where IncrementA,2,j,3 contains the instruction to output ACE.EncEK1(T +1,m∗1)
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input ACE.EncEK1(j − 1,m∗1) and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the
program to output ACE.EncEK1(j + 1,m
∗
1) when (i,m1) = (j − 1,m∗1).
In program TransformA,2,j,4 we unpuncture DK1 at pj, remove the instruction to
output ACE.EncEK2(j,m
∗
1,m2) on input (`
∗
j+1,m2) for any m2 and, in order to preserve
the functionality, instruct the program to output ACE.EncEK2(i − 1,m1,m2) when
(i,m1) = (j + 1,m
∗
1).
In program RetrieveTagA,2,j,4 we unpuncture DK1 at pj+1 and remove the instruction
to output m∗1 on input `
∗
j+1. No additional change is required since this is what
RetrieveTag would normally output27.
Lemma 13. advHybA,2,0,1,HybA,2,0,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, RetrieveTag we puncture EK1, DK1
at p0 = (0,m
∗




1) when required, in order to
preserve functionality:
In program GenZeroA,2,0,2 we can puncture EK1 at p0 without changing the functionality,
since GenZeroA,2,0,2 outputs
′fail′ when m1 = m
∗
1.
In program IncrementA,2,0,2 we puncture DK1 at p0 and, in order to preserve the
functionality, instruct the program to output ACE.EncEK1(2,m
∗
1) on input `
∗
0 (note
that this is what IncrementA,2,0,1 outputs on input `
∗
0). Further, we puncture EK1 at p0:
this is without changing the functionality, since this program never needs to encrypt
plaintexts with value 0.
In program TransformA,2,0,2 we puncture DK1 at p0 and, in order to preserve the
functionality, instruct the program to output ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1,m2) on input (`
∗
0,m2)
for any m2 (note that this is what TransformA,2,0,1 does). Because of this instruction,
we can also instruct TransformA,2,0,2 to output
′fail′ when (i,m1) = (0,m
∗
1), since this
line will never be reached.
In program RetrieveTagA,2,0,2 we puncture DK1 at p0 and, in order to preserve the
functionality, instruct the program to output m∗1 on input `
∗
0 (note that this is what
on input `∗T , and thus in IncrementA,2,j,4 we change the upper bound from T to T + 1 for the case
m1 = m
∗
1 in order to preserve the functionality.
27Except for the case j = T , which instruct the program to output m∗1 on input `
∗
T+1. In this case






Lemma 14. advHybA,2,0,2,HybA,2,0,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ci-
phertexts for the challenge plaintexts p0 = (0,m
∗
1) and p1 = (1,m
∗
1). Indeed, given
EK1{p0, p1}, DK1{p0, p1}, and either `∗0 = ACE.EncEK1(0,m∗1) or `∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m∗1),
it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. Note that indeed only one of the
two ciphertexts is used in both hybrids (in particular, a single-tag level we give to the
adversary is either `∗0 or `
∗
1).
Lemma 15. advHybA,2,0,3,HybA,3,1(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, RetrieveTag we unpuncture EK1,
DK1 at p1 = (1,m
∗
1) and remove hardwired `
∗
1 = ACE.EncEK1(j + 1,m
∗
1):
In program GenZeroA,3,2 we can unpuncture EK1 at p1 without changing the function-
ality, since GenZeroA,2,0,3 only encrypts plaintexts of the form (0,m1).
In program IncrementA,3,1 we unpuncture DK1 at p1 and remove the additional in-
struction to output ACE.EncEK1(2,m
∗
1) on input `
∗
1 (this is without changing the
functionality, since this is what the program normally does). Further, we unpuncture
EK1 at p1 without changing the functionality: indeed, the program could possibly
encrypt p1 only given an encryption of p0 as input. However, DK1 is punctured at p0
and thus the program would instead output ′fail′ on such input.
In program TransformA,3,1 we instruct the program to output ACE.EncEK2(i−1,m1,m2),
given an encryption of (i,m∗1) and m2 as input, in the whole range of i from 0 to T . In
contrast, program TransformA,2,0,3 does this only for 2 ≤ i ≤ T . However, this is with-
out changing the functionality: first, TransformA,2,0,3 outputs ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1,m2),
given `∗1 and m2 as input, thus we didn’t change the case i = 1. Second, DK1 is
punctured at p0, and thus we can arbitrary change behaviour for the case i = 0 since
the program never reaches that line when i = 0, outputting ′fail′ during decryption.
With this modification, we can remove the instruction to output ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1,m2)
on input (`∗1,m2) and then unpuncture DK1 at point p1.
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In program RetrieveTagA,3,1 we unpuncture DK1 at p1 and remove the instruction to
output m∗1 on input `
∗
1. No additional change is required since this is what RetrieveTag
would normally output.
Lemma 16. advHybA,3,1,HybA,3,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p0} = {(0,m∗1)} to puncture encryption key EK1 and
challenge sets {p0} ,∅ to puncture decryption key DK1. Indeed, given EK1{p0} and key
which is either DK1 or DK1{p0}, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution.
Lemma 17. advHybA,3,2,HybA,3,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we unpuncture EK1 at p0 = (0,m
∗
1). This
doesn’t change the functionality, since GenZero outputs ′fail′ when m1 = m
∗
1, and
Increment never encrypts a plaintext with value 0.
Reductions in the proof of lemma 6 (Changing the upper bound from T +1
to T )
We show that




+ T · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + T · 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
(1/T term comes from the fact that the reduction works only when i∗ 6= 0, where i∗ is
chosen randomly between 0 and T ).
Lemma 18. advHybB ,HybB,1,1(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(γ(λ)).
Proof. Assume there is a poly-time distinguisher D which distinguishes between these
two hybrids with probability η ≥ 2−o(γ(λ)) (for infinitely many λi). Then, since:
• programs IncrementB and IncrementB,1,1 differ only at one point (due to the fact
that g is injective);
• η ≥ 2−o(γ(λ)) ≥ 2−o(νiO(λ)) (from the condition γ(λ) ≤ O(νiO(λ))) in the theorem
statement),
420
it follows from lemma 4 that there exists an inverter which runs in time at most
O(1/η) log T = 2o(γ(λ)) log T , which by the condition in the theorem statement is at
most O(2νOWF(log T )). This inverter inverts the one way function with probability at least
(1−2−Ω(λ))η, which contradicts the fact that g is 2O(νOWF(λ log T )), 2−Ω(νOWF(λ log T ))-secure
OWF.
Lemma 19. advHybB,1,1,HybB,1,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. First, note that both programs GenZeroB,1,1 and GenZeroB,1,2 are functionally
equivalent: since i∗ + 1 6= 0, and GenZero only needs to encrypt value 0, we can safely
puncture EK1 at (i
∗ + 1,m∗1).
Second, programs IncrementB,1,1 and IncrementB,1,2 are functionally equivalent as
well: the only difference in the code is that the first outputs ′fail′ when (m1, i) =
(m∗1, i
∗) (on input ACE.EncEK1(i
∗,m∗1)), and the second instead outputs
′fail′ when it
tries to encrypt a punctured point (i∗ + 1,m∗1), which happens on the same input
ACE.EncEK1(i
∗,m∗1).
Lemma 20. If i∗ 6= 0, advHybB,2,j,1,HybB,2,j,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) for i∗ ≤ j ≤ T .
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set Si∗+1,j+1 to puncture encryption key EK1 and challenge sets
Si∗+1,j, Si∗+1,j+1 to puncture decryption key DK1 (here Sa,b = {(m∗1, a), (m∗1, a+1), . . . ,
(m∗1, b)} if b ≥ a and ∅ otherwise). Indeed, given EK1{Si∗+1,j+1} and key which is either
DK1{Si∗+1,j} or DK1{Si∗+1,j+1}, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution,
as long as i∗ 6= 0. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and
compute `∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗
1) (using the challenge encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j+1}
which is not punctured at (1,m∗1) since i
∗ 6= 0) and L∗0 = ACE.EncEK2(0,m∗1,m∗2).
Lemma 21. advHybB,2,j,2,HybB,2,j,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)) for i∗ ≤ j ≤ T .
Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment we additionally puncture EK1 at pj+2 = (j +
2,m∗1).
In program GenZero we can puncture EK1 at pj+2 without changing the functionality,
since GenZero only encrypts plaintexts of the form (0,m1), but j + 2 6= 0.
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In program Increment we can puncture EK1 at pj+2 without changing the functionality,
since DK1 is punctured at the point pj+1, thus Increment never needs to encrypt pj+2
since on input [j + 1,m∗1] it instead outputs
′fail′ during decryption.
Lemma 22. advHybB,3,1,HybB,3,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag we change the upper bound
from T + 1 back to T .
In particular, in program IncrementB,3,2 we now additionally output
′fail′ when i = T
and m1 = m
∗
1. This is without changing the functionality, since this line is never
reached: both programs IncrementB,3,1 and IncrementB,3,2 anyway output
′fail′ on input
[T,m∗1], since DK1 is punctured at (T,m
∗
1).
In program Transform we now additionally output ′fail′ when i = T + 1 and m1 = m
∗
1.
This is without changing the functionality, since this line is never reached: both
programs TransformB,3,1 and TransformB,3,2 anyway output
′fail′ on input [T + 1,m∗1]
and any m2, since DK1 is punctured at (T + 1,m
∗
1).
In program RetrieveTag we now additionally output ′fail′ when i = T + 1 and m1 = m
∗
1.
This is without changing the functionality, since this line is never reached: both
programs RetrieveTagB,3,1 and RetrieveTagB,3,2 anyway output
′fail′ on input [T+1,m∗1],
since DK1 is punctured at (T + 1,m
∗
1).
Lemma 23. If i∗ 6= 0, advHybB,4,j,1,HybB,4,j,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) for i∗ ≤ j ≤ T .
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set Si∗+1,j+1 to puncture encryption key EK1 and challenge sets
Si∗+1,j, Si∗+1,j+1 to puncture decryption key DK1 (here Sa,b = {(m∗1, a), (m∗1, a+1), . . . ,
(m∗1, b)} if b ≥ a and ∅ otherwise). Indeed, given EK1{Si∗+1,j+1} and key which is either
DK1{Si∗+1,j} or DK1{Si∗+1,j+1}, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution,
as long as i∗ 6= 0. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and
compute `∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗
1) (using the challenge encryption key EK1{Si∗+1,j+1}
which is not punctured at (1,m∗1) since i
∗ 6= 0) and L∗0 = ACE.EncEK2(0,m∗1,m∗2).
Lemma 24. advHybB,4,j,2,HybB,4,j,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)) for i∗ ≤ j ≤ T .




In program GenZero we can unpuncture EK1 at pj+1 without changing the functionality,
since GenZero only encrypts plaintexts of the form (0,m1), but j + 1 6= 0.
In program Increment we can unpuncture EK1 at pj+1 without changing the function-
ality, since DK1 is punctured at the point pj, thus Increment never needs to encrypt
pj+1 since on input [j,m
∗
1] it instead outputs
′fail′ during decryption.
Lemma 25. advHybB,5,1,HybB,5,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. First, note that both programs GenZeroB,5,1 and GenZeroB,5,2 are functionally
equivalent: since i∗ + 1 6= 0, and GenZero only needs to encrypt value 0, we can safely
unpuncture EK1 at (i
∗ + 1,m∗1).
Second, programs IncrementB,5,1 and IncrementB,5,2 are functionally equivalent as well:
the only difference in the code is that the first outputs ′fail′ when it tries to encrypt
a punctured point (i∗ + 1,m∗1) (which happens on input ACE.EncEK1(i
∗,m∗1)), and
the second outputs ′fail′ when (m1, i) = (m
∗
1, i
∗), which happens on the same input
ACE.EncEK1(i
∗,m∗1).
Lemma 26. advHybB,5,2,HybB,5,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(γ(λ)).
Proof. Assume there is a poly-time distinguisher D which distinguishes between these
two hybrids with probability η ≥ 2−o(γ(λ)) (for infinitely many λi). Then, since:
• programs IncrementB and IncrementB,1,1 differ only at one point (due to the fact
that g is injective);
• η ≥ 2−o(γ(λ)) ≥ 2−o(νiO(λ)) (from the condition γ(λ) ≤ O(νiO(λ))) in the theorem
statement),
it follows from lemma 4 that there exists an inverter which runs in time at most
O(1/η) log T = 2o(γ(λ)) log T , which by the condition in the theorem statement is at
most O(2νOWF(log T )). This inverter inverts the one way function with probability at least
(1−2−Ω(λ))η, which contradicts the fact that g is 2O(νOWF(λ log T )), 2−Ω(νOWF(λ log T ))-secure
OWF.
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Reductions in the proof of lemma 7 (Restoring behavior of Transform)
We show that
advHybC ,HybD(λ) ≤ 2
τ(λ)(T · 2−Ω(νiO(λ)) + T · 2−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)) + 2−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ))).
Lemma 27. advHybC,1,q ,HybC,1,q,1,1(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In program Transform we puncture encryption key EK2 at pT,q = (T,m
∗
1, q).
This is without changing the functionality, since Transform never encrypts this point:
indeed, it encrypts (i−1,m1,m2) when m2 = q, but will abort instead if i = T +1.
Lemma 28. advHybC,1,q,1,1,HybC,1,q,1,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {pT,q} = {(T,m∗1, q)} to puncture encryption key EK2
and challenge sets {pT,q}, ∅ to puncture decryption key DK2. Indeed, given EK2{pT,q}
and key which is either DK2{pT,q} or DK2, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and








2) (using the challenge
encryption key EK2{pT,q} which is not punctured at (0,m∗1,m∗2).
Lemma 29. advHybC,1,q,2,j,1,HybC,1,q,2,j,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2, 0 ≤ j ≤ T − 1.
Proof. We puncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q) and hardwire
L∗j,q = ACE.EncEK2(j,m
∗
1, q) to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt pj,q in programs
Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.
More specifically, in program Transform we puncture EK2 at pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q) and, in
order to preserve the functionality, add an instruction to output
L∗j,q = ACE.EncEK2(j,m
∗
1, q) when (i,m1,m2) = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q).
In program isLess we puncture decryption key DK2 at pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q) and, in order
to preserve the functionality, instruct the program not to decrypt L∗j,q, but to use
(j + 1,m∗1, q) as the result of decryption instead. Note that this is different from
what L∗j,q would normally decrypt to, which is (j,m
∗
1, q). However, we argue that this
doesn’t change the functionality of the program. Indeed:
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• The set of inputs on which isLess outputs ′fail′ isn’t changed; in particular, since
0 ≤ j ≤ T − 1, both (j,m∗1, q) and (j + 1,m∗1, q) are within 0 to T limits and
thus are both valid.
• The result of the comparison on inputs [i′,m1,m2] and [i′′,m1,m2], where
(m1,m2) 6= (m∗1, q), remains the same;
• The result of the comparison on inputs [i′,m∗1, q] and [i′′,m∗1, q], where i′, i′′ 6= j
and i′, i′′ 6= j + 1, remains the same;
• The output of the program on inputs ([i′,m∗1, q], [i′′,m∗1, q]), where i′ = j + 1 or
i′′ = j + 1, is ′fail′ for both the original and modified programs, since DK2 is
punctured at pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q) and thus decryption returns
′fail′;
• The result of the comparison on inputs ([i′,m∗1, q], [j,m∗1, q] = L∗j,q), remains the
same, since for both programs the output is:
– true for 0 ≤ i′ < j;
– false for i′ = j (indeed, in the original program in this case i′ = i′′ = j, and




and the program uses j + 1 as the decryption result);
– ′fail′ for i′ = j + 1, since DK2 is punctured at pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q) and
thus decryption returns ′fail′;
– false for j + 2 ≤ i′ ≤ T .
• Similarly, the result of the comparison on inputs ([j,m∗1, q] = L∗j,q, [i′,m∗1, q])
remains the same for the original program and modified program (with the
difference that the result is false for 0 ≤ i′ < j and true for j + 2 ≤ i′ ≤ T ).
In program RetrieveTags we puncture decryption key DK2 at pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q) and, in
order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output (m∗1, q) on input
L∗j,q.
Lemma 30. advHybC,1,q,2,j,2,HybC,1,q,2,j,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)), for q 6= m∗2, 0 ≤ j ≤ T − 1.
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE cipher-
texts for the challenge plaintexts pj,q = (j,m
∗
1, q) and pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q). Indeed,
given EK2{pj,q, pj+1,q}, DK2{pj,q, pj+1,q}, and either L∗j,q = ACE.EncEK2(j,m∗1, q) or
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L∗j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j + 1,m
∗
1, q), it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution.
That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all program (note that indeed at most
one of two ciphertexts L∗j,q, L
∗
j+1,q is used in programs of HybC,1,q,2,j,2 and HybC,1,q,2,j,3),









challenge encryption key EK2{pj,q, pj+1,q} which is not punctured at (0,m∗1,m∗2) since
q 6= m∗2).
Lemma 31. advHybC,1,q,2,j,3,HybC,1,q,2,j,4(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2, 0 ≤ j ≤ T − 1.
Proof. We unpuncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q) and
remove hardwired L∗j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j + 1,m
∗
1, q) in programs Transform, isLess,
and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.
More specifically, in program Transform we unpuncture EK2 at pj+1,q = (j+1,m
∗
1, q) and
remove an instruction to output L∗j+1,q = ACE.EncEK2(j + 1,m
∗
1, q) when (i,m1,m2) =
(j + 1,m∗1, q). This is without changing the functionality, since now the program will
run an encryption ACE.EncEK2(j + 1,m
∗
1, q) when (i,m1,m2) = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q), instead
of directly outputting hardwired L∗j+1,q.
In program isLess we unpuncture decryption key DK2 at pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q) and
remove an instruction to use (j+1,m∗1, q) as a result of decrypting L
∗
j+1,q, thus making
the program decrypt L∗j+1,q instead. This is without changing the functionality, since
(j + 1,m∗1, q) is what L
∗
j+1,q decrypts to.
In program RetrieveTags we unpuncture decryption key DK2 at pj+1,q = (j + 1,m
∗
1, q)
and remove an instruction to output (m∗1, q) on input L
∗
j+1,q. This is without changing
the functionality, since (m∗1, q) is what the program outputs when decrypting L
∗
j+1,q.
Lemma 32. advHybC,1,q,2,−1,1,HybC,1,q,2,−1,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. We puncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q) and hardwire
L∗−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q) to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt p−1,q in
programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.
More specifically, in program Transform we puncture EK2 at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q)
and, in order to preserve the functionality, add an instruction to output L∗−1,q =
ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q) when (i,m1,m2) = (0,m∗1, q).
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In program isLess we puncture decryption key DK2 at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q) and instruct
the program to output ′fail′, given L∗−1,q. This is without changing the functionality,
since [−1,m∗1, q] is treated by the program as an invalid input, since the value i should
be between 0 and T .
In program RetrieveTags we puncture decryption key DK2 at p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q) and
instruct the program to output ′fail′, given L∗−1,q. This is without changing the
functionality, since [−1,m∗1, q] is treated by the program as an invalid input, since the
value i should be between 0 and T .
Lemma 33. advHybC,1,q,2,−1,2,HybC,1,q,2,−1,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ci-
phertexts for the challenge plaintexts p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q) and p0,q = (0,m∗1, q). Indeed,
given EK2{p−1,q, p0,q}, DK2{p−1,q, p0,q}, and either L∗−1,q = ACE.EncEK2(−1,m∗1, q) or
L∗0,q = ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1, q), it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That
is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all program (note that indeed at most one
of two ciphertexts L∗−1,q, L
∗
0,q is used in programs of HybC,1,q,2,−1,2 and HybC,1,q,2,−1,3),









challenge encryption key EK2{p−1,q, p0,q} which is not punctured at (0,m∗1,m∗2) since
q 6= m∗2).
Lemma 34. advHybC,1,q,2,−1,3,HybC,1,q,3,1(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. We unpuncture ACE keys EK2,DK2 at the point p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q) and remove
hardwired L∗0,q = ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1, q) in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags,
without changing their functionality.
More specifically, in program Transform we unpuncture EK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q) and
remove an instruction to output L∗0,q = ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1, q) when (i,m1,m2) =
(0,m∗1, q). This is without changing the functionality, since now the program will run
an encryption ACE.EncEK2(0,m
∗
1, q) when (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q), instead of directly
outputting hardwired L∗0,q.
In program isLess we unpuncture decryption key DK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q) and remove
an instruction to output ′fail′ given L∗0,q; to preserve the functionality, we instruct the
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2) is equal to (0,m
∗
1, q).
In program RetrieveTags we unpuncture decryption key DK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q) and
remove an instruction to output ′fail′ given L∗0,q; to preserve the functionality, we
instruct the program to output ′fail′ when (i,m1,m2) = (0,m
∗
1, q).
Lemma 35. advHybC,1,q,3,1,HybC,1,q,3,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p−1,q} = {(−1,m∗1, q)} to puncture encryption key
EK2 and challenge sets {p−1,q}, ∅ to puncture decryption key DK2. Indeed, given
EK2{p−1,q} and key which is either DK2{p−1,q} or DK2, it is easy to reconstruct the rest
of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and








2) (using the challenge
encryption key EK2{p−1,q} which is not punctured at (0,m∗1,m∗2) since q 6= m∗2).
Lemma 36. advHybC,1,q,3,2,HybC,1,q,3,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. We unpuncture ACE key EK2 at the point p−1,q = (−1,m∗1, q) in program
Transform. This is without changing the functionality, since this program never
needs to encrypt p−1,q: indeed, when (m1,m2) = (m
∗
1, q), the program only encrypts
(i,m1,m2), where 0 ≤ i ≤ T .
Lemma 37. advHybC,1,q,3,3,HybC,1,q,4,1(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we puncture encryption key EK1 at p0 =
(0,m∗1). This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs to
encrypt this point.
Lemma 38. advHybC,1,q,4,1,HybC,1,q,4,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p0} = {(0,m∗1)} to puncture encryption key EK1 and
challenge sets {p0} ,∅ to puncture decryption key DK1. Indeed, given EK1{p0}
and key which is either DK1 or DK1{p0}, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and
compute `∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗
1) (using the challenge encryption key EK1{p0} which








Lemma 39. advHybC,1,q,4,2,HybC,1,q,4,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. In program Transform we puncture encryption key EK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q). This
is without changing the functionality: indeed, in order to encrypt p0,q, the program
should get ([0,m∗1], q) as input, but on this input Transform instead outputs
′fail′, since
decryption key DK1 is punctured at p0 = (0,m
∗
1).
Lemma 40. advHybC,1,q,4,3,HybC,1,q,4,4(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p0,q} = {(0,m∗1, q)} to puncture encryption key EK2
and challenge sets {p0,q}, ∅ to puncture decryption key DK2. Indeed, given EK2{p0,q}
and key which is either DK2{p0,q} or DK2, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and








2) (using the challenge
encryption key EK2{p0,q} which is not punctured at (0,m∗1,m∗2) since q 6= m∗2).
Lemma 41. advHybC,1,q,4,4,HybC,1,q,4,5(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. In programs isLess and RetrieveTags we remove an instruction to output ′fail′,
given [0,m∗1, q]. This is without changing the functionality, since in both programs
DK2 is punctured at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q), thus making the programs output
′fail′ during
decryption; thus the instructions which we are removing are never reached anyway,
and we can safely remove them.
Lemma 42. advHybC,1,q,4,5,HybC,1,q,4,6(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)) for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p0,q} = {(0,m∗1, q)} to puncture encryption key EK2
and challenge sets {p0,q}, ∅ to puncture decryption key DK2. Indeed, given EK2{p0,q}
and key which is either DK2{p0,q} or DK2, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and








2) (using the challenge
encryption key EK2{p0,q} which is not punctured at (0,m∗1,m∗2) since q 6= m∗2).
Lemma 43. advHybC,1,q,4,6,HybC,1,q,4,7(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
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Proof. In program Transform we unpuncture encryption key EK2 at p0,q = (0,m
∗
1, q).
This is without changing the functionality: indeed, in order to encrypt p0,q, the
program should get ([0,m∗1], q) as input, but on this input Transform instead outputs
′fail′, since decryption key DK1 is punctured at p0 = (0,m
∗
1).
Lemma 44. advHybC,1,q,4,7,HybC,1,q,4,8(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p0} = {(0,m∗1)} to puncture encryption key EK1 and
challenge sets {p0} ,∅ to puncture decryption key DK1. Indeed, given EK1{p0}
and key which is either DK1 or DK1{p0}, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and
compute `∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗
1) (using the challenge encryption key EK1{p0} which







Lemma 45. advHybC,1,q,4,8,HybC,1,q,4,9(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for q 6= m∗2.
Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we unpuncture encryption key EK1 at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1). This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs
to encrypt this point.
Lemma 46. advHybC,2,1,1,HybC,2,1,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).





This is without changing the functionality, since Transform never encrypts this point:




2) the largest value it encrypts is (T − 1,m1,m2).
Lemma 47. advHybC,2,1,2,HybC,2,1,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption




= {(T,m∗1,m∗2)} to puncture encryption key




, ∅ to puncture decryption key DK2. Indeed, given
EK2{pT,m∗2} and key which is either DK2{pT,m∗2} or DK2, it is easy to reconstruct the
rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs,















Lemma 48. advHybC,2,2,j,1,HybC,2,2,j,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1.









2) to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt pj,m∗2 in
programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.



















2) and, in order
to preserve the functionality, instruct the program not to decrypt L∗j,m∗2 , but to use
(j + 1,m∗1,m
∗
2) as the result of decryption instead. Note that this is different from




2). However, we argue that
this doesn’t change the functionality of the program. Indeed:
• The set of inputs on which isLess outputs ′fail′ isn’t changed; in particular, since
0 ≤ j ≤ T − 1, both (j,m∗1,m∗2) and (j + 1,m∗1,m∗2) are within 0 to T limits and
thus are both valid.
• The result of the comparison on inputs [i′,m1,m2] and [i′′,m1,m2], where
(m1,m2) 6= (m∗1,m∗2), remains the same, for all i′, i′′;
• The result of the comparison on inputs [i′,m∗1,m∗2] and [i′′,m∗1,m∗2], where i′, i′′ 6=
j and i′, i′′ 6= j + 1, remains the same;
• The output of the program on inputs ([i′,m∗1,m∗2], [i′′,m∗1,m∗2]), where i′ = j + 1
or i′′ = j + 1, is ′fail′ for both the original and modified programs, since DK2 is




2) and thus decryption returns
′fail′;
• The result of the comparison on inputs ([i′,m∗1,m∗2], [j,m∗1,m∗2] = L∗j,m∗2), remains
the same, since for both programs the output is:
– true for 0 ≤ i′ < j;
– false for i′ = j (indeed, in the original program in this case i′ = i′′ = j, and






i′ = j and the program uses j + 1 as the decryption result);





thus decryption returns ′fail′;
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– false for j + 2 ≤ i′ ≤ T .




remains the same for the original program and modified program (with the
difference that the result is false for 0 ≤ i′ < j and true for j + 2 ≤ i′ ≤ T ).









Lemma 49. advHybC,2,2,j,2,HybC,2,2,j,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.Indist(λ)), for 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1.
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE




2) and pj+1,m∗2 = (j +
1,m∗1,m
∗















2), it is easy to recon-
struct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate
all programs (note that creating the programs in each of the hybrids HybC,2,2,j,2,












2) (using the chal-






Lemma 50. advHybC,2,2,j,3,HybC,2,2,j,4(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)), for 1 ≤ j ≤ T − 1.









2) in programs Transform, isLess,
and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.














2). This is without changing the functionality, since now




2) when (i,m1,m2) =
(j + 1,m∗1,m
∗









and remove an instruction to use (j + 1,m∗1,m
∗





thus making the program decrypt L∗j+1,m∗2 instead. This is without changing the
functionality, since (j + 1,m∗1,m
∗









and remove an instruction to output (m∗1,m
∗
2) on input L
∗
j+1,m∗2
. This is without
changing the functionality, since (m∗1,m
∗
2) is what the program outputs when decrypting
L∗j+1,m∗2 .
Lemma 51. advHybC,2,3,1,HybC,2,3,2(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption




= {(1,m∗1,m∗2)} to puncture encryption key




, ∅ to puncture decryption key DK2. Indeed, given
EK2{p1,m∗2} and key which is either DK2{p1,m∗2} or DK2, it is easy to reconstruct the
rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs,














Lemma 52. advHybC,2,3,2,HybC,2,3,3(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In program Transform we do the following changes. First, we change the
condition for when to encrypt i − 1 from i ≤ 1 to i ≤ 0. This is without changing




2) corresponds to the input
([1,m∗1],m
∗
2), in which case the program outputs
′fail′ at the very beginning, thus the
line with the condition is not reached on this input anyway. For the same reason we





Next, in programs GenZero and Increment we puncture encryption key EK1 at p0 =
(0,m∗1). This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs to
encrypt this point.
Lemma 53. advHybC,2,3,3,HybC,2,3,4(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p0} = {(0,m∗1)} to puncture encryption key EK1 and
challenge sets {p0} ,∅ to puncture decryption key DK1. Indeed, given EK1{p0}
and key which is either DK1 or DK1{p0}, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and
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compute `∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗
1) (using the challenge encryption key EK1{p0} which







Lemma 54. advHybC,2,3,4,HybC,2,3,5(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In program Transform we make the program output ACE.EncEK2(i,m1,m2)
instead of ACE.EncEK2(i − 1,m1,m2) for the case (i,m1,m2) = (0,m∗1,m∗2); this is
without changing the funcitonality, since encryption is never reached in the case.
Indeed, on input ([0,m∗1],m
∗
2) Transform outputs
′fail′ during decryption, since DK1 is
punctured at p0 = (0,m
∗
1).
Lemma 55. advHybC,2,3,5,HybC,2,3,6(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νACE.ConstrDec(λ)).
Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption
of ACE for the challenge set {p0} = {(0,m∗1)} to puncture encryption key EK1 and
challenge sets {p0} ,∅ to puncture decryption key DK1. Indeed, given EK1{p0}
and key which is either DK1 or DK1{p0}, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and
compute `∗1 = ACE.EncEK1(1,m
∗
1) (using the challenge encryption key EK1{p0} which







Lemma 56. advHybC,2,3,6,HybC,2,3,7(λ) ≤ 2
−Ω(νiO(λ)).
Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we unpuncture encryption key EK1 at
p0 = (0,m
∗
1). This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs
to encrypt this point.
3.6 Construction of Interactive Deniable Encryption
In this section we describe a construction of interactive deniable encryption for a
single-bit message space.
Notation. We denote by s and r the variables corresponding to randomness of the
sender and the receiver, respectively, and let µ1, µ2, µ3 denote the three messages of
the protocol. P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake are programs of the deniable encryption.
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P1(s,m) takes as input sender randomness s and plaintext m and outputs the first mes-
sage µ1. P2(r, µ1) takes as input receiver randomness r and first message µ1 and outputs
the second message µ2. P3(s,m, µ1, µ2) takes as input sender randomness s, plaintext
m, and protocol messages µ1, µ2 and outputs the last message µ3. Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
takes as input receiver randomness r and protocol messages µ1, µ2, µ3 and outputs
the plaintext m. SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3) takes as input sender randomness s, true
plaintext m, new (fake) plaintext m̂, and protocol messages µ1, µ2, µ3 and outputs
fake randomness s′ which makes µ1, µ2, µ3 look consistent with m̂. RFake(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
takes as input new (fake) plaintext m̂ and protocol messages µ1, µ2, µ3 and outputs
fake randomness r′ which makes µ1, µ2, µ3 look consistent with m̂.
To avoid cumbersome notation, we use the same name for both unobfuscated and
obfuscated programs. In particular, the parties and the adversary only see obfuscated
programs and never the actual code of the programs. For example, on fig. 4·6 the
instruction to the sender to run P1 means taking the obfuscation of the program P1
from the CRS and running it.
Everywhere throughout the paper we will be assuming that any program outputs ⊥,
if any of its underlying primitives outputs ⊥, except for the cases where it is explicitly
written otherwise.
3.6.1 Construction
The protocol is described in fig. 4·6. It simply instructs parties to run the programs
from the CRS, which consists of 6 obfuscated programs P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake
(described in fig. 3·84, fig. 3·85). Note that deniability of the receiver is public, since
the knowledge of randomness of the receiver is not required in order to run RFake.
In the introduction we described the reasons behind the logic of the programs we are
using. Here we give an overview of the overall structure of protocol messages and fake
435
The CRS: Programs P1,P2,P3, Dec, SFake,RFake (fig. 3·84, fig. 3·85)), obfuscated
under iO.
Our Interactive bideniable encryption:
Inputs: plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} of the sender.
1. Message 1: The sender chooses random s∗, computes µ1
∗ ← P1(s∗,m) and
sends µ1
∗.
2. Message 2: The receiver chooses random r∗, computes µ2
∗ ← P2(r∗, µ1∗) and
sends µ2
∗.
3. Message 3: The sender computes µ3
∗ ← P3(s∗,m, µ1∗, µ2∗) and sends µ3∗.
4. The receiver runs m′ ← Dec(r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗).
Sender Coercion:
Inputs: real plaintext m ∈ {0, 1}, fake plaintext m̂ ∈ {0, 1}, real random coins s∗ of










Inputs: fake plaintext m̂ ∈ {0, 1} and the protocol transcript µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗.
1. Upon coercion, the receiver chooses random ρ∗ and computes fake randomness
r′ ← RFake(m̂, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗; ρ∗).
Figure 3·83: Our interactive bideniable encryption scheme.
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randomness. For simplicity, for this discussion we will use integers (instead of our
level system used in the programs of deniable encryption) to count how many times
s was faked (see the introduction for the discussion of what role levels play in our
construction).
The structure of protocol messages. The first two messages in the protocol
are simply “hashes” (implemented as a PRF) of internal state of parties so far: that
is, µ1 is PRF(s,m) and µ2 is PRF(r, µ1). The third message µ3 is an encryption of
m,µ1, µ2, and level 0. After running the protocol, the receiver can run Dec which
decrypts µ3 and outputs m.
The structure of fake randomness. Fake randomness s′ of the sender is an
encryption (under a special sender-fake key which is known to programs but not
known to parties) of m′, µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′, and level 1. This encryption has pseudorandom
ciphertexts, and for an external observer s′ looks like a truly random value. Programs
can decrypt s′ using hardwired key and interpret (m′, µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′, `′) as an instruction
to output µ1




′ (for program P3). Thus, such s′ makes the transcript look consistent with
m′, regardless of the actual plaintext which was used to generate the transcript.
Similarly, fake randomness r′ of the receiver is an encryption (under a special receiver-




and level 0 (together with prg(ρ) which is for randomizing this ciphertext). This
encryption has pseudorandom ciphertexts, and for an external observer r′ looks like




′, L′) as an instruction to output µ2
′ on input µ1
′ (for program P2) and
an instruction to output m′ on input µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ (for program Dec). Thus, such r′
makes the transcript looks consistent with m′ (and in particular decrypts it to m′),
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regardless of the actual plaintext which was used to generate the transcript.
Both programs P3,Dec also have special instructions for the “mixed input” case, i.e.
for the case when P3 gets as input fake s′ encrypting (m′, µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′, `′), but input
µ2 of the program P3 is different from µ2
′ in s′ (in case of Dec, when µ3
′ in fake r′ is
different from input µ3 to Dec). The correct treatment of the mixed case is crucial for
security of the scheme. See the explanation in the introduction for the logic of the
programs on mixed inputs.
3.6.2 Required Primitives and Their Parameters.
We require the primitives listed below. Note that these primitives can be constructed
from iO, injective PRFs (which in turn can be constructed from standard OWFs,
(SW14)) and injective OWFs (which in turn can be constructed from iO and standard
OWFs, (BPW16)); thus it is enough to require iO and OWFs. By starting with
subexponentially-secure iO and OWFs, we can get subexponential security of these
primitives.
Definitions can be found in section 4.2.
Notation. We denote security parameter by λ. We parametrize sizes in our
construction by τ(λ), which is the length of the first message in the protocol (also
equal to the size of a tag for the level system, since we use µ1, µ2 as tags), and T (λ),
which is an upper bound of the level system.
Injective PRFs with sparse image. As shown in (SW14), for any length l there exists
a family of PRFs {Fk}λ mapping l-sized inputs to 2l + λ-sized outputs, such that
with probability at least 1 − 2−λ (over the choice of the key), the PRF is injective.
Note that PRF with these parameters has exponentially sparse image, i.e. a randomly
chosen element is in its image with probability 2−l−λ.
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These PRFs are used in the construction of ACE and relaxed ACE.
Sparse extracting PRF. As shown in (SW14), for any length l, as long as the input
has entropy at least l ≥ τ/2 + 2λ+ 2, there exists a family of extracting PRFs {Fk}λ
mapping at least l-sized inputs to τ/2-sized outputs, which are strong extractors with
statistical distance at most 2−λ. It can be shown in a simple reduction that applying
a length-doubling prg to the output of such a PRF results in a (computationally)
extracting PRF, such that a random string is in its image with probability 2τ/2.
These PRFs are used to compute the first two messages in the protocol.
ACE. As shown in (CHJV14), for any plaintext length l, there exists an ACE with
ciphertexts of size 3l+λ (as long as injective PRFs used are from l bits to 2l+λ bits).
ACE is used as the main encryption scheme (used to compute the third message of
the protocol).
Relaxed ACE. As we show in section 3.11 by modifying the construction of (CHJV14),
for any plaintext length l and suffix parameter t, there exists a relaxed ACE with
ciphertexts of size (l − t + 1)(2l − t + λ) + λ (as long as each injective PRF Fi,
i = t, . . . , l, is from i bits to 2i+λ bits). . Further, ciphertexts of this ACE are sparse,
with ratio of ciphertexts at most 2−λ. Relaxed ACE is used as an encryption scheme
to generate fake sender and receiver randomness.
Length-doubling PRG. We use a prg from λ to 2λ bits. It is used in program RFake to
randomize fake randomness of the receiver. (In addition, as part of the construction
of a sparse extracting PRF, we also use a prg from τ(λ)/2 to τ(λ) bits).
Level system. In section 3.5 we build the level system for any superpolynomial upper
bound T and any sublinear tag size.
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Length of variables as a function of the first message size τ and level
upper bound T . Below we express sizes in our construction (which in turn specify
parameters of all primitives) as a function of the first message size τ(λ) and the upper
bound of the level system T (λ). We require that both τ(λ)and log T (λ) are sublinear
in λ. We assume that the plaintext of the deniable encryption scheme is one bit long.
Somewhat abusing notation, in this discussion we will be denoting the size of the ACE
ciphertext of l-size input as ACE(l); size of levels as |`|, |L|; size of the output of a prg
as |prg|.
• |µ1| = τ ;
• |µ2| = τ ;
• |`| = |ACE(|µ1|+ log T )| = 3(τ + log T ) + λ = O(λ);
• |L| = |ACE(|µ1|+ |µ2|+ log T )| = 3(2τ + log T ) + λ = O(λ);
• |µ3| = |ACE(1 + |µ1| + |µ2| + |L|)| = 3(1 + 2τ + 3(2τ + log T ) + λ) + λ =
3 + 24τ + 9 log T + 4λ = O(λ);
• |s| = relaxedACE(1 + |µ1| + |µ2| + |µ3| + |`|) (for suffix parameter t = |`|),
thus the size is equal to (1 + 2τ + (3 + 15τ + 9 log T + 4λ) + 1)(2(1 + 2τ +
(3 + 15τ + 9 log T + 4λ) + 3(τ + log T ) + λ) − (3(τ + log T ) + λ) + λ) + λ =
(5 + 17τ + 9 log T + 4λ)(8 + 37τ + 21 log T + 20λ) + λ = O(λ2);
• |r| = relaxedACE(1+ |µ1|+ |µ2|+ |µ3|+ |L|+ |prg|) (for suffix parameter t = |prg|),
thus the size is equal to ((1+2τ+3+24τ+9 log T +4λ+3(2τ+log T )+λ+2λ)−
2λ+ 1)(2(1 + 2τ + 3 + 24τ + 9 log T + 4λ+ 3(2τ + log T ) +λ+ 2λ)−2λ+λ) +λ =
(5 + 32τ + 12 log T + 5λ)(8 + 64τ + 24 log T + 13λ) + λ = O(λ2).
Further, since in our construction of deniable encryption we use the first message µ1
as a tag for the level system, we need a level system for upper bound T and tag size τ .
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The size of the programs, and removing layers of iO. Note that the source
code on fig. 3·84, fig. 3·85 includes the description of obfuscated programs of the
level system. In turn, the source code of programs of the level system contains ACE
keys which are again obfuscations of some other programs. Thus, the CRS contains
programs which have 3 layers of obfuscation.
However, we have only done this for convenience: namely, for being able to show
security of all primitives (e.g. ACE and the level system) separately and then to use
is it as part of a bigger proof (e.g. of deniable encryption or the level system). Indeed,
it is possible to prove security of our deniable encryption where programs of deniable
encryption are obfuscated only once. That is, programs of deniable encryption can
use unobfuscated code of the programs of the level system and ACE. However, to show
security of such a construction, one would have to “unroll” all proofs, i.e. substitute
the proof of, say, ACE instead of each reduction to security of ACE in the main
proof. Needless to say, writing, or even more importantly, verifying such a proof
does not sound feasible to the authors of this paper, who think of themselves as
polynomially-bounded Turing machines.
Nevertheless, in section 3.10 we briefly explain why such a proof could be written.
Intuitively, this holds because of the following: let’s say in the proof of ACE we
punctured the PRF and reduced it to security of the obfuscation (of ACE source code).
Then we can do the same reduction in the “unrolled” proof, since that punctured
PRF key, which is now a part of a source code of deniable encryption program, is still
protected by obfuscation on top of that program.
We state our theorem with the size σ of a source code of the programs of deniable
encryption scheme as a parameter. As long as our construction uses only one layer of
iO, σ = O(λ3) (λ3 comes from the fact that all programs of deniable encryption use
keys of a relaxed ACE, which have the size O(λ3) due to the fact each key consists of
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O(λ) PRF keys, these keys are punctured in the security proof, and each punctured
PRF key has size O(λ2)).
Theorem 26. Assume the existence of the following primitives with parameters
spicified above:
• SG,RG are extracting puncturable PRFs with sparse image. Further, these PRFs
should have a property that, given a punctured key, we can further puncture them
at one more point;
• prg is a pseudorandom generator with a sparse image;
• Programs (GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags) are the
programs of a level system;
• sender-fake ACE (with keys EKS,DKS) is a relaxed ACE with suffix parameter
equal to the size of a single-tag level of the level system; in addition, its ciphertexts
should be sparse.
• receiver-fake ACE (with keys EKR,DKR) is a relaxed ACE with suffix parameter
equal to the image length of a prg; in addition, its ciphertexts should be sparse.
• main ACE (with keys EK,DK);
• iO is a secure indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits of size σ = c · λ3 for
some constant c;
Then the protocol presented on fig. 4·6 with programs presented on fig. 3·84, fig.
3·85 is a bideniable and off-the-record deniable interactive encryption in the CRS
model for 1-bit plaintexts. More specifically, assuming that each primitive except the
level system is (t(λ), ε(λ))-secure, and assuming the level system for an upper bound
T and tag size τ is O(t(λ), ε1(λ, T, τ))-secure, the resulting deniable encryption is
(t(λ), O(ε(λ)) +O(2−τ ) + ε1(λ, T, τ))-secure.
Corollary 2. Let T = 2λ
ε/2
, τ = λε/2, and assume that all primitives in the the-
orem 26 are (poly(λ), 2−Ω(λ
ε2/2))-secure. Then the resulting deniable encryption is
(poly(λ), 2−Ω(λ
ε2/2))-secure.
Encrypting longer plaintexts. Note that the syntax of the scheme allows to
encrypt longer plaintexts. However, for simplicity we define and prove deniability
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and off-the-record-deniability for 1-bit plaintexts only. In section 3.12 we list the
changes required to adapt the proof to support longer plaintexts. However, this incurs





Inputs: sender randomness s, plaintext m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS (s,m).
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, plaintext m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption
key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake plaintext m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryp-
tion keys EKS ,DKS of sender-fake ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryp-
tion key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFake(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake plaintext m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of
the main ACE.




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·85: Programs P2,Dec,RFake.
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3.6.3 Proof Overview
Correctness. Correctness follows from correctness of all underlying primitives
and from the fact that sender-fake and receiver-fake ACE are both sparse. More
concretely, assume s∗ and r∗ are randomly chosen coins of the sender and the receiver.
Due to sparseness of ACE, s∗ (resp, r∗) is outside of the image of sender-fake (resp.,
receiver-fake) ACE. Therefore program P1 on input s∗,m executes the main step
and outputs µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m), program P2 on input r∗, µ1




∗), and program P3 on input s∗,m, µ1
∗, µ2
∗ executes






particular, the validity check passes since indeed P1(s∗,m) = µ1
∗.
Next, program Dec on input r∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗ executes the main step by decrypting µ3
∗
and returning its plaintext m. In particular, validity check passes, since P2(r∗, µ1
∗) =
µ2
∗. Further, note that µ1, µ2 which are the input to Dec, µ1
′′, µ2
′′ which are decrypted
from µ3





∗)). Thus all checks in the main step of Dec pass and
the program outputs m.
Notation. m∗0,m
∗
1 denote messages chosen by the adversary. s
∗, r∗ denote true




denote the challenge transcript of the protocol, which is either tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0) or
tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1) depending on the hybrid. s
′, r′ denote fake random coins of the sender
and receiver, respectively. We write tr(s, r,m) to denote the communication in the
protocol with input m and randomness s and r.
By `∗0 we denote a single-tag level 0 with tag µ1
∗. By `∗1 we denote a single-tag level 1
with tag µ1
∗. By L∗0 we denote double-tag level 0 with tags µ1
∗, µ2
∗.
In addition, we will be using notation [val, µ1] and [val, µ1, µ2] to denote single-tag and
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double-tag levels with value val and tag µ1 (or, tags µ1, µ2).
Main steps. We start with a distribution corresponding to transmitted plaintext
m∗0 ∈ {0, 1} and real randomness s∗ and r∗ presented to the adversary. More formally,






∗, r∗, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0)), where s
∗, r∗ are randomly chosen, and PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
To prove security of our deniable encryption scheme, we proceed in the following steps:
1. Indistinguishability of explanations of the sender: we switch real (ran-




and level `∗ = [0, µ1






′, r∗, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0)), where s







PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
The proof of this step is similar in spirit to the proof of a sender-deniable
encryption of Sahai and Waters (SW14), and relies on the fact that all relevant
programs, given s∗ or s′ as input, behave in the same way for any choice of
remaining inputs.
2. Indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver: we switch real (ran-




and level L∗ = [0, µ1
∗, µ2






′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0)), where s














for randomly chosen ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup)
for randomly chosen rSetup.
Unlike the previous step, here there exist inputs such that program Dec, when
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run on these inputs and r∗ or r′, produces different outputs. However, such
inputs are hard to find. Thus, in security proof of this step we first use properties
of ACE to “eliminate” bad inputs (i.e. to make the programs reject them), then
run Sahai-Waters-like proof similar to the previous step, and finally use ACE to
bring bad inputs back and restore the programs.
3. Semantic security: we switch the transcript from encrypting m∗0 to encrypting






′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1)), where s














for randomly chosen ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup)
for randomly chosen rSetup.
Proving security of this step involves the following. First, similar to the previous
step, we “eliminate” a ciphertext µ3∗ = ACE.EncEK(1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0), making






∗, L∗0), meaning it encrypts the
opposite bit). This allows us to modify program Dec such that decryption key
DK is not used to decrypt µ3
∗, µ3∗. Then we use security of ACE to switch µ3
∗
from encrypting m∗0 to m
∗
1, and then revert all previous changes.
4. Indistinguishability of levels: we switch the level encoded in s′ from `∗0 =
[0, µ1
∗] to `∗1 = [1, µ1
∗] (while keeping L∗0 = [0, µ1
∗, µ2







′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1)), where s














for randomly chosen ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup)
for randomly chosen rSetup.
To prove security of this step, we first use security of ACE to eliminate some
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bad inputs. After this, we can modify programs of deniable encryption scheme
in such a way that they only use punctured version of the programs of the level
system. Then we invoke security of the level system and finally revert previous
changes.












∗) (indeed, this is what







∗)) = RFake(m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗; ρ∗), we thus






′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1)), where s






∗), r′ = RFake(m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗; ρ∗) for randomly chosen
ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
Note that this distribution corresponds to the execution of the protocol with plaintext
m∗1 and fake randomness s
′, r′ which makes this transcript look consistent with plaintext
m∗0, and thus we proved security of our deniable encryption.
In section 3.7.1 for each one of the four steps we present a list of hybrids with a brief
explanation of why indistinguishability between each hybrid holds. Formal security
reductions can be found in section 3.7.2.
Off-the-record deniability. Proof of off-the-record deniability of our scheme
follows the same major four steps, but in a different order and with slightly different
distributions. In section 3.8 we explain how to modify the proof of deniability from
section 3.7 to turn it into a proof of off-the-record deniability.
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3.7 Proof of Security of Our Bideniable Encryption
3.7.1 List of hybrids
In this section we present a list of hybrids with brief explanation of why indistinguisha-
bility holds. Formal security reductions can be found in section 3.7.2.
We note that we repeat some hybrids in order to get 4 clean steps (e.g. hybrids
HybB,3,3 − HybB,3,5 at the very end of the proof of lemma 58 are immediately undone
at the very beginning of the proof of lemma 59).
Lemma 57. [Indistinguishability of explanations of the sender] Assuming
(t(λ), ε(λ)) security of relaxed ACE, iO and sparse extracting PRFs, the distiributions
in HybA,HybB are (t(λ), O(ε(λ)))-close.
Lemma 58. [Indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver] Assuming
(t(λ), ε(λ)) security of ACE, relaxed ACE, iO, prg and sparse extracting PRFs, the
distiributions in HybB,HybC are (t(λ), O(ε(λ)) + 2
−τ(λ))-close.
Lemma 59. [Semantic security] Assuming (t(λ), ε(λ)) security of ACE, relaxed
ACE, iO, and sparse extracting PRFs, the distiributions in HybC ,HybD are
(t(λ), O(ε(λ)) +O(2−τ(λ)))-close.
Lemma 60. [Indistinguishability of levels] Assuming (t(λ), ε(λ)) security of re-
laxed ACE, iO, and sparse extracting PRFs, and assuming (t(λ), ε1(λ, T, τ))-secure
level system, the distiributions in HybD,HybE are (t(λ), O(ε(λ)) + ε1(λ, T, τ))-close.
Proof of lemma 57 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the sender)
• HybA,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s∗, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2







∗, L∗0). Programs are presented on fig. 3·86.
Note that HybA,1 = HybA, conditioned on the fact that s
∗ is outside of the image
of ACE.
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• HybA,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s∗, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1A,1,P2,P3A,1,Dec, SFakeA,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2







∗, L∗0). Programs are presented on fig. 3·87.
That is, we modify programs of the sender by puncturing encryption key of sender-
fake ACE EKS{S`∗0} at the set S`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, decryption key of sender-
fake ACE DKS{s∗, s′} at s∗ and s′ (where s′ = ACE.EncEKS(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0)),
and the key kS of extracting PRF SG of the sender at the points (s
∗,m∗0) and
(s′,m∗0). In addition, we hardwire certain outputs inside programs of the sender to
make sure that functionality of the programs doesn’t change. Indistinguishability
holds by iO.
• HybA,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s∗, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1A,1,P2,P3A,1,Dec, SFakeA,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2







∗, L∗0). Programs are presented on fig. 3·87.
That is, we choose µ1
∗ at random instead of computing it as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗0).
Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured
point (s∗,m∗0).
• HybA,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1A,1,P2,P3A,1,Dec, SFakeA,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














are presented on fig. 3·87.
That is, we switch the roles of s∗ and s′ everywhere in the distribution: namely,
we give s′ (instead of s∗) to the adversary as randomness of the sender, and
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we change s∗ to s′ and s′ to s∗ everywhere in the programs. Note that
this doesn’t change the code of the programs since programs use s∗ and s′
in the same way. Indistinguishability holds by the symmetry of sender-fake
ACE, which says that (s∗, s′,EKS{S`∗0},DKS{s
∗, s′}) is indistinguishable from
(s′, s∗,EKS{S`∗0},DKS{s
∗, s′}), where p = (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), s∗ is randomly
chosen, s′ = ACE.EncEKS(p). Note that DKS{s∗, s′} is first punctured at one of
the points s∗, s′ which is lexicographically smaller, and then at the other.
• HybA,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1A,1,P2,P3A,1,Dec, SFakeA,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2














are presented on fig. 3·87.
That is, we generate µ1
∗ as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗0) instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured
point (s∗,m∗0).
• HybA,6. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2













∗, `∗0). Programs are presented on
fig. 3·86.
That is, we revert all changes we made to programs and thus use original
programs of our deniable encryption scheme in this hybrid. Indistinguishability
holds by iO, since we remove puncturing without changing the functionality of
the programs.
Note that HybA,6 = HybB, conditioned on the fact that s






Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS (s,m).
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption
key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryp-
tion keys EKS ,DKS of sender-fake ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{s∗, s′} of sender-fake ACE, punc-
tured key kS{(s∗,m∗0), (s′,m∗0)} of an extracting PRF SG, variables s∗, s′,m∗0, µ1∗.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) If (s,m) = (s∗,m∗0) or (s,m) = (s
′,m∗0) then return µ1
∗;
(b) If s = s∗ or s = s′ then goto main step;





(d) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS{(s∗,m∗0),(s′,m∗0)}(s,m).
Program P3A,1(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1A,1, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{s∗, s′} of sender-fake ACE, encryption




1. Validity check: if P1A,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) If (s,m, µ1, µ2) = (s
∗,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2






(b) If (s,m, µ1) = (s
∗,m∗0, µ1
∗) or (s,m, µ1) = (s
′,m∗0, µ1







(c) If s = s∗ or s = s′ then goto main step;





(e) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(f) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·87: Programs P1A,1,P3A,1, SFakeA,1, used in the proof of
lemma 57 (indistinguishability of explanations of the sender).
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Program SFakeA,1(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1A,1, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption key EKS{S`∗0} (where S`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}) and punctured decryp-
tion key DKS{s∗, s′}, variables s∗, s′,m∗0, µ1∗, `∗0.
1. Validity check: if P1A,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) If (s,m, µ1) = (s
∗,m∗0, µ1
∗) or (s,m, µ1) = (s
′,m∗0, µ1
∗) then return
EncEKS{p}(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, Increment(`
∗
0));
(b) If s = s∗ or s = s′ then goto main step;





(d) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{S`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{S`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·88: Programs P1A,1,P3A,1, SFakeA,1, used in the proof of
lemma 57 (indistinguishability of explanations of the sender).
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Proof of lemma 58 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the receiver)
First in a sequence of hybrids we “eliminate” complementary ciphertext µ3∗ =
ACE.EncEK(1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0), i.e. make programs Dec and SFake reject it:
• HybB,1,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2













∗, `∗0). Programs can be found in
fig. 3·89 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the receiver).
Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from HybB, conditioned
on the fact that s∗, r∗ are outside of images of their ACE.
• HybB,1,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,1,P2,P3B,1,Dec, SFakeB,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2














can be found in fig. 3·90 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
the receiver).
That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}\ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). Indistinguishability
holds by iO, since this modification doesn’t change the functionality of SFake
due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level `∗0.
• HybB,1,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2














can be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
457
the receiver).
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the same set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since
the corresponding encryption key EKS is already punctured at the same set.
• HybB,1,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














can be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
the receiver).
That is, we choose µ1
∗ at random instead of computing it as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗0).
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ was not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybB,1,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2,P3B,3,Dec, SFakeB,3,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














can be found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
the receiver).
That is, in program P3 we puncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the
point p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by iO, since P3 never
needs to encrypt this point. Roughly, this is because of the following: since µ1
∗
is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, P3 never encrypts p in the
main step. In order to encrypt it in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input
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some fake s encoding level `∗0. However, due to the fact that DKS is punctured
at the set P`∗0 which contains all but one strings with `
∗
0, the only valid fake s
with `∗0 is s
′. However, running P3 on s′ cannot result in encrypting p in the
trapdoor step since p contains the wrong plaintext 1⊕m∗0 (instead of m∗0).
• HybB,1,6. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,1,P3B,3,DecB,1, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,1; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














grams can be found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·97 (programs
of the receiver).
That is, in programs Dec,RFake we puncture decryption key DK of the main
ACE at the same point p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by
security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption
key EK is already punctured at this point.
Now µ3∗ = ACE.EncEK(1 ⊕ m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0) is rejected by Dec and RFake. In the
following hybrids, similarly to previous lemma, we switch the roles of r∗ and r′, using
the fact that programs treat them similarly, once µ3∗ is eliminated
28.
• HybB,2,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














grams can be found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·98 (programs
28The problem with µ3∗ is that unmodified Dec on input (r
∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3∗) outputs 1⊕m∗0 (via
main step), and on input (r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3∗) it outputs
′fail′ (via trapdoor step, since levels in r′ and
µ3∗ are both 0 and “isLess = true” check fails. Because of this difference, in HybB,2,1 we wouldn’t be
able to modify program Dec such that the code treats r∗ and r′ in the same way. However, after
HybB,1,6 µ3
∗ is not a valid ciphertext anymore and thus in HybB,2,1 we can instruct Dec to output
′fail′ on both r∗ and r′.
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of the receiver).
That is, we modify programs of the receiver (P2,Dec,RFake) by puncturing
encryption key of receiver-fake ACE EKR{Sρ̂∗} at Sρ̂∗ = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗)} for
randomly chosen ρ̂∗. Next, we puncture decryption key of receiver-fake ACE
DKR{r∗, r′} at r∗ and r′ (where r′ = ACE.EncEKR(p), p = (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, L∗0, ρ̂∗)),




∗). In addition, we hardwire certain outputs inside programs of the receiver
to make sure that functionality of the programs doesn’t change. Indistinguisha-
bility holds by iO.
• HybB,2,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2













Programs can be found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·98
(programs of the receiver).
That is, we choose µ2




Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured
point (r∗, µ1
∗).
• HybB,2,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2



















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·98 (programs of the
receiver).
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That is, we switch the roles of r∗ and r′ everywhere in the distribution: namely,
we give r′ (instead of r∗) to the adversary as randomness of the receiver, and
we change r∗ to r′ and r′ to r∗ everywhere in the programs. Note that this
doesn’t change the code of the programs since programs use r∗ and r′ in
the same way. Indistinguishability holds by the symmetry of receiver-fake
ACE, which says that (r∗, r′,EKR{Sρ̂∗},DKR{r∗, r′}) is indistinguishable from
(r′, r∗,EKR{Sρ̂∗},DKR{r′, r∗}), where Sρ̂∗ = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗)}, p = (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗,
µ3
∗, L∗0, ρ̂
∗), r∗ is randomly chosen, r′ = ACE.EncEKR(p).
• HybB,2,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. Programs can be
found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·98 (programs of the
receiver).




∗) instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF RG at the punctured
point (r∗, µ1
∗).
• HybB,2,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,1,P3B,3,DecB,1, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,1; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. Programs can be
found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·97 (programs of the
receiver).
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That is, we revert all changes we made to programs in HybB,2,1 and thus use
original programs P2,Dec,RFake, except that DK remains punctured at the point
p = (1 ⊕ m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by iO, since we remove
puncturing without changing the functionality of the programs.
• HybB,2,6. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,1,P3B,3,DecB,1, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,1; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; s
∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗0), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·97 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, we replace randomly chosen ρ̂∗ with prg(ρ∗) for randomly chosen ρ∗,
when generating r′. Indistinguishability holds by security of a prg.
Finally, in the following hybrids we revert all changes we made in hybrids HybB,1,1 -
HybB,1,6, thus restoring all programs (and making µ3
∗ a valid ciphertext):
• HybB,3,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2,P3B,3,Dec, SFakeB,3,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, chosen at random, µ1






















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Programs can be found in fig. 3·94 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96
(programs of the receiver).
That is, in programs Dec,RFake we unpuncture decryption key DK of the main
ACE at the point p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by security
of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is
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punctured at this point.
• HybB,3,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, in program P3 we unpuncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at
the point p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by iO, because of
the same reason as in HybB,1,5.
• HybB,3,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, we choose µ1
∗ as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗0) instead of computing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ is not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybB,3,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,1,P2,P3B,1,Dec, SFakeB,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2






















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·90 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the same set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since
the corresponding encryption key EKS is already punctured at the same set.
• HybB,3,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig. 3·89
(programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the receiver).
That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}\ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). Indistinguishability
holds by iO, since this modification doesn’t change the functionality of SFake
due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level `∗0.
Note that HybB,3,5 is the same as HybC , conditioned on the fact that s
∗, r∗ are




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS (s,m).
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption
key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryp-
tion keys EKS ,DKS of sender-fake ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting
PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3B,1(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,1, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main
ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1B,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·90: Programs P1B,1,P3B,1, SFakeB,1, used in the proof of
lemma 58 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).
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Program SFakeB,1(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,1, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption key EKS{P`∗0} and decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1B,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·91: Programs P1B,1,P3B,1, SFakeB,1, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3B,2(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,2, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1B,2(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·92: Programs P1B,2,P3B,2, SFakeB,2, used in the proof of
lemma 58 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).
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Program SFakeB,2(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,2, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1B,2(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·93: Programs P1B,2,P3B,2, SFakeB,2, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3B,3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,3, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), punctured encryption key EK{p} of main ACE,
where p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1B,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK{p}(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK{p}(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·94: Programs P1B,3,P3B,3, SFakeB,3, used in the proof of
lemma 58 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).
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Program SFakeB,3(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,3, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1B,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·95: Programs P1B,3,P3B,3, SFakeB,3, used in the proof of




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryp-
tion key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFake(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of
the main ACE.




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program DecB,1(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryp-
tion key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key DK{p} of the main
ACE, where p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).
1. Validity check: if P2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFakeB,1(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption
key DK{p} of the main ACE, where p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·97: Programs P2B,1,DecB,1,RFakeB,1, used in the proof of




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKR{r∗, r′} of receiver-fake ACE,
punctured key kR{(r∗, µ1∗), (r′, µ1∗)} of an extracting PRF RG, variables r∗, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) If (r, µ1) = (r
∗, µ1
∗) or (r, µ1) = (r
′, µ1
∗) then return µ2
∗;
(b) If r = r∗ or r = r′ then goto main step;
(c) out ← ACE.DecDKR{r∗,r′}(r); if out = ′fail′ then goto main step, else parse




(d) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR{(r∗,µ1∗),(r′,µ1∗)}(r, µ1).
Program DecB,2(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2B,2, isLess, RetrieveTags;
punctured decryption key DKR{r∗, r′} of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryp-





1. Validity check: if P2B,2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:










(b) If (r, µ1, µ2) = (r
∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) or (r, µ1, µ2) = (r
′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) then then goto
main step;
(c) If r = r∗ or r = r′ then goto main step;
(d) out← ACE.DecDKR{r∗,r′}(r); if out′ = ′fail′ then goto main step; else parse




(e) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Figure 3·98: Programs P2B,2,DecB,2,RFakeB,2, used in the proof of
lemma 58 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).
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Program RFakeB,2(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EKR{Sρ̂∗} of receiver-fake ACE, where
Sρ̂∗ = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗)} for randomly chosen ρ̂∗, punctured decryption key DK{p} of
the main ACE, where p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR{p}(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·99: Programs P2B,2,DecB,2,RFakeB,2, used in the proof of
lemma 58 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).
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Proof of lemma 59 (Semantic security)
• HybC,1,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig. 3·100
(programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the receiver).
Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from HybC , conditioned
on the fact that s∗, r∗ are outside of image of ACE.
• HybC,1,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,1,P2,P3C,1,Dec, SFakeC,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·101 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}\ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). Indistinguishability
holds by iO, since this modification doesn’t change the functionality of SFake
due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level `∗0.
• HybC,1,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,2,P2,P3C,2,Dec, SFakeC,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
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be found in fig. 3·103 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the same set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since
the corresponding encryption key EKS is already punctured at the same set.
• HybC,1,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,2,P2,P3C,2,Dec, SFakeC,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·103 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, we choose µ1
∗ at random instead of computing it as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗0).
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ was not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybC,1,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,2,P2,P3C,2,Dec, SFakeC,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2



















prg(ρ∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig. 3·103 (programs
of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the receiver).
That is, we choose µ2




Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the receiver PRF
RG (note that r∗ was not used anywhere else in the distribution).
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• HybC,2,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,3,P2,P3C,3,Dec, SFakeC,3,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2



















prg(ρ∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig. 3·105 (programs
of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the receiver).
That is, in program P3 we puncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the








∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds
by iO, since P3 never needs to encrypt these points. Roughly, this is because
of the following: since µ1
∗ is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG,
P3 never encrypts p0, p1 in the main step. In order to encrypt it in trapdoor
step, P3 needs to take as input some fake s encoding level `∗0. However, due to
the fact that DKS is punctured at the set P`∗0 which contains all but one strings
with `∗0, the only valid fake s with `
∗
0 is s
′. However, running P3 on s′ cannot
result in encrypting p0 or p1 in the trapdoor step: in order to hit the trapdoor
step with s′, the input to P3 should be (s′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗); however, in this case
the program immediately outputs µ3
′ without running an encryption algorithm.
• HybC,2,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,3,P2C,1,P3C,3,DecC,1, SFakeC,3,RFakeC,1; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2




















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig.
3·105 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·108 (programs of the receiver).
That is, in programs Dec,RFake we puncture decryption key DK of the main




∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by security
of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is
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already punctured at this point (and encryption of p1 is not used anywhere in
the distribution).
• HybC,2,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,3,P2C,2,P3C,3,DecC,2, SFakeC,3,RFakeC,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2




















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig.
3·105 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·109 (programs of the receiver).
That is, we modify programs Dec and RFake by additionally puncturing decryp-




∗, L∗0). In addition, we
hardwire certain outputs inside program RFake to make sure that its functional-
ity doesn’t change. (Note that in program Dec we only puncture keys, without
hardwiring anything. However, this doesn’t change the functionality of Dec.
This is because Dec would output ⊥ when trying to decrypt an encryption of
p0 anyway: roughly, this is because the main step cannot be reached because
µ2
∗ doesn’t have a preimage, and trapdoor step would output ⊥ because there
doesn’t exist fake randomness with level smaller than 0.) Indistinguishability
holds by iO.
• HybC,2,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,3,P2C,2,P3C,3,DecC,2, SFakeC,3,RFakeC,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2




















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig.
3·105 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·109 (programs of the receiver).
That is, we generate µ3










∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by security of the main ACE,
since encryption and decryption keys EK, DK are punctured at both p0, p1.
• HybC,2,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,3,P2C,3,P3C,3,DecC,3, SFakeC,3,RFakeC,3; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2




















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig.
3·105 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·110 (programs of the receiver).
That is, we modify programs Dec and RFake by unpuncturing decryption key




∗, L∗0) (note that DK remains




∗, L∗0)). We also remove additional instructions
introduced in HybC,2,3. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since we don’t change
functionality of the programs.
• HybC,2,6. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,3,P2,P3C,3,Dec, SFakeC,3,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2



















prg(ρ∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig. 3·105 (programs
of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the receiver).
That is, in programs Dec,RFake we unpuncture decryption key DK of the main




∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by security
of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK
is punctured at this point (and encryption of p0 is not used anywhere in the
distribution).
• HybC,2,7. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
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Setup(1λ; P1C,2,P2,P3C,2,Dec, SFakeC,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2



















prg(ρ∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig. 3·103 (programs
of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the receiver).
That is, in program P3 we unpuncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at









holds by iO, since this doesn’t change functionality of P3 for the same reason as
in HybC,2,1.
• HybC,3,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,2,P2,P3C,2,Dec, SFakeC,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·103 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the
receiver).




∗) instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the receiver PRF
RG (note that r∗ is not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybC,3,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,2,P2,P3C,2,Dec, SFakeC,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
























∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Programs can be found in fig. 3·103 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107
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(programs of the receiver).
That is, we compute µ1
∗ as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1) instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ is not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybC,3,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1C,1,P2,P3C,1,Dec, SFakeC,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
























∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Programs can be found in fig. 3·101 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107
(programs of the receiver).
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). Indis-
tinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the
corresponding encryption key EKS is punctured at the same set.
• HybC,3,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗ is
chosen at random, r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·100 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·107 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}\ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). Indistinguishability
holds by iO, since this modification doesn’t change the functionality of SFake
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due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level `∗0.
Note that HybC,3,4 = HybD, conditioned on the fact that s





Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS (s,m).
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption
key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryp-
tion keys EKS ,DKS of sender-fake ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting
PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3C,1(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1C,1, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main
ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1C,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·101: Programs P1C,1,P3C,1, SFakeC,1, used in the proof of
lemma 59 (semantic security).
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Program SFakeC,1(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1C,1, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption key EKS{P`∗0} and decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1C,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·102: Programs P1C,1,P3C,1, SFakeC,1, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3C,2(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1C,2, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1C,2(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·103: Programs P1C,2,P3C,2, SFakeC,2, used in the proof of
lemma 59 (semantic security).
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Program SFakeC,2(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1C,2, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1C,2(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·104: Programs P1C,2,P3C,2, SFakeC,2, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3C,3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1C,3, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), punctured encryption key EK{p0, p1} of main









1. Validity check: if P1C,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK{p0,p1}(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK{p0,p1}(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·105: Programs P1C,3,P3C,3, SFakeC,3, used in the proof of
lemma 59 (semantic security).
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Program SFakeC,3(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1C,3, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1C,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·106: Programs P1C,3,P3C,3, SFakeC,3, used in the proof of




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program Dec(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryp-
tion key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFake(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of
the main ACE.




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program DecC,1(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2C,1, isLess, RetrieveTags; de-
cryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key DK{p1} of the main





1. Validity check: if P2C,1(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFakeC,1(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption
key DK{p1} of the main ACE, where p1 = (m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·108: Programs P2C,1,DecC,1,RFakeC,1, used in the proof of




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program DecC,2(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2C,2, isLess, RetrieveTags; de-
cryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key DK{p0, p1} of the









1. Validity check: if P2C,2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFakeC,2(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption
key DK{p0, p1} of the main ACE, where p0 = (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0), p1 = (m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0),
variables µ3
∗, L∗0.
1. If µ3 = µ3
∗ then set L′′ = L∗0;




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·109: Programs P2C,2,DecC,2,RFakeC,2, used in the proof of




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program DecC,3(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2C,3, isLess, RetrieveTags; de-
cryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key DK{p0} of the main





1. Validity check: if P2C,3(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFakeC,3(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption
key DK{p0} of the main ACE, where p0 = (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·110: Programs P2C,3,DecC,3,RFakeC,3, used in the proof of
lemma 59 (semantic security).
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Proof of lemma 60 (Indistinguishability of levels)
• HybD,1,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of the sender can be found
in fig. 3·111.
Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from HybC , conditioned
on the fact that s∗, r∗ are outside of image of ACE.
• HybD,1,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,1,P2,P3D,1,Dec, SFakeD,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·112.
That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}\ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). Indistinguishability
holds by iO, since this modification doesn’t change the functionality of SFake
due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level `∗0.
• HybD,1,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,2,P2,P3D,2,Dec, SFakeD,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·114.
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That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the same set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since
the corresponding encryption key EKS is already punctured at the same set.
• HybD,1,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,2,P2,P3D,2,Dec, SFakeD,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·114.
That is, we choose µ1
∗ at random instead of computing it as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1).
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ was not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybD,2,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,3,P2,P3D,3,Dec, SFakeD,3,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·116.
That is, in programs P3 and SFake we use punctured programs GenZero[µ1
∗],
Transform[`∗0, µ2
∗]. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this doesn’t change
functionality of P3 and SFake. Roughly, this is because of the following:
Since µ1
∗ is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, programs P3 and
SFake never call GenZero(µ1
∗) in the main step, and program P3 never calls
Transform(`∗0, µ2
∗) in the main step.
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In order to call Transform(`∗0, µ2
∗) in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input
some fake s encoding level `∗0. However, due to the fact that DKS is punctured at
the set P`∗0 which contains all but one strings with `
∗
0, the only valid fake s with
`∗0 is s
′. However, running P3 on s′ cannot result in calling Transform(`∗0, µ2
∗) in
the trapdoor step: in order to hit the trapdoor step with s′ and run Transform
with µ2 = µ2
∗, the input to P3 should be (s′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗); however, in this case
the program immediately outputs µ3
′ without running Transform.
• HybD,2,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,4,P2,P3D,4,Dec, SFakeD,4,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·118.
That is, we switch the single-tag level used in generation of s′ from `∗0 = [0, µ1
∗]
to `∗1 = [1, µ1
∗]. Indistinguishability holds by security of level system: recall that
it guarantees that `∗0 is indistinguishable from `
∗
1, even given L
∗
0 = [0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗]
and punctured programs of the level system.
Note that now keys EKS,DKS of the sender-fake ACE become punctured at the
set P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗






∗, `∗0), and program Transform becomes punctured at the point
(`∗1, µ2
∗) instead of (`∗0, µ2
∗).
• HybD,2,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,5,P2,P3D,5,Dec, SFakeD,5,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2






















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·120.
That is, in programs P3 and SFake we use original programs GenZero, Transform
instead of punctured programs GenZero[µ1
∗], Transform[`∗1, µ2
∗]. Indistinguisha-
bility holds by iO, since this doesn’t change functionality of P3 and SFake.





∗ is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, programs P3 and
SFake never call GenZero(µ1
∗) in the main step, and program P3 never calls
Transform(`∗1, µ2
∗) in the main step.
In order to call Transform(`∗1, µ2
∗) in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input
some fake s encoding level `∗1. However, due to the fact that DKS is punctured at
the set P`∗1 which contains all but one strings with `
∗
1, the only valid fake s with
`∗1 is s
′. However, running P3 on s′ cannot result in calling Transform(`∗1, µ2
∗) in
the trapdoor step: in order to hit the trapdoor step with s′ and run Transform
with µ2 = µ2
∗, the input to P3 should be (s′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗); however, in this case
the program immediately outputs µ3
′ without running Transform.
• HybD,3,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,6,P2,P3D,6,Dec, SFakeD,6,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·122.
That is, in program SFake we additionally puncture encryption key EKS of
the sender-fake ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} (recall that it is already
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punctured at the set P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1)). Indistin-
guishability holds by security of iO, since this modification doesn’t change the
functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with
level `∗0.
• HybD,3,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,7,P2,P3D,7,Dec, SFakeD,7,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·124.
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we additionally puncture decryption key
DKS of the sender-fake ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} (recall that it
is already punctured at the set P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1)).
Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since
the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1 .
• HybD,3,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,8,P2,P3D,8,Dec, SFakeD,8,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·126.
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the set P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)}\(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1) (but this
key still remains punctured at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}). Indistinguishability
holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding
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encryption key EK is already punctured at P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1 .
• HybD,3,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,9,P2,P3D,9,Dec, SFakeD,9,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·128.
That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1) (but this key still
remains punctured at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}). Indistinguishability holds
by security of iO, since this doesn’t change the functionality of SFake. Indeed,
the program never needs to encrypt any plaintext containing `∗1 because of the
following. Since µ1
∗ is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, program
SFake never calls GenZero(µ1
∗) in the main step and thus never needs to encrypt
`∗1 = Increment(GenZero(µ1
∗)). In order to encrypt a plaintext containing `∗1 in
the trapdoor step, SFake needs to get as input fake s which contains `∗0. However,
since DKS is punctured at P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, there do not exist valid fake s
with `∗0, thus the program never needs to encrypt plaintexts with `
∗
1.
• HybD,3,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1D,10,P2,P3D,10,Dec, SFakeD,10,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen
rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·130.
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DKS of the
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sender-fake ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}. Indistinguishability holds by
security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption
key EK is already punctured at P`∗0 .
• HybD,3,6. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; r
∗ is
chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·132.
That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}. Indistinguishability holds by security of
iO, since this doesn’t change the functionality of SFake since SFake never needs
to encrypt plaintexts with `∗0.
• HybD,3,7. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗ is
chosen at random, r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs of
the sender can be found in fig. 3·132.
That is, we compute µ1
∗ as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1) instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ is not used anywhere else in the distribution).




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS (s,m).
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption
key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryp-
tion keys EKS ,DKS of sender-fake ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting
PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,1(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,1, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main
ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·112: Programs P1D,1,P3D,1, SFakeD,1, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,1(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,1, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption key EKS{P`∗0} and decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1D,1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·113: Programs P1D,1,P3D,1, SFakeD,1, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,2(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,2, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,2(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·114: Programs P1D,2,P3D,2, SFakeD,2, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,2(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,2, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1D,2(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·115: Programs P1D,2,P3D,2, SFakeD,2, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,3, punctured GenZero[µ1
∗],
punctured Transform[(`∗0, µ2
∗)], RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of
sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), encryption key
EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform[(`∗0, µ2∗)](`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform[(`∗0, µ2∗)](GenZero[µ1∗](µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·116: Programs P1D,3,P3D,3, SFakeD,3, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,3(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,3, punctured GenZero[µ1
∗],
Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-
fake ACE, where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0).
1. Validity check: if P1D,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero[µ1∗](µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·117: Programs P1D,3,P3D,3, SFakeD,3, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,4(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,4, punctured GenZero[µ1
∗],
punctured Transform[(`∗1, µ2
∗)], RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1} of
sender-fake ACE, where P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), encryption key
EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,4(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform[(`∗1, µ2∗)](`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform[(`∗1, µ2∗)](GenZero[µ1∗](µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·118: Programs P1D,4,P3D,4, SFakeD,4, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,4(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,4, punctured GenZero[µ1
∗],
Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗1},DKS{P`∗1} of sender-
fake ACE, where P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1).
1. Validity check: if P1D,4(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero[µ1∗](µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·119: Programs P1D,4,P3D,4, SFakeD,4, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,5(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,5, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗1 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,5(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·120: Programs P1D,5,P3D,5, SFakeD,5, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,5(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,5, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗1},DKS{P`∗1} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1).
1. Validity check: if P1D,5(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·121: Programs P1D,5,P3D,5, SFakeD,5, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,6(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,6, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗1 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,6(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·122: Programs P1D,6,P3D,6, SFakeD,6, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,6(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,6, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗1 ∪ P`∗0},DKS{P`∗1} of sender-fake ACE,
where P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}.
1. Validity check: if P1D,6(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·123: Programs P1D,6,P3D,6, SFakeD,6, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1 ∪ P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE,
where P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, key kS of
an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,7(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,7, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗1 ∪ P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)}\ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, encryption key EK
of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,7(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·124: Programs P1D,7,P3D,7, SFakeD,7, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,7(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,7, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗1 ∪ P`∗0},DKS{P`∗1 ∪ P`∗0} of sender-fake
ACE, where P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}.
1. Validity check: if P1D,7(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·125: Programs P1D,7,P3D,7, SFakeD,7, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,8(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,8, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)}, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,8(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·126: Programs P1D,8,P3D,8, SFakeD,8, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,8(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,8, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗1 ∪ P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE,
where P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}.
1. Validity check: if P1D,8(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗1∪P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·127: Programs P1D,8,P3D,8, SFakeD,8, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,9(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,9, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)}, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,9(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·128: Programs P1D,9,P3D,9, SFakeD,9, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,9(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,9, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}.
1. Validity check: if P1D,9(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·129: Programs P1D,9,P3D,9, SFakeD,9, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting
PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3D,10(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,10, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main
ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1D,10(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·130: Programs P1D,10,P3D,10, SFakeD,10, used in the proof of
lemma 60 (security of levels).
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Program SFakeD,10(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1D,10, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption key EKS{P`∗0} and decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}.
1. Validity check: if P1D,10(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·131: Programs P1D,10,P3D,10, SFakeD,10, used in the proof of




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKS of sender-fake ACE, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS (s,m).
Program P3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption
key DKS of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Program SFake(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryp-
tion keys EKS ,DKS of sender-fake ACE.
1. Validity check: if P1(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS (s); if out = ′fail′ goto main step, else parse out as (m′, µ1′, µ2′, µ3′, `′);
(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS (m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·132: Programs P1,P3, SFake.
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3.7.2 Detailed Proof of Security
In this section we present formal security reductions for each hybrid described in
section 3.7.1.
We denote by σ′ the maximum size of programs of deniable encryption in the con-
struction and the proof. Since our construction uses multiple layers of obfuscation, σ′
is some polynomial of λ. As we note in section 3.10, we could instead use only one
layer of obfuscation, and the resulting code would have size σ = O(λ3).
Reductions in the proof of lemma 57 (Indistinguishability of explanation
of the sender)
Let t(λ) be any function in Ω(poly(λ)), and let ε(λ) be a negligible function in w(2−λ).
Assuming the sender-fake relaxed ACE, sparse extracting puncturable PRF, and iO
for program size σ′ is (t(λ), ε(λ))-secure, we show that no time-t(λ) adversary can
distinguish between HybA and HybB with more than O(ε(λ)) advantage.
Note that conditioning on s∗ begin not in the image of ACE incurs only 2−λ loss and
therefore we omit it.
Lemma 61. Statistical distance between distributions HybA,HybA,1 is at most 2
−λ.
Proof. Since randomly chosen s∗ is a valid ciphertext of sender ACE with probability
at most 2−λ, with all but this probability both P1 and P3 will fail do decrypt s∗









Lemma 62. Assume s∗ is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists
an adversary which can distinguish HybA,1 and HybA,2 in time t(λ) with advantage
ε(λ), then there exists an adversary which can break iO for programs of size σ′ in time




Proof. Below we analyze all three pairs of programs assuming that s∗ is outside the
image of sender ACE, and thus ACE.DecDKS(s
∗) = ′fail′. We show that programs
have the same functionality. We use the fact that all underlying primitives satisfy
correctness.
Program P1. We present case analysis to show that the behavior of programs P1
and P1A,1 on each input is the same:
• Case s = s∗:
– Case m = m∗0: P1 outputs µ1
∗ via main step since s∗ is outside of image of
ACE. P1A,1 outputs µ1
∗ due to hardwired instruction.
– Case m 6= m∗0: P1 executes main step and outputs SGkS(s∗,m) since s∗ is
outside of image of ACE. P1A,1 executes main step and outputs SGkS(s
∗,m)
due to hardwired instruction.
• Case s = s′:
– Case m = m∗0: P1 outputs µ1
∗ via trapdoor step. P1A,1 outputs µ1
∗ due to
hardwired instruction.
– Case m 6= m∗0: P1 skips the trapdoor step since s′ contains the wrong
m∗0 6= m, and outputs SGkS(s′,m). P1A,1 executes main step and output
SGkS(s
′,m) due to hardwired instruction.
• Case s 6= s′, s∗: P1 and P1A,1 execute the same code, since punctured keys
preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured (note that when
s 6= s′, s∗ keys are indeed never used at punctured points).
Program P3. Next we compare programs P3 and P3A,1. Note that validity check
passes on the same set of inputs in programs P3 and P3A,1, since programs P1 and
P1A,1 are functionally equivalent. We present the analysis assuming inputs passed the
validity check.
• Case s = s∗:




∗ Case µ2 = µ2∗: P3 outputs µ3∗ via main step since s∗ is outside of
image of ACE. P3A,1 outputs µ3
∗ due to hardwired instruction.
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∗ Case µ2 6= µ2∗: P3 outputs EncEK(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2,Transform(GenZero(µ1∗),
µ2)) via main step since s






0, µ2)) due to hardwired instruction.
Note that GenZero(µ1
∗) = `∗0 and thus both outputs are the same.
– Case (m,µ1) 6= (m∗0, µ1∗): P3 executes main step and outputs EncEK(m,µ1,
µ2, Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2)) since s
∗ is outside of image of ACE. P3A,1
executes main step due to hardwired instruction and outputs EncEK(m,µ1, µ2,
Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2)).
• Case s = s′:




∗ Case µ2 = µ2∗: P3 outputs µ1∗ via trapdoor step. P3A,1 outputs µ1∗
due to hardwired instruction.
∗ Case µ2 6= µ2∗: P3 gets level `∗0 from s′ and outputs EncEK(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2,




Transform(`∗0, µ2)) due to hardwired instruction.
– Case (m,µ1) 6= (m∗0, µ1∗): P3 skips the trapdoor step since s′ contains the
wrong (m∗0, µ1
∗) 6= (m,µ1), and outputs EncEK(m,µ1, µ2,
Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2)) via main step. P3A,1 executes main step due
to hardwired instruction and outputs EncEK(m,µ1, µ2,
Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2)).
• Case s 6= s′, s∗: P3 and P3A,1 execute the same code, since punctured keys
preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that in this
case these keys are never used at punctured points.
Program SFake. Next we compare programs SFake and SFakeA,1. Note that
validity check passes on the same set of inputs in programs SFake and SFakeA,1, since
programs P1 and P1A,1 are functionally equivalent. We present the analysis assuming
inputs passed the validity check.
• Case s = s∗:
– Case (m,µ1) = (m
∗
0, µ1
∗) (for arbitrary (m̂, µ2, µ3)): SFake outputs
ACE.EncEKS(m̂, µ1
∗, µ2, µ3, Increment(GenZero(µ1
∗))) via main step since s∗
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is outside of image of ACE. SFakeA,1 outputs ACE.EncEKS(m̂, µ1
∗, µ2, µ3,
Increment(`∗0)) due to hardwired instruction. Note that GenZero(µ1
∗) = `∗0
and thus both outputs are the same.
– Case (m,µ1) 6= (m∗0, µ1∗) (for arbitrary (m̂, µ2, µ3)): SFake executes main
step since s∗ is outside of image of ACE and outputs ACE.EncEKS(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3,
Increment(GenZero(µ1))). SFakeA,1 skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired
instruction and outputs the same value via main step.
• Case s = s′:
– Case (m,µ1) = (m
∗
0, µ1




increments it and outputs ACE.EncEKS(m̂, µ1
∗, µ2, µ3, Increment(`
∗
0)). SFakeA,1
outputs the same value due to hardwired instruction.
– Case (m,µ1) 6= (m∗0, µ1∗) (for arbitrary (m̂, µ2, µ3)): SFake skips the trap-
door step since s′ contains the wrong (m∗0, µ1
∗) 6= (m,µ1), and outputs
ACE.EncEKS(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, Increment(GenZero(µ1))) via main step. SFakeA,1
skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction and outputs EncEK(m,µ1,
µ2,Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2)) via main step.
• Case s 6= s′, s∗: SFake and SFakeA,1 execute the same code, since punctured
keys preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that
keys are never used at punctured points (in particular, the program never needs
to encrypt a plaintext containing `∗0, and thus the key can be punctured at
S`∗0 = {∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0}).
Lemma 63. Assume s∗ is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists
an adversary which can distinguish HybA,2 and HybA,3 in time t(λ) with advantage
ε(λ), then there exists an adversary which can break security of a puncturable PRF
SGkS in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids HybA,2 and HybA,3 to
security of a puncturable PRF SGkS at the punctured point (s
∗,m∗0).
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. Next it chooses random
s∗ and sends the point (s∗,m∗0) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The
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reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key kS{(s∗,m∗0)} and the value
µ1
∗, which is either SGkS(s
∗,m∗0) or randomly chosen.
Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all
keys used in programs (except kS{(s∗,m∗0)}), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE,
keys EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kR of the
sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and sets µ2
∗ = RGkR(r
∗, µ1


















Next it computes punctured keys DKS{s∗, s′}, kS{(s∗,m∗0), (s′,m∗0)} (by additionally
puncturing challenge kS{(s∗,m∗0)} at (s′,m∗0)), and EKS{S`∗0}, S`∗0 = {∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0}.
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·87) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s∗, r∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗. If challenge µ1
∗ was
SGkS(s
∗,m∗0), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybA,2.
If µ1
∗ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybA,3.
Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured
key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of
an extracting PRF (SW14) is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this property.
Lemma 64. Assume s∗ is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists
an adversary which can distinguish HybA,3 and HybA,4 in time t(λ) with advantage
ε(λ), then there exists an adversary which can break symmetry of a sender-fake relaxed
ACE scheme in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids HybA,3 and HybA,4 to
symmetry of sender ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. Next it samples all
keys used in programs (except EKS,DKS), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys
EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender,
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key kR of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level sys-
tem to create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and sets µ1




It computes levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1
∗), L∗0 = Transform(`
∗
0, µ2







Next the reduction sends p = (m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗, `∗0) as the challenge point to the
challenger of the symmetry of ACE. The challenger chooses random s∗, samples
keys EKS,DKS of ACE and computes s
′ = EncEKS(p), and punctures EKS at S`∗0 =
{∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0} and DKS at s∗, s′ (DKS is first punctured at one of the strings s∗, s′ which
is lexicographically smaller, and then at the other). The reduction gets back from the
challenger (s1, s2,EKS{S`∗0}, DKS{s
∗, s′}), where s1 = s∗, s2 = s′ or s1 = s′, s2 = s∗.
Next the reduction computes punctured key kS{(s1,m∗0), (s2,m∗0)}. Then it uses
variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1,P3, SFake,
(fig. 3·87) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). In particular, in every place where s∗, s′
appear, e.g. in code of programs, or as a punctured point, the reduction first uses
one of the strings s1, s2 which is lexicographically smaller, and then the other (note
that s∗, s′ always appear together in the distribution, except for the value given to
the adversary as randomness of the sender).





∗. If challenge s1, s2 are s
∗, s′, then the resulting distribution is exactly the
distribution from HybA,3. If s1, s2 are s
′, s∗, then the resulting distribution is exactly
the distribution from HybA,4.
Lemma 65. Assume s∗ is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists
an adversary which can distinguish HybA,4 and HybA,5 in time t(λ) with advantage
ε(λ), then there exists an adversary which can break security of a puncturable PRF
SGkS in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybA,2,
HybA,3, except that the reduction gives s
′ instead of s∗ as randomness of the sender to
the adversary.
We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids HybA,4 and HybA,5 to security
of a puncturable PRF SGkS at the punctured point (s
∗,m∗0).
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The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. Next it chooses random
s∗ and sends the point (s∗,m∗0) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The
reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key kS{(s∗,m∗0)} and the value
µ1
∗, which is either SGkS(s
∗,m∗0) or randomly chosen.
Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all
keys used in programs (except kS{(s∗,m∗0)}), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE,
keys EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kR of the
sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and sets µ2
∗ = RGkR(r
∗, µ1
∗). It computes levels
`∗0 = GenZero(µ1
∗), L∗0 = Transform(`
∗
0, µ2












Next it computes punctured keys DKS{s∗, s′}, kS{(s∗,m∗0), (s′,m∗0)} (by additionally
puncturing challenge kS{(s∗,m∗0)} at (s′,m∗0)), and EKS{S`∗0}, S`∗0 = {∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0}
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·87) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s′, r∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗. If challenge µ1
∗ was
SGkS(s
∗,m∗0), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybA,5.
If µ1
∗ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybA,4.
Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured
key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of
an extracting PRF (SW14) is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this property.
Lemma 66. Assume s∗ is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists
an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybA,5 and HybA,6, then there exists




Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 62, except that we give s′, and
not s∗, as randomness of the sender to the adversary.
Finally, we note that the distributions in HybA,6 and HybB are 2
−λ-close (the reasoning
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is similar to distributions HybA,HybA,1).
Reductions in the proof of lemma 58 (Indistinguishability of explanation
of the receiver)
Let t(λ) be any function in Ω(poly(λ)), and let ε(λ) be a negligible function in w(2−λ).
Assuming the prg, the sender-fake relaxed ACE, receiver-fake relaxed ACE, main ACE,
sparse extracting puncturable PRF, and iO for program size σ′ are (t(λ), ε(λ))-secure,
we show that no time-t(λ) adversary can distinguish between HybB and HybC with
more than O(ε(λ)) + 2−τ(λ) advantage.
(Note that security loss 2−τ(λ) comes from conditioning on the fact that µ1
∗ is outside
of the image of the PRF SG. Conditioning on s∗, r∗, ρ̂∗ incurs only 2−λ loss and
therefore we omit it.).
Lemma 67. Statistical distance between distributions HybB,HybB,1,1 is at most 2 ·2−λ.
Proof. Since randomly chosen s∗ is a valid ciphertext of sender ACE with probability
senderACE.sparsity(λ), with all but this probability both P1 and P3 will fail do decrypt









Similarly, randomly chosen r∗ is a valid ciphertext of receiver ACE with probability
receiverACE.sparsity(λ), and thus with all but this probability P2 will fail do decrypt




Lemma 68. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,1,1 and HybB,1,2, then there exists an adversary which can
break iO for programs of size σ′ in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage
ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and SFakeB,1 is that SFakeB,1 uses
a punctured key EKS{P`∗0}, where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). This
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is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with
level `∗0, since `
∗
0 = [0, µ1
∗] and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1.
Lemma 69. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,1,2 and HybB,1,3, then there exists an adversary which
can break security of constrained decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,2 and HybB,1,3
to security of constrained decryption of sender ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EKS,DKS), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.






levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1
∗), L∗0 = Transform(`
∗
0, µ2






Next the reduction sends the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0) to
puncture encryption key and sets P`∗0 ,∅ to puncture decryption key to the challenger
of constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EKS, DKS and it sends
back to the reduction EKS{P`∗0} and key which is either DKS{P`∗0} or DKS{∅}.




∗, `∗0) (note that this
point is not punctured).
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·90, fig. 3·92) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). It




challenge key was DKS{∅}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybB,1,2. If key was DKS{P`∗0}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the
distribution from HybB,1,3.
Lemma 70. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,1,3 and HybB,1,4, then there exists an adversary which can
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break the strong computational extractor property of the PRF SG in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,3 and HybB,1,4
to strong computationally extracting PRF SGkS .
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It sends the point m
∗
0
to the challenger of strong extractor game. The challenger samples the key kS for SG
and either chooses µ1
∗ at random or computes it as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗0) for randomly
chosen s∗. The reduction gets back from the challenger the key kS and the value µ1
∗.
Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples
all keys used in programs (except kS), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys
EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kR of the sparse
extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the
code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and sets µ2
∗ = RGkR(r
∗, µ1

























Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·92) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s′, r∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗. If challenge µ1
∗ was
SGkS(s
∗,m∗0), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybB,1,3.
If µ1
∗ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybB,1,4.
Lemma 71. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,1,4
and HybB,1,5, then there exists an adversary which can break iO for programs of size
σ′ in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
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Proof. The only difference between programs P3B,2 and P3B,3 is that P3B,3 uses a
punctured key EK{p}, where p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). We argue that the program
never needs to encrypt any plaintext of the form (∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0), and therefore
puncturing this point doesn’t change the functionality:
Note that, since µ1
∗ is random, it is outside of the image of a PRF SG with over-
whelming probability, and thus validity check can pass only if P3 is run on some
(s,m, µ1
∗, µ2
∗), where s encodes m,µ1
∗ (and other values). However, note that P3B,2
on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus the key
in the main step can be safely punctured. Further, in order for the program to run
encryption algorithm in the trapdoor step on any plaintext of the form (∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0),
fake s should encode level `∗0. However, note that DKS is punctured at the set
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), and thus P3B,2 rejects all fake s with





∗, `∗0), that is, s
′. Finally, note that
running P3B,2 on (s
′,m, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) will pass validity check only if m = m∗0 (again, since
µ1
∗ is outside of the image of PRF SG). Thus (s′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) is the only potentially
problematic input. However, running P3B,2 on (s
′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) will not trigger en-
cryption algorithm, since the program directly outputs the value µ3
∗ encoded in s′.
Thus P3B,2 never encrypts any plaintext of the form (∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0) in the trapdoor
step.
Lemma 72. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,1,5
and HybB,1,6, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained
decryption of the main ACE in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,5 and HybB,1,6
to security of constrained decryption of main ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EK,DK), namely keys EKS,DKS of sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and sets µ1
∗ at random, µ2
∗ = RGkR(r
∗, µ1
∗). It computes levels
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`∗0 = GenZero(µ1




Next the reduction sends the set consisting of a single point p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0)
to puncture encryption key and sets p,∅ to puncture decryption key to the challenger
of constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EK, DK and it sends
back to the reduction EK{p} and key which is either DK{p} or DK{∅}.





∗, L∗0) (note that this point
isn’t punctured, thus the reduction can indeed encrypt it).
It punctured keys EKS{P`∗0}, DKS{P`∗0}, where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗,
µ3






Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake (fig. 3·94) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·96, fig. 3·97). It gives




key was DK{∅}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybB,1,5. If key was DKS{p}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybB,1,6.
Lemma 73. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image
of the PRF SG, and ρ̂∗ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,1,6 and HybB,2,1, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of iO for σ′-sized programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage 1
3
· ε(λ).
Proof. In this analysis we assume that r∗ is outside the image of receiver ACE, and
thus ACE.DecDKR(r
∗) = ′fail′.
Programs P2 and P2B,2. We present case analysis to show that the behavior of
programs P2 and P2B,2 on each input is the same:
• Case r = r∗:
– Case µ1 = µ1
∗: P2 outputs µ2
∗ via main step since r∗ is outside of image
of ACE. P2B,2 outputs µ2
∗ due to hardwired instruction.
– Case µ1 6= µ1∗: P2 executes main step and outputs RGkR(r∗, µ1) since r∗ is
outside of image of ACE. P2B,2 executes main step and outputs RGkR(r
∗, µ1)
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due to hardwired instruction.
• Case r = r′:
– Case µ1 = µ1
∗: P2 outputs µ2
∗ via trapdoor step. P2B,2 outputs µ2
∗ due
to hardwired instruction.
– Case µ1 6= µ1∗: P2 skips the trapdoor step since r′ contains the wrong
µ1
∗ 6= µ1, and outputs RGkR(r′, µ1). P2B,2 executes main step due to
hardwired instruction and outputs RGkR(r
′, µ1).
• Case r 6= r′, r∗: P2 and P2B,2 execute the same code, since punctured keys
preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that keys are
never used at punctured points.
Programs Dec and DecB,2. Next we compare programs Dec and DecB,2. Note
that validity check passes on the same set of inputs in programs Dec and DecB,2, since
programs P2 and P2B,1 are functionally equivalent. We present the analysis assuming
inputs passed the validity check.
• Case r = r∗:
– Case (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
∗, µ2
∗):
∗ Case µ3 = µ3∗: Dec outputs m∗0 via main step since r∗ is outside of
image of ACE. DecB,1 outputs m
∗
0 due to hardwired instruction.
∗ Case µ3 6= µ3∗: since r∗ is outside of image of ACE, Dec executes the
main step. DecB,2 skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction
and performes exactly the same actions in the main step.
– Case (µ1, µ2) 6= (µ1∗, µ2∗): Dec executes main step since r∗ is outside of
image of ACE. DecB,2 skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction
and performes exactly the same actions in the main step.
• Case r = r′:
– Case (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
∗, µ2
∗):
∗ Case µ3 = µ3∗: Dec outputs m∗0 via trapdoor step. DecB,2 outputs m∗0
due to hardwired instruction.
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∗ Case µ3 6= µ3∗: Dec executes trapdoor step. That is, it tries to decrypt
µ3 and either outputs its plaintext or
′fail′. In order for Dec to outputs
a plaintext (and not ′fail′), µ1, µ2 should be the same in the input, in µ3,
in r′, and in L′′, and moreover, isLess(L′, L′′) should be true. Since r′
has level L′ = L∗0, isLess is true for all L
′′ of the form [i, µ1
∗, µ2
∗], where
i > 0. In other words, µ3 should be an encryption of (m,µ1
∗, µ2
∗, L′′),
where L′′ = [i, µ1
∗, µ2
∗], i > 0, and m is arbitrary. We call it condition
1.
DecB,2 is instructed to skip the trapdoor step and execute the main
step. That is, it decrypts µ3 and either outputs its plaintext or
′fail′.
In order for DecB,1 to outputs a plaintext (and not
′fail′), µ1, µ2 should
be the same in the input, in µ3, and in L
′′ (however, unlike Dec, there
is no “isLess(L′, L′′) = true” condition). In other words, µ3 should be
an encryption of (m,µ1
∗, µ2
∗, L′′), where L′′ = [i, µ1
∗, µ2
∗], i ≥ 0, and
m is arbitrary. We call it condition 2.
Thus, the only difference in these conditions for Dec and DecB,2 is




∗]) for any m (that
is, µ3
∗ or µ3∗), condition 1 instructs to output
′fail′ and condition 2
instructs to output m. However, we claim that both programs Dec
and DecB,2 still behave the same on inputs µ3
∗ or µ3∗. Indeed, recall
that if the input was (r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗), both programs would output




both programs would output ′fail′, since decryption key DK of the main
ACE is punctured at the point p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, [0, µ1∗, µ2∗]).
Thus, in this case both programs have the same functionality.
– Case (µ1, µ2) 6= (µ1∗, µ2∗): Dec skips the trapdoor step since r′ contains
the wrong (µ1
∗, µ2
∗) 6= (µ1, µ2), and executes the main step. DecB,2 skips
the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction and executes the main step.
• Case r 6= r′, r∗: Dec and DecB,2 execute the same code, since punctured keys
preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that DecB,2
never uses key DKR at the punctured points, thus puncturing it doesn’t change
the functionality of the program. Note that the key DKp can be used by Dec and
DecB,2 to decrypt an encryption of p, however it is punctured at both programs
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and thus functionality of both programs is the same in this case.
Programs RFake and RFakeB,2. Next we compare programs RFake and RFakeB,2.
Note that the only difference is that RFakeB,2 uses a punctured key EKR{Sρ̂∗}, where
Sρ̂∗ = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗)} for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. By assumption of the lemma, ρ̂∗ is
outside of the image of this prg, and thus RFakeB,2 never needs to encrypt any of
points ending with ρ̂∗. Therefore puncturing the key doesn’t change the functionality
of the program.
Lemma 74. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG, and ρ̂∗ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an adversary
which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,2,1 and HybB,2,2, then there exists an adversary
which can break security of of a puncturable PRF RGkR in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with
distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybA,2,
HybA,3, except that the reduction is for PRF of the receiver, not the PRF of the
sender.
We give a reduction to security of a puncturable PRF RGkR at the punctured point
(r∗, µ1
∗).
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. Next it chooses random
r∗, µ1
∗ and sends the point (r∗, µ1
∗) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The
reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key kR{(r∗, µ1∗)} and the value
µ2
∗, which is either RGkR(r
∗, µ1
∗) or randomly chosen.
Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all
keys used in programs (except kR{(r∗, µ1∗)}), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE,
keys EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kS of the
sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It computes levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1
∗), L∗0 = Transform(`
∗
0, µ2




















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗.
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Next it computes punctured keys DKR{r∗, r′}, kR{(r∗, µ1∗), (r′, µ1∗)} (by additionally
puncturing challenge kR{(r∗, µ1∗)} at (r′, µ1∗)), and EKR{Sρ̂∗}, Sρ̂∗ = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗)}
for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. It also punctures keys EKS{P`∗0}, DKS{P`∗0}, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)}\(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), and EK{p}, DK{p} at p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·94) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·98). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s′, r∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3




∗), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybB,2,1.
If µ2
∗ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybB,2,2.
Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured
key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of
an extracting puncturable PRF of (SW14) is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this
property.
Lemma 75. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG, and ρ̂∗ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an adversary
which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,2,2 and HybB,2,3, then there exists an adversary
which can break the symmetry of a receiver-fake relaxed ACE in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybA,3,
HybA,4, except that the reduction is to the ACE of the receiver, not ACE of the sender.
We give a reduction to symmetry of receiver ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. Next it samples all
keys used in programs (except EKR,DKR), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys
EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key
kR of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system
to create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random µ1
∗, µ2























as the challenge point to the challenger of the symmetry of ACE. The challenger
chooses random r∗, samples keys EKR,DKR of ACE and computes r
′ = EncEKR(p), and
punctures EKR at Sρ̂∗ = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗)} and DKR at r∗, r′ (DKR is first punctured
at one of the strings r∗, r′ which is lexicographically smaller, and then at the other).
The reduction gets back from the challenger (r1, r2,EKR{Sρ̂∗}, DKR{r∗, r′}), where
r1 = r
∗, r2 = r
′ or r1 = r
′, r2 = r
∗.






∗, `∗0), and EK{p}, DK{p} where p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).
Next the reduction computes punctured key kR{(r1, µ1∗), (r2, µ1∗)}. Then it uses
variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1,P3, SFake,
(fig. 3·94) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·98). In particular, in every place where r∗, r′
appear, e.g. in code of programs, or as a punctured point, the reduction first uses
one of the strings r1, r2 which is lexicographically smaller, and then the other (note
that r∗, r′ always appear together in the distribution, except for the value given to
the adversary as randomness of the receiver).




∗. If challenge r1, r2 are r
∗, r′, then the resulting distribution is exactly the
distribution from HybB,2,2. If r1, r2 are r
′, r∗, then the resulting distribution is exactly
the distribution from HybB,2,3.
Lemma 76. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image
of the PRF SG, and ρ̂∗ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,2,3 and HybB,2,4, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of a puncturable PRF RGkR in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,2,1,
HybB,2,2, except that r
′ and not r∗ is given to the adversary as randomness of the
receiever.




The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. Next it chooses random
r∗, µ1
∗ and sends the point (r∗, µ1
∗) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The
reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key kR{(r∗, µ1∗)} and the value
µ2
∗, which is either RGkR(r
∗, µ1
∗) or randomly chosen.
Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all
keys used in programs (except kR{(r∗, µ1∗)}), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE,
keys EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kS of the
sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It computes levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1
∗), L∗0 = Transform(`
∗
0, µ2




















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗.
Next it computes punctured keys DKR{r∗, r′}, kR{(r∗, µ1∗), (r′, µ1∗)} (by additionally
puncturing challenge kR{(r∗, µ1∗)} at (r′, µ1∗)), and EKR{Sρ̂∗}, Sρ̂∗ = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗)}
for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. It also punctures keys EKS{P`∗0}, DKS{P`∗0}, where P`∗0 =
{(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `∗0)}\(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), and EK{p}, DK{p} at p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·94) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·98). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s′, r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3




∗), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybB,2,4.
If µ2
∗ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybB,2,3.
Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured
key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of
an extracting puncturable PRF of (SW14) is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this
property.
Lemma 77. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image
of the PRF SG, and ρ̂∗ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,2,4 and HybB,2,5, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of iO for σ′-sized programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ)




Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 73.
Lemma 78. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,2,5
and HybB,2,6, then there exists an adversary which can break security of a prg in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction to security of a prg.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary.
It samples all keys used in programs, namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys
EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kS of the
sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of the sparse extracting PRF
RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of
GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
Next it chooses random r∗, µ1
∗ and computes µ2
∗ = RGkR(r
∗, µ1
∗). It computes levels
`∗0 = GenZero(µ1
∗), L∗0 = Transform(`
∗
0, µ2












It receives ρ̂∗ from a challenger of a prg game which is either randomly chosen or prg(ρ∗)











∗, `∗0), and EK{p}, DK{p} at p = (1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·94) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·97). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s′, r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗. If challenge ρ̂∗ was an
image of a prg, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybB,2,6.
If ρ̂∗ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybB,2,5.
Lemma 79. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,2,6
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and HybB,3,1, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained
decryption of the main ACE in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,5,
HybB,1,6, except that r
′ and not r∗ is given to the adversary as randomness of the
receiver.
Lemma 80. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,3,1
and HybB,3,2, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ
′-sized
programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 71.
Lemma 81. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,3,2 and HybB,3,3, then there exists an adversary which can
break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF SGkS in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,3,
HybB,1,4, except that r
′ and not r∗ is given to the adversary as randomness of the
receiver.
Lemma 82. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,3,3 and HybB,3,4, then there exists an adversary which
can break security of contrained decryption of a sender-fake relaxed ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,2,
HybB,1,3, except that r
′ and not r∗ is given to the adversary as randomness of the
receiver.
Lemma 83. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
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PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybB,3,4
and HybB,3,5, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ
′-sized
programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 68.
Finally, we note that the distributions in HybB,3,5 and HybC are 2
−λ-close (the reasoning
is similar to distributions HybB,HybB,1,1).
Reductions in the proof of lemma 59 (Semantic Security)
Let t(λ) be any function in Ω(poly(λ)), and let ε(λ) be a negligible function in w(2−λ).
Assuming the sender-fake relaxed ACE, receiver-fake relaxed ACE, main ACE, sparse
extracting puncturable PRF, and iO for program size σ′ are (t(λ), ε(λ))-secure, we
show that no time-t(λ) adversary can distinguish between HybC and HybD with more
than O(ε(λ)) +O(2−τ(λ)) advantage.
(Note that security loss O(2−τ(λ)) comes from conditioning on the fact that µ1
∗, µ2
∗
are outside of the image of the corresponding PRFs. Conditioning on s∗, r∗ incurs
only 2−λ loss and therefore we omit it.).
Lemma 84. Statistical distance between distributions HybC ,HybC,1,1 is at most 2 ·2−λ.
Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids HybB,HybB,1,1.
Lemma 85. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,1,1 and HybC,1,2, then there exists an adversary which can
break security of iO for σ′-sized programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing
advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and SFakeC,1 is that SFakeC,1 uses
a punctured key EKS{P`∗0}, where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). This
is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with
level `∗0, since `
∗
0 = [0, µ1
∗] and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1.
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Lemma 86. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,1,2 and HybC,1,3, then there exists an adversary which
can break security of contrained decryption of a sender-fake relaxed ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids HybB,3,3,HybB,3,4.
Lemma 87. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,1,3 and HybC,1,4, then there exists an adversary which can
break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF SGkS in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids HybB,3,2,HybB,3,3.
Lemma 88. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,1,4
and HybC,1,5, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational
extractor property of a PRF RGkR in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage
ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,3,
HybB,1,4, except that the reduction is to the strong extracting PRF of the receiver,
not the sender.
We give a reduction to strong computationally extracting PRF RGkR .
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It chooses µ1
∗ at
random and sends the point µ1
∗ to the challenger of strong extractor game. The
challenger samples the key kR for RG and either chooses µ2




∗) for randomly chosen r∗. The reduction gets back from the
challenger the key kR and the value µ2
∗.
Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples
all keys used in programs (except kR), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys
EKS,DKS of the sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse
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extracting PRF SG of the sender. It also runs setup of the level system to create the
code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It computes levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1
∗), L∗0 = Transform(`
∗
0, µ2




















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.







Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·103) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·107). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s′, r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3




∗), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybC,1,4.
If µ2
∗ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybC,1,5.
Lemma 89. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of
the PRF SG, and µ2
∗ is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,1,5 and HybC,2,1, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of iO for σ′-sized programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs P3B,2 and P3B,3 is that P3B,3 uses a
punctured key EK{p0, p1}, where p0 = (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0), p1 = (m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). We
argue that the program never needs to encrypt p0, p1, and therefore puncturing these
points doesn’t change the functionality:
Since we assumed that µ1
∗ is outside of the image of a PRF SG, validity check can
pass only if P3 is run on some (s,m, µ1
∗, µ2
∗), where s encodes m,µ1
∗ (and other
values). However, note that P3C,2 on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and
not the main step); thus the key in the main step can be safely punctured. Further,
in order for the program to run encryption algorithm in the trapdoor step on input
p0 or p1, fake s should encode level `
∗
0. However, note that DKS is punctured at the
set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), and thus P3C,2 rejects all fake s with





∗, `∗0), that is, s
′. Finally, note that
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running P3C,2 on (s
′,m, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) will pass validity check only if m = m∗0 (again, since
µ1
∗ is outside of the image of PRF SG). Thus (s′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) is the only potentially
problematic input (in particular, the key is never used to encrypt p1). However,
running P3C,2 on (s
′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) will not trigger encryption algorithm, since the
program directly outputs the value µ3
∗ encoded in s′. Thus P3C,2 never encrypts p0
or p1 in the trapdoor step.
Lemma 90. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of
the PRF SG, and µ2
∗ is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,2,1 and HybC,2,2, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of main ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,3,3,
HybB,3,4, except that EK is additionally punctured at another point, and µ2
∗ is
randomly chosen.
We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of main ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EK,DK), namely keys EKS,DKS of sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random µ1
∗, µ2















∗, L∗0) to puncture encryption key, sets p1,∅ to puncture decryption
key, and plaintext p0 to the challenger of constrained decryption game (note that
plaintext p0 doesn’t belong to the set {p1} for puncturing DK and thus this is a valid
query to the challenger of constrained decryption game). The challenger samples keys
EK, DK and it sends back to the reduction EK{p0, p1}, key which is either DK{p1} or
DK{∅}, and µ3∗ = EncEK(p0).




















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake (fig. 3·105) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·107, fig. 3·108). It gives
obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with s′, r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗. If challenge key
was DK{∅}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybC,2,1.
If key was DKS{p1}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybC,2,2.
Lemma 91. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of
the PRF SG, and µ2
∗ is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,2,2 and HybC,2,3, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of iO for σ′-sized circuits in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage 1
2
ε(λ).
Proof. We start with analyzing program Dec: The only difference between pro-
grams DecC,1 and DecC,2 is that DecC,1 uses key DK{p1} and DecC,2 uses DK{p0, p1},




∗, L∗0), p1 =
(m∗1, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, L∗0)). We will argue that if DecC,1 on input µ3
∗ = ACE.EncEK(p0) reaches
the line where it needs to decrypt µ3
∗, then it always outputs ′fail′. Therefore punctur-
ing this point (and thus forcing DecC,2 to output
′fail′ when attempt to decrypt µ3
∗)
doesn’t change the functionality:
First, note that if input µ3 = µ3
∗, but (µ1, µ2) 6= (µ1∗, µ2∗) and the program reached
decryption of µ3




thus the check (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
∗, µ2
∗) will not pass.
Second, by assumption µ2
∗ is outside of the image of a PRF RG, and thus validity check
can pass only if DecC,1 is run on some (r, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗), where r encodes µ1
∗, µ2
∗ (and
other values). However, note that DecC,1 on such input can only execute the trapdoor
step (and not the main step); thus the key in the main step can be safely punctured.
Further, in order for the program to output m after decryption in the trapdoor step,
the condition “isLess(L′, L′′)” should hold. However, when input µ3 = µ3
∗, L′′ is equal
to [0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗], which is the smallest possible level and therefore there doesn’t exist
L′ such that isLess(L′, L′′) = true. Thus, if DecC,1 reached decryption in the trapdoor
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step on input µ3
∗, it will anyway output ′fail′ due to failed “isLess” check and therefore
we can puncture DK at p0 such that an attempt to decrypt µ3
∗ would cause Dec to
output ′fail′ immediately.
Next we analyze program RFake. The difference between RFakeC,1 and RFakeC,2 is
that the key DK, which is already punctured at p1, is additionally punctured at p0.
In order to preserve the functionality of RFake on input µ3
∗, we additionally instruct
RFake to use level L∗0 = [0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗] on input µ3
∗ (without actually decrypting µ3
∗).
Note that this is what RFakeC,1 would do on input µ3
∗; thus this doesn’t change the
functionality.
Lemma 92. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of
the PRF SG, and µ2
∗ is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,2,3 and HybC,2,4, then there exists
an adversary which can break indistinguishability of ciphertexts of main ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage 1
2
ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction to indistinguishability of ciphertexts of main ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EK,DK), namely keys EKS,DKS of sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random µ1
∗, µ2
∗. It computes levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1














∗, L∗0) to puncture encryption key, the same set {p0, p1} to puncture
decryption key, and plaintexts p0, p1 to the challenger of indistinguishability of cipher-
texts game (note that plaintexts belong to both punctured sets and thus this is a valid
query to the challenger of indistinguishability of ciphertexts game). The challenger
samples keys EK, DK and it sends back to the reduction EK{p0, p1}, DK{p0, p1}, and
µ3
∗ which is either EncEK(p0) or EncEK(p1).




















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake (fig. 3·105) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·109). It gives obfuscated
programs to the adversary, together with s′, r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗. If challenge µ3
∗ was
EncEK(p0), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybC,2,3.
If µ3
∗ was EncEK(p1), then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybC,2,4.
Lemma 93. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of
the PRF SG, and µ2
∗ is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,2,4 and HybC,2,5, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of iO for σ′-sized circuits in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage 1
2
ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 91, except that in this hybrid
µ3
∗ = EncEK(p1) instead of p0, and we unpuncture DK at p1 instead of p0.
We start with analyzing program Dec: The only difference between programs DecC,3
and DecC,2 is that DecC,3 uses key DK{p0} and DecC,2 uses DK{p0, p1}, i.e. the key









We will argue that if DecC,3 on input µ3
∗ = EncEK(p1) reaches the line where it needs
to decrypt µ3
∗, then it always outputs ′fail′. Therefore puncturing this point (and
thus forcing DecC,2 to output
′fail′ when attempt to decrypt µ3
∗) doesn’t change the
functionality:
First, note that if input µ3 = µ3
∗, but (µ1, µ2) 6= (µ1∗, µ2∗) and the program reached
decryption of µ3




thus the check (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
∗, µ2
∗) will not pass.
Second, since µ2
∗ is random, it is outside of the image of a PRF RG with over-




∗), where r encodes µ1
∗, µ2
∗ (and other values). However, note that
DecC,3 on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus the
key in the main step can be safely punctured. Further, in order for the program to
output m after decryption in the trapdoor step, the condition “isLess(L′, L′′)” should
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hold. However, when input µ3 = µ3
∗, L′′ is equal to [0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗], which is the smallest
possible level and therefore there doesn’t exist L′ such that isLess(L′, L′′) = true. Thus,
if DecC,3 reached decryption in the trapdoor step on input µ3
∗, it will anyway output
′fail′ due to failed “isLess” check and therefore we can puncture DK at p1 such that an
attempt to decrypt µ3
∗ would cause Dec to output ′fail′ immediately.
Next we analyze program RFake. The difference between RFakeC,3 and RFakeC,2 is
that the key DK, which is already punctured at p0, is additionally punctured at p1.
In order to preserve the functionality of RFake on input µ3
∗, we additionally instruct
RFake to use level L∗0 = [0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗] on input µ3
∗ (without actually decrypting µ3
∗).
Note that this is what RFakeC,3 would do on input µ3
∗; thus this doesn’t change the
functionality.
Lemma 94. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of
the PRF SG, and µ2
∗ is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,2,5 and HybC,2,6, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of main ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybC,2,1,
HybC,2,2, except that we unpuncture DK at p0 instead of p1, and our third message is
µ3
∗ = EncEK(p1) instead of µ3
∗ = EncEK(p0).
We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of main ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EK,DK), namely keys EKS,DKS of sender ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random µ1
∗, µ2
∗. It computes levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1














∗, L∗0) to puncture encryption key, sets p0,∅ to puncture decryption
key, and plaintext p1 to the challenger of constrained decryption game (note that
plaintext p1 doesn’t belong to the set {p0} for puncturing DK and thus this is a valid
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query to the challenger of constrained decryption game). The challenger samples keys
EK, DK and it sends back to the reduction EK{p0, p1}, key which is either DK{p0} or
DK{∅}, and µ3∗ = EncEK(p1).



















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake (fig. 3·105) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·110, fig. 3·107). It gives
obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with s′, r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗. If challenge key
was DK{∅}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from HybC,2,6.
If key was DKS{p0}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybC,2,5.
Lemma 95. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of
the PRF SG, and µ2
∗ is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an
adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,2,6 and HybC,2,7, then there exists an
adversary which can break security of iO for σ′-sized programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 89.
Lemma 96. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,2,7
and HybC,3,1, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational
extractor property of a PRF RGkR in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage
ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybC,1,4,











Lemma 97. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
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(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,3,1 and HybC,3,2, then there exists an adversary which can
break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF SGkS in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybC,1,3,HybC,1,4











∗, L∗0), and the reduction is made for the point (s
∗,m∗1) instead of (s
∗,m∗0)).
Lemma 98. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,3,2 and HybC,3,3, then there exists an adversary which
can break security of contrained decryption of a sender-fake relaxed ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybC,1,2,











∗, L∗0), and µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1) instead of µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0)).
Lemma 99. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybC,3,3 and HybC,3,4, then there exists an adversary which can
break security of iO for σ′-sized programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing
advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and SFakeC,1 is that SFakeC,1 uses
a punctured key EKS{P`∗0}, where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). This
is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with
level `∗0, since `
∗
0 = [0, µ1
∗] and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1.
Finally, we note that the distributions in HybC,3,4 and HybD are O(2
−λ)-close (the
reasoning is similar to distributions HybB,HybB,1,1).
Reductions in the proof of lemma 60 (Indistinguishability of Levels)
Let t(λ) be any function in Ω(poly(λ)), and let ε(λ) be a negligible function in
w(2−λ). Assuming the sender-fake relaxed ACE, sparse extracting puncturable PRF,
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and iO for program size σ′ are (t(λ), ε(λ))-secure, and assuming the level system is
(t(λ), ε1(λ, T, τ))-secure, we show that no time-t(λ) adversary can distinguish between
HybD and HybE with more than O(ε(λ)) + ε1(λ, T, τ) advantage.
(Note that security loss O(2−τ(λ)) comes from conditioning on the fact that µ1
∗ is
outside of the image of the corresponding PRF. Conditioning on s∗, r∗ incurs only 2−λ
loss and therefore we omit it.).
Lemma 100. Statistical distance between distributions HybD,HybD,1,1 is at most
2 · 2−λ.
Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids HybB,HybB,1,1.
Lemma 101. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,1,1 and HybD,1,2, then there exists an adversary which can
break security of iO for σ′-sized programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing
advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and SFakeD,1 is that SFakeD,1 uses
a punctured key EKS{P`∗0}, where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0). This
is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with
level `∗0, since `
∗
0 = [0, µ1
∗] and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1.
Lemma 102. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,1,2 and HybD,1,3, then there exists an adversary which
can break security of constrained decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time
t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,2,
HybB,1,3 (with the difference that r
















Lemma 103. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,1,3 and HybD,1,4, then there exists an adversary which can
break computational strong extractor property of the PRF SG in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybB,1,3,
HybB,1,4 (with the difference that r











∗, L∗0), and the reduction is
made for the point (s∗,m∗1) instead of (s
∗,m∗0)).
Lemma 104. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,1,4
and HybD,2,1, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ
′-sized
programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage 1
2
ε(λ).
Proof. The difference between programs in the two hybrids is that in HybD,2,1 programs
use only punctured versions of programs of the level system. We argue that this
doesn’t change the functionality of the programs of deniable encryption, since these
programs never need to call programs of the level system on punctured inputs.
We start with analyzing program P3D,2. By assumption, µ1
∗ is outside of the image
of a PRF SG, and thus when µ1 = µ1
∗ validity check can pass only if P3 is run on
some (s,m, µ1
∗, µ2), where s encodes m,µ1
∗ (and other values). However, note that
P3D,2 on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus in
the main step we can use GenZero[µ1
∗] which is punctured at µ1
∗. Moreover, since
GenZero[µ1
∗] never outputs `∗0, we can also use Transform[(`
∗
0, µ2
∗)] which is punctured
at the input (`∗0, µ2
∗).
It remains to argue that we can puncture Transform[(`∗0, µ2
∗)] at the input (`∗0, µ2
∗) in
the trapdoor step as well. Note that in order to run Transform on this input in the
trapdoor step, P3 should take as input fake s which encodes `∗0 (among other things).
However, since DKS is punctured at P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0), the





∗, `∗0), that is, s
′. Further, in order for
“(m,µ1) = (m
′, µ1
′)” check to pass, inputs to P3 should be m = m∗0 and µ1 = µ1
∗.
Finally, in order to call Transform on (`∗0, µ2
∗), the input µ2 to P3 should be µ2
∗.
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In other words, the only input on which P3 could potentially run Transform at the
punctured point is (s′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗); however, in this case P3 simply outputs µ3
∗, which
is encoded in s′, without running Transform at all. Thus we can puncture Transform
safely.
Next we analyze program SFakeD,2. By assumption, µ1
∗ is is outside of the im-
age of a PRF SG, and thus validity check can pass only if SFake is run on some
(s,m, m̂, µ1
∗, µ2, µ3), where s encodes m,µ1
∗ (and other values). However, note that
SFakeD,2 on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus
in the main step we can use GenZero[µ1
∗] which is punctured at µ1
∗.
Lemma 105. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,2,1
and HybD,2,2, then there exists an adversary which can break security of the level
system with an upper bound T and tag size τ in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing
advantage ε(λ).
Proof. We give a reduction to security of the level system.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys
used in programs, namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys EKS,DKS of the sender
ACE, keys EKR,DKR of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of
the sender, key kR of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver.
It chooses random r∗ and µ1
∗ and computes µ2
∗ = RGkR(r
∗, µ1
∗). It sends µ1
∗, µ2
∗
as the first and the second tag to the challenger of the level system. The challenger
chooses bit b at random and runs setup of the level system to obtain programs
GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags. Then it computes `∗0 =
GenZero(µ1







∗). It also obfuscates
punctured programs GenZero[µ1
∗], Increment,Transform[(`∗b , µ2
∗)], isLess,RetrieveTag,
RetrieveTags. It sends these obfuscated punctured programs to the reduction, together
with `∗b and L
∗
0.



















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Next the reduction punctures keys EKS{P`∗b}, DKS{P`∗b} at the set
P`∗b = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
b)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗b).
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Then the reduction uses variables and code obtained from the challenger to construct
and obfuscate programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·116, fig. 3·118) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig.
3·85). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗.
If challenge bit b is 0, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybD,2,1. If b is 1, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybD,2,2.
Lemma 106. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,2,2
and HybD,2,3, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ
′-sized
programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage 1
2
ε(λ).
Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 104, except that Transform is
punctured at (`∗1, µ2
∗) instead of (`∗0, µ2
∗).
The difference between programs in HybD,2,2,HybD,2,3 is that in HybD,2,2 programs use
only punctured versions of programs of the level system. We argue that this doesn’t
change the functionality of the programs of deniable encryption, since these programs
never need to call programs of the level system on punctured inputs.
We start with analyzing program P3D,4. By assumption µ1
∗ is outside of the image
of a PRF SG, and thus when µ1 = µ1
∗ validity check can pass only if P3 is run on
some (s,m, µ1
∗, µ2), where s encodes m,µ1
∗ (and other values). However, note that
P3D,4 on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus in
the main step we can use GenZero[µ1
∗] which is punctured at µ1
∗. Moreover, since
GenZero[µ1
∗] never outputs `∗1, we can also use Transform[(`
∗
1, µ2
∗)] which is punctured
at the input (`∗1, µ2
∗).
It remains to argue that we can puncture Transform[(`∗1, µ2
∗)] at the input (`∗1, µ2
∗) in
the trapdoor step as well. Note that in order to run Transform on this input in the
trapdoor step, P3D,5 should take as input fake s which encodes `
∗
1 (among other things).
However, since DKS is punctured at P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1), the





∗, `∗1), that is, s
′. Further, in order for
“(m,µ1) = (m
′, µ1
′)” check to pass, inputs to P3 should be m = m∗0 and µ1 = µ1
∗.
Finally, in order to call Transform on (`∗1, µ2
∗), the input µ2 to P3 should be µ2
∗.
In other words, the only input on which P3 could potentially run Transform at the
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punctured point is (s′,m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗); however, in this case P3 simply outputs µ3
∗, which
is encoded in s′, without running Transform at all. Thus we can puncture Transform
safely.
Next we analyze program SFakeD,4. Since µ1
∗ is outside of the image of a PRF SG,
and thus validity check can pass only if SFake is run on some (s,m, m̂, µ1
∗, µ2, µ3),
where s encodes m,µ1
∗ (and other values). However, note that SFakeD,4 on such input
can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus in the main step we can
use GenZero[µ1
∗] which is punctured at µ1
∗.
Lemma 107. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,2,3
and HybD,3,1, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ
′-sized
programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs SFakeD,5 and SFakeD,6 is that in SFakeD,6
the key EKS is also punctured at P`∗0 , where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} (in addition to
being punctured at P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1)). This is without
changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level `∗0,
since `∗0 = [0, µ1
∗] and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1.
Lemma 108. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,3,1
and HybD,3,2, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained
decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing
advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybD,1,2,
HybD,1,3, except that `
∗
1 instead of `
∗
0 is used in the distribution, and keys EK, DK are
additionally punctured at the set P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1).
We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of sender ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EKS,DKS), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
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the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and µ1




levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1














Next the reduction sends the set P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1 as a set to puncture encryption key (where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1)), and sends sets
P`∗1 and P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1 as sets to puncture decryption key to the challenger of constrained
decryption game. The challenger samples keys EKS, DKS and it sends back to the
reduction EKS{P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1} and key which is either DKS{P`∗1} or DKS{P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1}.




∗, `∗1) (note that this








Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·122, fig. 3·124) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). It gives




key is DKS{P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybD,3,2. If key is DKS{P`∗1}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybD,3,1.
Lemma 109. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,3,2
and HybD,3,3, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained
decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing
advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybD,3,1,
HybD,3,2, except that we unpuncture DK at the set P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)}\(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1)
instead of P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} . We give a reduction to security of constrained de-
cryption of sender ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EKS,DKS), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
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the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and µ1




levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1














Next the reduction sends the set P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1 as a set to puncture encryption key (where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)} \ (m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1)), and sends sets
P`∗0 and P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1 as sets to puncture decryption key to the challenger of constrained
decryption game. The challenger samples keys EKS, DKS and it sends back to the
reduction EKS{P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1} and key which is either DKS{P`∗0} or DKS{P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1}.




∗, `∗1) (note that this








Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·124, fig. 3·126) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). It gives




key is DKS{P`∗0 ∪ P`∗1}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybD,3,2. If key is DKS{P`∗0}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybD,3,3.
Lemma 110. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,3,3
and HybD,3,4, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ
′-sized
programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs SFakeD,8 and SFakeD,9 is that in SFakeD,8
the key EKS is also punctured at P`∗1 , where P`∗1 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
1)}\(m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗1)
(in addition to being punctured at P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}). We argue that this is without
changing functionality:
First, note that the trapdoor step never needs to encrypt the plaintext with `∗1: for
that SFake would need to get as input some fake s which encodes `∗0, but such fake s




Second, in order to encrypt `∗1 in the main step, SFakeD,9 should get µ1
∗ as input.
However, in order to pass validity check with µ1
∗ (which is outside of the image of
PRF SG), SFakeD,9 should get as input some (s,m, m̂, µ1
∗, µ2, µ3), where s is fake and
encodes (m,µ1
∗) (among other things). But on such input SFakeD,9 never executes
the main step - it executes the trapdoor step. Thus we can additionally puncture EK
at P`∗1 in the main step.
Lemma 111. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,3,4
and HybD,3,5, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained
decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing
advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybD,3,2,
HybD,3,3, except that EKS, DKS are punctured at different sets. We give a reduction
to security of constrained decryption of sender ACE.
The reduction first takes plaintexts m∗0,m
∗
1 from the adversary. It samples all keys used
in programs (except EKS,DKS), namely keys EK,DK of the main ACE, keys EKR,DKR
of the receiver ACE, key kS of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key kR of
the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to
create the code of GenZero, Increment,Transform, isLess,RetrieveTag,RetrieveTags.
It chooses random r∗ and µ1




levels `∗0 = GenZero(µ1














Next the reduction sends the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} as a set to puncture encryption
key, and sends sets P`∗0 and ∅ as sets to puncture decryption key to the challenger of
constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EKS, DKS and it sends
back to the reduction EKS{P`∗0} and key which is either DKS{P`∗0} or DKS{∅}.




∗, `∗1) (note that this








Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate
programs P1,P3, SFake, (fig. 3·124, fig. 3·126) and P2,Dec,RFake (fig. 3·85). It gives
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key is DKS{P`∗0}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from
HybD,3,4. If key is DKS{∅}, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution
from HybD,3,5.
Lemma 112. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the
receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that µ1
∗ is outside the image of the
PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can (t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,3,5
and HybD,3,6, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ
′-sized
programs in time t(λ) + poly(λ) with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The only difference between programs SFakeD,9 and SFakeD,10 is that in SFakeD,9
the key EKS is punctured at P`∗0 , where P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}. This is without changing
functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level `∗0, since
`∗0 = [0, µ1
∗] and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1.
Lemma 113. Assume s∗, r∗ are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and
the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can
(t(λ), ε(λ))-distinguish HybD,3,6 and HybD,3,7, then there exists an adversary which can
break computational strong extractor property of the PRF SG in time t(λ) + poly(λ)
with distinguishing advantage ε(λ).
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids HybD,1,3,
HybD,1,4, except that fake s
′ is computed using level `∗1 instead of `
∗
0.
Finally, we note that the distributions in HybD,3,7 and HybE are O(2
−λ)-close (the
reasoning is similar to distributions HybB,HybB,1,1).
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3.8 Proof of Off-the-record Deniability of Our Bideniable En-
cryption
In this section we show that our scheme also satisfies off-the-record property, which
says that the adversary who gets contradicting claims from parties (that is, the sender
claims that the plaintext was m∗0 and shows consistent randomness, but the receiver
claims that the plaintext was m∗1 and also shows consistent randomness) cannot tell
which party is lying (if not both) and which plaintext was actually sent. In other
words, neither party can prove which plaintext was used in the protocol. We underline
however that this property only holds as long as parties act honestly during the
protocol: indeed, a malicious party can always choose its randomness as a result of a
prg and provide the seed of this prg as a proof that its randomness is genuine.
Recall the definition of off-the-record deniability states that the following three
distributions are computationally indistinguishable:
• the sender claims m∗0 was sent, the receiver claims m∗1 was sent, the







∗, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0)), where s
∗, r∗ are ran-
domly chosen, r′ = RFake(m∗1, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗; ρ∗) for randomly chosen ρ∗, and
PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
• the sender claims m∗0 was sent, the receiver claims m∗1 was sent, the







′, r∗, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1)), where s
∗, r∗ are ran-






and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen
rSetup.
• the sender claims m∗0 was sent, the receiver claims m∗1 was sent, the







′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗2)), where s
∗, r∗ are ran-










ρ∗), and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup and ρ
∗.
















∗, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0)), where s







∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗,
and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.






∗) with overwhelming probability over the











′, r∗, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1)), where s






∗, `∗1), and PP = Setup(1
λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake;
rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.









′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗2)), where s














randomly chosen ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for ran-
domly chosen rSetup.
Thus to prove off-the-record deniability it suffices to show indistinguishability between
hybrids HybA, HybE, and HybD′ . The proof of this statement consists of the same
main components as the proof of deniability, albeit in a different order and with slight
changes. Below we describe the structure of the proof and comment on the differences
with the proof of deniability. Conscretely, we show that HybA ≈ HybB ≈ HybC
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≈ HybD ≈ HybE and that HybC ≈ HybD′ , where hybrids are as follows:
1. Indistinguishability of explanations of the sender: starting from HybA,




and level `∗ = [0, µ1








′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0)), where s













prg(ρ∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,
RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 57, except that







∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗ and give r′
(instead of r∗) to the adversary.
2. Indistinguishability of levels: we switch the level encoded in s′ from `∗0 =
[0, µ1
∗] to `∗1 = [1, µ1
∗] (while keeping L∗0 = [0, µ1
∗, µ2









′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗0)), where s













prg(ρ∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗ and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,
RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 60, except that in


















∗, L∗0), and µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗0) instead of µ1
∗ =
SG(s∗,m∗1) (except when µ1
∗ is randomly chosen).
3. Semantic security: we switch the transcript from encrypting m∗0 to encrypting









′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1)), where s













prg(ρ∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,
RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 59, except that in




stead of r′ = RFake(m∗0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3













4. Indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver: we switch fake r′,
which encodes plaintext m∗1, transcript µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
∗, and level L∗ = [0, µ1
∗, µ2
∗],








′, r∗, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗1)), where s






∗, `∗1), and PP = Setup(1
λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,
RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup.
The proof of this step is very close to the proof of lemma 58, except for a
couple of changes. First, we switch the role of m∗0,m
∗
1 everywhere (in hy-
brids and reductions), and we generate s′ using level `∗1 instead of `
∗
0. How-











∗, `∗1)), and we use the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}
(isntead of P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)} \ (m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, `∗0)).
For the ease of verification, in the paragraph below we present the list of hybrids
proving indistinguishability of HybD and HybE.
Semantic security for plaintext m∗2: besides showing indistinguishability between
HybC and HybD, we also show indistinguishability between HybC and HybD′ , i.e. we
switch the transcript from encrypting m∗0 to encrypting m
∗










′, r′, tr(s∗, r∗,m∗2)), where s














randomly chosen ρ∗, and PP = Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for ran-
domly chosen rSetup.
The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 59, except that in all
hybrids and reductions we generate r′ = RFake(m∗1, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3
















∗, `∗0). Also, everywhere in hybrids


















List of hybrids for the proof of indistinguishability of HybD and HybE Now
we present the list of hybrids for the proof of indistinguishability of receiver explanation
of off-the-record deniability. We do not present the reductions since they are very
similar to the corresponding reductions (section 3.7.2), used for hybrids in section
3.7.1 in the proof of lemma 58. For a more convenient reference to security reductions,
we do not change enumeration of hybrids from section 3.7.1, and we keep hybrids in
the same order as there (starting from randomly chosen r∗, and moving to fake r′).
We also present programs (those which require changes compared to their version in
the proof of lemma 58).
List of hybrids. First in a sequence of hybrids we “eliminate” complementary
ciphertext µ3∗ = ACE.EncEK(1⊕m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0), i.e. make programs Dec and SFake
reject it:
• HybB,1,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
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are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2













∗, `∗1). Programs can be found in
fig. 3·89 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the receiver).
Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from HybD, conditioned
on the fact that s∗, r∗ are outside of images of their ACE.
• HybB,1,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,1,P2,P3B,1,Dec, SFakeB,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2














can be found in fig. 3·90 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
the receiver).
That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since
this modification doesn’t change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that
SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level `∗0.
• HybB,1,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2














can be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
the receiver).
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the same set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}. Indistinguishability
holds by security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption
key EKS is already punctured at the same set.
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• HybB,1,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














can be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
the receiver).
That is, we choose µ1
∗ at random instead of computing it as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1).
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ was not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybB,1,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2,P3B,3,Dec, SFakeB,3,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














can be found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of
the receiver).
That is, in program P3 we puncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the
point p = (1⊕m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by iO, since P3 never
needs to encrypt this point. Roughly, this is because of the following: since µ1
∗
is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, P3 never encrypts p in the
main step. In order to encrypt it in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input
some fake s encoding level `∗0, which doesn’t exist due to the fact that DKS is
punctured at the set P`∗0 .
• HybB,1,6. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,1,P3B,3,DecB,1, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,1; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2















grams can be found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·135
(programs of the receiver).
That is, in programs Dec,RFake we puncture decryption key DK of the main
ACE at the same point p = (1⊕m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by
security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK
is already punctured at this point.
Now µ3∗ = ACE.EncEK(1 ⊕ m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0) is rejected by Dec and RFake. In the
following hybrids, similarly to previous lemma, we switch the roles of r∗ and r′, using
the fact that programs treat them similarly, once µ3∗ is eliminated
29.
• HybB,2,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2














grams can be found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·136
(programs of the receiver).
That is, we modify programs of the receiver (P2,Dec,RFake) by puncturing en-
cryption key of receiver-fake ACE EKR{p} at the point p = (m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, L∗0,
ρ̂∗), decryption key of receiver-fake ACE DKR{r∗, r′} at r∗ and r′ (where
r′ = ACE.EncEKR(p)), and the key kR of extracting PRF RG of the receiver
at the points (r∗, µ1
∗) and (r′, µ1
∗). In addition, we hardwire certain outputs
inside programs of the receiver to make sure that functionality of the programs
29The problem with µ3∗ is that unmodified Dec on input (r
∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3∗) outputs 1⊕m∗1 (via
main step), and on input (r′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗, µ3∗) it outputs
′fail′ (via trapdoor step, since levels in r′ and
µ3∗ are both 0 and “isLess = true” check fails. Because of this difference, in HybB,2,1 we wouldn’t be
able to modify program Dec such that the code treats r∗ and r′ in the same way. However, after
HybB,1,6 µ3
∗ is not a valid ciphertext anymore and thus in HybB,2,1 we can instruct Dec to output
′fail′ on both r∗ and r′.
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doesn’t change. Indistinguishability holds by iO.
• HybB,2,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r∗, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2













Programs can be found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·136
(programs of the receiver).
That is, we choose µ2




Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured
point (r∗, µ1
∗).
• HybB,2,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2



















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·136 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, we switch the roles of r∗ and r′ everywhere in the distribution: namely,
we give r′ (instead of r∗) to the adversary as randomness of the receiver, and
we change r∗ to r′ and r′ to r∗ everywhere in the programs. Note that this
doesn’t change the code of the programs since programs use r∗ and r′ in
the same way. Indistinguishability holds by the symmetry of receiver-fake
ACE, which says that (r∗, r′,EKR{p},DKR{r∗, r′}) is indistinguishable from
(r′, r∗,EKR{p},DKR{r′, r∗}), where p = (m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗, L∗0, ρ̂∗), r∗ is randomly
chosen, r′ = ACE.EncEKR(p).
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• HybB,2,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,2,P3B,3,DecB,2, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,2; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. Programs can be
found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·136 (programs of the
receiver).




∗) instead of choosing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF RG at the punctured
point (r∗, µ1
∗).
• HybB,2,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,1,P3B,3,DecB,1, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,1; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; r
∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗) for randomly chosen ρ̂∗. Programs can be
found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·135 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, we revert all changes we made to programs in HybB,2,1 and thus use
original programs P2,Dec,RFake, except that DK remains punctured at the point
p = (1 ⊕ m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by iO, since we remove
puncturing without changing the functionality of the programs.
• HybB,2,6. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2B,1,P3B,3,DecB,1, SFakeB,3,RFakeB,1; rSetup) for randomly cho-
sen rSetup; s
∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1), µ2






















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·135 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, we replace randomly chosen ρ̂∗ with prg(ρ∗) for randomly chosen ρ∗,
when generating r′. Indistinguishability holds by security of a prg.
Finally, in the following hybrids we revert all changes we made in hybrids HybB,1,1 -
HybB,1,6, thus restoring all programs (and making µ3
∗ a valid ciphertext):
• HybB,3,1. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,3,P2,P3B,3,Dec, SFakeB,3,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, chosen at random, µ1






















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗.
Programs can be found in fig. 3·133 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96
(programs of the receiver).
That is, in programs Dec,RFake we unpuncture decryption key DK of the main
ACE at the point p = (1 ⊕ m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by
security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK
is punctured at this point.
• HybB,3,2. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
r∗ is chosen at random, µ1
∗ is chosen at random, µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the
receiver).
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That is, in program P3 we unpuncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at
the point p = (1⊕m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0). Indistinguishability holds by iO, because of
the same reason as in HybB,1,5.
• HybB,3,3. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,2,P2,P3B,2,Dec, SFakeB,2,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, we choose µ1
∗ as µ1
∗ = SGkS(s
∗,m∗1) instead of computing it at random.
Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF
SG (note that s∗ is not used anywhere else in the distribution).
• HybB,3,4. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
Setup(1λ; P1B,1,P2,P3B,1,Dec, SFakeB,1,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup;
s∗, r∗ are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can
be found in fig. 3·90 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the
receiver).
That is, in programs P1,P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DKS of the
sender-fake ACE at the same set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}. Indistinguishability
holds by security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption
key EKS is already punctured at the same set.
• HybB,3,5. We give the adversary (PP,m∗0,m∗1, s′, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗, µ3∗), where PP =
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Setup(1λ; P1,P2,P3,Dec, SFake,RFake; rSetup) for randomly chosen rSetup; s
∗, r∗
are chosen at random, µ1
∗ = SG(s∗,m∗1), µ2





















∗)) for randomly chosen ρ∗. Programs can be found in fig. 3·89
(programs of the sender) and fig. 3·96 (programs of the receiver).
That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EKS of the sender-fake
ACE at the set P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since
this modification doesn’t change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that
SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level `∗0.
Note that HybB,3,5 is the same as HybC , conditioned on the fact that s
∗, r∗ are




Inputs: sender randomness s, message m.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}, key kS of an extracting PRF SG.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m = m′ then return µ1
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ1 ← SGkS(s,m).
Program P3B,3(s,m, µ1, µ2)
Inputs: sender randomness s, message m, the first and the second messages µ1, µ2 in
the protocol.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,3, GenZero, Transform,
RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where P`∗0 =




1. Validity check: if P1B,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1, µ2 = m
′, µ1
′, µ2
′ then return µ3
′;
(c) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then:
i. If µ1 6= RetrieveTag(`′) then abort;
ii. Set L← Transform(`′, µ2);
iii. Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK{p}(m,µ1, µ2, L);
3. Main step:
(a) Set L0 ← Transform(GenZero(µ1), µ2);
(b) Return µ3 ← ACE.EncEK{p}(m,µ1, µ2, L0).
Figure 3·133: Programs P1B,3,P3B,3, SFakeB,3, used in the proof in-
distinguishability of explanations of the receiver for off-the-record deni-
ability.
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Program SFakeB,3(s,m, m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: sender randomness s, real message m, fake message m̂, protocol transcript
µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1B,3, GenZero, Increment; punc-
tured encryption and decryption keys EKS{P`∗0},DKS{P`∗0} of sender-fake ACE, where
P`∗0 = {(∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, `
∗
0)}.
1. Validity check: if P1B,3(s,m) 6= µ1 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:
(a) out← ACE.DecDKS{P`∗0}(s); if out =





(b) If m,µ1 = m
′, µ1
′ then
i. Set `+1 ← Increment(`′); if `+1 = ′fail′ then abort;
ii. Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `+1).
3. Main step:
(a) Set `1 ← Increment(GenZero(µ1));
(b) Return ACE.EncEKS{P`∗0}
(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, `1).
Figure 3·134: Programs P1B,3,P3B,3, SFakeB,3, used in the proof in-





Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: decryption key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, key kR of an extracting
PRF RG.
1. Trapdoor step:





(b) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR(r, µ1).
Program DecB,1(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryp-
tion key DKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key DK{p} of the main
ACE, where p = (1⊕m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).
1. Validity check: if P2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:





(b) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Program RFakeB,1(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: encryption key EKR of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption
key DK{p} of the main ACE, where p = (1⊕m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·135: Programs P2B,1,DecB,1,RFakeB,1, used in the proof of




Inputs: receiver randomness r, the first message µ1 in the protocol.
Hardwired values: punctured decryption key DKR{r∗, r′} of receiver-fake ACE,
punctured key kR{(r∗, µ1∗), (r′, µ1∗)} of an extracting PRF RG, variables r∗, r′, µ1∗, µ2∗.
1. Trapdoor step:
(a) If (r, µ1) = (r
∗, µ1
∗) or (r, µ1) = (r
′, µ1
∗) then return µ2
∗;
(b) If r = r∗ or r = r′ then goto main step;
(c) out ← ACE.DecDKR{r∗,r′}(r); if out = ′fail′ then goto main step, else parse




(d) If µ1 = µ1
′ then return µ2
′;
2. Main step:
(a) Return µ2 ← RGkR{(r∗,µ1∗),(r′,µ1∗)}(r, µ1).
Program DecB,2(r, µ1, µ2, µ3)
Inputs: receiver randomness r, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3.
Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2B,2, isLess, RetrieveTags;
punctured decryption key DKR{r∗, r′} of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryp-





1. Validity check: if P2B,2(r, µ1) 6= µ2 then abort;
2. Trapdoor step:










(b) If (r, µ1, µ2) = (r
∗, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) or (r, µ1, µ2) = (r
′, µ1
∗, µ2
∗) then then goto
main step;
(c) If r = r∗ or r = r′ then goto main step;
(d) out← ACE.DecDKR{r∗,r′}(r); if out′ = ′fail′ then goto main step; else parse




(e) if µ1, µ2, µ3 = µ1
′, µ2
′, µ3
′ then return m′;



















(b) If (µ1, µ2) = (µ1
′′, µ2
′′) = RetrieveTags(L′′) then return m′′;
(c) Else abort.
Figure 3·136: Programs P2B,2,DecB,2,RFakeB,2, used in the proof of
lemma 58 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).
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Program RFakeB,2(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3; ρ)
Inputs: fake message m̂, protocol transcript µ1, µ2, µ3, random coins ρ.
Hardwired values: punctured encryption key EKR{Sρ̂∗} of receiver-fake ACE, where
Sρ̂∗ = {∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ∗, ρ̂∗} for randomly chosen ρ̂∗, punctured decryption key DK{p} of
the main ACE, where p = (1⊕m∗1, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0).




2. Return r′ ← ACE.EncEKR{Sρ̂∗}(m̂, µ1, µ2, µ3, L′′, prg(ρ)).
Figure 3·137: Programs P2B,2,DecB,2,RFakeB,2, used in the proof of
lemma 58 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).
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3.9 On Flexible Deniability
This weaker notion of deniability (CDNO97, OPW11, BNNO11, Dac12, AFL16,
CIO16, GKW17), sometimes called multi-distributional deniability or dual-scheme
deniability postulates two schemes, S and S ′, where S is “deniable with respect to S ′”.
When applied to sender-deniability, the requirement is roughly as follows: The sender
can use scheme S to encrypt plaintext m with random string r to obtain ciphertext c,
and then can present an appropriate fake random string r̃ such that c is obtained as an
encryption of m′ 6= m with randomness r̃, using the scheme S ′. However, there is no
requirement for the case where the sender chooses to present the original randomness
r — and, indeed, in all the schemes in the literature that satisfy this notion, as soon
as the sender presents r, all deniability is lost: It becomes clear that scheme S was
used that the plaintext was m. (This stands in sharp contrast to full deniability,
which guarantees that the adversary cannot tell whether the sender presented the real
randomness or a fake one, or more generally that, once the ciphertext is sent, the
scheme does not provide the sender with a way to “forfeit deniability.”)
The cases of flexible receiver deniability and flexible bideniability are defined similarly.
We note that in the case of flexible bideniability, the guarantees are given only when
both parties cooperate and present their faked random strings. That is, as soon as one
of the parties chooses to “defect” and disclose its rue randomness, the other party
loses its deniability guarantees as well.
On a positive side, this definition already guarantees plausible deniability, since the
coercer cannot prove that S was used - even though it may have reasons to believe so.
Thus, flexible deniability already protects parties in many scenarios where plausible
deniability suffices, e.g. in court. But even in cases when plausible deniability is not
enough, having a partial solution is much better than nothing - especially given a very
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slow progress on fully deniable schemes. Moreover, the efficiency gap between fully and
flexibly deniable schemes seems tremendous: unlike fully deniable schemes (including
this work and (SW14)), known flexibly deniable schemes can be implemented in
practice.
But even from a theoretical prospective, a weaker definition of flexible deniability
allows for fewer rounds, more efficiency, and weaker assumptions than fully deniable
schemes, and requires no setup. For instance, (OPW11) build a 2-message flexibly
bideniable encryption from LWE and from simulatable encryption. In fact we even
have more advanced encryption schemes (like identity-based encryption (OPW11),
functional encryption (CIO16), and attribute-based encryption ((AFL16))) with flexi-
ble deniability, and we have flexibly deniable encryption scheme with succinct keys
(GKW17), where the size of a key is proportional to the number of possible fake
messages (which can be smaller than the total number of possible plaintexts).
However, flexible notion of deniability has significant drawbacks. Indeed, having two
different algorithms, which have two different security guarantees and which are up
to the parties to choose, leaves room for suspicion, misuse, and can even cause harm
to parties themselves. It also requires additional coordination between parties. But
most importantly, flexible deniability doesn’t provide perhaps the most desirable benefit
of deniability - preventing coercion in the first place by making it useless. Below we
explain these issues in more detail.
First, refusal to provide keys for deniable version could significantly increase the
adversary’s certainty that parties are lying - compared to the ideal channels case
where the coercer has nothing besides parties’ claims. Indeed, in the real world the
opinion of the coercer will be shifted by its certainty that deniable version was used.
However, this is not captured by security definition of flexible deniability, which doesn’t
take into account how exactly parties choose an algorithm, e.g. by assuming some
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distribution on the choices of S and S ′, or considering rational behavior. For instance,
one could argue that rational players would prefer S over S ′ because of better security
guarantees, which is further aggravated by the fact that flexible deniability could
actually harm those who use the non-deniable version. Indeed, as (CHK+08), who
analyze plausible deniability of TrueCrypt hidden volume, put it, “deniability cuts
both ways, and sometimes that’s not a benefit”.
Second, note that fully deniable encryption doesn’t allow parties to prove what their
plaintext was even if they want to30. This is crucial in preventing bribery or vote
selling. In contrast, in flexibly deniable encryption parties can choose whether they
want it or not by choosing deniable or non-deniable algorithm. As a result, with fully
deniable encryption one could set up receipt-free voting scheme using a physical booth
which, for instance, provides parties with randomness (so that they can still lie about
their vote, but cannot use preset randomness to sell their vote). But if flexible scheme
is used, then voters can lie about their vote but at the same time sell their true vote
if they want (if deniable version is used), or can do neither (if non-deniable version is
used).
Another important issue which arises in flexible setting is the need for coordination.
That is, parties need a way to agree whether they run S or S ′, and do so by the
time of encryption31. It is not clear how to do such coordination without another
deniable channel. As a result, well-being of each party is in the other party’s hands:
e.g. the sender’s claim will look credible only as long as the receiver also used deniable
algorithm at time of encryption, also decided to fake at time of coercion, and used the
same fake plaintext. This is a problem not only when the receiver turns against the
sender, but also when the receiver remains honest but doesn’t know what actions to
30As discussed before, this property only holds if parties execute the protocol correctly.
31However coordination is not required for correctness and semantic security, since these properties
hold even if the sender and the receiver use different schemes (OPW11).
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take out of lack of coordination.
Finally and most importantly, as already pointed out by (OPW11), deniable encryption
not only allows to withstand coercion, but also makes in useless in the first place - just
like it is useless in the ideal world, where there is no way of verifying parties’ claims.
However, flexible deniability doesn’t give this guarantee: the coercer (who suspects
that deniable version could be used) can gradually increase the pressure - be it a sum
of money or “enhanced interrogation” - until the parties find it more preferable to
prove what their plaintext was by disclosing keys of deniable version, S.
To summarize this discussion, we think that flexible deniability as a real-life application
already suffices in many cases - e.g. when plausible deniability is sufficient, or when
the coercer is not aware of the concept of deniable encryption and will be satisfied by
seeing some working key. However, to obtain security guarantees of the ideal channel,
one should use encryption which is (fully) deniable and off-the-record deniable.
Needless to say, we still believe that flexible deniability is a fascinating concept to
explore. For instance, coming up with flexible scheme where S ′ is some standard
encryption, e.g. RSA, would mitigate some issues mentioned above, thus making
flexible deniability as good as full deniability for many practical purposes. Further,
flexibly deniable encryption is an interesting primitive whose connections to non-
committing encryption and full deniability are yet to be explored.
3.10 On Removing Layers of Obfuscation
When our construction described in section 3.6 is instantiated with ACE from
(CHJV14), relaxed ACE described in section 3.11, and the level system described in
section 3.5 (which in turn uses ACE of (CHJV14)), the resulting CRS ends up con-
taining three layers of obfuscation. Since even a single obfuscation incurs a significant
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blowup in the program size, ideally we would like to have only one layer of obfuscation.
In this section we explain why the whole proof of bideniability and off-the-record
deniability can still go through, if we use non-obfuscated version and “unroll” all the
proofs. More concretely, we do the following:
• Instead of using ACE keys and the programs of the level system, which are all
obfuscated programs, we use their non-obfuscated versions. Still, we use one
layer of obfuscation on top of programs of deniable encryption. We pad the
size of the non-obfuscated programs of deniable encryption to size σ such that
σ is larger than the size of any (non-obfuscated) program (including programs
variants in the hybrids) of deniable encryption, ACE, relaxed ACE, or the level
system.
• In the proof we replace each hybrid reducing to security of any of ACE, relaxed
ACE, or the level system with a sequence of hybrids proving the corresponding
property of the primitive.
Now we briefly comment on why each security reduction can still be proven. Let
program C1 of a primitive ∆1, and program C2 of a primitive ∆2 be such that C1
uses an obfuscated version of C2, i.e. iO(C2), as a black box (e.g. ∆1 can be deniable
encryption and ∆2 can be relaxed ACE, ACE or the level system, or ∆1 can be
the level system and ∆2 can be ACE). We denote this by C1[iO(C2)]. Further, let
C1[C2] be program C1 which uses program C2, instead of iO(C2). Note that this is
syntactically well-defined since C1 uses iO(C2) as a black box and since iO(C2) and
C2 have the same syntax.
Further, let all reductions in the security proof of ∆1 use iO(C2) as a black box. We
claim that the “unrThen all reductions in security proofs of deniable encryption, ACE,
relaxed ACE, and the level system can be classified as follows:
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Reductions in the proof of security of ∆1:
• Reductions which rely on security of ∆2: we replace each reduction with a
sequence of reductions from the proof of ∆2, and as we argue later, they all still
can be proven.
• Reductions which do not rely on security of ∆2, but which use the fact that
iO(C2) has a certain functionality (e.g. an iO-based reduction, which uses the
fact that the functionality of C1 in the two consecutive hybrids doesn’t change,
and analyzes functionality of iO(C2) as part of the argument). We claim that if
such a reduction is possible with C1[iO(C2)], then it is also possible with C1[C2].
This is because iO preserves the functionality with all-but-negligible probability
over the randomness of iO.
• All other reductions: these reductions merely use the fact that in the reduction
it is possible to reconstruct iO(C2) in polynomial time. Note that this is true
for C2 as well, thus such reductions still go through.
Reductions in the proof of security of ∆2
• Reductions to security of obfuscation for a program C2, relying on the fact that
C2 has the same functionality in the two consecutive hybrids: we claim that we
can instead reduce to security of obfuscation for a program iO(C1[C2]). Indeed,
since C1 uses iO(C2) as a black box, and since iO preserves functionality except
for negligible probability over the choice of randomness of iO, C1[C2] also has the
same functionality in those two hybrids. Thus, as long as we pad the program
C1[C2] sufficiently, the reduction to security of iO still holds.
• Reductions which rely on the fact that in some cases iO allows to extract a
differing input of programs C ′2, C
′′
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• All other reductions: in such reductions we need to make sure that the reduction
can reconstruct the whole distribution, which now includes an obfuscated pro-
gram iO(C1[C2]), together with any values the adversary is supposed to get as
part of the game for primitive ∆1. We note that this can be done: since it was
possible to do in the reduction (of the proof for ∆1) to security of ∆2, it should
be possible as well for every hybrid in security proof of ∆2, since otherwise the
reduction of the proof of ∆1 can be used as a distinguisher for ∆2. Indeed, since
the reduction uses iO(C2) as a black box, we can replace iO(C2) with C2 and
the reduction still succeeds.
3.11 Construction of Relaxed ACE
In this section we describe how to modify the construction of ACE from (CHJV14)
to obtain relaxed ACE (def. 13). Recall that the differences between ACE and
relaxed ACE are that relaxed ACE doesn’t necessarily satisfy indistinguishability of
ciphertexts; that its distinguishing advantage in security of constrained decryption
game is negligible for certain sets (as opposed to being proportional to size of those
sets); and that it additionally satisfies symmetry.
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Brief motivation and explanation of the construction. The first attempt
to remove dependency on the size of the sets is perhaps to use the technique from
(GPS16) - that is, instead of having a single PRF-based signature on the plaintext
m, have |m| signatures of each prefix of m. This allows to change the key on many
inputs (with the same prefix) in a single step. However, with this approach we are
not able to prove symmetry: it requires to switch c∗ = Enc(m∗) to random and thus
to puncture all keys for each PRF; however, such puncturing cannot be done without
changing the functionality of the encryption program, since e.g. puncturing the PRF
which is applied on the first bit already prohibits encrypting of half of all inputs.
To deal with this, we notice that in the proof of deniable encryption we use security
of relaxed ACE on sets of special structure, which is either all strings ending with the
same suffix of a fixed size, or all such strings except one. Thus we require relaxed
ACE to be parametrized with prefix parameter t, which denotes the size of this prefix.
32 An encryption of m will be an ACE ciphertext where instead of a single PRF
signature of m, we will have n− t+ 1 PRF signatures of suffixt(m), . . . , suffixn(m). We
say that a set S is consistent with some suffix suf of size t, if S consists of all strings
ending with suf; we say that a plaintext m is consistent with suf, if m ends with suf.
Using n− t+ 1 signatures allows us to prove the following:
• symmetry for random c∗ and c′ = Enc(m∗), as long as encryption key is punctured
at the set S, and both S and m∗ are consistent with the same suffix suf of size t;
• security of constrained decryption with distinguishing advantage independent of
set sizes, as long as S1 \ S0 is either Ssuf (e.g. a set consistent with some suf of
size t), or Ssuf \ {m}, where both S and m are consistent with the same suf of
size t.
32In the construction of deniable encryption, t = |`0| for the sender ACE and t = |prg(ρ)| for the
receiver ACE.
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Security of constrained decryption follows a by-now standard proof, which punctures
the key at the whole set Ssufi at once (for each i = t+ 1, . . . , n), by adding an injective
prg on top of a signature check and then switching the prg image to random (in the
actual proof we instead use an injective OWF to minimize assumptions). For the case
S1 \ S0 = Ssuf it is enough to do one step, and for the case S1 \ S0 = Ssuf \ {m} we
need n− t steps.33
Symmetry argument is essentially a Sahai-Waters (SW14) symmetry argument in
the proof of deniable encryption, with a difference that they didn’t use ACE as an
abstraction, and we instead decided to formulate it on ACE level to shorten the main
proof of deniable encryption. The proof follows essentially the same steps, except
that, since we have more signatures, we also need to argue that in the proof the
decryption key can be punctured at a certain set of points (this is done using an
argument similar to the proof of security of constrained decryption, since encryption
key is already punctured on those points). Indeed, the proof of (SW14) uses the fact
that the (only) signature uniquely defines the plaintext. This is not true in our case
anymore, since some signatures only define the corresponding prefix of the plaintext.
This introduces “bad” plaintexts which we need to get rid of. To do this, we rely
on the fact that S \ {m∗} can be represented as a union of Ssufi , where all sufi are
different from suffixes of m∗.
Construction of relaxed ACE. The construction of relaxed ACE is the same
as the construction of ACE from (CHJV14), except that we use different programs.
Namely, let Ft, . . . , Fn be injective PRFs with sparse images, mapping t, . . . , n bits,
respectively, to nout = O(λ) bits. Let F be a PRF mapping nout bits to O(λ)
33We write S0, S1 (sets to puncture keys at in the security game) and Ssuf (a set denoting all
strings ending with suf), somewhat abusing the notation, since the subscript means an index in the
former case and a prefix in the latter. However, all our suffixes are of length at least t, so there
should be no confusion.
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bits. Then a (possibly punctured) encryption key is obfuscated GEnc(m), a (possibly
punctured) decryption key is obfuscated GDec(m), and a ciphertext-based punctured
key is obfuscated GPuncture(c)[c(0), c(1)], where one of c(0), c(1) is a valid ciphertext and
the other is randomly chosen. Programs can be found on fig. 3·138.
Theorem 27. Assuming iO and injective one way functions, the construction of
(CHJV14) instantiated with programs on fig. 3·138 is a relaxed ACE for plaintext
length n and suffix parameter t. Concretely, assuming iO is (t1, ε1)-secure and one way
function is (t2, ε2)-secure, and let (t3, ε3) be such that ε3 ≥ εo(1)1 , and t3 · 1ε1 (n− t) =
O(t2).
Then the resulting ACE is (min(t1, t3), O((n− t) · (ε1 + ε2 + ε)))-secure.
Proof. Correctness. All necessary correctness properties follow from correctness of
iO, injectivity of PRFs and can be immediately verified.
Security of constrained decryption with negligible advantage. We prove
security for a harder case of S1 \ S0 = Ssuft \ {m∗} (the case when S1 \ S0 = Ssuft can
be shown by doing a single step of this proof for the PRF Ft). Note that S1 \ S0 =
Ssuft \ {m∗} can be represented as Ssufn ∪ . . . ∪ Ssuft+1 , where sufn = m∗1,m∗2, . . . ,m∗n,
sufn−1 = m∗2,m
∗
3, . . . ,m
∗




n−t+2, . . . ,m
∗
n.
We start with a distribution corresponding to the key DK which is punctured at S0
(which we denote by Hyb0) and eventially reach a distribution where the key DK is
punctured at S1 (which we denote by Hybn,5). We show indistinguishability via a
sequence of hybrids Hybj,k for j = t+ 1, . . . , n, k = 0, . . . , 5. Programs can be found
on fig. 3·139:
• Hyb0 corresponds to the game where DK is punctured at S0, i.e. the adversary
gets (EK{U}, DK{S0}).
• Hybj,0: the adversary gets (EK{U}, DKj,0), where DKi is an obfuscation of a
program Gj,0Dec (fig. 3·139). Note that when j = t+ 1, Hybj,0 = Hyb0.
• Hybj,1: the adversary gets (EKj,1, DKj,1), where DKj,1 is an obfuscation of a
program Gj,1Dec, where z∗ = Fj(Kj; sufj)), and EKj,1 is an obfuscation of G
j,1
Enc.
Indistinguishability from the previous hybrid follows from iO, since both pairs
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Programs of relaxed ACE.
Program GEnc(m)
Inputs: message m.
Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K of PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CU describing
set U . Parameters t, n.
1. If CU(m) then return ⊥;
2. For each i = t, . . . , n set αi ← Fi(Ki; suffixi(m));
3. Set β ← F (K;αn)⊕m;
4. Return (αt, . . . , αn, β).
Program GDec(c)
Inputs: ciphertext c.
Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K of PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CS. Parame-
ters t, n.
1. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β);
2. Set m← F (K;αn)⊕ β
3. If CS(m) then return ⊥;




Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K of PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F . In addition, strings
c(0) and c(1), hardwired in lexicographic order. Parameters t, n.
1. If c = c(0) or c = c(1) then return ⊥; (c(0) and c(1) are written in lexicographic
order)
2. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β);
3. Set m← F (K;αn)⊕ β
4. For each i = t, . . . , n do: if αi 6= Fi(Ki; suffixi(m)) then return ⊥;
5. Return m.
Figure 3·138: Programs of constrained keys of relaxed ACE. By
suffixi(m) we denote mn−i+1, . . . ,mn.
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of programs have the same functionality. Indeed, in Gj,0Dec and G
j,1
Dec we replaced
the condition αj = Fj(Kj; suffixj(m)) with two different checks for the case
suffixj(m) 6= sufj and suffixj(m) = sufj. For the former, we didn’t change the
check (but punctured the key Kj at sufj), and for the latter, we replaced the
check αj = Fj(Kj; sufj) with the check g(αj) = z
∗, where z∗ = g(Fj(Kj; sufj)).
Since g is injective, this doesn’t change the functionality.
In Gj,1Enc we punctured the key Kj at sufj . This is without changing the function-
ality, since the program outputs ⊥ on input m ∈ Ssufj ⊂ U .
• Hybj,2: the adversary gets (EKj,1, DKj,1), where DKj,1 is an obfuscation of a
program Gj,1Dec, where z∗ = g(y∗) for random y∗, and EKj,1 is an obfuscation of
Gj,1Enc. Indistinguishability holds by security of a punctured PRF Fj at sufj.
• Hybj,3: the adversary gets (EKj,1, DKj,3), where DKj,3 is an obfuscation of a
program Gj,3Dec, where z∗ = g(y∗) for random y∗, and EKj,1 is an obfuscation of
Gj,1Enc. In other words, we instruct the program to output ⊥ instead of m when
g(αj) = z
∗.
Similar to lemma 4 from (BCP15), we argue that if any adversary can distinguish
between hybrids Hybj,2 and Hybj,3 and iO is secure, then we can invert the one-
way function g. Note that in our case programs differ on exponentially many
inputs; however, differing inputs are a subset of {αt, . . . , αj = y∗, . . . , αn, β},
where y∗ = g−1(z∗) and other values can be arbitrary. In other words, differing
inputs share the block y∗, and we can do binary search over y∗ similar to how
the proof of lemma 4 does a binary search over a single differing input.
More concretely, the extractor works as follows. It creates a program M which
on input αt, . . . , αj, . . . , αn, β first checks if αj < y
′ (where y′ is a binary search
guess for y∗, i.e. in the first iteration y′ = 2|αj |/2). If so, then M executes
Gj,1Dec, otherwise it executes G
j,3
Dec. Note that if y
∗ < y′, then M is functionally
equivalent to Gj,1Dec, and if y∗ ≥ y′, then M is functionally equivalent to G
j,3
Dec.
(Indeed, if y∗ < y′, then for all input αj ≥ y′ the line with the check g(αj) = z∗ in
both Gj,1Dec, G
j,3
Dec will never be executed, since g is injective and its only preimage
y∗ < y′. Since this is the only difference in the programs, these programs are
functionally equivalent for the case αj ≥ y′, and therefore for all inputs M is
functionally equivalent to Gj,1Dec. The case y∗ ≥ y′ can be analyzed similarly).
If by assumption there is an adversary which distinguishes between Hybj,2 and
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Hybj,3 with probability at least η and iO is ν-secure, where ν = η
o(1), then
the adversary can run the adversary O(1/η) times, estimate its distinguishing
probability, learn the first bit of y∗, and continue binary search similar to the
proof of lemma 4.
• Hybj,4: the adversary gets (EKj,1, DKj,3), where DKj,3 is an obfuscation of a
program Gj,3Dec, where z∗ = g(Fj(Kj ; sufj)), and EKj,1 is an obfuscation of G
j,1
Enc. In
other words, we switch y∗ back to Fj(Kj ; sufj) from random. Indistinguishability
holds by security of a punctured PRF Fj at sufj.
• Hybj,5: the adversary gets (EK{U}, DKj+1,0), where DKj+1,0 is an obfuscation
of a program Gj+1,0Dec . In other words, we unpuncture the key Kj at sufj, and,
since the program now always returns ⊥ when suffixj(m) = sufj, we remove the
line with z∗-check and instead make the program output ⊥ when m ∈ Ssufj .
indistinguishability holds by iO, since this doesn’t change the functionality (the
reasoning why the key can be unpunctured is the same as in Hybj,1).
Note that Hybj,5 = Hybj+1,0.
Note that in Hybn,5 program G
n+1,0
Dec outputs ⊥ when s ∈ S0 or m ∈ Ssufn∪. . .∪Ssuft+1 =
S1 \S0. In other words, it outputs ⊥ when m ∈ S1, and thus this program is equivalent
to DK{S1}, which concludes security proof.
Finally, note that security loss depends only logarithmically on the size of S1 \ S0, as
required by security of constrained decryption of relaxed ACE.
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Programs of relaxed ACE.
Program Gj,1Enc(m)
Inputs: message m.
Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K (where Kj{sufj} is punctured at sufj) of
PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CU describing set U . Parameters t, n.
1. If CU(m) then return ⊥;
2. For each i = t, . . . , n, i 6= j, set αi ← Fi(Ki; suffixi(m)); set αj ←
Fj(Kj{sufj}; suffixi(m));
3. Set β ← F (K;αn)⊕m;
4. Return (αt, . . . , αn, β).
Program Gj,0Dec(c)
Inputs: ciphertext c.
Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K of PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CS0 . Parame-
ters t, n. Set of suffixes sufn, . . . , suft+1 describing S1 \ S0.
1. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β);
2. Set m← F (K;αn)⊕ β
3. If CS0(m) then return ⊥;
4. If m ∈ Ssufj−1 ∪ Ssufj−2 ∪ . . . ∪ Ssuft+2 ∪ Ssuft+1 then return ⊥;
5. For each i = t, . . . , n do: if αi 6= Fi(Ki; suffixi(m)) then return ⊥;
6. Return m.
Figure 3·139: Programs used in the proof of security of constrained




Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K (where Kj{sufj} is punctured at sufj) of
PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CS0 . Parameters t, n. Set of suffixes sufn, . . . , suft+1
describing S1 \ S0, injective owf g, value z∗.
1. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β);
2. Set m← F (K;αn)⊕ β
3. If CS0(m) then return ⊥;
4. If m ∈ Ssufj−1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ssuft+1 then return ⊥;
5. For each i = t, . . . , n, i 6= j do: if αi 6= Fi(Ki{sufj}; suffixi(m)) then return ⊥;
6. If suffixj(m) = sufj then: if g(αj) = z
∗ then return m, else return ⊥;




Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K (where Kj{sufj} is punctured at sufj) of
PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CS0 . Parameters t, n. Set of suffixes sufn, . . . , suft+1
describing S1 \ S0, injective owf g, value z∗.
1. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β);
2. Set m← F (K;αn)⊕ β
3. If CS0(m) then return ⊥;
4. If m ∈ Ssufj−1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ssuft+1 then return ⊥;
5. For each i = t, . . . , n, i 6= j do: if αi 6= Fi(Ki{sufj}; suffixi(m)) then return ⊥;
6. If suffixj(m) = sufj then: if g(αj) = z
∗ then return ⊥, else return ⊥;
7. If suffixj(m) 6= sufj then: if αj = Fj(Kj{sufj}; suffixj(m)) then return m, else
return ⊥.
8. Return ⊥.
Figure 3·140: Programs used in the proof of security of constrained
decryption of relaxed ACE.
Symmetry. Recall that from the definition of symmetry U = Ssuft is a set of plaintexts
ending with the same suffix of size t, and the challenge plaintext m∗ ends with suft
as well. Let suf∗n, . . . , suf
∗
t denote n, . . . , t-long suffixes of m
∗ (note that suft = suf
∗
t ).
Further, as in the proof of security of constrained decpryption, let sufn, . . . , suft+1 be
such that U \ {m∗} = Ssufn ∪ . . .∪Ssuft+1 . (Note that for each i = t+ 1, . . . , n sufi and
suf∗i only differ in the first bit).
We show symmetry of ACE in a sequence of hybrids, for b = 0, 1. Programs can be
found on fig. 3·141.
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• Hybb0: The distribution in this hybrid is (c(0), c(1), EK{U}, DK{c(0), c(1)}), where
cb is randomly chosen and c1−b is Enc(EK,m
∗).
• Hybb1: The distribution in this hybrid is (c(0), c(1), EK ′, DK ′), where EK ′, DK ′
are instead obfuscations of programs G ′Enc and G ′Puncture, respectively. Denote
c = (αt, . . . , αn, β), and c





We argue that indistinguishability between Hybb0 and Hyb
b
1 for any b holds by
iO. Indeed, since for all i = t, . . . , n Ssuf∗i ⊂ U and Ssufi ⊂ U , G
′
Enc outputs ⊥
on any input m ∈ Ssuf∗i or m ∈ Ssufi , for all i = t, . . . , n, anyway and thus each
Fi is never computed on suf
∗
i , sufi, i = t, . . . , n. Thus we can puncture each Fi
at suf∗i , sufi, i = t, . . . , n (note that suft = suf
∗
t and thus Ft is only punctured
once). Further, since Fn is injective, and is never run on suf
∗
n = m









n is randomly chosen and Fn has sparse image, with overwhelming
probability α
(b)








n since before that there is an instruction
to output ⊥ if αn is equal to one of these values. We argue that this instruction
doesn’t change the functionality: indeed, α
(b)
n is outside of the image of Fn
with high probability and therefore the program would reject anyway. Next,
if α = α
(1−b)
n , since Fn is injective, the only way to satisfy the Fn-check is to
have β = F (K;α
(1−b)
n ) ⊕m∗ = β(1−b). But then, to satisfy other PRF checks,
αt, . . . , αn−1 should be equal to α
(1−b)
t , . . . , α
(1−b)
n−1 , in which case c = c
(1−b) and
the program outputs ⊥ in the very beginning.
• Hybb2: The distribution in this hybrid is (c(0), c(1), EK ′, DK ′′), where EK ′, DK ′′
are obfuscations of programs G ′Enc and G ′′Puncture, respectively. In other words, we
instruct the program G ′′Puncture to output ⊥ if m ∈ Ssufn ∪ Ssufn−1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ssuft+2 ∪
Ssuft+1 . Indistinguishability of this hybrid can be shown similarly to the proof of
the security of constrained decryption. That is, for each sufi, i = t+ 1, . . . , n, we
can make this program reject all m ∈ Ssufi by puncturing the PRF Fi, changing
Fi(Ki; sufi) to random, replacing the PRF check with OWF check, and arguing
that the program can abort (instead of outputting m) if OWF check passes,
since otherwise OWF can be inverted. (Importantly, note that indeed the value
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Fi(Ki; sufi), for i = t+ 1, . . . , n, isn’t used anywhere else in the distribution: in
particular, it is not required to compute c(0) or c(1), and moreover program G ′Enc
only uses a punctured key Ki{sufi}).
Indistinguishability holds by security of punctured PRFs Ft+1, . . . , Fn, one-
wayness of injective OWF, and security of iO.
• Hybb3: The distribution in this hybrid is (c(0), c(1), EK ′, DK ′′′), where EK ′, DK ′′′
are obfuscations of programs G ′Enc and G ′′′Puncture, respectively. In other words, we
instruct program G ′′′Puncture to output ⊥ when m ∈ Ssuft . We argue this doesn’t
change the functionality. Indeed, the condition “m ∈ Ssufn∪Ssufn−1∪ . . .∪Ssuft+1”
covers all m ∈ Ssuft except m∗. Therefore requiring to output ⊥ when m ∈ Ssuft
is equivalent to additionally ask to output ⊥ when m = m∗. However, when
m = m∗, c = c(1−b) and therefore the program outputs ⊥ in the very beginning.
Further, in program G ′′′Puncture we puncture all keys Ki, i = t, . . . , n, at suf
∗
i . This
can be done since the program never needs to compute any of these values since
when m ∈ Ssuft , the program outputs ⊥.
• Hybb4: The distribution in this hybrid is (c(0), c(1), EK ′, DK ′′′), where EK ′, DK ′′′
are obfuscations of programs G ′Enc and G ′′′Puncture, respectively, and c(1−b) is chosen
at random instead of as a result of PRFs. Security holds by security of PRFs




t , . . . , suf
∗
n, respectively.
Finally, note that the distributions in Hyb04 and Hyb
1
4 are the same. Thus concludes
the proof of the symmetry of ACE.
3.12 Encrypting Longer Plaintexts
Our main security proof holds for the case when 1-bit plaintexts are used. Here we
outline the changes in the proof when the scheme is used to encrypt long plaintexts
from some plaintext space M.
The only change is that in the proof of indistinguishability of explanations of the
receiver (lemma 58), instead of eliminating a single complementary ciphertext µ3∗ =
ACE.EncEK(1⊕m∗0, µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0), we need to eliminate all complementary ciphertexts
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Programs of relaxed ACE.
Program G ′Enc(m)
Inputs: message m.





n } of PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CU describing set U . Pa-
rameters t, n.
1. If CU(m) then return ⊥;
2. For each i = t, . . . , n set αi ← Fi(Ki{suf∗i , sufi}; suffixi(m));
3. Set β ← F (K{α(0)n , α(1)n };αn)⊕m;
4. Return (αt, . . . , αn, β).
Program G ′Puncture(c)
Inputs: ciphertext c.
Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K{α(0)n , α(1)n } of PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CU
describing set U . In addition, strings c(0) and c(1), hardwired in lexicographic order.
Parameters t, n.
1. If c = c(0) or c = c(1) then return ⊥; (c(0) and c(1) are written in lexicographic
order)
2. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β); c
(0) = (α
(0)
t , . . . , α
(0)
n , β(0)); c(1) = (α
(1)
t , . . . , α
(1)
n , β(1));
3. If αn = α
(0)
n or αn = α
(1)
n then return ⊥; (α(0)n and α(1)n are written in lexicographic
order)
4. Set m← F (K{α(0)n , α(1)n };αn)⊕ β;
5. For each i = t, . . . , n do: if αi 6= Fi(Ki; suffixi(m)) then return ⊥;
6. Return m.
Figure 3·141: Programs of constrained keys. Note that everywhere where




n appear, they are written in lexicographic order (in
particular, in the GGM-based punctured PRF, key K{α(0)n , α(1)n } doesn’t









). For convenience we denote the punctured Kt by
Kt{suf∗t , suft} (similar to other keys), even though suf∗t = suft and the key is




Hardwired values: keys Kt, . . . , Kn, K{α(0)n , α(1)n } of PRFs Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CU
describing set U . In addition, strings c(0) and c(1), hardwired in lexicographic order.
Parameters t, n.
1. If c = c(0) or c = c(1) then return ⊥; (c(0) and c(1) are written in lexicographic
order)
2. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β); c
(0) = (α
(0)
t , . . . , α
(0)
n , β(0)); c(1) = (α
(1)
t , . . . , α
(1)
n , β(1));
3. If αn = α
(0)
n or αn = α
(1)
n then return ⊥; (α(0)n and α(1)n are written in lexicographic
order)
4. Set m← F (K{α(0)n , α(1)n };αn)⊕ β;
5. If m ∈ Ssufn ∪ Ssufn−1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ssuft+2 ∪ Ssuft+1 then return ⊥;








n } of PRFs
Ft, . . . , Fn, F ; circuit CU describing set U . In addition, strings c
(0) and c(1), hardwired
in lexicographic order. Parameters t, n.
1. If c = c(0) or c = c(1) then return ⊥; (c(0) and c(1) are written in lexicographic
order)
2. Parse c = (αt, . . . , αn, β); c
(0) = (α
(0)
t , . . . , α
(0)
n , β(0)); c(1) = (α
(1)
t , . . . , α
(1)
n , β(1));
3. If αn = α
(0)
n or αn = α
(1)
n then return ⊥; (α(0)n and α(1)n are written in lexicographic
order)
4. Set m← F (K{α(0)n , α(1)n };αn)⊕ β;
5. If m ∈ Ssuft then return ⊥;
6. For each i = t, . . . , n do: if αi 6= Fi(Ki{suf∗i }; suffixi(m)) then return ⊥;
7. Return m.
Figure 3·142: Programs of constrained keys. Note that everywhere where




n appear, they are written in lexicographic order (in
particular, in the GGM-based punctured PRF, key K{α(0)n , α(1)n } doesn’t









). For convenience we denote the punctured Kt by
Kt{suf∗t , suft} (similar to other keys), even though suf∗t = suft and the key is
only punctured at one point.
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{ACE.EncEK(m,µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0) : m ∈M,m 6= m∗0}. This change is required both in the
proof of deniability and off-the-record deniability.
Concretely, changes are the following:
• In hybrid HybB,1,5 (similarly, in HybB,3,2) in program P3 we puncture encryption
key EK of the main ACE at all points {(m,µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0) : m ∈M,m 6= m∗0}.
Indistinguishability holds by the same reasoning as in the orginal proof. The
description of the program P3 on fig. 3·94 should be changed accordingly.
• In hybrid HybB,1,6 (similarly, in HybB,3,1) we puncture decryption key DK of the
main ACE at the same set of points p = {(m,µ1∗, µ2∗, L∗0) : m ∈M,m 6= m∗0}.
Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since
the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at these points. The
description of the programs Dec,RFake on fig. 3·97 should be changed accordingly.
Note however that this incurs security loss proportional to |M|, since security
loss in constrained decryption game depends on the size of the punctured set.
Thus the proof can be adapted to the case of longer plaintexts, with additional
multiplicative factor of |M| in security loss. However, the resulting scheme is only
statically secure, i.e. both real and fake plaintexts have to be fixed before the CRS is
generated. To achieve adaptive security, one can guess both plaintexts in the proof
and lose another factor of |M|2.
Thus the scheme can be used for encrypting and denying longer messages, albeit with






Consider a tight-knit society whose members regularly meet behind closed doors and
run their society’s business with complete privacy. An external entity might be able
to deduce information on the nature of the interactions that take place in the society’s
meetings from the external behavior of the society members, but no direct information
on what really takes place at the meetings can be obtained. This is so even if the
external entity has coercive power on the society’s members and demand that they
fully disclose the contents of the meetings: All that the coercive entity can obtain is
the word of the members, which may or may not be correct (or consistent).
Can we reproduce this situation online, when the society members communicate over
public channels that are accessible to the external entity? That is, can the society
members engage in a multiparty computation that allows then to obtain the same
privacy and security guarantees (with respect to each other) that they had before,
and in addition limit the power of the external coercive entity to the power that it
had when they met behind closed doors?
This scenario is one of many scenarios that motivate the notion of incoercible multi-
party computation. Early works that considered the problem include (Her91, BT94)
in the context of voting, and (CDNO96) which formulated the concept of deniable
encryption. The general task was first formulated in (CG96), and studied in several
works since, eg (MN06, UM10, CGP15),
(AOZZ15). We note however that incoercibility is a broad term that takes different
forms in different scenarios. For instance, in the context of voting we’re interested
in receipt-freeness, which is aimed to prevent the protocol participants themselves
(i.e., the voters) from being able to convincingly prove how they voted; In the context
of incoercibility with defectors, we’re interested in the situation where some of the
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parties may willingly collaborate with the external entity in order to implicate others.
In terms of protocols, we currently have protocols that use physical devices (such as
a secure hardware token, or a voting booth) where some crucial parts of the local
states of the protocol participants are physically inaccessible even to the participants
themselves (MN06, AOZZ15). Alternatively, the protocol of (CG96), combined with
the sender-deniable encryption of (SW14), does not make any inaccessible hardware
assumption and provides a general solution even for the case where some of the parties
are adversarial and others are coerced. However, that solution only withstands the
case where the total number of parties that are either adversarial or coerced is less
than half the overall number of parties. The case where all the parties (or even a
majority of the parties) are coerced, and where the coercive entity can access all the
internal states of all parties, has been wide open.
We present two protocols: A four-round general multi-party function evaluation
protocol and a three-round two-party Oblivious Transfer protocol, that share the
following properties:
1. The protocols are secure against honest-but-curious adaptive corruption of all
parties.
2. The protocols withstand coercion of all participants. (Coercion is defined within
the UC framework ((Can00)), as in (CGP15)). That is, the protocol includes a
faking algorithm which a party uses in order to generate fake local randomness
that can be presented to the coercing entity and is consistent with the actual
communication that took place and any fake inputs and outputs that the parties
wish to disclose. The protocols UC-realize ideal functionalities that guarantee
that the external attacker (the environment) is limited to the same information
it has in the ‘ideal case’ where the computation is done behind closed doors and
only the (possibly fake) inputs and outputs reported by the parties are available.
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3. The protocols use a short, global (i.e., non-programmable) CRS, but all local
state of the computation is accessible to the adversary.
4. The protocols assume subexponentially secure IO for all circuits and one way
functions.
We stress that the faking procedure is local to each party, and is done based only on
that party’s local view of the computation. More precisely, faking procedure of each
party only uses that party’s true randomness, that party’s true input and output, that
party’s fake input and output, and the public communication. In particular, it doesn’t
require to know other parties’ real or fake inputs.
On the other hand, our protocols only withstand the case where all coerced parties run
the provided faking algorithm. In particular, parties should run the faking algorithm
even if they wish to disclose the true inputs and outputs. If some of the parties
“defect” and provide their true local state, all security is lost. While this is indeed a
weakness, we believe that the results are still meaningful for salient settings and in
fact break new ground in the ability to withstand coercion of all parties — namely
a situation where the coercing entity expects to have full and complete view of the
entire computation.
4.1.1 Our results in more detail
Our results are twofold. First, we show how to convert certain types of bideniable en-
cryption into incoercible oblivious transfer. Note that, while standard (non-incoercible)
OT implies standard MPC, it is not clear whether the same holds in the presence of
coercive adversary. However, since OT immediately implement 2PC with short inputs,
incoercible OT implements incoercible 2PC in a similar manner.
Theorem 28. (Informal) Any receiver-oblivious bideniable encryption with public
receiver deniability can be converted into incoercible oblivious transfer.
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Here receiver-obliviousness means that messages of the receiver in the protocol can be
generated obliviously (e.g. chosen at random), without knowing the randomness r of
the receiver in the protocol. Public receiver deniability means that anyone (not just
the receiver) can fake on behalf of the receiver.
Second, we show how to combine bideniable encryption with adaptively secure MPC
protocols satisfying certain properties, in order to obtain incoercible MPC:
Theorem 29. (Informal) It is possible to build incoercible MPC protocol from bideni-
able encryption and adaptively secure MPC protocol with a global CRS and corruption-
oblivious simulator.
Roughly, a protocol is adaptively secure if the simulator can simulate the execution
of this protocol even if parties become corrupted later. The CRS of the protocol is
said to be global, if the simulator uses the CRS in the simulation (as opposed to
generating the CRS on its own). The simulation is said to be corruption-oblivious, if,
roughly, simulating internal state of each party is done independently of simulating
other parties.
We underline that our security proof implies indistinguishability only between cases
when everyone’s randomness is real, and when everyone’s randomness is fake. In other
words, incoercibility guarantee holds only as long as long as there are no defectors -
i.e. parties who disclose their true random coins while others are trying to fake. As
a result, this protocol is useful in scenarios where parties “work together” and are
interested in keeping all their inputs secret, rather than turn against each other trying
to make sure others get caught cheating. We note however that the protocol remains
secure even if inputs of some parties are real and inputs of some other parties are fake
- as long as randomness of all parties is fake. Indeed, it might happen so that a certain
party is not interested in lying about its input, but still wishes the whole group of
people to succeed in deceiving; then this party may provide fake randomness for its
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real input, thus not ruining an attempt to deceive, while achieving its own goals1.
Finally, our security guarantees hold only as long as fake inputs and outputs are
consistent with the function being computed: indeed, if this is not the case, then the
coercer can detect cheating even in if ideal functionality is used.
Instantiation. Both required primitives (i.e. bideniable encryption and adap-
tive MPC with special properties) exist, albeit under very strong assumptions of
subexponentially-secure indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. Con-
cretely, using 3-message bideniable encryption of (CPP18), we get 3-message incoercible
OT in the CRS model. Using the same bideniable encryption together with 2-round
adaptive MPC of (CPV17), we get 4-round incoercible MPC in the CRS model.
4.1.2 Technical Overview
Before describing our approach, we note that it is enough to handle only fake inputs
(as opposed to fake inputs and fake outputs), by letting parties encrypt the output
under one-time pad key and equivocating the key.
Faking outputs can be handled by faking inputs only, using standard tech-
niques. We note that it is enough to consider the case where parties only want to
fake their inputs, but not outputs. Indeed, if parties want to fake their outputs, they
can always pick a OTP keys k1, k2, make it part of their input, and ask to instead
evaluate a function f ′((x1, k1), x2, k2), defined as f(x1, x2)⊕ k1||f(x1, x2)⊕ k2. This
still allows each party to learn the output f(x1, x2), and at the same time allows them
to lie about the value f(x1, x2), by lying about k1, k2.
1Note that this scenario highlights a subtle but important difference between the modelling of
coercion in (CG96) and (CGP15). Indeed, in (CG96), if the party is given a real input, it has to
provide its true randomness.
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Due to this transformation, in the remainder of the paper we assume that parties
want to fake their inputs only (but not outputs).
Incoercible oblivious transfer. Intuitively, incoercible oblivious transfer acts
like a standard oblivious transfer - i.e. it allows the receiver to obtain exactly one
value xb (corresponding to its own input b), out of two values x0, x1 held by the sender.
Incoercible oblivious transfer also provides security guarantees against a coercer: that
is, even if the coercer demands to see all randomness used by both parties in the
protocol, parties can successfully lie about their inputs. That is, the sender can claim
that it used any, possibly different inputs x′0, x
′
1 (and provide convincing randomness
supporting this claim). Similarly, the receiver can claim it used a possibly different
input bit b′, and received a different output x′ of its choice.
This primitive can be constructed from any receiver-oblivious DE with public receiver
deniability. Here “public receiver deniability” means that the faking algorithm of
the receiver doesn’t take true receiver coins as input (thus anyone can fake on behalf
of the receiver). “Receiver-oblivious” DE means that the adversary cannot tell if
the receiver messages were generated honestly (following the algorithm of DE), or
instead chosen at random (in this case, we say that these messages were generated
obliviously); further, this indistinguishability should hold even given fake random
coins of the sender. We note that deniable encryption of (CPP18) has public receiver
deniability, and in the section 4.5 we remark that it is also receiver-oblivious.
The construction of incoercible OT is similar to the construction of adaptively secure
OT from non-committing (adaptively secure) encryption (CLOS02). Namely, let x0, x1
be the inputs of the sender, and b be the input of the receiver. The parties should run
in parallel two instances of DE: DE0 and DE1. The sender’s input to each DEi is xi,
for both i = 0, 1. The receiver should pick random r and generate messages of DEb
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honestly (using r as randomness of the receiver in the protocol), while messages of
DE1−b should be generated by the receiver obliviously.
It is easy to see that the receiver can learn only xb but not x1−b, since the receiver
knows r, which allows it to decrypt DEb, but doesn’t know randomness for DE1−b
and therefore cannot decrypt it. Further, this OT is indeed deniable: the sender can
directly use deniability of DE to claim that different inputs x′0, x
′
1 were sent. The
receiver can lie about its input b by claiming that DEb was generated obliviously,
and by presenting fake r′ as randomness for DE1−b. This fake r
′ can be generated by
using the faking algorithm on DE1−b and y
′, where y′ is the desired fake output of
the oblivious transfer. Note that the receiver doesn’t know true coins for obliviously
generated DE1−b, but it can generate fake r
′ anyway due to the fact that receiver
deniability is public.
This construction can be extended to 1-out-of-m incoercible OT in a straightforward
way.
Incoercible 2PC for short inputs from incoercible OT. Recall that, when
the number m of possible inputs of some party is polynomial, standard 1-out-of-m OT
immediately implies general 2PC: The OT sender inputs to the OT the m possible
values of f(x, y) for the m possible values of the receiver’s input x an the sender’s
input y. Using incoercible 1-out-of-m OT in this protocol immediately makes the
resulting 2pc protocol incoercible.
Incoercible MPC from OT? Despite the fact that standard, non-deniable OT
implies general secure multi-party computation (GMW87), it is not clear whether
incoercible OT implies incoercible MPC as well. In particular, simply plugging (even
ideal) incoercible OT into the protocol of (GMW87) doesn’t seem to result in a
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deniable protocol, even just for two parties. The problem here is the following: recall
that this protocol works by letting the parties compute additive secret shares of each
wire of the circuit of f(x1, x2). On one hand, since in the normal execution two shares
add up to the value of the wire of f(x1, x2), the same should hold in the fake case:
fake secret shares should add up to the value of the wire of f(x′1, x
′
2) (note that the
adversary may coerce both parties, learn both shares and check if the shares indeed
add up to the right value). On the other hand, upon coercion each party has to
compute this fake share locally: that is, it may use only that party’s fake input, e.g.
x′1 but not x
′
2, and parties are not allowed to interact with each other at this point.
It is not clear if these two requirements are satisfiable at the same time, i.e. if it is
possible to compute these shares locally, but in a way that they nevertheless add up
to a proper value of the wire of f(x′1, x
′
2). In other words, the issue here is not in
deniability of OT itself. Rather, the issue is with the deniability of the overall protocol
even in presence of ideally deniable OT.
Incoercible MPC. A natural starting point is to make parties run any secure
MPC protocol, where each message is encrypted under a separate instance of bi-
deniable encryption. If in addition the parties are allowed to communicate out of
the view of the adversary - e.g. by meeting physically - and if they are comfortable
sharing their fake inputs with each other, this method immediately gives incoercible
MPC. Indeed, upon coercion parties can all agree on some transcript tr′ = tr({x′i, r′i})
on their fake inputs. When coerced, each party can use deniability of encryption to
lie (by presenting consistent randomness and keys of deniable encryption) that it sent
and received messages of tr′. In addition, each party should claim that x′i, r
′
i are the
true input and randomness which it used to compute the messages of tr′.
However, this protocol fails when no out-of-band interaction is possible, since parties
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do not have means to agree on tr′. To fix this problem, we combine deniability with
adaptive security. That is, we use MPC which is adaptively secure and has a special
property called corruption oblivious simulation ((BCH12)). Roughly, it means that
there is a “main” simulator which simulates the transcript, and in addition each party
has its own, “local” simulator which simulates the coins of that party, using that
party’s inputs only (but not the inputs of other parties). This property eliminates the
need for the parties to know other fake inputs: Upon coercion, parties can first run
the main simulator to generate (the same) simulated transcript tr′ of adaptive MPC,
and then each party can use its own simulator to locally compute fake coins consistent
with this simulated transcript and its own input. Finally, as before, each party can
use deniability of encryption to claim that the simulated messages were indeed sent.
It remains to determine how the parties agree on the random coins of the main
simulator: indeed, in order to produce the same simulated transcript, parties should
run the simulator on the same coins, rSim. We do this by letting one of the parties (say,
the first) choose rSim at random and send it (encrypted under deniable encryption) to
each other party at the onset of the protocol, for case that they need to fake later.
However, this new mechanism introduces another difficulty: Now the adversary can
demand to see also rSim, and revealing it would allow the adversary to check that the
transcript was simulated and thus detect a lie. Therefore, instead of sending rSim, the
first party should send randomly chosen seed s to all other parties. During fake, each
party can use a pseudorandom generator to expand s into a string rSim||s′, where rSim,
as before, is used to produce the same simulated transcript of MPC, and s′ is what
parties will claim as fake seed. Note that it is safe to reveal s′ to the adversary, since
s′||rSim is pseudorandom, and therefore s′ cannot help the adversary to indicate in any
way that tr′ was simulated.
We show that this protocol is indeed incoercible, and no coordination is required
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between parties after the protocol execution. However, it is incoercible only as long
as all coerced parties choose to lie simultaneously; if some parties decide to tell the
truth, the adversary will see true s, which allows it to compute rSim and catch liars.
4-round protocol for incoercible MPC. We need the following ingredients for
our protocol:
• 2-round adaptively secure MPC aMPC with global CRS2 and corruption-oblivious
simulator, e.g. that of (CPV17).
• 3-round delayed-input3 bideniable encryption DE, e.g. that of (CPP18). While
that construction is not delayed-input, we observe that it is easy to turn any
bideniable encryption into its delayed-input version. This can be done by letting
the sender send a randomly chosen key k using bideniable encryption, and also
send m⊕ k in the clear at the last round.
Then our protocol proceeds as follows:
1. In rounds 1 − 3 parties exchange the messages of the first round of aMPC,
encrypted under point-to-point deniable encryption.
2. In rounds 2 − 4 parties exchange the messages of the second round of aMPC,
encrypted under point-to-point deniable encryption. It is important that deniable
encryption requires its input only by the last round, since parties learn messages
of the first round of aMPC, and therefore can compute messages of the second
round of aMPC, only by round 4.
3. In rounds 2− 4 party 1 sends to each party randomly chosen seed, encrypted
under point-to-point deniable encryption. Note that each party receives the
same value of seed.
2Roughly, a protocol is said to have a global CRS if the simulator is not allowed to generate the
CRS: it has to work given the CRS.
3That is, only the third message of the sender depends on the plaintext.
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After round 4, parties learn all messages of aMPC and therefore can compute the
output. Note that our protocol is delayed input, since inputs are required only by
round 3. Upon coercion, each party first computes fake transcript tr′ of aMPC. tr′ is
computed by running the “main” simulator of aMPC on rSim, where rSim is obtained
by expanding seed into seed′||rSim using a prg. (Note that parties use the same rSim
and therefore obtain the same tr′ upon coercion). Next, each party can use its local
simulator to produce fake coins consistent with tr′ and fake input x′. Therefore, each
party can claim that the transcript of the underlying protocol was tr′, and this claim
will be consistent with party’s own fake input, and across different parties. Finally,
each party should claim that the seed value sent by party 1 was in fact seed′.
On the necessity of a global CRS. Globality of the CRS is a property of MPC
protocols which is often overlooked. Recall that the protocol is said to have global
CRS if the simulator isn’t allowed to simulate the CRS; instead it should use a given
CRS in the simulation. This is in contrast with the local CRS model, where the
simulator is allowed to generate the CRS on its own. Typically MPC protocols are
more easy to design in the local CRS model, since the simulator can choose some
secret trapdoors for the CRS to assist in simulation; however, in is important that
these trapdoors (or, generally speaking, generation randomness of the CRS) remain
secret from the adversary.
We underline that our incoercible protocol requires the underlying aMPC protocol to
have a global CRS. Indeed, this allows parties to run the simulator of aMPC (and
therefore, fake), even though the CRS of aMPC, CRSaMPC, is fixed in advance as part
of the CRS of incoercible protocol.
If the CRS was local and the simulator had to produce CRSaMPC during the simulation,
we wouldn’t be able to fix CRSaMPC in advance; this means that parties would have
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to generate it themselves during the execution of the protocol. However, in this
case parties would jointly know randomness of the generation of the CRS, and
therefore the adversary would learn it upon coercion of all parties. To the best of our
knowledge, current protocols with local CRS crucially base their security on the fact
that randomness used to generate the CRS remains hidden. Thus, it is not clear how
to use a protocol with a local CRS as part of our construction.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Incoercible computation
We use the definition of incoercible computation from (CGP15), which can be regarded
as a re-formulation of the definition of (CG96) within the UC framework. (We note
however that the formulations of
(MN06), (AOZZ15) are similar to and consistent with the one we use.) Specifically,
we let the adversary send a special coercion message to parties; upon receiving
this message a party notifies a predetermined external entity (say, its “caller”) via
subroutine output, and expects an instruction to either “tell the truth”, in which case
it reveals its entire local state to the adversary, or “fake to input x and output y”,
in which case the party runs the faking algorithm provided as part of the protocol,
on x, y and the current local state, and reveals the output of the algorithm to the
adversary.
In addition, for the purpose of this work we add two restrictions: First, coercion
is allowed only at the end of the protocol execution; Second, while the adversary
can choose to either corrupt or coerce parties, we disallow situations where some
parties are corrupted and some are coerced. (These restrictions can be encoded via
appropriate instructions to the “‘shell code” of parties.)
An ideal functionality can now guarantee incoercibility via the following mechanism:
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Functionality Fiot
• Upon receiving input (OT-Sender, sid, R, (m0,m1)) from party S, where R is
an identity for the intended receiver, send (sid, S,R) to the adversary. When
receiving ok from the adversary, output (OT-Receiver, sid, S) to R.
• Upon receiving input (OT-Receiver, sid, b) from R, send sid to the adversary.
When receiving ok from the adversary, output (OT-Receiver, sid,mb) to R.
• Upon receiving (Coerce, sid, P ) from the adversary, where P ∈ {S,R}, output
(Coerce, sid) to P . Upon receiving V from P do: If V = (tell-truth) then
send P ’s input or output to the adversary. If V = (fake-to, v) then send v to
the adversary.
Figure 4·1: The Incoercible Oblivious Transfer Functionality Fiot.
The formal coercion operation captures both coercion and (passive)
corruption.
When asked by the adversary (or, simulator) to coerce a party P , the ideal functionality
outputs a request to coerce P to the said external entity, in the same way as done by
the protocol. If the response is “fake to input x and output y, then the pair x, y is
returned to the adversary. If the response is “tell the truth” then the actual input
x and output y are returned to the adversary. Crucially, the adversary is not told
whether the values received are real or fake.
This behavior is intended to mimic the situation where the computation is done
“behind closed doors” and no information about it is ever exposed, other than the
inputs and outputs of the parties. In particular, such an ideal functionality does
not prevent situations where the outputs of the parties are inconsistent with their
inputs, or where a certain set of inputs of the parties are inconsistent with auxiliary
information that’s known outside the protocol execution.
In this work we consider the incoercible variants of the standard ideal functionalities
for multiparty function evaluation and oblivious transfer.
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Functionality Fife
• Upon receiving input (Init, sid, P1, ..., Pn, f from party P1, send
(sid, P1, ..., Pn, f) to the adversary. When receiving (ok,Pi) from the
adversary, output (Init, sid, P1, ..., Pn, f) to Pi.
• Upon receiving input (Init, sid, xi) from Pi, record (Pi, xi). Once (Pi, xi)
are recorded for all i = 1..n, compute (y1, ..., yn) ← f(x1, ..., xn) and send
(Output, sid) to the adversary.
• When receiving output from Pi, output yi to Pi.
• Upon receiving (Coerce, sid, Pi) from the adversary output (Coerce, sid) to Pi.
Upon receiving V from Pi do: If V = (tell-truth) then send Pi’s input and
output to the adversary. If V = (fake-to, v) then send v to the adversary.
Figure 4·2: The Incoercible Function Evaluation Functionality Fife.
The formal coercion operation captures both coercion and (passive)
corruption.
Functionality Fimt
• Upon receiving input (Send, sid, R,m) from party S, where R is an identity for
the intended receiver, send (sid, S,R, |m|) to the adversary. When receiving ok
from the adversary, output (Receive, sid, S,m) to R.
• Upon receiving (Coerce, sid, P ) from the adversary, where P ∈ {S,R}, output
(Coerce, sid) to P . Upon receiving V from P do: If V = (tell-truth) then
send m to the adversary. If V = (fake-to,m′) then send m′ to the adversary.
Figure 4·3: The Incoercible Message transmission Functionality Fimt.




We take the definition of deniable encryption from (CPP18), and only change the
name of the algorithms. We denote by π(CRS, s, r,m) the messages sent by parties
when running deniable encryption protocol on input m with randomness s of the
sender and r of the receiver.
Definition 18. Bideniable bit encryption in the CRS model.
π = (DE.Setup,DE.msg1,DE.msg2,DE.msg3, DE.Dec,DE.SFake,DE.RFake) is a 3-
message bideniable interactive encryption scheme for message space M = {0, 1},
if it satisfies the following correctness and bideniability properties:
• Correctness: There exists negligible function ν(λ) such that for at least (1−ν)-
fraction of randomness rSetup ← {0, 1}|rSetup| the following holds: let CRS ←
DE.Setup(rSetup). Then for any m ∈ M Pr[m′ 6= m : s ← {0, 1}|s| , r ←
{0, 1}|r| , tr← π(CRS, s, r,m),m′ ← DE.Dec(CRS, r, tr)] ≤ ν(λ), where the prob-
ability is taken over the choices of s and r.
• Bideniability: No PPT adversary Adv wins with more than negligible advan-
tage in the following game, for any m0,m1 ∈M:
1. The challenger chooses random rSetup and generates CRS← Setup(rSetup).
It also chooses a bit b at random.
2. If b = 0, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) It chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ = π(CRS, s∗, r∗,m0).
(b) It gives the adversary (CRS,m0,m1, s
∗, r∗, tr∗).
3. If b = 1, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) The challenger chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes
tr∗ ← π(CRS, s∗, r∗,m1);
(b) It sets s′ ← SFake(CRS, s∗,m1,m0, tr∗; ρS) and r′ ← RFake(CRS,
r∗,m1,m0, tr
∗; ρR), for randomly chosen ρS, ρR.
(c) It gives the adversary (CRS,m0,m1, s
′, r′, tr∗).
4. Adv outputs b′ and wins if b = b′.
Receiver-obliviousness. We say that bideniable encryption satisfies receiver-
obliviousness, if no adversary can win the following game, for any m in the plaintext
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space:
1. The challenger chooses random rSetup and generates CRS← Setup(rSetup). It also
chooses a bit b at random.
2. If b = 0, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) It chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ = π(CRS, s∗, r∗,m).
(b) It gives the adversary (CRS,m, s∗, tr∗).
3. If b = 1, then the challenger generates the following variables:
(a) The challenger chooses random s∗, r∗ and computes tr∗ as follows. It
sets a1 = DE.msg1(CRS, s∗,m), chooses a2 at random, and sets a3 =
DE.msg3(CRS, s∗,m, a1, a2). It sets tr∗ = (a1, a2, a3).
(b) It gives the adversary (CRS,m, s∗, tr∗).
4. Adv outputs b′ and wins if b = b′.
In other words, the adversary cannot tell if messages of the receiver are honestly
generated or simply chosen at random (as long as the adversary doesn’t see the random
coins of the receiver).
Public receiver deniability. We say that receiver deniability is public, if
DE.RFake(CRS,m′, tr; ·) only takes as input the CRS, the fake plaintext, the transcript
of the execution, and its own random coins. In other words, true random coins r of
the receiver are not required to run RFake.
Bideniable encryption with public receiver deniability is built in (CPP18). In section
4.5 we note that it also satisfies receiver-obliviousness.
4.2.3 Adaptively Secure Protocols with Corruption-Oblivious Simulation
Intuitively, the simulator of such a protocol can be splitted in several parts:
• The “main” simulator Sim(rSim)→ (tr, state), which simulates the transcript tr
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of the protocol, and also generates a state to be used by “local” simulators;
• “Local” simulators Simi(state, xi, yi; ·)→ ri, where each Simi takes as input the
state of the main simulator, input and output of party i, and possibly its own
random coins. It outputs ri, a simulated randomness of party i.
Intuitively, security requirement states that the transcript of a real protocol execution,
together with randomness of each party, should be indistinguishable from simulated
transcript, together with simulated randomness of each party. Note that this require-
ment is not trivial, since simulators hove to work “locally” (without knowing other
parties’ inputs) and still have to jointly generate a consistently-looking picture. We
refer the reader to (?) for formal treatment.
In our construction we use a 2-round adaptively secure MPC with corruption-oblivious
simulator by (CPV17).
4.3 Incoercible Oblivious Transfer
In this section we describe our construction of incoercible oblivious transfer. As noted
in the introduction, such a protocol immediately implies incoercible 2PC for the case
where one of the parties has polynomial input space.
4.3.1 Protocol Description
For simplicity, we consider 1-out-of-2 OT (the construction can be generalized to
1-out-of-n OT in a straightforward way), and we also assume that all inputs are bits.
Our protocol is described on fig. 4·4. It requires a special deniable encryption scheme,
where deniability of the receiver is public (i.e. the faking algorithm of the receiver
doesn’t take receiver’s true coins as input), and which satisfies receiver-obliviousness,
i.e. the real transcript is indistinguishable from a transcript where receiver simply
generated all its messages at random. As noted in (CPP18), their DE protocol satisfies
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public receiver deniability. In a simple observation in section 4.5, we note that this
protocol is also receiver-oblivious.
Theorem 30. Assume DE is an interactive deniable encryption scheme which satisfies
public receiver deniability and receiver obliviousness. Then the protocol on fig. 4·4 is
an incoercible oblivious transfer protocol.
4.3.2 Proof of the Theorem
Correctness immediately follows from correctness of deniable encryption.
Incoercibility. Consider the simulator depicted on fig. 4·5. We show that the




′ and real randomness given (HybReal), and from the real execution with inputs






• HybFake. This is the execution from fig. 4·4, with real inputs x0, x1 of the sender,
b of the receiver, and fake inputs x′0, x
′
1 of the sender, fake input b
′ of the receiver,
fake output x′ = x′b′ of the receiver.
• Hyb1. In this hybrid receiver also generates messages in DE1−b honestly (instead
of generating them at random), i.e. it chooses two randomness r0, r1, computes
messages in DEi honestly using ri, for both i = 0, 1. Indistinguishability be-
tween this and the previous hybrid follows from obliviousness of the receiver
of deniable encryption. Note that it is important for the reduction that the
receiver deniability is public, since otherwise the reduction wouldn’t be able to
compute fake randomness of execution 1 − b since in the game the reduction
doesn’t receive any randomness of the receiver.
• Hyb2. In this hybrid the receiver generates messages in DE1−b′ obliviously (in-
stead of generating them honestly, using r1−b′). Indistinguishability between this
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Incoercible Oblivious Transfer
The CRS: CRS = CRSDE, where CRSDE is a CRS of deniable encryption with receiver-
obliviousness, and public receiver deniability.
Inputs: inputs x0, x1 of the sender S; input bit b of the receiver R.
The protocol:
The sender chooses random coins s0, s1 for two executions of deniable encryption,
where S acts as a sender. The receiver chooses randomness r for a single execution of
deniable encryption where it acts as a receiver. The sender and the receiver run two
instances of deniable encryption, DE0 and DE1, in parallel. Here:
• In each execution i, for i = 0, 1, the sender computes its messages by honestly
running the code of deniable encryption on its input xi, randomness si, and the
transcript so far;
• In the execution b the receiver computes its messages by honestly running the
code of deniable encryption on its randomness r and the transcript so far. In
the execution 1− b the receiver instead generates all its messages at random,
using randomly chosen r̃.
At the end of both executions, the receiver sets its output in the protocol to be
DE.Dec(r; DEb).
Faking procedure of the sender S
Inputs: fake inputs x′0, x
′
1 of the sender, true inputs and randomness x0, s0, x1, s1 of
the sender, the protocol transcript (DE0,DE1), and the CRS.
In order to fake, the sender runs the faking algorithm of deniable encryption for each
execution, i.e. computes s′i ← DE.SFake(si, xi, x′i,DEi; ·) for both i = 0, 1. It gives
s′0, s
′
1 to the adversary.
Faking procedure of the receiver R
Inputs: fake input b′ and fake output x′ of the receiver, true inputs and randomness
b, r, r̃ of the receiver, the protocol transcript (DE0,DE1), and the CRS.
In order to fake, the receiver claims that messages of the receiver in execution 1−b′ were
generated at random, and sets fake r̃′ to be the concatenation of these receiver messages.
Next, it uses public deniability of the receiver to compute r′ ← DE.RFake(x′,DEb′ ; ·).
It gives r′, r̃′ to the adversary.
Figure 4·4: Incoercible Oblivious Transfer.
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and the previous hybrid follows from obliviousness of the receiver of deniable
encryption. Note that it is important for the reduction that the receiver denia-
bility is public, since otherwise the reduction wouldn’t be able to compute fake
randomness of execution 1− b since in the game the reduction doesn’t receive
any randomness of the receiver.
• Hyb3. In this hybrid the sender encrypts x′b′ (instead of xb′) in the execution
b′. It also gives its true randomness sb′ instead of fake one. Indistinguishability
follows from bideniability of the encryption scheme.
• HybReal. In this hybrid the sender encrypts x′1−b′ (instead of x1−b′) in the execution
b′. It also gives its true randomness s1−b′ instead of fake one. Indistinguishability
follows from sender deniability of the encryption scheme.





Indistinguishability of HybReal and HybSim can be shown in a similar manner.
4.4 4-Round Incoercible MPC
4.4.1 Description of the protocol
In this section we describe our protocol achieving incoercibility even when all parties
are coerced. As discussed in the introduction, lies remain undetectable only as long
as all parties lie about their randomness (however, then can still tell the truth about
their inputs, if they choose so).
Our protocol is presented on fig. 4·6. As discussed more in detail in the introduction,
the protocol essentially instructs parties to run the underlying adaptively secure
protocol, where each message is encrypted under a separate instance of deniable
encryption. In addition, party P1 sends to everyone the same seed seed of the prg, to
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Simulation of communication
Inputs given to simulate the communication: CRS.
The simulator chooses random s0, s1, r0, r1, and computes DEi ← DE(si, ri, 0) for both
i = 0, 1, i.e. sets DEi to be the transcript of the protocol for deniable encryption,
computed with the sender input 0, sender randomness si, and receiver randomness ri.
(DE0,DE1) is a simulated transcript of the protocol.
Simulation of coercion of the sender S




The simulator computes s′i ← DE.SFake(si, 0, x′i,DEi; ·) for both i = 0, 1. It gives s′0, s′1
to the adversary.
Simulation of coercion of the receiver R
Inputs additionally given to simulate the coercion of R: fake input b′, fake
output x′.
The simulator claims that messages of the receiver in execution 1− b′ were generated
at random, and sets fake r̃′ to be the concatenation of these receiver messages. Next,
it computes r′ ← DE.RFake(x′,DEb′ ; ·). It gives r′, r̃′ to the adversary.
Figure 4·5: Simulation
be used in the faking procedure. Parties fake by using seed to derive (the same for
all parties) coins rSim, which are used to generate (the same for all parties) simulated
transcript σ′ of the underlying MPC. Next each party uses the local simulator of
that MPC (recall that we need that MPC to have corruption-oblivious simulator) to
simulate its own fake coins of the underlying MPC. Finally parties claim that they
indeed exchanged messages of σ′, using deniability of encryption.
Coercion model. We prove incoercibility of our protocol assuming the environment
never gives mixed instructions to participants of the same protocol: that is, upon
coercion of parties, the environment can either instruct all parties to tell the truth, or
instruct all parties to fake (possibly to their true inputs). Coercion requests are only
allowed after the protocol finished. Environment is allowed to coerce potentially all
parties.
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Theorem 31. Assume the existence of the following primitives:
• aMPC = (aMPC.msg1, aMPC.msg2, aMPC.Eval, aMPC.Sim, aMPC.Simi) is a 2-
round adaptively secure MPC with corruption-oblivious simulation, in a global
CRS model;
• DE = (DE.msg1,DE.msg2,DE.msg3,DE.Dec,DE.SFake,DE.RFake) is a 3-message,
delayed-input bideniable encryption protocol, in a CRS model;
• prg is a pseudorandom generator.
Then the protocol iMPC described on on fig. 4·6 (notation and the choice of random-
ness), 4·7 (description of the protocol), and 4·8 (description of the faking algorithm)
is a 4-round semi-honest incoercible MPC protocol in a CRS model4.
We note that all required primitives can be built using subexponentially-secure
indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions ((CPP18),
(CPV17)). Therefore we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 3. Assume the existence of subexponentially secure indistinguishability
obfuscation and subexponentially secure one-way functions. Then there exists a 4-round
semi-honest incoercible MPC.
Notation and indexing. Subscript i, j on the message of the protocol means that
the message is sent from Pi to Pj. Subscript i, j of the randomness means that this
randomness is used as sender or receiver randomness in the protocol where i is the
sender and j is the receiver.
For example, M1i,j is the first message of aMPC, sent from Pi to Pj. Our protocol
transmits this message inside deniable encryption, which in turn consists of messages
a1i,j , a2j,i, and a3i,j . To compute these messages, party Pi uses its sender randomness
si,j,1, and party Pj uses its receiver randomness ri,j,1.
4Note that our CRS is global (recall that the notion of deniability or incoercibility only makes
sense in the global CRS model).
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Randomness and inputs in the 4-round incoercible MPC protocol iMPC:
The CRS: CRS = (CRSDE,CRSaMPC), where CRSDE is a CRS of deniable encryption,
and CRSaMPC is a CRS of adaptively secure MPC protocol.
Inputs: inputs x1, . . . , xn of parties P1, . . . , Pn, respectively;
Randomness: each party Pi generates the following random values:
1. si,j,1, ri,j,1, j 6= i, which is sender and receiver randomness of DE, used to send
and receive aMPC messages of round 1;
2. si,j,2, ri,j,2, j 6= i, which is sender and receiver randomness of DE, used to send
and receive aMPC messages of round 2;
3. saMPC,i, which is randomness of party Pi in the underlying aMPC protocol.
In addition, party P1 chooses at random:
1. seed, which will be used by parties to generate coins of the simulator rSim and
fake seed′;
2. s1,j,3, j 6= 1, which is sender randomness of DE used to send seed;
Finally, parties Pi, i 6= 1 generate r1,i,3, which is receiver randomness of DE, used to
receive seed.
We denote all randomness generated by each party Pi by si.
Figure 4·6: Randomness and inputs in the 4-round incoercible MPC
protocol.
4.4.2 Proof of the Theorem
Correctness. Correctness of the protocol immediately follows from correctness of
the underlying aMPC protocol and correctness of deniable encryption DE.
Incoercibility. We define a simulator which can simulate communication and
internal states of all parties, given inputs and outputs only, but without knowing
whether these inputs are real or fake.
We can assume that the simulator knows the output y before the protocol starts, due to
the following standard transformation, where parties additionally choose OTP keys ki
and use it to mask the output: f ′((x1, k1), x2, k2) = f(x1, x2)⊕ k1||f(x1, x2)⊕ k2. Due
to this transformation, the simulator can always choose output z of parties uniformly
at random, and once the first coercion occurs and the true output y becomes known,
set the corresponding ki to be z ⊕ (y||y). From now on we assume that the simulator
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4-round incoercible MPC protocol iMPC:
The protocol:
1. Round 1: Each party Pi sends to each other party Pj, j 6= i, the following:
a1i,j = DE.msg1(CRSDE; si,j,1).
2. Round 2: Each party Pi sends to each other party Pj, j 6= i, the following:
• a2i,j = DE.msg2(CRSDE; ri,j,1, a1j,i).
• b1i,j = DE.msg1(CRSDE; si,j,2).
In addition, P1 sends to each other party Pj, j 6= 1, the following:
• c11,j = DE.msg1(CRSDE; s1,j,3).
3. Round 3: Each party Pi for each j 6= i computes {M1i,1, . . . ,M1i,n} ←
aMPC.msg1(CRSaMPC;xi; saMPC,i), and sends the following:
• a3i,j = DE.msg3(CRSDE; si,j,1,M1i,j, a1i,j, a2j,i).
• b2i,j = DE.msg2(CRSDE; ri,j,2, b1j,i).
In addition, each party Pi except P1 sends to P1 the following:
• c2i,1 = DE.msg2(CRSDE; r1,i,3, c11,i).
4. Round 4: Each party Pi, for each j 6= i, computes M1j,i ←
DE.Dec(CRSDE; rj,i,1, a1j,i, a2i,j, a3j,i). Next for each j 6= i it computes
{M2i,1, . . . ,M2i,n} ← aMPC.msg2(CRSaMPC;xi,M11,i, . . . ,M1n,i; saMPC,i), and
sends the following:
• b3i,j = DE.msg3(CRSDE; si,j,2,M2i,j, b1i,j, b2j,i).
In addition, P1 sends to each other party Pj, j 6= 1, the following:
• c31,j = DE.msg3(CRSDE; s1,j,3, seed, c11,j, c2j,1).
5. Evaluation: Each party Pi, for each j 6= i, computes M2j,i ←
DE.Dec(CRSDE; rj,i,2, b1j,i, b2i,j, b3j,i). Next for each j 6= i it computes y ←
aMPC.Eval(CRSaMPC;xi,M11,i, . . . ,M1n,i,M21,i, . . . ,M2n,i; saMPC,i). It sets y to
be its output in the protocol.
By π = iMPC(CRS, (x1, s1), . . . , (xn, sn)) = ({a1i,j, a2i,j, a3i,j}i 6=j ,
{b1i,j, b2i,j, b3i,j}i 6=j , {c11,j, c2j,1, c31,j}j 6=1) we denote the transcript of our pro-
tocol.
By σ = aMPC(CRSaMPC, (x1, saMPC,1), . . . , (xn, saMPC,n)) = ({M1i,j,M2i,j}i 6=j) we de-
note the transcript of underlying adaptive MPC protocol aMPC.
Figure 4·7: 4-round incoercible MPC protocol.
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Faking procedure of party Pi, i = 1, . . . , n
Inputs: Pi’s true input xi, fake input x
′
i, true output y, real random coins si, and the
protocol transcript π.
1. learning the seed: If i 6= 1, Pi computes
seed← DE.Dec(CRSDE; r1,i,3, c11,i, c2i,1, c31,i).
2. expanding the seed: Pi computes prg(seed) and parses the result as rSim||seed′,
where |seed| = |seed′|.
3. computing fake transcript: Pi computes the fake transcript and state








4. computing fake coins of the underlying MPC: Pi computes the fake coins
s′aMPC,i ← aMPC.Simi(CRSaMPC, state, x′i, y; ·) of the underlying MPC protocol,
using the local simulator.
5. computing fake coins of deniable encryption: Pi computes the fake coins
for each instance of deniable encryption as follows:
s′i,j,1 ← DE.SFake(CRSDE, si,j,1,M1i,j,M1′i,j, a1i,j, a2j,i, a3i,j; ·), to claim that it
sent M1′i,j instead of M1i,j;
s′i,j,2 ← DE.SFake(CRSDE, si,j,2,M2i,j,M2′i,j, b1i,j, b2j,i, b3i,j; ·), to claim that it
sent M2′i,j instead of M2i,j;
r′i,j,1 ← DE.RFake(CRSDE, ri,j,1,M1j,i,M1′j,i, a1j,i, a2i,j, a3j,i; ·), to claim that it
received M1′j,i instead of M1j,i;
r′i,j,2 ← DE.RFake(CRSDE, ri,j,2,M2j,i,M2′j,i, b1j,i, b2i,j, b3j,i; ·), to claim that it
received M2′j,i instead of M2j,i.
Further, if i = 1, then for each j 6= 1 the party computes:
s′1,j,3 ← DE.SFake(CRSDE, s1,j,3, seed, seed′, c11,j, c2j,1, c31,j; ·), to claim that it
sent seed′ instead of seed.
If i 6= 1, then Pi computes
r′1,i,3 ← DE.RFake(CRSDE, r1,i,3, seed, seed′, c11,i, c2i,1, c31,i; ·), to claim that it
received seed′ instead of seed.
The output of the faking procedure: Finally, Pi gives the adversary its fake
internal state s′i, where:












































(Note that all other information which Pi should know in the honest execution, e.g.





transcript π, and the CRS.)
Figure 4·8: Faking procedure of party Pi, i = 1, . . . , n
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knows the output y ahead of time.
Simulation. The simulator is formally described on fig. 4·9. Informally, the simula-
tor uses the underlying simulator of aMPC to simulate communication between parties,
σ′. It then encrypts messages of σ′ under deniable encryption. It encrypts randomly
chosen seed′ under deniable encryption as well. This concludes the description of
simulation of communication.
Upon coercion of a party, given an input x′i (without knowing whether xi is real
or fake), the simulator computes fake random coins of aMPC by running the local
simulator aMPC.Simi on input x
′
i. These are the only coins which are faked by the
simulator; the simulator reveal true values of seed′ and all randomness of DE.
To show that this simulator indeed simulates the real world, we need to show that the
simulated execution is indistinguishable from both real execution with true randomness
provided by the parties (corresponding to inputs x′i) and from real execution for some
other inputs xi, where parties provide fake randomness consistent with x
′
i. We call
these three distributions HybSim, HybReal, and HybFake, respectively, and show that they
are indistinguishable in the following sequence of hybrid distributions:
• HybFake. We start with the distribution corresponding to the real-world execution
of the protocol, where parties fake their random coins upon coercion. In other
words, the adversary sees CRS, π, and x′i, s
′
i for each i, generated as in fig. 4·6, 4·8.
In particular, the truly sent transcript σ of the underlying MPC is a transcript
on inputs xi; however, parties claim that they instead sent (simulated) transcript
σ′, which appears consistent with fake inputs x′i.
• Hyb1. In this hybrid P1 sends seed′ instead of seed inside {c11,j, c2j,1, c31,j}j 6=1,
and parties (both senders and receivers) give the adversary true randomness
for this deniable encryption (instead of faking it to seed′). Indistinguishabil-
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Simulation of communication
Inputs given to simulate the communication: CRS; output of the protocol y
1. computing fake transcript: the simulator chooses rSim at random and com-
putes the fake transcript and state (σ′, state)← aMPC.Sim(CRSaMPC, y, rSim) of







2. computing messages of π: the simulator chooses seed′ at random.
It also chooses {si,j,1}j 6=i , {ri,j,1}j 6=i , {si,j,2}j 6=i , {ri,j,2}j 6=i , {r1,j,3}j 6=1 , {s1,j,3}j 6=1
uniformly at random, and uses these randomness to compute messages of deniable





3. the output of the simulator: The simulator outputs the simulated commu-
nication
π′ = ({a1i,j, a2i,j, a3i,j}i 6=j , {b1i,j, b2i,j, b3i,j}i 6=j , {c11,j, c2j,1, c31,j}j 6=1).
Simulation of coercion of Pi
Inputs additionally given to simulate the coercion of the party Pi: Pi’s input
x′i (without the information whether this input is real or fake)
1. computing fake coins of the underlying MPC: the simulator computes
the fake coins s′aMPC,i ← aMPC.Simi(CRSaMPC, state, x′i, y; ·) of the underlying
MPC protocol, using the local simulator.
2. The output of the simulator: The simulator gives the adversary simulated
internal state s′i of Pi, where:
• If i 6= 1, s′i = {si,j,1}j 6=i , {ri,j,1}j 6=i , {si,j,2}j 6=i , {ri,j,2}j 6=i , {r1,i,3}, s
′
aMPC,i.
• If i = 1, s′i = {si,j,1}j 6=i , {ri,j,1}j 6=i , {si,j,2}j 6=i , {ri,j,2}j 6=i , {s1,j,3}j 6=1,
s′aMPC,i, seed
′.
(Note that all other information which Pi should know in the honest execution,
e.g. seed′ or M1′i,j , can be derived by the adversary using random coins s
′
i, input
x′i, the transcript π
′, and the CRS.)
Figure 4·9: Simulation
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ity between this and the previous distribution holds by n − 1 invocations of
bideniability of encryption for plaintexts seed and seed′.
• Hyb2. In this hybrid we switch rSim||seed′ from prg(seed) to uniformly random.
Indistinguishability holds by security of a prg. Note that seed is not used
anywhere else in the distribution, thus the reduction is possible.
• HybSim. In this hybrid we set {a1i,j, a2i,j, a3i,j}i 6=j to encrypt 1-round messages
of simulated σ′ (consistent with fake x′i), instead of encrypting 1-round messages
of real transcript σ (consistent with xi). Also, all parties give true randomness
{si,j,1}j 6=i , {ri,j,1}j 6=i, instead of giving fake randomness consistent with σ
′.
Similarly, we change {b1i,j, b2i,j, b3i,j}i 6=j to encrypt 1-round messages of sim-
ulated σ′ (consistent with fake x′i), instead of encrypting 1-round messages of
real transcript σ (consistent with xi). Also, all parties give true randomness
{si,j,2}j 6=i , {ri,j,2}j 6=i, instead of giving fake randomness consistent with σ
′.
Indistinguishability between this and the previous distribution holds by 2n(n−1)
invocations of bideniability of encryption, where plaintexts are messages of σ
and σ′.
Note that this is the simulated distribution.
• HybReal. Finally, we switch the messages of aMPC, encrypted inside deniable
encryption, from simulated σ′ to real σ, which is the true transcript of aMPC
on inputs x′i. In addition, parties reveal their true randomness saMPC,i instead
of computing simulated s′aMPC,i consistent with x
′
i using the local simulator
aMPC.Simi.
Indistinguishability between this and the previous hybrid follows from adaptive
security of aMPC. Note that indeed rSim, randomness of the simulator, is not
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used anywhere else in the distribution.
This distribution corresponds to the real execution of the protocol on inputs x′i,
where parties disclose their true randomness upon being coerced.
This concludes the security proof.
4.5 Receiver-oblivious DE
We note that the construction of (CPP18) is receiver-oblivious. Intuitively, this is
because the only message of the receiver is an extracting PRF of its randomness r and
the first message µ1; using the fact that this PRF is a strong extractor, it is possible
to change the output of the PRF to a uniformly random value indistinguishably, even
in a presence of a PRF key.
More concretely, if someone can distinguish between the transcript with µ2 =
RGkR(r, µ1) or random µ2, then we can win the strong extractor game as follows.
We choose the sender randomness s at random and try to guess what the plaintext
m will be (since m is simply a bit, the guess will succeed with one half probability).
We compute µ1 = P1(s,m), and give µ1 as an input to the challenger of the strong
computational extractor game. The challenger chooses the key kR for the extracting
PRF RG, chooses random r and either gives us µ2 = RGkR(r, µ1) or uniformly random
µ2, together with the key kR. We can use these values to reconstruct the rest of the
distribution (note that r is not required anywhere else). Thus, if someone breaks
receiver-obliviousness, then our reduction can break the strong extractor property of
the PRF.
4.6 Input-Delayed Bideniable Encryption
Theorem 32. Any bideniable encryption can be transformed to bideniable encryption
with the same number of rounds, where the plaintext should be determined only by the
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last round.
Proof. The idea is to transmit a one-time pad key k (instead of the plaintext m)
using bideniable encryption protocol, and in the last round also send k ⊕m in the
clear. More formally, the sender should pick random k, such that |k| = |m|, before
the protocol starts, and use bideniable encryption to transmit k; in addition, during
the last round the sender should also send c = k ⊕ m in the clear. The receiver
should execute decryption procedure of deniable encryption to learn k, and then set
its message to be k ⊕ c. Note that in such a protocol m has to be determined only by
the last round.
To fake the communication to a different plaintext m′, both the sender and the receiver
should compute fake k′ = c⊕m′, and then use the corresponding faking algorithm
of deniable encryption in order to create fake random coins of the sender/receiver,
making the transcript consistent with k′.
References
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